How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Fernando]

8 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Oh c’mon, that is selective analysis to the point of deliberately ignoring parts of that war to fit a narrative.  Why did  all those Central Powers “crumble”.  It wasn’t decisive offensive action, we know that much.  WW1 was largely a positional war of attrition on multiple fronts.  Both sides tried operational offensives and suffered horrendous losses.  The bulk of the overall effects delivered in that war were defensive and attritional, particularly by the allies after about 1917.  Of course there were final offensives once the Germans collapsed but these were coup de grace after they Germans had essentially buckled under the weight of loses.  In fact the naval blockade, a largely defensive action in Sea Control, led to strategic pressures that ultimately broke Germany.

The fact that one finishes with offensive action does not negate the massive effects the defensive actions had in the course of any war.  Hell in this war Kharkiv and Kyiv were only possible after the RA had been decisively defensively defeated.  The fact that the UA drove through the RA at the end of all that is not a “see told ya, offensive” moment.

Poor man’s victory - BS.  History of warfare is filled with counter examples.  In fact Exhaustion is one of the major strategies of warfare since freakin Sun Tzu.  The Cold War was one massive monument to defensive containment actions.  We did not even finish that one with an operational offensive.  That binary framework did not serve is the past and it definitely does not serve in this war.  Ukraine may very well win this war by simply not losing.  Their “consolation” is remaining an independent nation free to chart their own destiny.

”That dog won’t hunt!”  Would be the English saying.

1. War includes ATTRITION. Even if you do NOTHING, you loses men and equipment. Saying that war is just attrition is a HUGE oversimplification which reduces military art to just a matter of a slower or faster attrition of your enemy. If I get a victory in battle over my enemy, I have worn out the enemy army and its will, so is ANYTHING I do is  just a matter or attrition? If everything is reduced to just a matter of how much I can wear away my enemy, what's the reason to do a military maneuver or offensive? Just rain fire and lead over your enemy until no enemy soldier, tank or gun is left, or they decide to quit.

2. Germany did lose WWI because ALL fronts collapsed under Allied offensives and there was no way to stabilize them. The Balkan Front around Salonica was pierced, so Bulgaria went out of the war. Without Bulgaria that front was fully open and impossible to stabilize. The Italian front collapsed after Vittorio Venetto, so A-H, unable to stabilize the Balkan and Italian front finally went off the war. The Turkish fronts also collapsed, so Turkey finally surrender. Germany surrendered in November 11th, 1918 , but at that moment Germany was fighting alone because all other Central Power allies (Bulgaria, Turkey and Austria-Hungary) had collapsed after successful enemy offensives and surrendered. Attrition helped to undermine CP's resistance, but the final victory was won via good, old, traditional offensives that crushed entire enemy fronts until Germany was not able to keep them under control. Moreover, victory was worn by new tactics and weapons born from new military thinking, not by mere attrition. Attrition keep the war going for 4 years until new tactics and new ideas finally brought the war to and end via successful offensives.

3. If Ukraine resorts to pure defensive and strategy based in attrition, it might be able to avert defeat (if Ukrainian collapse is avoided first, that is), but it won't be able to win. Ukraine would be able to just "win" a stalemate.

In a traditional war, with front lines, etc., the pace of attrition is set by the attacker, never by the defender. The Russian army is burning lots of soldiers and equipment in their horrid meat offensives/holocausts (BTW a tradition in Russian military history that has worked more often than not), but they sacrifice just the forces they are prepared to sacrifice, not a single soldier more. If the Russian runs out  of soldiers, it just stops and recruits more meat until they have enough for more meat offensives. Then Ukraine only options are to accept the attrition exchange on Russian terms while Russia wants, or retreat to avoid excessive attrition. The only way to break that vicious circle is by finding a way to attack the enemy and put him out of balance, so you are the one who decides the attrition cicle. The only way to do it is via an offensive.

3. Sooner or later you must attack and maneuver in order to get a victory, that is , impose your will and objetives over those of your enemy . Attrition just paves the way for victory, but it is not a victory in itself until  you destroys the enemy will with successful maneuver offensives.

