How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[MikeyD]

The NATO hardware did shift the tide, though, but there's a difference between shifting the tide and draining the ocean, if I may use an awkward analogy. This war was always going to go on until Russia didn't want to do it anymore. That's not a matter of military strategy but of Russian sanity.

[ArmouredTopHat]

1 hour ago, MikeyD said:

The NATO hardware did shift the tide, though, but there's a difference between shifting the tide and draining the ocean, if I may use an awkward analogy. This war was always going to go on until Russia didn't want to do it anymore. That's not a matter of military strategy but of Russian sanity.

Sorry, to be more exact I meant there was an expectation by some that the injection of NATO hardware would end the war / collapse the Russian defences. NATO hardware is obviously doing a lot to help sustain the AFU in the fight but its not a magic I win button as some hoped it might. 

Edited Friday at 02:07 AM by ArmouredTopHat

[Joe982]

55 minutes ago, MikeyD said:

The NATO hardware did shift the tide, though, but there's a difference between shifting the tide and draining the ocean, if I may use an awkward analogy. 

Excellent analogy thank you!

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I definitely fall into that last camp. Why? Well the major reasons is that the trend lines we saw before this war are matching observations we see on the battlefield in Ukraine.

All of what you said, but adding that ISR isn't the only armor unfriendly trend we've been watching for decades and discussing here.  I speak, of course, our out friend precision munitions.  In particular top attack precision AT.

To recap this very quickly, for a long time the West has coasted along without an adequate defense for a weapon that, eventually, their enemies would be able to field.  Decades, in fact.  APS has struggled to get to the point where MAYBE it can defeat top attack munitions, but unfortunately for APS makers a new threat (unmanned) has emerged and it is unlikely to offer a solution for it.  At the very least, not any time soon and certainly not without the procurement and engineering costs going up.  Since these systems are already frighteningly expensive, it should have nations questioning whether APS is ever likely to be viable, especially given the reasons to question if the costs of the platform itself are worth it.

Obviously I'm also in the camp that believes the TankIsDead™ and that traditional maneuver doctrine needs to be completely rethought.  Those in the middle, the ones who think it hasn't gone that far, are worth listening to because they don't completely disagree and therefore might make some suggestions that are productive.  But the ones who think this is a fad are a waste of time other than to learn what their arguments are so they can be effectively trashed in the decision making rooms.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

In straight up capabilities I would agree with Steve and imagine Russia would get utterly mauled, there is a reason why they have been so reluctant to fight with NATO forces

Yes, I believe that if NATO and Russia had gone to war in 2022, instead of Ukraine and Russia, this war have been over within a few weeks or months.  Hopefully not with nukes, but that's one scenario I would not rule out their use.  The premise is that NATO would have trashed all of Russia's forces (air, land, and sea) so horribly and so quickly that military and/or political collapse would have been unavoidable.  Losses for NATO would have no influence on this outcome.

If it played out this way the deep stocks for munitions and replacement systems would, ironically, be less than it is now even though NATO isn't fighting in this war at all!

However, this is just theory.  As confident as I am that it would play out this way, it absolutely could fail to do so and leave Russia functional and in possession of lands NATO was trying to liberate.  In that case, the amount of replacements could be a major issue.  At a minimum it would require countries engaged in the fighting figure out how to rapidly jump start very expensive production and to do so immediately.  That is rarely the most cost effective strategy.

I'm also in the camp that Russia is so compromised that it won't be a threat to any other neighbor, not to mention NATO members, for a decade after this current war ends.  At least.  It would be good to have NATO's ducks in a row now so that when Russia reconstitutes its ability to wage new wars it is ready for it.

And then there's China...

Steve

 

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, Offshoot said:

No skin in this game, but from foggy memory, was not something done a while back to enable a post of his to be pinned? And he does have a moderator badge.

Ah!  Well, yeah duh.  He has a moderator badge.  Turns out we gave that to him and Bil in 2020 because of Cold War related activities.  I don't think either he or Bil ever used those special powers, for good or evil, so I rescinded them.  They are now mere mortals as far as the Forum software is concerned.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

Lengthy article on the tactical situation near Pokrovsk.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/09/17/7475408/

 

That's interesting.  His points about the wisdom of not using badly positioned defenses is sound, but the question is why are defenses badly positioned?  I had the impression that all of them were constructed since the fall of Avdiivka, not pre-2022 when the threat of drones wasn't in the equation yet.

It's also interesting to ponder why Russia is seemingly using infantry instead of artillery to keep its advances going.  Is it voluntary or are conditions such that it's obligatory?

