How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Taranis]

"A Ukrainian soldier launches a Polish reconnaissance drone in the kyiv region, August 2, 2022. EFREM LUKATSKY / AP"

[Taranis]

2 hours ago, Grigb said:

Personally, until a couple of days ago I did not expect any UKR moves until at least the middle of Aug or better End of Aug. I am the guy who is saying that UKR arty is big trouble. But looking at Pisky and RU description of fighting in all these settlements I got feeling that it is much noise about just a side show. 

But if it is there is a side show there should be somewhere main event. And today Khodakovsky came with news that UKR EW is gone. It is the most pivotal point of this offensive - RU is about to capture Pisky and start encircling Avdyivka. And UKR Command weakens the front?!

Does not make sense unless UKR up to something. 

 

I would say there would be three phases:

1. Suprise phase - several mobile groups under arty support breach RU line and try to grab as much settlements as possible probably trying to reach/form a good defensive line 
2. Attrition phase - RU will throw everything including kitchen sink at UKR penetration. This is grinding battle where UKR needs to attrite counter-attacking RU forces. It will be mostly static but extremely brutal
3. Collapse phase - the one who left standing exploit enemy collapse

This is the most reasonable given the current capabilities of both sides.

Maybe another sign that something is about to happen (troops concentrations etc):

"Curfew declared in Mykolaiv for this weekend"

 

"Curfew until Monday morning in Mykolaiv
The governor of the Mykolaiv region in southern Ukraine, which is constantly bombed, announced a curfew in the regional capital on Friday until Monday morning in order to neutralize the "collaborators" of the Russians.

Vitali Kim had already promised in July a reward of one hundred dollars for information allowing the identification of people who “reveal to the occupiers the places of deployment of Ukrainian troops” or who help them to establish the coordinates of potential targets of bombardments. “Honest people have nothing to fear. Have your papers with you just in case. You can walk your dog not far from your house, the children can play in the courtyard of their building, but try to stay at home, ”he warned.

Mykolaiv saw heavy shelling last week, possibly "the strongest" since the start of the Russian invasion, according to the city's mayor, Oleksandr Senkevich."

Source : Le Monde

Edited August 5, 2022 by Taranis

[Huba]

Just beautiful:

 

[Beleg85]

Interesting development on InfoWars front.

Unfamous Amnesty Ineterntional report (made without coordination with UA branch) in which organziation accused UAF of puting civilians in danger is already being used by Russian propaganda machine to smear their victims and utilitizing open nature of our societies. We have typical pattern here, already seen in Syria and other places:

- Western NGO publishes a report without proper context (re: Pope Francis "everybody is somewhat guilty)

- RU bend the truth, using short attention span of social media and inherent confirmation bias of its users. Amplified and immediatelly catched by Russian assets, trolls, but also wide range of contrarians, pacifists, tankies and generally persons striving for "independent thinking" (which in normal circumstances is a positive thing, if done right).

- Discussions arize on topics of UA "crimes" and/or level of acceptable measures against RUS. Countless discusions.

-Two effects positive for Russian side: Polarization of western public opinion serve to turn attention away from real perpetrators (the same was with video of UA soldiers near Kharkiv killing prisoners early in war- one of public media institute counted that this one episode took periodically like 1/3 of views and comments on the net regarding this war) and proportions of guilt are disturbed. Second effect is more important, as it can serve to build longer strategies.

 

Edited August 5, 2022 by Beleg85

[Taranis]

 

 

[Huba]

An excellent thread from Def Mon with some maps. As great minds think alike, he also points to the possibility of UA shifting forces East to outmarch Russian reserves around Kherson, as I suggested yesterday What is more interesting is the maps and RU forces dislocation. To me it seems like at the moment they are ready for defence, with big reserve ready to intervene either  in Kherson and Zaporozhiya or in both. Interesting, interesting... 
There is more maps in the thread, I attach only the most general one:

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Grigb said:

Sorry, I confused you with my amateur attempts at mapping. I mostly try to avoid map shelling (and do only for main settlements when there is no other info from UKR GS). RU shells dozens of settlements every day and I do not see any useful pattern in reported shelling. On other hand it clatters map enormously (and the map is already complicated).

However, I noticed two distinct patterns in reported RU attacks. They either attack with significant movement (from settlement to settlement) or small local attacks, street fights or just static firefights. Attacks with significant movement are marked with arrow starting from reported direction (settlement). Attacks without significant movement are marked with red start.

