How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Kinophile]

Not the strongest reasoning but... 

 

[Kinophile]

Lol

 

[Vet 0369]

2 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Lol

 

The disappearances have usually been accompanied by bright lights and loud noises. Could this be UFOs?

[paxromana]

Just now, Vet 0369 said:

The disappearances have usually been accompanied by bright lights and loud noises. Could this be UFOs?

Unidentified Floating  Objects!

[Vet 0369]

1 minute ago, paxromana said:

Unidentified Floating  Objects!

Or UKRAINIAN floating objects!

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

Not gonna lie, thats not really fast moving is it? i mean, some searchlights, more sailors, more crew mounted light guns, some patrol boats around, would that attack have failed? 

I am thinking that these unmanned surface vessels are probably going to evolve into platforms as opposed to suicide drones.  They are fast (relatively), low profile and have incredibly long range.  I suspect they are already working on using them for UAS or missile launching platforms.  And I would not rule out small fast torpedoes.  In the end they don’t even have sink the ship, only damage it enough and the effect is the same.  That way these small sea drones can stand off kms and simply launch other systems until enough get through.  At these ranges this will effectively deny sea space within the littorals and possibly further out.

[dan/california]

7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I am thinking that these unmanned surface vessels are probably going to evolve into platforms as opposed to suicide drones.  They are fast (relatively), low profile and have incredibly long range.  I suspect they are already working on using them for UAS or missile launching platforms.  And I would not rule out small fast torpedoes.  In the end they don’t even have sink the ship, only damage it enough and the effect is the same.  That way these small sea drones can stand off kms and simply launch other systems until enough get through.  At these ranges this will effectively deny sea space within the littorals and possibly further out.

Stated range on the current models is enough to threaten ships from one side of the Mediterranean or the North Sea to the other. When some clean sheet of paper engineering is applied I can easily see that doubling. Taiwan needs thousands of these things in distributed basing arrangements. The Baltic is already a NATO lake, but USVs are vastly cheaper way to maintain that status.

 

[ASL Veteran]

6 hours ago, Joe982 said:

Loan?

What does that mean? 

In this context my assumption would be that the Russian assets would be used as a form of collateral and since they mention 'Surety' then I would say as collateral vs a form of Surety bond (a bond is a form of loan - when you buy a corporate bond you are essentially loaning the issuing company money in exchange for an interest payment) sort of deal and since they mention reparations perhaps they could demand some form of reparations in exchange for getting their assets returned when this whole thing is finally over.  

Quote

 

In practice, surety bonds can have several variations to their definition, meaning, and purpose depending on the specific bond requirement. There are thousands of different types of surety bonds across the country. Some surety bonds provide coverage for, or ensure compliance with, local, state, or federal licensing and permit requirements. Other surety bonds guarantee payment of tax or other financial obligations. These bonds are referred to as "strict financial guarantee" bonds and often times are more expensive due to inherent risk of guaranteeing a payment as opposed to a compliance requirement.

Another common type of surety bond called is referred to as a contract bond. These surety bonds provide a guarantee that contractors complete construction projects in accordance with specifications and make all required payments to subcontractors and suppliers. Contractors engaged in a variety of both government contracts and private sector work must secure contract bonds as required by project owners.

 

 

 

[Kinophile]

57 minutes ago, ASL Veteran said:

In this context my assumption would be that the Russian assets would be used as a form of collateral and since they mention 'Surety' then I would say as collateral vs a form of Surety bond (a bond is a form of loan - when you buy a corporate bond you are essentially loaning the issuing company money in exchange for an interest payment) sort of deal and since they mention reparations perhaps they could demand some form of reparations in exchange for getting their assets returned when this whole thing is finally over.  

 

 

Yes, exactly. 

[hcrof]

1 hour ago, ASL Veteran said:

In this context my assumption would be that the Russian assets would be used as a form of collateral and since they mention 'Surety' then I would say as collateral vs a form of Surety bond (a bond is a form of loan - when you buy a corporate bond you are essentially loaning the issuing company money in exchange for an interest payment) sort of deal and since they mention reparations perhaps they could demand some form of reparations in exchange for getting their assets returned when this whole thing is finally over.  

 

 

Alternatively, the interest on any russian money in banks etc can be handed to Ukraine, even if they don't get the money itself.

