How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[JonS]

6 hours ago, Vet 0369 said:

I personally wouldn’t be caught dead looking “up” at a toilet (loo to some). I’ve ever been that thirsty!

 

[Kraft]

I seriously wonder about the tone of the NYT.

There is reporting, and there is opinion shaping. I think this stuff is very much in the latter. Just the language being used and purposefully repeated through the article is very much not objective.

Quote

Ukrainian Marines on ‘Suicide Mission’ in Crossing the Dnipro River

Quote

Soldiers frustrated by positive reports from Ukrainian officials break their silence, describing the effort as brutalizing and, ultimately, futile.

Quote

Soldiers and marines who have taken part in the river crossings described the offensive as brutalizing and futile, as waves of Ukrainian troops have been struck down on the river banks or in the water, even before they reach the other side.

Quote

where Ukrainian troops seized a narrow strip of fishermen’s houses — the only place where they managed to establish a toehold.

Quote

“It’s not even a fight for survival,” he added. “It’s a suicide mission.”

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/16/world/europe/ukraine-kherson-river-russia.html

Their next article is called "people snatchers"

Quote

Ukrainian men are reporting incidents of wrongful draft notices, unprofessional medical commissions and coercive mobilization tactics.

No mentioning of russia, their conditions, the 300 vehicles they burnt through this month, if UA did that, oh how many sob stories would they write?

Also it irks me they call it "russia-Ukraine war" instead of invasion, or russias war on Ukraine. But Im sure thats just coincidence

Edited December 17, 2023 by Kraft

[Seedorf81]

It seems to me that most people forget how humanly normal it is for the Ukrainians to be war-weary and somber, and to even question a positive outcome. But it is almost certainly TEMPORARY!

It is not only the longevity of the war, and the corresponding fear and stress that goes along with it, that creates this grim atmosphere. In my experience hope that doesn't get materialized tends to weigh heavier on most people's morale, than physical pain, fear, disappointment and other adversities.

And in this war the average hope before the summer offensive was very high, perhaps - in retrospect of course, unrealisticly high. The unexpected defeat of the Russian invasion, the sinking of the Moskva and the further humiliation of the Black Sea Fleet, the Wagner-uprising, the endless amount of video's and reports of exploding Russian vehicles and dead and dying Russian soldiers, and the large number of countries that gave material and/or financial support (Which in hindsight gave a false impression of the usefull amount of support. Ten countries donating 10 -20 tanks each sounds nice, but creates unrealistic hope.), all contributed to an understandable belief in succes.

In my opinion a sudden realisation that thing aren't nearly as rosy as expected, weighs people down. Mostly because rational thinking cannot cope very well with accepting the fact that our expectations were too high.

It just takes time. Whether the situation on the frontline stays as it is, or even when there are going to be more setbacks for the Ukrainians, this current "depression" will subside. The Ukrainian tenacity and unwielding fighting spirit just have a little understandable setback.

And to parafrase Schwarzenegger's famous quote: "They will be back".   

Edited December 17, 2023 by Seedorf81
and another spellingblunder as usual

[Battlefront.com]

16 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

Sorry for posting a link to Reddit - it's some crazy footage well worth watching, but didn't intend it to autoplay. And this forum won't let me delete or even edit the post so that the video is not embedded.

I fixed it for you.

When you paste a Reddit link if you wait a couple of seconds a message is displayed at the bottom with a blue background.  Read that and click where it says to post as a link instead. 

Steve

 

[Bulletpoint]

2 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I fixed it for you.

When you paste a Reddit link if you wait a couple of seconds a message is displayed at the bottom with a blue background.  Read that and click where it says to post as a link instead. 

Steve

 

Got it, thanks.

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, Seedorf81 said:

It seems to me that most people forget how humanly normal it is for the Ukrainians to be war-weary and somber, and to even question a positive outcome. But it is almost certainly TEMPORARY!

It is not only the longevity of the war, and the corresponding fear and stress that goes along with it, that creates this grim atmosphere. In my experience hope that doesn't get materialized tends to weigh heavier on most people's morale, than physical pain, fear, disappointment and other adversities.

And in this war the average hope before the summer offensive was very high, perhaps - in retrospect of course, unrealisticly high. The unexpected defeat of the Russian invasion, the sinking of the Moskva and the further humiliation of the Black Sea Fleet, the Wagner-uprising, the endless amount of video's and reports of exploding Russian vehicles and dead and dying Russian soldiers, and the large number of countries that gave material and/or financial support (Which in hindsight gave a false impression of the usefull amount of support. Ten countries donating 10 -20 tanks each sounds nice, but creates unrealistic hope.), all contributed to an understandable belief in succes.

In my opinion a sudden realisation that thing aren't nearly as rosy as expected, weighs people down. Mostly because rational thinking cannot cope very well with accepting the fact that our expectations were too high.