Edited February 9 by Fernando

[kraze]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I have not heard or read the full transcript of Zelensky's speech.  But from the bit posted at the bottom of the previous page, I don't see him saying that.  What I see is a leader commenting that there's too much staff and too many do not have frontline experience.  That is a Soviet legacy problem that's been mentioned more than a few times since the war started in 2014.  If it's as true as it seems to be, then Zelensky stating it right out in the open is a good sign.

There's roughly 300k in the frontline, which conservatively is about 200k support personnel (could be pushing 225k).  The total Armed Forces is about 1,000k.  That means there's roughly a 9:1 ratio between non-combat and direct combat personnel.  I don't know if that's a reasonable number, but to me it sounds like too much for a force that is mostly ground based, has no significant military commitments outside of its country, has a relatively short logistics tail, and is focused on a single (albeit long) front.  Even if the ratio was changed to 8:1 it would effectively double the combat component.

As for rotating units, we know this is a problem.  It's good to have this being mentioned as a priority to address.  One of the criticisms of the summer offensive was that the 10+ newly raised brigades could have been used as rotation and reinforcements instead of being bled white in fruitless offensive actions.  I disagreed with this as the offensive was building up and even with hindsight I don't think I can agree with that position.

Steve

Problem is that Zelensky aimed this at people who are absolutely clueless about the army or the war.
Because what he said is "too many do not have frontline experience" - but then he immediately promoted exactly those people? Sounds like a logical action.

Two years ago I've vaguely said that Zelensky is, to put it lightly, not a very good leader. Yesterday you saw a major reason why. Because you don't fire the main commander of an army with zero explanation why. Unless of course that explanation is a childish envy. I know that our Western friends here don't know what really is going on here, but this didn't come out of the blue, Zelensky had led a smearing campaign against Zaluzhny for a while with all state media taking major dumps on him almost daily. Seeing as how Zelensky already all but ruined the Western support - not saying it outright doesn't matter anymore.

A good thing for our survival was that Zaluzhny could say no to Zelensky and you now know why it mattered thanks to Shuster's book. Problem is - Syrsky doesn't say no. And it's the reason why he was chosen. And, unfortunately, we will have a lot of tragedies going forward because of this.

Edited February 9 by kraze

[JonS]

2 hours ago, Fernando said:

3. Sooner or later you must attack and maneuver in order to get a victory, that is , impose your will and objetives over those of your enemy . Attrition just paves the way for victory, but it is not a victory in itself until  you destroys the enemy will with successful maneuver offensives.

Clausewitz, were he still around, would disagree with you. He recognised that victory could be achieved by either annihilation (via maneauvre) or exhaustion (via attrition).

Then again, he's old and dead, so his ideas probably aren't relevant anymore.

Edited February 9 by JonS

[Maciej Zwolinski]

3 hours ago, Fernando said:

3. Sooner or later you must attack and maneuver in order to get a victory, that is , impose your will and objetives over those of your enemy . Attrition just paves the way for victory, but it is not a victory in itself until  you destroys the enemy will with successful maneuver offensives.

Technically speaking, this is incorrect at least since significant number of nuclear weapons has been produced. Winning a war through atomic bombardment is possible, and it would be a purely attritional action.

[Holien]

15 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

Winning a war through atomic bombardment is possible

Winning - really?

[Kraft]

10 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

Watch at your own risk:

 

I find it interesting that instead of creating a propaganda piece for americans to consume with simple talking points, he spends it on a  repetition of his bent-history lesson starting in 900AD.

Edited February 9 by Kraft

[The_Capt]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I have not heard or read the full transcript of Zelensky's speech.  But from the bit posted at the bottom of the previous page, I don't see him saying that.  What I see is a leader commenting that there's too much staff and too many do not have frontline experience.  That is a Soviet legacy problem that's been mentioned more than a few times since the war started in 2014.  If it's as true as it seems to be, then Zelensky stating it right out in the open is a good sign.

There's roughly 300k in the frontline, which conservatively is about 200k support personnel (could be pushing 225k).  The total Armed Forces is about 1,000k.  That means there's roughly a 9:1 ratio between non-combat and direct combat personnel.  I don't know if that's a reasonable number, but to me it sounds like too much for a force that is mostly ground based, has no significant military commitments outside of its country, has a relatively short logistics tail, and is focused on a single (albeit long) front.  Even if the ratio was changed to 8:1 it would effectively double the combat component.

