How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

2 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

Is the problem the minefields, the dug in defenders, the fortifications, their artillery or their drones? If one of these were removed, would the whole thing collapse? Which one would be the easiest to remove?

Flying over removes the minefields + fortifications, but requires a lot of flying infrastructure. 10k heavy lift quadcopters to move 1000 soldiers, many of which will get trashed… that’s a big ask.

Drone swarm of autonomous death that kills anything with a few km squared it can find (including landing and waiting for hapless defenders to peek their heads up)… this is technologically feasible, and probably less expensive than many artillery systems + their accompanying logistics and training requirements. But it doesn’t exist yet.

As someone put it eloquently a few pages ago, the problem isn't just having a lot of your own drones, it is suppressing the other guys. As long as the other guy has drones up attacking is just going to cost to much and be to slow. Ground the bad guys drones one or another and everything else has some chance to work.

[dan/california]

7 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

Is the problem the minefields, the dug in defenders, the fortifications, their artillery or their drones? If one of these were removed, would the whole thing collapse? Which one would be the easiest to remove?

Flying over removes the minefields + fortifications, but requires a lot of flying infrastructure. 10k heavy lift quadcopters to move 1000 soldiers, many of which will get trashed… that’s a big ask.

Drone swarm of autonomous death that kills anything with a few km squared it can find (including landing and waiting for hapless defenders to peek their heads up)… this is technologically feasible, and probably less expensive than many artillery systems + their accompanying logistics and training requirements. But it doesn’t exist yet.

As someone put it eloquently a few pages ago, the problem isn't just having a lot of your own drones, it is suppressing the other guys. As long as the other guy has drones up attacking is just going to cost to much and be to slow. Ground the bad guys drones one way or another and everything else has some chance to work.

[OBJ]

12 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:

Is the problem the minefields, the dug in defenders, the fortifications, their artillery or their drones? If one of these were removed, would the whole thing collapse? Which one would be the easiest to remove?

Flying over removes the minefields + fortifications, but requires a lot of flying infrastructure. 10k heavy lift quadcopters to move 1000 soldiers, many of which will get trashed… that’s a big ask.

Drone swarm of autonomous death that kills anything with a few km squared it can find (including landing and waiting for hapless defenders to peek their heads up)… this is technologically feasible, and probably less expensive than many artillery systems + their accompanying logistics and training requirements. But it doesn’t exist yet.

Really like your thinking @kimbosbread, great questions, what aspects of the defense have to be overcome to allow a breakthrough/restore mobility. Using the WWI/WWII armor analogy our 'Death Swarm' will need to break through the entirety of the defender's forward positions to then overrun the defenders artillery, logistics, and C3, if not C4, to cripple the defender's ability to sustain a cohesive defense.
So let me extend to discussion, play devil's advocate to maybe see how the offensive might reach at least parity with the defensive (defensive as we think we are seeing now in Ukraine)

1. How do we sustain the 'Death Swarm,' once we breakout and are exploiting
2. How do we hold ground once the Death Swarm has broken through to prevent the defender from reoccupying it?
3. What do our 'Anti-Death Swarm' units look like to counter the enemies Death Swarms?
 

[OBJ]

17 minutes ago, dan/california said:

As someone put it eloquently a few pages ago, the problem isn't just having a lot of your own drones, it is suppressing the other guys. As long as the other guy has drones up attacking is just going to cost to much and be to slow. Ground the bad guys drones one way or another and everything else has some chance to work.

I agree @dan/california, 'drone supremacy' is likely to be a prerequisite to operational level offensive success.

[Seedorf81]

Reuters:

Ukrainian General (Brigadier, according to Reuters) Tarnavsky says in interview that there is a significant shortage of ammunition for Ukrainian frontline troops, and that some operations have been scaled down because of lack of foreign support.

Ammo-shortage predominantly with post-soviet period shells. "It is a real big problem", he stated. The Ukrainians have to redistribute the ammo they still have, and adapt offensive plans.