[JonS]

15 hours ago, The_Capt said:

It appears that you have not kept up on this war.  We are not seeing a "few recon drones spotting" -  which will still be a serious problem with this sort of SHORAD system because LOS (with camera magnification) is much father than these systems can likely reach.  We are starting to see drones being employed en masse on the sorts of scales that these systems cannot deal with. They are not solely being used for recon, but now strike.  Production is reaching massive scales (e.g. reports of 100k per month).

This is not "perfect so we shouldn't bother", it is "expensive and not useful for the environment."  We have gone down this path before and wind up getting into trouble every time - let's send tanks to a COIN fight...anyone?  Massed UAS are not a SHORAD problem, or at least one it can solve.  But that wont stop big business from trying to convince us otherwise.

Here is a scenario - 100 FPVs being driven by 10 crews with repeaters.  These are not even fully autonomous, which we know is coming.  They are EW hardened but we can even accept 50% attrition, so now 50 FPVs are coming in and attacking a position.  These large SHORAD systems now need to track and engage small fast moving UAS capable of treetop and below.  Assuming you have submunitions (which there is no evidence of), and each missile can engage 5 drones effectively - hell give them 100 percent; based on the photos, 5 Coyote systems needed to counter this one attack.  Ok, doesn't sound too bad.  Except for the fact that these FPVs are not working alone.  They are linked into supporting fires.  So as soon as those Coyotes start firing they are going to get lit up and engaged by PGM indirect fires.  But these are trained crews and are scooting, so maybe you only lose half of them, lets say 2 out of 5.

So how many Coyotes do we have in a Bde?  Because the enemy has another 150 FPVs...for todays attack alone.  You basically need to stick one or two in every platoon...fantastic, exactly what Raytheon wants.  And here is the thing...it will not work.  First problem will be clutter.  The enemy will fill the sky with all sorts of junk to toss off detection.  Fire control and coordination will be a nightmare.  And now on a battlefield where everyone is whispering for fear of getting picked up by sound detection, we are going to have dozens of these missiles firing off all over the place.  So we have solved the recon UAS problem by making ourselves visible from freakin space.  And finally sustainment; the enemy is losing ammunition, we are losing platforms.  We cannot keep that up over any period of time.  Like other high end western equipment, we will run out and politicians will never sign off on massive "what if" production capacity.

But let's put this all aside or the moment, this approach will not only be challenged by current reality, it will not solve for what is coming next. UAS are going to get cheaper and more distributed.  They will combine with UGVs so you can lay them like mines and suddenly have them pop up a few meters away.  Drone swarms will be in the hundreds with EFP and launchable sub-munitions of their own.  So while we are investing billions in SHORAD as a solution, we are going to find out it was a half-measure, at best. 

We are so addicted to big, few and expensive platforms, that our solution to their possible extinction on the battlefield is, more big expensive platforms.

So what is the solution?  Cheap and many.  I want a C-UAS weapon that fits under the barrel of a rifle like a GL but has a 1-2 km range and high Pk - so better than a shotgun.  I want UAS, that hunt and kill other UAS.  I want direct fire support on lighter unmanned platforms that do not drink a swimming pools worth of gas per km, and are big and hot. I want infantry that can carry more, move faster and go for days without resupply.   What I do not want are more big, loud expensive platforms to protect my already big, loud and expensive platforms.

I've been thinking about this post most of the day, and keep coming back to "Neat. Now what?"

Which got me thinking about how other step changes in military capability were handled. The two obvious ones that come to mind are tanks in WWII, and airpower during the Cold War. Now, clearly, in both cases they existed early, but they only really became effective/worrisome/"game-changing" some decades after their entree to the battlefield.

For the infantry, in both cases, the response became basically the same: very small infantry units became fully capable of anti-ing the other thing, either anti-tank or anti-air.

During WWII anti-tank rifles, bazookas, fausts, shrecks, Piats and hearty grenades gave platoons and sections an ability to defend against or attack against tanks, pretty explicitly at the detriment to the nominal role of the infantry, which was to oppose and defeat enemy infantry. That trend was significantly enhanced during second half of last century with things like RPGs and M-72s. This is at the point now where with weapons like Javelin tanks perhaps have more to fear from infantry than the vice versa, even though lugging Javelin around is a royal PITA especially for light infantry.