As for rotating units, we know this is a problem.  It's good to have this being mentioned as a priority to address.  One of the criticisms of the summer offensive was that the 10+ newly raised brigades could have been used as rotation and reinforcements instead of being bled white in fruitless offensive actions.  I disagreed with this as the offensive was building up and even with hindsight I don't think I can agree with that position.

Steve

So generals who become inappropriately involved at the political level are just as dangerous as politicians who try to be generals.  This is a tooth to tail judgement issue, which frankly no politician is qualified to make unless they have held high military command.  The factors in what creates that ratio are pretty complex but this is not a political issue.  The UA is running a series of military operations along an 800km front - that is roughly the length of the Western Front in WW1.  The logistics and support demands are enormous.  The C4ISR requirements, which have kept Ukraine in this war, all take staff.

Best line I ever heard on this came (surprisingly) from a Canadian GO - “there are teeth, there is a tail; in between are a lot of vital organs”.

Edited February 9 by The_Capt

[Beleg85]

6 hours ago, pintere said:

Found a transcript for the Putin-Tucker interview:

https://www.happyscribe.com/public/the-tucker-carlson-podcast/vladimir-putin-ad58097b-f616-47d8-8bb8-1cbfe9aba16c

Among the contents was this juicy nugget:

Putin - "Before World War II, Poland collaborated with Hitler, and although it did not yield to Hitler's demands, it still participated in the petitioning of Czechoslovakia together with Hitler, as the Poles had not given the Danzig corridor to Germany and went too far, pushing Hitler to start World War II by attacking them. Why was it Poland against whom war started on first September, 1939? Poland turned out to be uncompromising, and Hitler had nothing to do but start implementing his plans with Poland."

Putin is quite conciously presenting vision of Central Europe as "collaborants" (real or imagined) with Hitler, and Poles particulary - absurd which will find mark in some (hopefully limited) circles in the West. Nothing new here, it's consistent in Kremlin narrations across last 15 years and directed as much for domestic as for foreign consumption. Albeit long rant about X-century Ruthenia is funny to look at.

Overall, interview was rather boring. Did not expected from Carlson to go full Oriana Fallaci, but even blond Fox bimbos from Ailes era were probably better prepared for interviewing Putin than he is. Putin's views are also getting more dull and predictable with every year, too.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

27 minutes ago, Holien said:

Winning - really?

Of course. Has been done once, can be done now.

I do not mean a full blown exchange between MAD capable countries. But let's assume a different scenario - e.g.NATO falls apart, the nuclear umbrella along with it and 20 years from now there is a war between Russia and one of non-nuclear capable East European countries. If that war goes badly for the Russians, a single nuke to the other country's capital would turn that into a Russian win. For example, I look at my compatriots, and I do not think we would have the stomach to keep fighting in irradiated ruins of cities. One nuke goes off and we would almost certainly surrender.

 Or some Muslim country finally managing to get the will and the means to nuke Israel. It is such a small country that it probably would not recover.

[Holien]

7 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

If that war goes badly for the Russians, a single nuke to the other country's capital would turn that into a Russian win.

Do you not think there might be a bit of fallout for Russia from other countries which might put in doubt the "win"...

Anyway enough of that rabbit hole, thanks for explaining it....

[Maciej Zwolinski]

5 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Overall, interview was rather boring. Did not expected from Carlson to go full Oriana Fallaci, but even blond Fox bimbos from Ailes era were probably better prepared for interviewing Putin than he is. Putin's views are also getting more dull and predictable with every year, too.

I noticed one response to this interview coming today from some US twitter users.  They compared favourably Putin to Biden just on pure physical ability to sit and speak for long time, without getting physically exhausted and losing track of what he was saying. They did not even comment on the nonsense he spoke, just on the appearance.

Obviously this reflects badly on the people who think in such superficial terms, but this is a fact: people who have insufficient knowledge to look to the merits of the message, see the US through the lens of its physically frail president. That is very unfortunate.

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, Fernando said:

Saying that war is just attrition is a HUGE oversimplification which reduces military art to just a matter of a slower or faster attrition of your enemy

Well first off, I never said this war, or any war was “only” attrition.  I said these were the primary mechanisms that engineered victory.  A gross over simplification is to claim that wars can “only” be won through offensive action.