According to Tarnavsky, who led the southern counter-offensive that led to the liberation of Cherson and who played an important role during fighting around Zaporizja, the Russians also suffer from post-soviet ammo shortages.

But he still expects that (local??)victories can be achieved and stated that Ukrainian reserves are being prepared for further large actions.

 

 

Edited December 18, 2023 by Seedorf81
small addition

[Yet]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

 

 

Edited December 18, 2023 by Yet
sometimes silence is beter

[OBJ]

Ukraine’s Military Chief Says One of His Offices Was Bugged and Other Devices Were Detected

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2023/12/18/ukraines-military-chief-says-one-of-his-offices-was-bugged-and-other-devices-were-detected.html

 

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, OBJ said:

No idea, 'how do we,' Break the Stalemate.

From my limited understanding of historical precedent relative to WWI western front defensive primacy:
1. 1918 Germans developed a doctrinal solution, Stosstruppen, infiltration tactics
2. 1916 British developed a technical solution, the tank
3. The Germans then combined both in WWII

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stormtroopers_(Imperial_Germany)#:~:text=Under a creeping barrage%2C Stoßtruppen,enemy headquarters and artillery strongpoints.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infiltration_tactics#:~:text=Hutier favoured brief but intense,%2C artillery%2C and command centres.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tanks_in_World_War_I#:~:text=In Great Britain%2C an initial,Army on 2 February 1916.

 

So maybe flying over the minefields just needs a combination of doctrine and technology to work. Still not sure how the sustainment logistics would work, maybe they fly over too.

At some point I think we also need to account for what is unique in Ukraine, and might not be applicable in all sectors of a wider war.

Just want to note, chaps, that I talk to a lot of folks and I have yet to hear a clearer take on our tactical and operational conundrum than I do here. 

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, fireship4 said:

...Because it made no sense to me: you switched from what I normally see in your long dissertations on military strategy to an incoherent definition of "liberals progressive theory"?  Like you had a stroke.  I'm not a political scientist by any means but it is does you a disservice.  Perhaps things are different in Canada...

https://www.britannica.com/question/How-does-modern-liberalism-differ-from-conservatism

Ok, so lets start here.  Not classical liberalism - technically we in North America live in classic liberal democracies.  Liberalism - with a capital "L" is a loose political theory built around forward leaning into social change.  It highlights all of the items I was talking about - which are seen a "liberal" in my country.

Here is some more on the US specifically, or at least a good place to start:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_ideologies_in_the_United_States#:~:text=Liberalism is the predominant left,this scale are called moderates.

Global order:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_order

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_world_order_(politics)

Flimflam or whatever is lining up with this:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_World_Order_(conspiracy_theory)

Clearly I was talking about global collectivism vs individualism between states (ie Russia, Ukraine and the US)  Liberalism embraces a collective global order and multi-lateralism, while conservatism leans towards individualism of the state - bi-lateralism and less global/international community oversight.  

If that does not clear things up then I guess we are just not going to be able to communicate on this one.  My advice is that maybe you spend some time doing the background readings.  Political theory is evolving around us.

As to climate change...seriously, where have you been?  It is a major wedge point between the right and left in North America.  Why?  Because to address it will take significant social change.  One side is ok with that, and the other is not - quick quiz, who do you suppose those sides are?  One side on the extreme,  denies that climate change is even happening.  The extreme on the other side wants us to freeze to death in the dark.  (I am not making this up).  

You may think this sounds crazy but welcome to my world.  I am not sure where you live, but honestly I am a little jealous.  This sort of stuff is tearing our politics apart.  

Anyway if you really want to continue the poli-sci debate you can DM me as this whole discussion, while interesting, really has nothing to do with the war. 

 

Edited December 18, 2023 by The_Capt

[kimbosbread]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

As someone put it eloquently a few pages ago, the problem isn't just having a lot of your own drones, it is suppressing the other guys.

Drones cannot hold territory, at least in their present form. If there is bad weather, that will ground all small drones. Obviously UGVs with enough power to last a few days and that are essentially autonomous, moving turrets, that complicates things.