Steve

[ArmouredTopHat]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Obviously I'm also in the camp that believes the TankIsDead™ and that traditional maneuver doctrine needs to be completely rethought.  Those in the middle, the ones who think it hasn't gone that far, are worth listening to because they don't completely disagree and therefore might make some suggestions that are productive.  But the ones who think this is a fad are a waste of time other than to learn what their arguments are so they can be effectively trashed in the decision making rooms.

To be clear, I consider myself to be in the middle of that spectrum. I think the days of concentrated mechanised warfare cold war style are almost certainly over (they certainly cannot be approached in the way the Russians are doing currently if you want to preserve your fighting power over any length of time) My view is that approaches can be reworked and adapted to find better in the conditions at least present in Ukraine. This would work even better with appropriate design considerations and definitive battlefield shaping operations. There must be a greater effort to deny enemy ISR and drone striking potential, which in its own right has become in effect a second layer of air warfare. Whichever side dominates that spectrum is going to win all the harder with its mobile elements less constrained and able to deal decisive blows. 

Overall all though, things are most certainly not 'fine' as they stand and this cannot be ignored, that much is evident. 

I also think those who think this is a 'fad' completely misunderstand the impact drones overall are achieving, I am not sure one would apply that logic when we are still barely figured out counters to the current generation of drones, let alone the next. I certainly dont see drones or attitudes going back to before 2022 in that regard. 
 

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

To recap this very quickly, for a long time the West has coasted along without an adequate defense for a weapon that, eventually, their enemies would be able to field.  Decades, in fact.  APS has struggled to get to the point where MAYBE it can defeat top attack munitions, but unfortunately for APS makers a new threat (unmanned) has emerged and it is unlikely to offer a solution for it.  At the very least, not any time soon and certainly not without the procurement and engineering costs going up.  Since these systems are already frighteningly expensive, it should have nations questioning whether APS is ever likely to be viable, especially given the reasons to question if the costs of the platform itself are worth it.

To this, some good summaries: 

Quote

One important development is that the Russians have made several modifications to their tanks that are reducing the effectiveness of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). First, they are fitting vehicles – as well as many defensive positions – with anti-thermal material,46 which is proving highly effective. Second, modification to the engine deck and thus the heat plume from the vehicle’s exhaust and engine is reducing the reliability of where certain ATGMs engage the target. Third, by fighting at dusk and dawn when the vehicle temperature is most similar to the ambient temperature of the surroundings (known as ‘thermal crossover’), the vehicles are harder to detect through thermal imagery.47 The result is a significant decrease in the probability of kill from several ATGM types, although this is only achievable by imposing a range of tactical constraints on the employment of Russian armour.

Source: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://static.rusi.org/403-SR-Russian-Tactics-web-final.pdf

RUSI have also pointed out in the past ATGM teams suffered heavily if the tank detects them (which happens more than you might think, especially if they fire:
 

Quote

Furthermore, evidence from Ukraine suggests that fighting armoured forces is difficult and dangerous for ATGM-armed dismounted light infantry, even if they possess Javelin, one of the most effective and lethal systems currently available. If such forces are detected by enemy tank crews they become acutely vulnerable to the tank’s main armaments, which cause large numbers of casualties.72 The main gun of an MBT can also outrange all but the most capable of ATGMs, such as Javelin, and the evidence from Ukraine indicates that the addition of thermal shielding to Russian T90s could successfully reduce the effective range of Javelin to well within that of the vehicle’s main armament by making it harder for the command launch unit to lock on to targets.73

Source: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://static.rusi.org/heavy-armoured-forces-in-future-warfare-occasional-paper-december-23.pdf

There are reasonable means a tank can employ to defend itself on the passive side (which are much cheaper than the active measures) Of course top attacks are still highly lethal, especially against tanks with little dedicated protection against them. Outside of course, a tank can do plenty to avoid being shot at in the first place (which is where that drone recon comes in!) Strv 122s upgraded top scheme protection (MEXAS) has made a significant difference in its ability to survive such attacks for instance, a relatively minor modification that has paid dividends. I know I mention Strv 122 a lot but its one of the few tanks with that heightened emphasis on top attack that is likely to be followed up on by others. 

Edited Friday at 03:25 AM by ArmouredTopHat

[sburke]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Ah!  Well, yeah duh.  He has a moderator badge.  Turns out we gave that to him and Bil in 2020 because of Cold War related activities.  I don't think either he or Bil ever used those special powers, for good or evil, so I rescinded them.  They are now mere mortals as far as the Forum software is concerned.

Steve

mere mortals?  Okay yeah @The_Capt, but @Bil Hardenberger ?  Blasphemy I say! How dare you sir!