The introduction of air power, and especially effective CAS, started us on the road to the fully illuminated battlefield, where nowhere is safe and to be seen is to die. During WWII the only real counter that the infantry had was to dig on, or hide, or both. But during the Cold War a lot of effort went into MANPADS, resulting in the Stinger in the 1980s and with other systems following soon after. Just like their anti tank weapons, lugging around anti-aircraft missiles is a PITA which detracts from the nominal role of engaging enemy infantry, not to mention the drain on budgets and training schedules. But on the other hand now every platoon and section is capable of destroying any tank or aircraft that wanders into it's little tactical AO. And once the air and armour battle is won - either locally or globally - then the rest is just mopping up. The degradation of the infantry platoon and section's ability in the infantry-battle doesn't really matter, since while that bit remains hard and unpleasant, it is incredibly harder and more unpleasant in the absence of either air or armoured support.

So you can probably see where this is going.

Assuming UAS remains in play (and why wouldn't it?), then the role of infantry platoons and sections will change again. Instead of being little nodes of anti-tank and anti-air goodness,with some residual anti-infantry capability, they will become little anti-UAS nodes, with the weapons, training, mindset and purpose to defeat enemy UAS in their local area, and also protect or project friendly UAS capability around themselves. If an enemy tank or aircraft turns up then the section or platoon mightn't be able to deal with it themselves, but they will be networked to someone who can - guns, missiles, friendly armour or air, or friendly UAS. And they'll still, you know, carry rifles. Mainly out of habit and tradition, as well as giving the NCOs something to inspect every day. But most of their weaponry, and sensors, and just the general claggage they're carting about will be geared towards winning the UAS fight, because winning that will mean that the rest is just mopping up.

In other words, the infantry will be able to concentrate physically and cognitively on the UAS battle because it won't be their role any more to win the tank, infantry, or local airspace battle.

[Battlefront.com]

59 minutes ago, JonS said:

I've been thinking about this post most of the day, and keep coming back to "Neat. Now what?"

Which got me thinking about how other step changes in military capability were handled. The two obvious ones that come to mind are tanks in WWII, and airpower during the Cold War. Now, clearly, in both cases they existed early, but they only really became effective/worrisome/"game-changing" some decades after their entree to the battlefield.

For the infantry, in both cases, the response became basically the same: very small infantry units became fully capable of anti-ing the other thing, either anti-tank or anti-air.

During WWII anti-tank rifles, bazookas, fausts, shrecks, Piats and hearty grenades gave platoons and sections an ability to defend against or attack against tanks, pretty explicitly at the detriment to the nominal role of the infantry, which was to oppose and defeat enemy infantry. That trend was significantly enhanced during second half of last century with things like RPGs and M-72s. This is at the point now where with weapons like Javelin tanks perhaps have more to fear from infantry than the vice versa, even though lugging Javelin around is a royal PITA especially for light infantry.

The introduction of air power, and especially effective CAS, started us on the road to the fully illuminated battlefield, where nowhere is safe and to be seen is to die. During WWII the only real counter that the infantry had was to dig on, or hide, or both. But during the Cold War a lot of effort went into MANPADS, resulting in the Stinger in the 1980s and with other systems following soon after. Just like their anti tank weapons, lugging around anti-aircraft missiles is a PITA which detracts from the nominal role of engaging enemy infantry, not to mention the drain on budgets and training schedules. But on the other hand now every platoon and section is capable of destroying any tank or aircraft that wanders into it's little tactical AO. And once the air and armour battle is won - either locally or globally - then the rest is just mopping up. The degradation of the infantry platoon and section's ability in the infantry-battle doesn't really matter, since while that bit remains hard and unpleasant, it is incredibly harder and more unpleasant in the absence of either air or armoured support.

So you can probably see where this is going.

Assuming UAS remains in play (and why wouldn't it?), then the role of infantry platoons and sections will change again. Instead of being little nodes of anti-tank and anti-air goodness,with some residual anti-infantry capability, they will become little anti-UAS nodes, with the weapons, training, mindset and purpose to defeat enemy UAS in their local area, and also protect or project friendly UAS capability around themselves. If an enemy tank or aircraft turns up then the section or platoon mightn't be able to deal with it themselves, but they will be networked to someone who can - guns, missiles, friendly armour or air, or friendly UAS. And they'll still, you know, carry rifles. Mainly out of habit and tradition, as well as giving the NCOs something to inspect every day. But most of their weaponry, and sensors, and just the general claggage they're carting about will be geared towards winning the UAS fight, because winning that will mean that the rest is just mopping up.