58 minutes ago, OBJ said:

So let me extend to discussion, play devil's advocate to maybe see how the offensive might reach at least parity with the defensive (defensive as we think we are seeing now in Ukraine)

1. How do we sustain the 'Death Swarm,' once we breakout and are exploiting
2. How do we hold ground once the Death Swarm has broken through to prevent the defender from reoccupying it?
3. What do our 'Anti-Death Swarm' units look like to counter the enemies Death Swarms?
 

1. Drone swarm is expendable. Most drones don’t last long anway, like a few flights. Treat it like a munition.

2. Dug-in infantry, UGVs, mines

3. If the drones are autonomous, it’s gonna be really hard to detect them. I like the idea of loitering interceptor drones you launch to clear the air and that hunt via SDR, small radar and optical, but that seems like you may need a lot more interceptors. Lasers for point defense sound great but are expensive and complex, any sort of active radar is going to get detected and bring unwanted attention, fast. I think counter-battery drones against the launchers. Small fixerd-wing electric drones might only have 1-4 hours loiter time, so if the enemy is not able to put new ones in the air, that’s a problem for them. Or anything they can put up with enough endurance won’t have enough of a warhead to blow up a properly fortified position (logs with dirt on top, for example).

Edited December 18, 2023 by kimbosbread

[danfrodo]

33 minutes ago, OBJ said:

Ukraine’s Military Chief Says One of His Offices Was Bugged and Other Devices Were Detected

https://www.military.com/daily-news/2023/12/18/ukraines-military-chief-says-one-of-his-offices-was-bugged-and-other-devices-were-detected.html

 

First, thanks OBJ (and Tux) for some excellent posts.  Second, this is interesting.  How much of RU ability to pre-empt UKR offensive actions is because of treason?  I get that moving some mobiks into a threatened sector isn't very hard, logistically, but what about arty & drone assets?  Are those getting to the trouble spots faster than otherwise because of insider information?

One thing Putin is good at:  leveraging personal greed.  And if there are traitors, are they just doing it for money (probably) or some insane love or Russian totalitarian domination?  

Edited December 18, 2023 by danfrodo

[cyrano01]

16 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Another paper on the subject.  Punchline is that we are way off historical norms for a high intensity conventional conflict:

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2022/Liddell-Hart-Space-1960/

At 300 per km, it really looks like a Bn is covering what a division used to in WW2 and what I suspect a Bde was supposed to in the Cold War.

Interesting paper, for some reason I had never stumbled across it. Entertainingly, the nearest defensive force ratio that BLH mentions to the 300 per km appears to be the Boers during the second Boer war. Complete with open veldt, no usable  indirect artillery fire and rifle dominance, certainly part of the previous era of defensive predominance albeit with radically different technologies. Kind of hoping that the Ukrainian commanders are a bit sharper than Buller or Methuen, at least there's no danger they have old Etonians in positions of command.

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, kimbosbread said:

Is the problem the minefields, the dug in defenders, the fortifications, their artillery or their drones? If one of these were removed, would the whole thing collapse? Which one would be the easiest to remove?

Flying over removes the minefields + fortifications, but requires a lot of flying infrastructure. 10k heavy lift quadcopters to move 1000 soldiers, many of which will get trashed… that’s a big ask.

Drone swarm of autonomous death that kills anything with a few km squared it can find (including landing and waiting for hapless defenders to peek their heads up)… this is technologically feasible, and probably less expensive than many artillery systems + their accompanying logistics and training requirements. But it doesn’t exist yet.

I was talking about those individual jet packs, but of course they would have to upscale production dramatically.  Heavy lift UAS could be used for resupply and medivac - but again...not ready at scale.  

To solve the minefield problem one basically needs to isolate the breaching area (including bridgehead), conduct the breach, amass and breakout - that it the traditional doctrinal approach.  Problem is - how do you isolate an area when your opponent can see pretty much everything?  So sweeping enemy drones, attrition of guns are a must.  But one has to go in and take out all those ATGM teams linked into the drones and guns.  For that I think we need massed offensive drone swarms.  Or a lot of precise artillery. 