WW1 - thanks for the history lesson, I am passingly familiar with how it went down.  Now why did all those Central fronts collapse at the end of the war?  It was not “one last push” at the end of a bunch of Allied manoeuvre or even offensive actions.  It was the punctuation mark in a war of extreme attrition and exhaustion in which defensive primacy ruled.  There are any number of historical examples of decisive defensive victories - Stalingrad, Gettysburg and Waterloo.  Setting the conditions for an opponent to break themselves on a defence as a route to victory is as old as warfare itself.

As to Ukraine, there is absolutely a viable strategy to allow the RA to burn itself out to the point they become vulnerable to collapse.  In fact given the battlefield conditions we are seeing (eg denial and defence), this might be the best strategy they have.  Going back on offensive as a finishing move; like Kyiv, like Kharkiv - then becomes an option.

Conversely Ukraine could lose this war through a series of ill advised and wasteful offensives, because “we expect them to always attack seeking ‘decisions of arms’”.  

As to denying an opponent their will (I.e. stalemate) as “not a victory” - tell that to South Korea.  Or the Cold War.  History simply does not support this position.  It is possible to “win” simply by not losing and denying victory for an opponent and I have noted more than a few examples.  Not every war requires a bold imposition of Will and rolling through their capital.  In fact the majority of wars across history end without that.  For every grand decisive war there are a dozen small side shows that ended in some sort of negotiated limited victory - 1813-1815 in North America, Russia-Japan - 1905, the Balkan Wars, China-Vietnam, Iran-Iraq - hell, the First Gulf War for that matter.

None of these were total victories.  They all ended with levels of simply not losing entirely, nor winning.  In fact it could be argued the true art of war is to “not lose just enough”.  The problem we have in the West is we are so enamoured with ourselves that we only see the wars we want to see.  We only study the “real wars” which gives an extremely biased and skewed view of warfare.  I call this the Ricky Bobby school of military history - “if you ain’t first, you’re last.”  

This is not an accurate or useful viewpoint with respect to this war.  Ukraine may be “only” capable of denying Russia full control of its nation.  That is not a loss by any reasonable metric.  And to accuse them of claiming “a poor man’s victory” smacks of ill informed and shallow analysis of how wars actually work.  War is very often a choice of “bad and worse” with most the effort trying to determine which is which.

Edited February 9 by The_Capt

[Zeleban]

2 hours ago, kraze said:

Because you don't fire the main commander of an army with zero explanation why. Unless of course that explanation is a childish envy.

Isn’t the completely failed strategy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2023 grounds for the dismissal of the commander-in-chief?

Let's look at 2023 from the perspective of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The loss of Bakhmut, the failure of the offensive in the Zaporozhye region. Underestimation of Russia's mobilization and industrial capabilities and, as a result, the encirclement and probable loss of the large fortified hub of Avdeevka.

To be honest, I don’t quite understand why Ukrainians idolize Zaluzhny so much? Although perhaps this is understandable. This is exactly the image of the victorious general in 2022 that was painted by Ukrainian and foreign media. Well, how can you not fall in love?

Let's look at Zelensky's culpability in the loss of foreign (American) support. Do you really think that Zelensky’s personality was the reason for blocking Ukrainian aid in the House of Representatives?

 

I believe this is just part of the Republicans' plan to take power. And it doesn’t matter who would be the current president of Ukraine: Poroshenko, Zaluzhny or Stepan Bandera, aid to Ukraine would still be blocked.

Perhaps you think that this influenced the blocking of borders by Polish or Slovak farmers? But I think that this also has nothing to do with Zelensky’s personality or politics

[riptides]

1 hour ago, Kraft said:

I find it interesting that instead of creating a propaganda piece for americans to consume with simple talking points, he spends it on a  repetition of his bent-history lesson starting in 900AD.

He has engaged the American "news" media. This was a small step to gauge reactions and political movements on his part. I bet he offers a second.

[Ultradave]

2 hours ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

Winning a war through atomic bombardment is possible, and it would be a purely attritional action.

"is possible"   How, exactly is winning accomplished that way?

Spoiler alert:  No winners, 2 losers.