So, what you see is that they are ramming now the settlements directly. So, in the South they reached settlements and started to ram them with main forces around 1-Aug. And in the North, it was around yesterday. This is what you see on the map. Will update the legend.

OK, thanks for the clarification.  That is kinda what I was suspicious of.  The pattern seems to be changing to intensive shelling of a few major points of effort and scattered "terror" shelling of pretty much everywhere else.  Looking at other sources it doesn't seem most of the scattered shelling is even targeted at military targets.  It's just tossing a couple of salvos into a settlement center and calling it good enough.

I've been looking for signs that Russia's artillery is being worn out to the point of not being militarily useful.  If I were a terrorist state, as Russia is, and I had artillery that was so inaccurate that I couldn't hit within a few hundred meters of what I targeted, I would probably task that artillery to lob rounds into the center of civilian area.  That way my forces are hitting something instead of open fields or unoccupied woods.

I'd need to see more evidence that this is what is happening before concluding this is Russia's new reality, but theoretically it should be happening now and that means we should be able to see signs of it.

The next thing to look for is an overall decrease in volume of fire per day.  That would indicate shell shortages.  At some point that has to happen as well, but it could be months from now.  All we can say for sure is that Russia is firing off very old ammo and it's current rate of consumption is in excess of what its factories can produce.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Taranis said:

"A Ukrainian soldier launches a Polish reconnaissance drone in the kyiv region, August 2, 2022. EFREM LUKATSKY / AP"

Hah!  That's a still from the RFE/RL video I posted a couple of pages back.  I chuckled when the guy lost his hat

Steve

[Grigb]

4 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

OK, thanks for the clarification.  That is kinda what I was suspicious of.  The pattern seems to be changing to intensive shelling of a few major points of effort and scattered "terror" shelling of pretty much everywhere else.  Looking at other sources it doesn't seem most of the scattered shelling is even targeted at military targets.  It's just tossing a couple of salvos into a settlement center and calling it good enough.

I've been looking for signs that Russia's artillery is being worn out to the point of not being militarily useful.  If I were a terrorist state, as Russia is, and I had artillery that was so inaccurate that I couldn't hit within a few hundred meters of what I targeted, I would probably task that artillery to lob rounds into the center of civilian area.  That way my forces are hitting something instead of open fields or unoccupied woods.

I'd need to see more evidence that this is what is happening before concluding this is Russia's new reality, but theoretically it should be happening now and that means we should be able to see signs of it.

The next thing to look for is an overall decrease in volume of fire per day.  That would indicate shell shortages.  At some point that has to happen as well, but it could be months from now.  All we can say for sure is that Russia is firing off very old ammo and it's current rate of consumption is in excess of what its factories can produce.

Steve

AFAIR couple of days ago Tatarsky mentioned that he hopes RU gov considers issues of new tubes instead of worn out, hinting that while it is ok now it will be problem in the near future. Subjectively (from the way he said it) I believe that he expects it to be the real issue in one month.

Cannot say anything yet about ammo.

[sburke]

11 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Another video making the rounds showing a unit refusing to fight.  This one Ukrainian 56th Brigade.  Unit was at Pisky.  Some think the video is faked because the guys look too disheveled to be regular army:

 

not so sure about their numbers. 10 generals confirmed is significantly more than what anyone else has posted to my knowledge.

 

 

 

 

[Harmon Rabb]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

Interesting development on InfoWars front.

Unfamous Amnesty Ineterntional report (made without coordination with UA branch) in which organziation accused UAF of puting civilians in danger is already being used by Russian propaganda machine to smear their victims and utilitizing open nature of our societies. We have typical pattern here, already seen in Syria and other places:

- Western NGO publishes a report without proper context (re: Pope Francis "everybody is somewhat guilty)

- RU bend the truth, using short attention span of social media and inherent confirmation bias of its users. Amplified and immediatelly catched by Russian assets, trolls, but also wide range of contrarians, pacifists, tankies and generally persons striving for "independent thinking" (which in normal circumstances is a positive thing, if done right).

- Discussions arize on topics of UA "crimes" and/or level of acceptable measures against RUS. Countless discusions.

-Two effects positive for Russian side: Polarization of western public opinion serve to turn attention away from real perpetrators (the same was with video of UA soldiers near Kharkiv killing prisoners early in war- one of public media institute counted that this one episode took periodically like 1/3 of views and comments on the net regarding this war) and proportions of guilt are disturbed. Second effect is more important, as it can serve to build longer strategies.