Once you can isolate an area you then need to move really quickly.  Even the RA is moving fast by warfare standards.  You do not have hours to rally up at the bridgehead and charge out - you have minutes.  This means any crossing is a bouce-crossing, which has significant challenges of its own.

What I think we are landing on is "it doesn't exist yet".  So next question: "Can it be built for this war?" 

[Battlefront.com]

12 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Now this does bring up a good point.  How long can the RA sustain losses of the high end capability?  Stuffing 300 conscripts into trenches is one thing.  Replacing a summers worth of AD, EW and guns is something else.  There has to be a qualitative breaking point in there somewhere. These systems take significant resources to manufacture and train competent crews on - not all blood has the same value.

I have been asking that same thing here, rhetorically, on a regular basis since March of 2022.  Every time Ukraine blows up an AD, EW, or ISR complex I wonder when Russia will run out.

Logically we know that Russia doesn't have an endless supply of these things.  We also know they are slow and expensive to produce.  We also know they don't have yards full of rusting ones that they can put into action.  They also likely didn't have a large number in reserve at the start of the war because Russia chronically underfunded expansion/introduction of newer systems/capabilities.

That's all factual, not speculative.

Since the war started we know that Russia has transferred a lot of these systems from all over the Federation.  We know they've drawn down forces from the Finnish border and long since tapped out resources in the Far east.  We've seen intel reports of them moving S-400s from Kaliningrad, which is something they would not have done unless they were running out of places to grab stuff from (Kaliningrad is Russia's most important forward air defense region).

And yet, they still seem to have enough to adequately cover threats in/from Ukraine.  Though some evidence suggests that Russia is forced to economize and leave some places less covered than others.

So the question remains... at what point does Russia simply not have enough of these fancy systems to maintain some form of edge over Ukraine?  I keep thinking "soon".  Someday I'll be correct!

Steve

[Aragorn2002]

2 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I have been asking that same thing here, rhetorically, on a regular basis since March of 2022.  Every time Ukraine blows up an AD, EW, or ISR complex I wonder when Russia will run out.

Logically we know that Russia doesn't have an endless supply of these things.  We also know they are slow and expensive to produce.  We also know they don't have yards full of rusting ones that they can put into action.  They also likely didn't have a large number in reserve at the start of the war because Russia chronically underfunded expansion/introduction of newer systems/capabilities.

That's all factual, not speculative.

Since the war started we know that Russia has transferred a lot of these systems from all over the Federation.  We know they've drawn down forces from the Finnish border and long since tapped out resources in the Far east.  We've seen intel reports of them moving S-400s from Kaliningrad, which is something they would not have done unless they were running out of places to grab stuff from (Kaliningrad is Russia's most important forward air defense region).

And yet, they still seem to have enough to adequately cover threats in/from Ukraine.  Though some evidence suggests that Russia is forced to economize and leave some places less covered than others.

So the question remains... at what point does Russia simply not have enough of these fancy systems to maintain some form of edge over Ukraine?  I keep thinking "soon".  Someday I'll be correct!

Steve

We all know how long "soon" can take in your world, Steve.

[Battlefront.com]

Just now, Aragorn2002 said:

We all know how long "soon" can take in your world, Steve.

Fair point

Steve

[danfrodo]

19 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I have been asking that same thing here, rhetorically, on a regular basis since March of 2022.  Every time Ukraine blows up an AD, EW, or ISR complex I wonder when Russia will run out.

Logically we know that Russia doesn't have an endless supply of these things.  We also know they are slow and expensive to produce.  We also know they don't have yards full of rusting ones that they can put into action.  They also likely didn't have a large number in reserve at the start of the war because Russia chronically underfunded expansion/introduction of newer systems/capabilities.

That's all factual, not speculative.

Since the war started we know that Russia has transferred a lot of these systems from all over the Federation.  We know they've drawn down forces from the Finnish border and long since tapped out resources in the Far east.  We've seen intel reports of them moving S-400s from Kaliningrad, which is something they would not have done unless they were running out of places to grab stuff from (Kaliningrad is Russia's most important forward air defense region).