In other words, the infantry will be able to concentrate physically and cognitively on the UAS battle because it won't be their role any more to win the tank, infantry, or local airspace battle.

Good thoughts.  The thing that occurred to me reading this is that we are likely to see some merging of current capabilities within infantry as well as adding new ones that traditionally haven't been feasible. 

For example, for most of the 20th and 21st Centuries the primary task of taking out enemy tanks was left to heavy AFVs.  Non-crew served AT weapons were more-or-less weapons of desperation.  If you were light infantry, and you wanted to kill a tank, chances are one of preferred options wouldn't be available unless you were Mech/Armored Infantry.  Increasingly infantry has at least had a ride handy, but generallly not one capable of taking out a tank or IFV.  Hence the proliferation of man portable AT weapons.

The Javelin didn't help the burden of light infantry any as it was heavier and bulkier than anything they had before.  However, it did give infantry the ability to secure sure kills with significantly less danger and tactical headaches.  Typical pros and cons.

Recently, however, the trend has been to stick a Javelin/Spike on the RWS stations of a very wide variety of vehicles (light, medium, and heavy).  This should take some of the burden of lugging ATGMs off of the infantry because now their organic, plentiful, rides can plink tanks without dismounting and maneuvering.

UGVs are going to take this to the next level.  Not only will UGVs be able to take out tanks, but they will also be armed with pretty much the same weapons they have on their current rides, up to and including 20mm cannon and air defense missiles.  In theory this means infantry are going to have even more access to such weapons, thereby reducing their load.

So what does this mean?  What it always means... if light infantry has weight taken off its shoulders, somebody will give  them something else heavy to replace it with   The obvious one now involves UAS/UGS.

I think we'll see a day, soon, where a platoon and/or company's organic drone units can scout, take out tanks, counter battery fire, and directly attack ground targets which previously battalion and above had to deal with.  I also think we'll see some degree of using UAS/UGV for some forms of air defense.  Rotary aircraft are already vulnerable to the same UAS that would be used against ground targets.  Not good against the fast fliers, so UGVs with a bunch of previously manually carried MANPADs already exist.  UGVs can mount other systems which previously had to be tasked to larger and more expensive rides that would inevitably be uncommon for infantry to have direct (low level organic) access to.

 

To summarize... unmanned systems are likely to take some of the infantry's physical burden off its shoulders, while at the same time giving them the ability to do stuff better that they've always been expected to do (kill enemy infantry), had to do (kill tanks), stretched to do (take out aircraft), or found they couldn't do (counter battery, ISR, EW, etc.).  Looks like being a tanker or a helicopter pilot as a career may not be as popular as they once were.

Steve

 

[sburke]

Looks Like Somebody Come Huntin' For that $9 | The Peripheral(2022) (youtube.com)

[Butschi]

5 hours ago, JonS said:

I've been thinking about this post most of the day, and keep coming back to "Neat. Now what?"

Which got me thinking about how other step changes in military capability were handled. The two obvious ones that come to mind are tanks in WWII, and airpower during the Cold War. Now, clearly, in both cases they existed early, but they only really became effective/worrisome/"game-changing" some decades after their entree to the battlefield.

For the infantry, in both cases, the response became basically the same: very small infantry units became fully capable of anti-ing the other thing, either anti-tank or anti-air.

During WWII anti-tank rifles, bazookas, fausts, shrecks, Piats and hearty grenades gave platoons and sections an ability to defend against or attack against tanks, pretty explicitly at the detriment to the nominal role of the infantry, which was to oppose and defeat enemy infantry. That trend was significantly enhanced during second half of last century with things like RPGs and M-72s. This is at the point now where with weapons like Javelin tanks perhaps have more to fear from infantry than the vice versa, even though lugging Javelin around is a royal PITA especially for light infantry.

The introduction of air power, and especially effective CAS, started us on the road to the fully illuminated battlefield, where nowhere is safe and to be seen is to die. During WWII the only real counter that the infantry had was to dig on, or hide, or both. But during the Cold War a lot of effort went into MANPADS, resulting in the Stinger in the 1980s and with other systems following soon after. Just like their anti tank weapons, lugging around anti-aircraft missiles is a PITA which detracts from the nominal role of engaging enemy infantry, not to mention the drain on budgets and training schedules. But on the other hand now every platoon and section is capable of destroying any tank or aircraft that wanders into it's little tactical AO. And once the air and armour battle is won - either locally or globally - then the rest is just mopping up. The degradation of the infantry platoon and section's ability in the infantry-battle doesn't really matter, since while that bit remains hard and unpleasant, it is incredibly harder and more unpleasant in the absence of either air or armoured support.