 

This tweet sums up what I think of this report by Amnesty International.

On a related note I will not be donating any money to this organization anytime soon or maybe ever.

I do plan to donate even more money directly to the Ukrainian military.

[Battlefront.com]

1 minute ago, Grigb said:

AFAIR couple of days ago Tatarsky mentioned that he hopes RU gov considers issues of new tubes instead of worn out, hinting that while it is ok now it will be problem in the near future. Subjectively (from the way he said it) I believe that he expects it to be the real issue in one month.

Cannot say anything yet about ammo.

It's pretty much a given that some artillery units have been firing a LOT more rounds than others.  The ones firing the most are the ones in the most critical areas.  Since those critical areas haven't shifted much in months, logically the critical areas need to rotate out their equipment for refurbished or otherwise guns in better condition.  It seems that Russian industry can't resleeve barrels as fast as they are worn out, nor have the reports of reviving mothball guns been positive.  Therefore, I'd expect Russia to rotate units (or their equipment) between their main points of interest and everywhere else.  As long as those other sectors don't have to do anything other than murder civilians and destroy houses, it should work for a while.  However, eventually they will run out of acceptable replacements for their main points and/or run into situations where they need to hit military targets and find they can't.

Steve

[Taranis]

"Ukrainian soldiers carry a coffin during a funeral ceremony for their brothers in arms, killed in a fight against Russian troops, in kyiv, Ukraine, August 5, 2022. STRINGER / REUTERS"

[riptides]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

An excellent thread from Def Mon with some maps. As great minds think alike, he also points to the possibility of UA shifting forces East to outmarch Russian reserves around Kherson, as I suggested yesterday What is more interesting is the maps and RU forces dislocation. To me it seems like at the moment they are ready for defence, with big reserve ready to intervene either  in Kherson and Zaporozhiya or in both. Interesting, interesting... 
There is more maps in the thread, I attach only the most general one:

---cut ---

I think the UFA strategy is to keep the Russians moving. They will not attack as long as they can keep the Russians moving.

This strategy has got to be exhausting on all aspects of the Russian war effort. Leadership, moral, supplies and logistics.

Look at the terrain they have got to cover during these movements. Can you imagine the intel from the communications these units are giving up?

[Battlefront.com]

There is so much to try and sort through in terms of where this war is headed at the strategic level.  I'm going to list a few things which appear to be largely confirmed:

1. Russia is now forced to take Ukraine's offensive potential into account when planning.  As ISW pointed out, this is the first time in the war this has happened at the strategic level.
2. Kharkiv area is largely static warfare at a relatively low level of intensity from either side.
3. Other than terrorist strikes by Russian artillery along the border north of Kharkiv, nothing really worth speaking of.
4. Russia is relocating forces from the north to the south via Crimea, but so far it doesn't seem they have been pushed into any particular frontline area.
5. Russia's repositioning of forces has come at the expense of the Izyum area's offensive capabilities and, perhaps, its defensive capabilities as well.
6. Ukraine can cut Kherson off from meaningful resupply at any time, therefore it's logical to conclude that they have some reason to not do it quite yet.
7. Significant Ukrainian forces have been withdrawn from Donbas, but unclear what's going on there.  Have they been withdrawn for resting?  Have they been redeployed for offensive activities somewhere else?  A combination?  And what about their support systems, such as artillery, EW, and other services that seem to have been withdrawn?
8. Ukraine has been saying it's going on the offensive in Kherson for months now, so much so that it either needs to SOMEWHERE in a significant way.  Nobody would be unhappy if it turns out Kherson was a faint and the main offensive is elsewhere, but people will grumble if they don't do something somewhere.  If Ukraine isn't really ready for a large scale offensive then it was very dumb to build up those expectations.  Ukraine isn't dumb
9. Mykolaiv is on lockdown for the weekend with some emphasis on keeping Russian spies less effective.  Any significant positioning of forces along the southern portion of the Kherson front would likely go through Mykolaiv.
10. Ukrainian 5th Tank Brigade (reserve unit brought up to strength with Western vehicles) is likely to be used for any new offensive activity.  Last I saw they were in Odessa, which means they would have to transit through Mykolaiv.

Oh, I could probably come up with another bunch, but 10 is a good number to stop at

Here's what I make of all of this.

First, I do not believe there will be another attack out of Belarus, this time with Belarusian forces.  This is likely classic maskirovka.  I think Russia would like Ukraine to think this and there are advantages in Ukraine pretending that they believe it.