And yet, they still seem to have enough to adequately cover threats in/from Ukraine.  Though some evidence suggests that Russia is forced to economize and leave some places less covered than others.

So the question remains... at what point does Russia simply not have enough of these fancy systems to maintain some form of edge over Ukraine?  I keep thinking "soon".  Someday I'll be correct!

Steve

This gets into the basic problem.  For all the faults of RU and the continuing qualitative weakening of its capabilities, UKR does not seem to have the resources to exploit RU weakness.  Meanwhile, all the Putin lovers in the US are making it even harder for UKR.  I do wonder whether these folks get campaign cash from lobbying groups that are multiple cut-outs from the source -- meaning Putin.

[OBJ]

36 minutes ago, cyrano01 said:

Interesting paper, for some reason I had never stumbled across it. Entertainingly, the nearest defensive force ratio that BLH mentions to the 300 per km appears to be the Boers during the second Boer war. Complete with open veldt, no usable  indirect artillery fire and rifle dominance, certainly part of the previous era of defensive predominance albeit with radically different technologies. Kind of hoping that the Ukrainian commanders are a bit sharper than Buller or Methuen, at least there's no danger they have old Etonians in positions of command.

Agree with everyone else, very interesting paper and discussion of conventional warfare concentration in space and time. Anything from Liddell Hart gets my attention. I was not aware of it either. Thanks for sharing.

[OBJ]

31 minutes ago, Aragorn2002 said:

We all know how long "soon" can take in your world, Steve.

Good one

[Vet 0369]

9 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Well evidently somebody thinks moar mech is the key to breaking the deadlock 

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/12/07/ukraine-is-forming-five-new-mechanized-brigades-now-they-need-vehicles/?sh=3bff7d502f70

The Ukrainian army is forming five new mechanized brigades. On paper, the 150th, 151st, 152nd, 153rd and 154th Mechanized Brigades represent a significant force—a five-percent expansion of the Ukrainian ground forces....

The brigades reportedly are drawing their cadres of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers from existing brigades, while filling out their 2,000 or so other billets with new recruits.

In practice, the Ukrainians seem to appreciate that brigades lose fighting vehicles fast while in combat, and need access to ample stocks of replacement vehicles.

 

Well, it’s all very simple even though it seems that most military leaders and planners have forgotten the concepts.

1.ARMOR SUPPORTS INFANTRY! 

2. INFANTRY PROTECTS ARMOR!

Contrary to popular belief, and depiction by Hollywood, armor IS NOT CALVARY! In this type of war, armor, except APCs, need to by positioned “hull-down” in overwatch to target the objectives of the infantry assault, not to “lead the charge with bugles blaring.” Yes, the armored “battle-taxis needs to run forward to deploy the grunts, but then, if possible, return to hull-down positions to do close support of the infantry.

if you don’t have air support, you use predesignated artillery fire on ANY location that can be used for AT assets and heavy weapons the enemy might have to use against your assault element. Battalion size elements and larger (remember always have a minimum of at least 3 to 1 over the enemy force), use double envelopment whenever possible so the enemy can’t concentrate all their forces against the assault force.

it seems to me that the commanders of today, except in very basic ways the Russians, have forgotten these very basic precepts that I was taught as a Sgt. more than 50-years ago.

[LongLeftFlank]

RESOLVED: 'Accuracy over mass is going to win this war'.

Discuss.

(jk, that's like the last 3100 pages)

***

Been seeing a fair number of these kills of AD systems over the last month. I know very little about air defence, so not much sense of how badly each of these 'hurts' Ivan.

So per Wiki, it looks like the Russian Army has about 350 Buk SAM launchers of all types. No count on Zhitel jammers.

[The_Capt]

19 minutes ago, Vet 0369 said:

it seems to me that the commanders of today, except in very basic ways the Russians, have forgotten these very basic precepts that I was taught as a Sgt. more than 50-years ago.

That is because they do not work anymore.

Armor cannot support infantry as it get detected too far out.  This is why we keep seeing them pushed forward in 1 & 2s to snipe, and then blown up.  So basically more infantry mobile guns.