It just takes time. Whether the situation on the frontline stays as it is, or even when there are going to be more setbacks for the Ukrainians, this current "depression" will subside. The Ukrainian tenacity and unwielding fighting spirit just have a little understandable setback.

And to parafrase Schwarzenegger's famous quote: "They will be back".   

Well put.

I think we're in a "period of adjustment" where expectations have to be "recentered" after getting misaligned this summer.  Ukrainian political and military leaders dialed up the hubris to 11 and that set the tone for much of what followed.  Even here, where we tend towards pessimistic realism on what is right in front of us (even if we are optimistic about where it winds up), our expectations were higher than what Ukraine was able to achieve.  Which indicates pretty much everybody was caught, to some extent, by surprise at how little ground Ukraine took back under its control and how Russia (yet again) managed to prevent a collapse by sheer expenditure of Russian lives.

So now us pessimistic realist types are talking about "defensive primacy" and exploring what it might mean for the frontlines in the near future.  The term "stalemate" is being used now whereas it was not being used before.

What distinguishes the pessimistic realists from ordinary pessimists is well thought through analysis.  Where the pessimist only sees what can't be done by the Ukrainians, the realist variety also sees what can't be done by the Russians.  Specifically, take ground easily and in quantity.

It is very clear that Russia has much higher territorial objectives than what it currently possesses, yet equally clear it lacks the means of achieving them.  Ukraine's primary territorial objectives are already met (i.e. not being fully overrun), however its secondary objectives (retaking what it lost) are for now unrealistic.  To be realistic Russians need to adjust its primary objectives, Ukraine its secondary ones.  I believe Ukraine can adjust, I do not believe Russia can.  Advantage Ukraine.

Ukraine needs to refocus on maintaining its primary objective (i.e. not being ethnically cleansed) and put aside secondary aspirations of regaining territory for now.

It's not going to be pretty or easy, but Ukraine's alternative (defeat) is vastly worse.  Russia has made sure to communicate that to the Ukrainian people and the world.  I have faith that will be enough to keep Russia from getting what it wants.

Steve

[FlemFire]

On 12/15/2023 at 9:43 PM, JonS said:

I mean, in one sense you're right - pretty much every historian of the rise of the Nazis and the outbreak of WWII does mention Versailles. But they are definitely not all saying the same thing.

You are either being dishonest by implying they are, or being ignorant in thinking they are.

A lot of words to just say Versailles had a huge impact on the lead up to WWII which was indeed the point.

 

Quote

 

What does this actually mean?

The UK, its Dominions, and France entered a war against Germany in September 1939 to - amongst other things - guarantee the independence of Poland. Six years later that war ended. Had Poland's independence been secured? Can the UK be said to have 'won' in those terms? What about France, or even Poland?

If they didn't win, does that mean Germany did?

 

 

I don't know what part is confusing. My calculus is that Ukraine can never win militarily on its own. Therefore, the involvement of the West needs to be of substantial material or direct involvement. Neither of these things are happening. What is happening is something I judge as a half-measure that is only extending the length of war for no actual gain. I asked earlier this year how Ukraine wins militarily and got a lot of answers which have been proven definitively wrong in every regard. If you want to take another crack at it as to how Ukraine succeeds militarily now, I'm all ears.

 

  

14 hours ago, Vet 0369 said:

How does this have any relevance to anything? Ukraine is in a war for its very existence, and it’s only natural that they recruit and conscript anywho they feel can make a contribution. Case-in point, when I was in Norway on a NATO joint operation, I learned that EVERY Norwegian citizen, from the time they graduated secondary school, was REQUIRED to serve 15 months in the Army, or 24 months in the Air Force/Navy as long as they were physically and mentally qualified. They then served in the Active Reserve until age 45, and then in the Inactive Reserve until age 65! That was in case they were invaded again (this time by the Soviet Union). Your comments about “50-year olds” in Ukraine are nothing more than “Red Herrings.”

You have ONE chance to address this intelligently, before I put you on ignore.

 

 

 

Drafting middle-aged people does not equate to having the average age of your soldiers be middle-aged. The former is not unusual, particularly in a time of war. The latter indicates that your frontlines are completely exhausted and you are nearly out of manpower.

 

 

 

[Bulletpoint]

6 minutes ago, FlemFire said:

I don't know what part is confusing. My calculus is that Ukraine can never win militarily on its own. Therefore, the involvement of the West needs to be of substantial material or direct involvement. Neither of these things are happening.

I think most people here will agree on this part. At least I do.

7 minutes ago, FlemFire said:

What is happening is something I judge as a half-measure that is only extending the length of war for no actual gain.

Here is where it gets a bit controversial. I think the USA (and therefore NATO) is pretty happy about where the current frontline goes.

Ukraine's independence has been saved, because there is no way Russia can take the rest of the 80 percent of the country.