So you can probably see where this is going.

Assuming UAS remains in play (and why wouldn't it?), then the role of infantry platoons and sections will change again. Instead of being little nodes of anti-tank and anti-air goodness,with some residual anti-infantry capability, they will become little anti-UAS nodes, with the weapons, training, mindset and purpose to defeat enemy UAS in their local area, and also protect or project friendly UAS capability around themselves. If an enemy tank or aircraft turns up then the section or platoon mightn't be able to deal with it themselves, but they will be networked to someone who can - guns, missiles, friendly armour or air, or friendly UAS. And they'll still, you know, carry rifles. Mainly out of habit and tradition, as well as giving the NCOs something to inspect every day. But most of their weaponry, and sensors, and just the general claggage they're carting about will be geared towards winning the UAS fight, because winning that will mean that the rest is just mopping up.

In other words, the infantry will be able to concentrate physically and cognitively on the UAS battle because it won't be their role any more to win the tank, infantry, or local airspace battle.

Question is if not infantry itself is obsolete at some point. If, as you say, the roll of infantry is no longer to fight infantry or tanks but UAS, why have infantry in the first place? If we are not talking Russian style cannon fodder but well trained soldiers, that training takes time and costs money and so does keeping them in the fight. How much does a drone cost compared to an infantry man and how much better does said infantry man perform than a drone?

And once we have mass produced fully autonomous systems that are purpose built (not improvised) all bets are off, anyway. I think it is practically guaranteed that such a system will be more efficient than a human who has to sleep, pee, is distracted, gets panicked, can't see the dark and has a fairly limited sensory bandwidth.

[JonS]

9 hours ago, Butschi said:

If, as you say, the roll of infantry is no longer to fight infantry or tanks but UAS, why have infantry in the first place?

Because , as Bullethead used to say, it ain't over till a grunt sticks a flag on it.

Drones are cool, and all, but like aircraft they can't seize *and*hold* terrain, regardless of season, weather or terrain.

Edited March 7 by JonS

[Pete Wenman]

22 minutes ago, Butschi said:

Question is if not infantry itself is obsolete at some point. If, as you say, the roll of infantry is no longer to fight infantry or tanks but UAS, why have infantry in the first place?

Cause someone needs to keep changing the batteries in all the hi-tech kit. 

[panzermartin]

I can see a hypothetical scenario in CM:WW3, where your first mission in a campaign is to assault a fortified forward position defended only by mines, air drones,  AI bunkers and land drones. 

I think in the final attack you will still need human infantry. 

[Butschi]

1 hour ago, JonS said:

Drones are cool, and all, but like aircraft they can't seize *and*hold* terrain.

They can't seize and hold terrain, yet.

And how well will holding that terrain work out for the infantry in the future? Hell, how well does it work right now?

Edited March 7 by Butschi

[The_Capt]

7 hours ago, JonS said:

I've been thinking about this post most of the day, and keep coming back to "Neat. Now what?"

Which got me thinking about how other step changes in military capability were handled. The two obvious ones that come to mind are tanks in WWII, and airpower during the Cold War. Now, clearly, in both cases they existed early, but they only really became effective/worrisome/"game-changing" some decades after their entree to the battlefield.

For the infantry, in both cases, the response became basically the same: very small infantry units became fully capable of anti-ing the other thing, either anti-tank or anti-air.

During WWII anti-tank rifles, bazookas, fausts, shrecks, Piats and hearty grenades gave platoons and sections an ability to defend against or attack against tanks, pretty explicitly at the detriment to the nominal role of the infantry, which was to oppose and defeat enemy infantry. That trend was significantly enhanced during second half of last century with things like RPGs and M-72s. This is at the point now where with weapons like Javelin tanks perhaps have more to fear from infantry than the vice versa, even though lugging Javelin around is a royal PITA especially for light infantry.