[OBJ]

Well, I can't claim to be an expert in military history, world or any one nation's, or anyone's generals, but I do have the sense wars 'won' through exhaustion, tend to start up again as soon as one side or the other decides it is no longer exhausted. In the era of mobilized nation states, a ceasefire negotiated peace tends to leave the issues that caused the war in the first place unresolved. On the other hand, wars in which one side is utterly devastated, occupied and dictated a new form of government, those wars tend to be 'over,' the issues causing them being permanently removed.

So, if current fighting in Ukraine stops with a cease fire, possibly a negotiated 'peace,' show of hands, who here thinks that's the end of it, IF, what's left of Ukraine isn't brought into NATO and protected by article 5 before Russia reconstitutes? 

Do diametrically opposed political ideologies typically peacefully coexist for centuries, especially if they share a border? Is it worth differentiating between great power wars, minor power wars, minor power participation in great power wars and wars followed by a century or more in which the entire world geopolitical and technological situation changed?

Did the Allies really win WWI if they had to fight Germany/Axis in a much more destructive war 20 years later?
If NATO service chiefs are saying they need to be ready to fight Russia in 3-6 years, did the west really win the Cold War? Can a Cold War really be in the same conversation with a shooting war? Is deterrence the same as war? Is economic collapse without war the same as in a war?

I don't know but would guess the experts on any major power's national military history and past Generals are people having spent their professional lives (30+ years) making a career of it, in or out of uniform.

Again, I am no expert. I am interested in other's thoughts on above in relation to Ukraine.

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, kraze said:

Problem is that Zelensky aimed this at people who are absolutely clueless about the army or the war.
Because what he said is "too many do not have frontline experience" - but then he immediately promoted exactly those people? Sounds like a logical action.

Not knowing the details of Ukraine's command structure, I suspect there is no other option.  The last thing Ukraine needs is a Colonel with combat experience running the entire MOD.  Promoting junior or mid level management to be the head of a large organization almost never ends well.  Not in the military, not in private enterprise.

The problem Zelensky is talking about, which seems to be factual, is that the Ukrainian Army is in the tough spot right now in terms of battlefield experienced officers being in staff positions.  Since the war has been going on since 2014 this should not be the case, but from what I've read it is largely true.

There's no easy way to solve this.

3 hours ago, kraze said:

Two years ago I've vaguely said that Zelensky is, to put it lightly, not a very good leader. Yesterday you saw a major reason why. Because you don't fire the main commander of an army with zero explanation why.

I can not comment on possible personal reasons for the dismissal, but I see plenty of good reasons for a "shake up of command".  Whether Zaluzhny's replacement will do a better job or not is unknown at this point.

3 hours ago, kraze said:

Seeing as how Zelensky already all but ruined the Western support - not saying it outright doesn't matter anymore.

You are 100% wrong about this.  Pretty much the ONLY reason Ukraine has had the level of support it has is because of Zelensky.  If Poroshenko had still been President you'd have received far less aid, especially from every day people. 

The loss of support was predicted by people here back in 2022 and early 2023 if there wasn't a major success in 2023's Summer offensive.  And even then... the US support was on shaky ground for purely internal political reasons.  Which, sadly, we are seeing on full display.

Zelensky trying to put on a brave face in front of the world is the correct thing to do.  What would you have him do?  Whine?  Complain?  Beg?  None of that will make the Republicans in the US change their minds.  Might even make it worse.

3 hours ago, kraze said:

A good thing for our survival was that Zaluzhny could say no to Zelensky and you now know why it mattered thanks to Shuster's book. Problem is - Syrsky doesn't say no. And it's the reason why he was chosen. And, unfortunately, we will have a lot of tragedies going forward because of this.

This might well be true.  It won't take long to find out.  But it could be the other way around, where that Zaluzhny was not listening to political reality and now Ukraine is stuck in a position where the old strategy is a proven failure and now options are limited for a new strategy.

There's a very old saying that goes like this:  "No man is so important that he can not be replaced".  Zaluzhny is not an exception to this.  Whether he should have been replaced or not, whether his successor will be an improvement or not, whether the timing was right or not... these are questions that can not be answered for many months.  Keep an open mind as time goes on.  You could be wrong.