Infantry cannot protect armor.  ATGM are reaching out to 3-5kms.  UAS are everywhere.  And guns when linked to UAS/ISR are dropping the sky on them before they even reach direct fire distance.  Infantry cannot sweep the ranges needed to protect that armor...and they cannot fly.

I might have bought the RA "forgetting this" (which would be odd as they demonstrated it in 2014).  But the UA has been feeding troops into western training for nearly 2 years.  And officers into our war colleges for nearly a decade.  The UA simply did not "forget".  In fact they tried it last May-Jun and it failed.

The combined arms team is broken and no one knows how to fix it.

Edited December 18, 2023 by The_Capt

[kimbosbread]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

What I think we are landing on is "it doesn't exist yet".  So next question: "Can it be built for this war?" 

Small scale autonomous drone swarms (group of 2-5) working hunter-killer groups where drones are 5-10kg with 2-6 hour flight time, going after radars, trucks, trains etc? Absolutely doable by 2025EOY in some volume. But if you are using a hundred a day, you have to be producing 100k per year. China could do this easily; I have less confidence in the US due to the fact we don’t build most of the components here.

Larger swarms of smaller drones, where you expend 100 or 1000 drones on one small section of front in an engagement? Science fiction until we have the means to produce enough of them.

EDIT: One workaround is of course less expendability, and more payload- an autonomous drone bomber for example. But drones just don’t last that long in the field under hard use.

Edited December 18, 2023 by kimbosbread

[Vet 0369]

6 hours ago, Zeleban said:

Much worse. Many new Ukrainian officers are so-called "jackets" - this is the name regular Soviet officers gave to reserve officers - ordinary citizens who graduated from a civilian higher educational institution with a military department at that university. For example, at the law school where my friend studied there may be an artillery department that trained artillery platoon commanders. The preparation was very minimal (a friend told me that they had an 85 mm D-44 cannon as a training tool).

Before the war, institutes with a military department were super popular, because they made it possible to avoid conscription. You calmly graduated from university, after which you automatically became a junior lieutenant in the reserves. Then no one thought that war would happen and that he would have to become a real officer.

The disparaging nickname “jackets” was given to these people by real regular officers of the Soviet army. Because these so-called officers came to military training in civilian clothes. They didn't even have military uniforms. Due to their extremely poor training and virtual uselessness, the attitude towards such officers was very dismissive (we are not members of the same family).

Today, such officers command platoons and even companies in the Ukrainian (and also in Russian) army. To be fair, I can say that not all “jackets” are bad officers. Just like not all regular officers are “good” officers. Everything depends heavily on a person’s motivation and desire for self-development.

All officers, whether Regular or Reserve, basically enter the service with the same amount of training. The vast majority of officers were officers simply because they were college grads. They all received the same amount of basic Officer training, and then got their REAL training and experience in the field. The successful “good” officers were successful and good because they listened to their experienced NCOs. Even a college degree wasn’t really necessary. During recruit training, everyone takes a battery of tests to determine their GCT (I believe it stands for “general college test”) score to determine their general placement and “job qualification.” If it it high enough, you qualify for Officer training. In 1969, I was offered the opportunity to attend U.S.M.C. Basic Officer Candidate School, even though I was 19 years old, graduated High School one month before, and had no college. I declined the offer.

One young (under-aged) Soldier from Texas during WWII  had tried to join the Marine Corps, but was rejected because he was too short. He got into the Army as a Private, and finished the war as a Major, AND, the most decorated serviceman in WWII. His name was Audie Murphy. So I would question the validity of any statement that a “90-day wonder” is something less than a West Point or Annapolis graduate.

[Haiduk]

Russian TGs claimed yesterday not one, but two Russian Su-25 were lost. Allegedly they completed strike mission, but conducting evasive maneuvers to avoid MANPADs launches both planes collided in bad weather conditions. Both pilots are dead. 

Fighterbomber didn't confirm this yet

 

Edited December 18, 2023 by Haiduk