[TheVulture]

On the subject of who is buying what, the Australian army and BAE Systems recently announced their ATLAS project for a 8 wheeled UGV which is mostly autonomous (human in the loop on firing decisions I believe) and armed with a 25mm Bushmaster cannon

https://euro-sd.com/2024/09/major-news/40327/baes-australia-unveils-new-ugv/

Can't find any information on approximate projected cost per unit.

Quote

The autonomy system at the core of the ATLAS CCV will ‘drive’ the vehicle, avoid obstacles, route plan, and make tactical decisions. The vehicle is equipped with a new, lightweight, highly automated medium-calibre turret called Vantage ATS that is armed with an M242 Bushmaster 25mm cannon, providing lethal fire to a range of 2,500 m. A ready-use ammunition capacity of 260 rounds allows for multiple engagements and high battlefield persistence. BAE Systems emphasised that the turret is designed with a ‘human in-the-loop’ targeting system.

Alternatively, BAE Systems notes that the ATLAS CCV’s 10-tonne combat weight and rugged suspension system provide a stable firing platform that can accommodate a 120 mm automated mortar system or counter unmanned aerial vehicle payload.

Sensors on board the ATLAS CCV include 360 multi-spectral automatic target detection, tracking and classification system; a day camera and thermal imaging sensor; a LiDAR system; acoustic sensors; and a passive electronic warfare system.

[Aragorn2002]

9 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

Lengthy article on the tactical situation near Pokrovsk.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/09/17/7475408/

 

Sobering article. Sounds like Kursk has also for the Ukrainians been beyond their strength. I feared that much. The article tries to play that down, but I'm not convinced.

In the meantime there are hundreds of thousands of able bodied Ukrainian men in Europe, profiting from their position and apparently not giving a damn about the fact that their country is losing the war. Or at least not winning it.

Edited Friday at 06:56 AM by Aragorn2002

[Holien]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

His points about the wisdom of not using badly positioned defenses is sound, but the question is why are defenses badly positioned? 

Add to that where are the forces defending? Especially if he has so few men?

My guess is small mobile force in tree lines keep switching locations. 

It sounds like they have fallen back to "prepared" positions that were done by folk that were not trained to place them in sensible places. 

[LongLeftFlank]

3 hours ago, sburke said:

mere mortals?  Okay yeah @The_Capt, but @Bil Hardenberger ?  Blasphemy I say! How dare you sir!

 

If only you could see what I have seen, with your eyes.

Edited Friday at 07:52 AM by LongLeftFlank

[Offshoot]

Revealed: Russia anticipated Kursk incursion months in advance, seized papers show
 

Quote

 

Russia’s military command had anticipated Ukraine’s incursion into its Kursk region and had been making plans to prevent it for several months, according to a cache of documents that the Ukrainian army said it had seized from abandoned Russian positions in the region.

The disclosure makes the disarray among Russian forces after Ukraine’s attack in early August all the more embarrassing. The documents, shared with the Guardian, also reveal Russian concerns about morale in the ranks in Kursk, which intensified after the suicide of a soldier at the front who had reportedly been in a “prolonged state of depression due to his service in the Russian army”.
...
The Guardian could not independently verify the authenticity of the documents, though they bear the hallmarks of genuine Russian army communications.

 

 

[The_Capt]

6 hours ago, sburke said:

mere mortals?  Okay yeah @The_Capt, but @Bil Hardenberger ?  Blasphemy I say! How dare you sir!

Apparently we had special powers? I suddenly feel so vulnerable and weak. Normally I only get that on my birthday.  

If it means that I can get some people to stop following my posts around like stalkers…make me mortal!

Edited Friday at 10:17 AM by The_Capt

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, Aragorn2002 said:

Sobering article. Sounds like Kursk has also for the Ukrainians been beyond their strength. I feared that much. The article tries to play that down, but I'm not convinced.

In the meantime there are hundreds of thousands of able bodied Ukrainian men in Europe, profiting from their position and apparently not giving a damn about the fact that their country is losing the war. Or at least not winning it.

About the only way Ukraine loses this war in total is a strategic collapse. If it is possible for Russia, it is possible for Ukraine. In fact in a war of attrition and exhaustion one side is going to eventually collapse unless an end is negotiated.

We have talked about the diaspora of Ukrainian fighting aged men. While I strongly believe in a volunteer military, I also am having trouble with several hundred thousand young Ukrainian men holding out in other countries while others are doing the dying for them.

https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-war-conscription-law-poland-0357b7f90095c8bfaaad1ec16a4b7a66

I am not sure what EU countries could do to either entice or enforce the move by Ukraine to get more fighting men. But this is an existential war for that nation and more needs to be done. 