Steve

[Astrophel]

@OBJ

I am convinced that Putin has no intention of stopping.  At the most he would take a ceasefire to regroup and rebuild, but right now he probably thinks he is winning and will not look for a ceasefire.  Any attempt by Ukraine to look for a ceasefire will be rejected - Putin is looking for a surrender, not a ceasefire.  Why would Putin stop now when everybody is dancing to his music including the United Nations and the United States Congress?

Putin himself reminds me of Macbeth:

"I am in blood / Stepped in so far that should I wade no more, / Returning were as tedious as go o'er"

He has no way back.

[Astrophel]

5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Not knowing the details of Ukraine's command structure, I suspect there is no other option.  The last thing Ukraine needs is a Colonel with combat experience running the entire MOD.  Promoting junior or mid level management to be the head of a large organization almost never ends well.  Not in the military, not in private enterprise.

The problem Zelensky is talking about, which seems to be factual, is that the Ukrainian Army is in the tough spot right now in terms of battlefield experienced officers being in staff positions.  Since the war has been going on since 2014 this should not be the case, but from what I've read it is largely true.

There's no easy way to solve this.

I can not comment on possible personal reasons for the dismissal, but I see plenty of good reasons for a "shake up of command".  Whether Zaluzhny's replacement will do a better job or not is unknown at this point.

You are 100% wrong about this.  Pretty much the ONLY reason Ukraine has had the level of support it has is because of Zelensky.  If Poroshenko had still been President you'd have received far less aid, especially from every day people. 

The loss of support was predicted by people here back in 2022 and early 2023 if there wasn't a major success in 2023's Summer offensive.  And even then... the US support was on shaky ground for purely internal political reasons.  Which, sadly, we are seeing on full display.

Zelensky trying to put on a brave face in front of the world is the correct thing to do.  What would you have him do?  Whine?  Complain?  Beg?  None of that will make the Republicans in the US change their minds.  Might even make it worse.

This might well be true.  It won't take long to find out.  But it could be the other way around, where that Zaluzhny was not listening to political reality and now Ukraine is stuck in a position where the old strategy is a proven failure and now options are limited for a new strategy.

There's a very old saying that goes like this:  "No man is so important that he can not be replaced".  Zaluzhny is not an exception to this.  Whether he should have been replaced or not, whether his successor will be an improvement or not, whether the timing was right or not... these are questions that can not be answered for many months.  Keep an open mind as time goes on.  You could be wrong.

Steve

Super analysis!   I would add that Zaluzhny had plenty of opportunity to take a variety of honourable exits but instead preferred to be fired - at least this is how it seems to me.  In democracies generals do what the elected representatives tell them to do, not the other way around.  I don't know the man or his successor but in my view Zaluzhny crossed the red line.

While I am on, the idea of rotating troops more and giving more front-line exposure seems eminently sensible, but what do I know.

The other thing in the West is you get paid by results or you make way gracefully.  Zaluzhny did not deliver in 2023 if we are honest and it is time to try something else.

[photon]

24 minutes ago, OBJ said:

Can a Cold War really be in the same conversation with a shooting war?

Amateur historian chiming in, so take it for what it's worth: yes with a but.

I'd suggest that there are two kinds of war, the second of which is relatively uncommon. I'd distinguish them based on what the victor gets at the end of the war.

The first kind of war is a war-for-things. The aggressor wants to take some things (which can be abstract things) from the defender. The victor gets to keep the things. For example, when the United States fought Mexico in the 1840s, that was a war for things. The victor kept Texas and California. Or the Roman conquest of Gaul: Caesar plundered everything that was not nailed down, and functionally annexed modern France to Roman rule. These are pretty common, and World War II was, from one side, a war for things: Germany wanted Lebensraum, Japan wanted the rich resources of the indo-pacific region (particularly oil). Note that I'm defining wars-for-things in terms of the spoils, not the rhetoric that surrounds the spoils. I'd note that modern war is so mind bogglingly destructive that rational actors have concluded that protracted war-for-things is a suckers game. There are no things you can get that are worth the destruction on the things you want!

The second kind, which is relatively rare, is a war-for-rules. The aggressor wants to impose (or maintain) a particular rule set on a collection of polities. The ancient examples of this would be Roman expansion in Italy (which ended with the defeated state bound into a treaty structure rather than obliterated) and the inter-Polis wars in Greece (which were by and large prestige competitions). The victor incorporates the defeated party into a particular rule-set. The objective is not to take things away from the defeated party.