Second, I do not believe that Russia is going to try some new operation in the Kharkiv area.  They've weakened their forces in that region to the point where they're losing ground to already positioned Ukrainian forces.  They've also made no progress overall in this area for several months.

Putin's main effort has got to remain the Donbas.  Without the rest of Donetsk he doesn't have his "win" to sell to the Russian people.  Therefore, Russia's main effort will continue to be Donetsk.

Russia's military leadership must understand that they have been incapable of fighting two major offensive efforts concurrently since March, and even then they didn't do well at it.  I think they will be very reluctant to engage in any sort of proactive offensive activity anywhere outside of Donetsk. 

If Russia were to do something proactive I'd expect them to attack from the south closer to Donetsk City, not out in Kherson or Zaporizhzhia.  Why?  Because those areas do not help with taking Donetsk in any direct way.

Therefore, I conclude that all of Russia's moves to put forces into the south are to respond to Ukrainian attacks, not to bulk up for their own proactive offensive activity.

Russia probably has a pretty good idea what Ukraine is up to.  I'd be shocked if it didn't.  What they can't know for sure is where their front will strain and/or crack.  Keeping its forces generally uncommitted is smart because that allows them to plug gaps more easily.
Steve

[Battlefront.com]

As for the Ukrainian side of things, any diversion of Russian units away from the north and Donbas is good.  The south is a far more difficult place for Russia to defend, therefore better to have their forces tied up there than anywhere else.  Simply getting Russia to redeploy and divert to the south is a win of sorts.

It seems that Ukraine's thinning of the Donetsk front is having ramifications, but only slowly for now.  However, Ukraine can not risk this situation lasting much longer. Pisky is a warning that their forces will crack sooner rather than later without the support that's seemingly been withdrawn to southern offensive activities.

This makes me agree with the thinking that Ukraine has to attack pretty soon or not at all.  And not at all doesn't seem to be a viable option.  Therefore, we should see an attack somewhere very soon.

My guess is that Ukraine will:

1. cut Kherson off completely.  This includes attacking the ferry locations and any other Russian workarounds.
2. attack from their bridgehead down road T-22-07 towards the Dnepr, thus bisecting the Russian defenses and cutting the north off from Kherson.
3. push directly towards Kherson, maybe just north of it, to put major pressure on Russia's logistics base of operations.
4. any significant logistics point in Kherson that has been identified but not hit, HIRAMS the Hell out of it in rapid succession.  "Shock and awe" style.  Given how nervous Russian forces in the area already are, having all units reporting something going boom in their rear will definitely make them even more rattled.
5. mount some sort of limited offensive around Zaporizhzhia to cause Russia some heartburn and, perhaps, make some gains.
6. keep the pressure up on Izyum and make sure that Russia doesn't have any opportunities for significant advances in Donetsk.

That's what I got out of the tea leaves

Steve

[FancyCat]

Attacking from south of Donetsk, if Def Mon's numbers are correct, the bulk of their reserves need to go all the way back to Crimea and do a big circle to get to Donetsk, as there is no rail line from Kherson, to Mariupol, only Crimea to Metropol. 

[billbindc]

7 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Russia probably has a pretty good idea what Ukraine is up to.  I'd be shocked if it didn't.  What they can't know for sure is where their front will strain and/or crack.  Keeping its forces generally uncommitted is smart because that allows them to plug gaps more easily.
Steve

From reading DefMon3's map, it's pretty clear that Russia can't be sure which bank of the Dnieper the Ukrainian attack will come from...and with interior lines, Ukraine has the luxury of keeping it that way. And for Ukraine, the best case scenario is to pull some of that reserve over to the right bank to cut it off or to double blind them into not sending them over the river at all. The RuA has a lot of unpalatable choices to make right now. 

[FancyCat]

Its nice to see daytime HIMAR attacks. 

 

 

 

[danfrodo]

2 hours ago, Huba said:

Just beautiful:

 

Beautiful video.  Damn, I love tanks.  Always have, always will.  Even russian-designed tanks (as long as they fly UKR flag).  I think tanks are not obsolete, because God loves tanks.  If he did not love them, he would not have made them so beautiful. 

Lots of people like airplanes, but they worship a false god. Tanks are God's chosen war machines. 

[danfrodo]

So is it my imagination or has Russian artillery greatly diminished from what it was 2 months ago?   Sometimes I forget just how much ordnance RU was throwing at UKR until rather recently.  So between CB, burned out barrels, and supply dumps exploding, there seems to have been an effect.
 