The introduction of air power, and especially effective CAS, started us on the road to the fully illuminated battlefield, where nowhere is safe and to be seen is to die. During WWII the only real counter that the infantry had was to dig on, or hide, or both. But during the Cold War a lot of effort went into MANPADS, resulting in the Stinger in the 1980s and with other systems following soon after. Just like their anti tank weapons, lugging around anti-aircraft missiles is a PITA which detracts from the nominal role of engaging enemy infantry, not to mention the drain on budgets and training schedules. But on the other hand now every platoon and section is capable of destroying any tank or aircraft that wanders into it's little tactical AO. And once the air and armour battle is won - either locally or globally - then the rest is just mopping up. The degradation of the infantry platoon and section's ability in the infantry-battle doesn't really matter, since while that bit remains hard and unpleasant, it is incredibly harder and more unpleasant in the absence of either air or armoured support.

So you can probably see where this is going.

Assuming UAS remains in play (and why wouldn't it?), then the role of infantry platoons and sections will change again. Instead of being little nodes of anti-tank and anti-air goodness,with some residual anti-infantry capability, they will become little anti-UAS nodes, with the weapons, training, mindset and purpose to defeat enemy UAS in their local area, and also protect or project friendly UAS capability around themselves. If an enemy tank or aircraft turns up then the section or platoon mightn't be able to deal with it themselves, but they will be networked to someone who can - guns, missiles, friendly armour or air, or friendly UAS. And they'll still, you know, carry rifles. Mainly out of habit and tradition, as well as giving the NCOs something to inspect every day. But most of their weaponry, and sensors, and just the general claggage they're carting about will be geared towards winning the UAS fight, because winning that will mean that the rest is just mopping up.

In other words, the infantry will be able to concentrate physically and cognitively on the UAS battle because it won't be their role any more to win the tank, infantry, or local airspace battle.

I am honestly amazed that anything I write causes anyone to think about anything “all day”, but that must be the pressure of Canadian culture.

I think “unmanned” as a phenomenon is the continuing emergence of something larger within warfare.  What you describe here would be big enough to drive significant re-thinking of how we wage war.  Since the beginning of this war, I have noted how many really fundamental concepts are being impacted: Mass (density, concentration of force), Offensive, Surprise, Connections, Speed (space and time) and Friction, to name several.  These definitely signal a shift in the character of warfare.  A change to the fundamental capability of infantry is enormous - on par with shifts we have seen in the last 200 years.

But I honestly think it may be bigger.  Most military technology has been developed to better project or protect human energy in the use of violence to shape human will.  Rocks, spears, bow/arrow, horses, armor, chariots, walls, siege weapons, guns, artillery, air power and seapower - all designed around the human being.  However, as Clausewitz (and others) have argued, these are all shifts in the “character” of warfare, not its fundamental nature.

A shift in the nature of warfare has occurred at least twice in human history.  The first time was when we invented civilization and made warfare an extension of human politics.  Before, in pre-civilization, warfare occurred for what could be considered micro-political reasons but was also occurring for many other reason as well, the largest being survival.  By upscaling warfare..in fact as a direct result as a pre-condition to upscaling itself, warfare changed to become an “act of violence to force political will”.  Political will changed with civilization and so did war.  

The second time the nature of warfare changed was in 1945.  The creation and operationalization of nuclear weapons changed the nature of warfare forever.  The nature of warfare became “an act of viable violence to force political will”.  War became bounded by the nuclear equation.  Unlimited violence meant mutual destruction, so we were forced to view all war through a different lens. This new nature of warfare exists to this day.

Now we are staring down the barrel of something else.  And what this is exactly, I am not sure.  We are essentially seeing technology augmenting and replacing human cognitive processing power.  This has been happening for centuries but “unmanned” by definition is about replacing human beings.  The larger question with “unmanned” is how far down this road does that replacement go?  At a very high expression, unmanned can become a WMD and create a new mutual destruction spin.  Even further down that road we are looking at warfare becoming a blend of “viable violence to force hybrid political will”.  What “unmanned” really is about is creating and weaponizing artificial-human capabilities.  We can see things like “synthetic mass”, “virtual manoeuvre” and of course the autonomy debate.

So, “how far?” Is quickly followed by “how fast?”  And based on this war…damned fast.  It took roughly 2 million years for the first shift in the nature of warfare.  Another 10k to get to the second.  And now it looks like we could be at a single century for the next one.  This is not to say that humans will be left out of warfare completely, but how we wage war shapes (and is shaped by) why and what.  I suspect we will see an evolution as you note, towards human effort focused on creating “unmanned superiority”, yet this will include more than explodey stuff.