We've also seen asymmetric combinations of the two. For example, Gulf War I. Iraq was fighting a war-for-things against Kuwait, but the Coalition was fighting a war-for-rules against Iraq (we did not annex Iraq at the end of the war, we said, "no annexing neighbors, bad Iraq").

So the war in Ukraine is a combination of these two. Russia is fighting a war-for-things against Ukraine. They are attempting to take the whole of Ukraine's territory, and stealing grain and people. Simultaneously, Russia is fighting a war-for-rules against the Status-quo Coalition. The rule change they're attempting to effect is a return to the "annexing-neighbors-is-ok" rule set that preceded WW2. Ukraine is fighting an existential war-for-things against Russia, and wins if they exist as an independent state at the end of the fighting. The Status-quo Coalition is fighting an existential war against Russia as well: the absolute lynchpin of the status quo is that annexing neighbors is not OK. If that rule falters, it will blow up the international order and allow a renegotiation of lots of the status quo by actors not enamored of the status quo (the Baltics, Taiwan, Africa, the Middle East, &c.). Victory of the Status-quo Coalition is deterrent: showing everyone that attempting to violate the international rule set is *just not worth it*.

[The_Capt]

4 minutes ago, photon said:

I'd suggest that there are two kinds of war, the second of which is relatively uncommon. I'd distinguish them based on what the victor gets at the end of the war.

I think every war is a combination of the two to be honest.  Rarely does one side simply “want stuff”.  They very often want people in that stuff to make more stuff, so that means “new rules”.  Even imposing “gimme your stuff” is creating a new rule set - when I want your stuff, you give it…or else.

These really are shades of certainty.  And then there are wars that make zero sense.  Someone is afraid of someone else’s certainty, even if they completely imagine it.  So they react to imagined stimuli and start a war.  Then we get into religion, which could be a rule set but very often gets really weird and irrational as the dictation of that rule set is assigned to an imaginary higher power - one cannot sit God down at the negotiating table.

The most rare form of warfare is total extermination.  They happen but in these cases an entire group of people no longer existing becomes the cause, and objective.  Wars over rules happened all the time with stuff getting rolled in, or vice versa.

[Fernando]

3 hours ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

Technically speaking, this is incorrect at least since significant number of nuclear weapons has been produced. Winning a war through atomic bombardment is possible, and it would be a purely attritional action.

I was speaking of a conventional war, not a nuclear one.

[photon]

1 minute ago, The_Capt said:

I think every war is a combination of the two to be honest.  Rarely does one side simply “want stuff”.

That's fair. I'd include people in the stuff that you can fight a war-for-stuff for. I suppose I'm trying to grapple with the asymmetry in objective that we see in lots of wars. Like, the Roman wars in Italy where they left the locals in charge (but bound to Rome by treaty) feel different from the Roman wars where they annexed territory and deposed the local rulers.

[Astrophel]

21 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I think every war is a combination of the two to be honest.  Rarely does one side simply “want stuff”.  They very often want people in that stuff to make more stuff, so that means “new rules”.  Even imposing “gimme your stuff” is creating a new rule set - when I want your stuff, you give it…or else.

These really are shades of certainty.  And then there are wars that make zero sense.  Someone is afraid of someone else’s certainty, even if they completely imagine it.  So they react to imagined stimuli and start a war.  Then we get into religion, which could be a rule set but very often gets really weird and irrational as the dictation of that rule set is assigned to an imaginary higher power - one cannot sit God down at the negotiating table.

The most rare form of warfare is total extermination.  They happen but in these cases an entire group of people no longer existing becomes the cause, and objective.  Wars over rules happened all the time with stuff getting rolled in, or vice versa.

Entities who fight wars usually "have stuff" or they cannot afford a war.  So perhaps they want "even more stuff", or they equate territory with potency, or they have some kind of religious drive.  Or they are genuinely afraid.

[LongLeftFlank]

17 hours ago, The_Capt said:

My overall point stands - there is a magic point in time and space when the right general meets the right moment, with the right army; this is consistent throughout history.

 

Now I have precisely the right instrument, at precisely the right moment of history, in exactly the right place.

Edited February 9 by LongLeftFlank