 

[Huba]

In an amazing piece of RUMINT I just came across, RU is negotiating deployment of DPRK expeditionary corps in Ukraine. No way to treat this seriously, but the concept itself and it’s potential ramifications are just too hillarious not to mention it.

[Grigb]

Today and probably tomorrow I will not post any maps due to life interference Fortunately for today at least I do not see anything happening - main RU Nats news is capture of Pisky but it is kind of low-level news. Not much RU news from other places.

And while we are waiting for something major happening somewhere else I would like to make an introduction to Soledar battlefield. Soledar in the North is what Pisky is in the South. Capturing Soledar will allow RU to right hook Bakhmut.  Until something major happens I will keep an eye on both Pisky and Soledar. Currently RU Nats are saying they reached Soledar and are fighting on the outskirts at Knauf plant (saying they are hammered there by UKR long range artillery, which is either Crab, Pz2000 or Caesar, that was zeroed on the plant). I think it is true. What is not true is that it is on the outskirts of Soledar. It few km away from soledar urban area and main UKR positions at mines. Let's look at geography.

Soledar Map

Please keep in mind that this is work in progress. Some things I do not know yet. In some I could make mistakes. 

To get you feel of the land here is video from the ruins of Belokamensk Fireproof plant.

• 00:00 till 00:28 camera looks toward Unknow Plant and Soledar at the edge
• 00:29 till 00:53 camera looks toward right edge of my map slowly turning to Knauf plant (not showing it yet)
• 00:53 till 01:11 camera looks down to ruins
• 01:12 till 01:25 camera looks toward Soledar
• 01:26 till 01:46 camera looks toward Knauf plant
• 01:47 till 1:54 camera look toward bottom edge of my map (i think)
• 1:54 till end camera looks at Top Left edge of my map

And this is a good video from Soledar urban area

Unfortunately, I am running out of time so no directions for this video. 

Last extremely important point - Soledar is famous for its Salt mines. They look like this. 

I do not think you can put vehicles there (they are underground with access through lift, but I could be mistaken) but everything else can be store there and even Nukes cannot get it. The military implications are obvious.

And here is a tourist video of one of the mines for those who are interested.

[Taranis]

"Russian militaries shelled the Zaporizhzhia NPP for the second time in the last few hours: three hits were recorded on the site of the station. The nitrogen-oxygen station and the combined auxiliary building were damaged"
 

 

Quote

Ukraine and Russia blame each other for strikes in Zaporizhia
Ukrainian nuclear group Energoatom has accused Russia of launching three rockets at the Zaporizhia power plant, near a nuclear reactor. “There are risks of hydrogen leakage and spraying of radioactive substances. The danger of fire is high, ”according to the same source, which did not report any victims at first.

At least one high-voltage power line supplying the plant was hit, Energoatom also said. Almost the entire town of Enerhodar would also have been without electricity.

The pro-Russian administration in the occupied Ukrainian city said power lines were damaged by a Ukrainian strike.

More information on the strikes at the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant

Three strikes were reported on Friday near a nuclear reactor at the Zaporizhia power plant, Ukrainian state-owned Energoatom announced on Telegram, which accused Russia of being behind them. A high voltage line was damaged in this attack, triggering the shutdown of one of the reactors of the power plant, the largest in Europe.

According to Energoatom, officials from the Russian company, Rosatom, "hastily left the site before the attack".

The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry for its part “strongly condemned the actions of the occupying troops at the Zaporizhia power plant”. "The possible consequences of a strike on an operating reactor are equivalent to the use of an atomic bomb", warns the ministry in a press release, calling on the international community to take "immediate measures to force Russia to leave the power station" and to "transfer it to Ukraine's control in the interests of world security". At the end of July, Ukraine accused Russia of storing heavy weapons and ammunition at the site of the nuclear power plant.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said on Tuesday that the situation was "volatile" at the Zaporizhia power plant and was becoming "more and more dangerous day by day". When the plant was taken over in early March, the Russian army opened fire on buildings on the site, already raising the risk of a major nuclear accident.

Source : Le Monde

 

[cesmonkey]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

In an amazing piece of RUMINT I just came across, RU is negotiating deployment of DPRK expeditionary corps in Ukraine. No way to treat this seriously, but the concept itself and it’s potential ramifications are just too hillarious not to mention it.

I'm sure South Korea wouldn't mind.