[The_Capt]

41 minutes ago, Offshoot said:

Revealed: Russia anticipated Kursk incursion months in advance, seized papers show
 

 

Was waiting for this one. So much for operational surprise. Just good old Russian denial, confusion and incompetence. If Russia knew, the US definitely knew.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

7 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Outside of course, a tank can do plenty to avoid being shot at in the first place (which is where that drone recon comes in!) Strv 122s upgraded top scheme protection (MEXAS) has made a significant difference in its ability to survive such attacks for instance, a relatively minor modification that has paid dividends. I know I mention Strv 122 a lot but its one of the few tanks with that heightened emphasis on top attack that is likely to be followed up on by others. 

On a related note, I am wondering if the relative unpopularity of Abrams and hints that it is particularly vulnerable to drone attacks have something to do with its vaunted ammunition blow-out panels. I assume that in order to work as intended, the top of the panels must be thin, much more so than the top armour elsewhere. And the panels on Abrams are particularly large and prominent, basically taking up the entire rear of the turret. This suggests that a drone operator only needs to hit pretty much anywhere on the top rear of the turret with pretty much any kind of HEAT warhead, even smallish, to achieve a very likely penetration and ammo cook off, resulting in the tank abandoned and unable to fight. In comparison, the blow out panels on Leo 2 are much smaller and harder to target with a FPV drone (just on the left side of turret rear top) whereas AFAIK Chally 2 has no blow out panels at all.

If I am thinking correctly, this would make the Abrams a kind of anti-Strv 122, a tank with a particularly bad armour configuration for the modern drone battlefield.

[Eug85]

4 hours ago, Aragorn2002 said:

Sobering article. Sounds like Kursk has also for the Ukrainians been beyond their strength. I feared that much. The article tries to play that down, but I'm not convinced.

In the meantime there are hundreds of thousands of able bodied Ukrainian men in Europe, profiting from their position and apparently not giving a damn about the fact that their country is losing the war. Or at least not winning it.

Who would have thought. After two and a half years of war, Ukrainian officers have not learned to command their units. It seems that the Ukrainians neglect to systematize and use military experience. While the Russians seem to be successfully systematizing the experience gained during the war and increasing the effectiveness of their troops.

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Was waiting for this one. So much for operational surprise. Just good old Russian denial, confusion and incompetence. If Russia knew, the US definitely knew.

Really makes the claims made back then look ridiculous and underlines how often the Ukrainian government is making political statements rather than entirely unvarnished factual descriptions of the situation. That's ok, btw, but folks need to be much warier about taking things at face value and I would argue that Zelensky needs to be more careful about nipping at the fingers that are feeding the war effort. 

[hcrof]

44 minutes ago, Eug85 said:

Who would have thought. After two and a half years of war, Ukrainian officers have not learned to command their units. It seems that the Ukrainians neglect to systematize and use military experience. While the Russians seem to be successfully systematizing the experience gained during the war and increasing the effectiveness of their troops.

The word "seems" is doing a lot of heavy lifting there. Both of your statements are enormous generalisations and probably need to be expanded considerably to have any meaning at all I'm afraid. 

[Joe982]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Was waiting for this one. So much for operational surprise. Just good old Russian denial, confusion and incompetence. If Russia knew, the US definitely knew.

"Anticipated" is different to "know". In table tennis I anticipate my opponents shots.

[Lieutenant Ash]

https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/ukraine-s-gun-wielding-robot-tears-through-russian-forces-in-kursk-destroyed-the-enemy/ar-AA1qT06K?ocid=socialshare&pc=NMTS&cvid=49d951b76fd24ba1ae6d04549eb539cf&ei=116

Report on the small UGV used in videos posted earlier in thread.

[Eug85]

45 minutes ago, hcrof said:

The word "seems" is doing a lot of heavy lifting there. Both of your statements are enormous generalisations and probably need to be expanded considerably to have any meaning at all I'm afraid. 

And what do you think are the real reasons why, as written in the article, the command of the Ukrainian forces has low management skills?

"The first problem on the Pokrovsk front is personnel numbers, the second is their level of training, and the third is the skills of the unit command."

[hcrof]

9 minutes ago, Eug85 said:

And what do you think are the real reasons why, as written in the article, the command of the Ukrainian forces has low management skills?

"The first problem on the Pokrovsk front is personnel numbers, the second is their level of training, and the third is the skills of the unit command."

I was pushing back against your statement that all of the Ukrainian commanders are incompetent and incapable of learning while all of the russian commanders are improving. Blanket statements like that are unhelpful. 

How about "some Ukrainian commanders appear to be poor, even after more than two years of war. Why are they being put into the areas of heavy fighting?" And "Russians appear to be distributing lessons learned, resulting in increased effectiveness along parts of the front" 

I could show dozens of examples of daring and competent Ukrainian commanders and bumbling and incompetent russian commanders to contradict blanket statements like your original one.