At its fullest expression we get into things like predictive analytics that actually work.  This puts one at temporal advantage over an opponent.  We see AI commanders, maybe?  AI staff is already happening.  I strongly suspect there will be a race to see who can get the most unmanned, the fastest.  I honestly do not know where this ends, but one thing this war is teaching me is that this entire thing looks and feels real.  What we have seen in the last two years alone has been stunning.  The fact that the character of warfare is changing is really moving past a debate.  What we do not know is whether there will be a shift in war’s nature.  But I am getting a weird feeling about the whole damned business at this point.

Edited March 7 by The_Capt

[Lieutenant Ash]

https://www.msn.com/en-gb/money/technology/cutting-edge-tech-gives-uk-soldiers-high-probability-of-shooting-down-deadly-drones/ar-BB1jrHWN?ocid=socialshare&pc=NMTS&cvid=65d90f9565674ec79b3a0b0c1f1fe4dc&ei=160

Just spotted this, might be relevant to the drone discussion.

[Carolus]

21 minutes ago, Lieutenant Ash said:

https://www.msn.com/en-gb/money/technology/cutting-edge-tech-gives-uk-soldiers-high-probability-of-shooting-down-deadly-drones/ar-BB1jrHWN?ocid=socialshare&pc=NMTS&cvid=65d90f9565674ec79b3a0b0c1f1fe4dc&ei=160

Just spotted this, might be relevant to the drone discussion.

5.56 and 7.62 are too small for explosive or airburst bullets, but what would a flechette bullet do to a drone? It was in development during the Vietnam era.

Or maybe these modern dumdum rounds which splitter on impact??

[Hapless]

50 minutes ago, Carolus said:

5.56 and 7.62 are too small for explosive or airburst bullets, but what would a flechette bullet do to a drone? It was in development during the Vietnam era.

Or maybe these modern dumdum rounds which splitter on impact??

I don't think a flechette round is going to do anything that your basic 5.56/7.62 isn't- the problem looks more like drones are very difficult to hit, rather than current ammunition doesn't do enough damage.

It's got me wondering though- how big do jammers need to be to be effective? Could you stick one inside a 40mm grenade with a parachute and bloop them off into the sky a la instant EW barrage balloons?

[kimbosbread]

1 minute ago, Hapless said:

It's got me wondering though- how big do jammers need to be to be effective? Could you stick one inside a 40mm grenade with a parachute and bloop them off into the sky a la instant EW barrage balloons?

That’s not a bad idea, but I don’t think you’d have the battery power (or room for gas + generator) in a 40mm grenade. Maybe a fixed wing UAV would flying an orbit would work better?

Obviously directional vs omni-directional antenna is a big question; the former is more efficient, but you need to aim/steer it for it to be effective.

[Battlefront.com]

19 minutes ago, Hapless said:

I don't think a flechette round is going to do anything that your basic 5.56/7.62 isn't- the problem looks more like drones are very difficult to hit, rather than current ammunition doesn't do enough damage.

I question the ability to produce the ammo and supply it to troops in the quantities that would be necessary to potentially challenge (not even take down) 1m drones a year.  Let's just say that 500 rounds are expended per drone... that's half a billion rounds.  Anybody think that's practical?  Nope.  OK, so let's say only 10% of drones are even challenged, that's still 50 million rounds on top of everything else that needs to produced.

Also, what needs to be kept in mind is what goes up will come down somewhere.  Looking at the recent video of the ship attack made me think the people filming from the other ship were in danger.  Lots of those tracer rounds could be seen skipping off the waves and redirected.

I do not see volume of fire as being the practical counter.

19 minutes ago, Hapless said:

It's got me wondering though- how big do jammers need to be to be effective? Could you stick one inside a 40mm grenade with a parachute and bloop them off into the sky a la instant EW barrage balloons?

The problem I see with this is that hardening and autonomy neutralize such a threat.  Same with localized EMP blasts.  These are apparent dead end concepts in the big picture.

Steve

[cesmonkey]

Actually, the above is out of date now.  

TLDR: Secretary of State Anthony Blinken welcomes Sweden to NATO and he and the Swedish Prime Minister both say some nice words.

Edited March 7 by cesmonkey