But on the other hand, Russia won't lose the remaining 20 percent of Ukraine that they are most interested in - large amount of Russian speakers and a vital land bridge to Crimea.

This means Putin will be able to sell this war as a win, despite the cost. He feels secure he will stay in power, and no real escalation happens.

This is also why Western support for Ukraine is now being dialled down. We are in a process of Ukrainian leadership and public slowly getting more and more used to the idea of not being able to win a total victory.

(I should add that I would personally like Ukraine to regain everything, but I do not think this will happen).

[danfrodo]

I'm interested to see how UKR uses those long range strike drones mentioned above.  Logistics, obviously.  But probably energy infrastructure.  Once hundreds of thousands urban Russians have gotten a taste of winter without power for a few days, or a week at a time, where will there anger be directed?  At UKR, of course.  But maybe at Putin also?

[poesel]

I'm disappointed by you all. All this talk about toilets and nobody posted this:

 

[Bulletpoint]

5 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

I'm interested to see how UKR uses those long range strike drones mentioned above.  Logistics, obviously.  But probably energy infrastructure.  Once hundreds of thousands urban Russians have gotten a taste of winter without power for a few days, or a week at a time, where will there anger be directed?  At UKR, of course.  But maybe at Putin also?

I doubt it. The last winter showed how many missiles and drones it really takes in order to knock out a country's power supply faster than it can be repaired. And that was with Russian cruise missiles that despite not being perfect are probably still much more accurate than these Ukrainian drones.

[Haiduk]

I recall discussions on our military forum 15 years ago about ways of development of ground forces. And discussions will it worth to completely substitute tracked BMPs on Ukrainian BTR-4, which indeed is wheeled IFV. 

Now we can be shure in our mud season conditions in the fields and dirt roads, any wheeled vehilces lost to tracked ones. 

 

[FlemFire]

On 12/15/2023 at 8:31 PM, Battlefront.com said:

Er, I was just repeating your characterization of it.  I have no idea what really went on.  Nobody does.

Seriously, how in the name of whatever deity you choose to mention did you get THAT out of what I said?  In fact, I said the opposite.  Ukraine is in the driver's seat on this, not the West.  While I don't agree with how well they are handling getting Ukraine everything it needs to fight this war, it certainly can't be seen as shrugging it off either.  As I pointed out a bunch of pages ago, the West has collectively provided Ukraine with 2x its annual GDP in various forms of direct assistance.  It might not be enough or the right mix of things, but it certainly is a massive commitment.  Historically it is abnormally large, as a chart I posted at the time demonstrated.

Ukraine is not in the driver seat, per the Israeli PM, and frankly per anyone with a set of eyes. Let's just assume the opposite case, that the West didn't want conflict with Russia. Do you think Ukraine is able to "take the wheel" so to speak and run off to war anyway? The West has far more influence than you are letting on, and has been all over Ukraine for nearly 10 years now. If the West told Ukraine we're out, then Ukraine would have never buckled down to fight a war with a much larger enemy next door.

GDP numbers are pointless, btw. You and I both know the existence of funny money and bloviated costs when it comes to military expenditure. The metrics mean virtually nothing when it's all a question of what is the gear, and how can it be fielded, and when can it be replaced. Ukraine needs a replacement stream of equipment at best, and that literally does not exist. This really shouldn't even be a debate. The existing state of the battlefield speaks for itself.

 

 

On 12/15/2023 at 8:31 PM, Battlefront.com said:

You are flinging around so much stuff so fast and so lose that you are losing track of it as much as I am.  The "conspiracy theory" charge I made against you was specific to your premise that there's a cabal of military industrialists teamed up with Neocons running the show, somehow, under a Democratic controlled US government which is acting in concert with a few dozen other nations.  That's the conspiracy theory I was referring to.

 

If your point is neocons do not have imbalanced influence on the world stage we'll just have to disagree.

 

 

On 12/15/2023 at 8:31 PM, Battlefront.com said:

As for the notion that NATO expansion was the cause of Russia's aggression towards Ukraine, in any way, I will challenge any policy expert who holds that opinion to a debate on that topic.

 

I'm not an interlocutor for those people but they do exist and with plenty of credentials to back up their viewpoints. You should seek them out and bring them here heh.

 

 

On 12/15/2023 at 8:31 PM, Battlefront.com said:

Even if Russia wasn't a lost cause in the 1990s, and there's a great debate about that for sure, the fact is by the time the 2000s rolled around it was firmly headed down the authoritarian path.  And even if it wasn't, there was no reason for the Eastern European countries to think that Russia had really changed.  History shows they were correct.

So no, it wasn't the West's fault.  Russia chose its path and that is the path we have to deal with.

 

Difference of opinion again, just going in circles. By 2000s they were going down the authoritarian path, yes. The shock therapy basically left them as a criminal state and you're not going to legitimately vote your way to stability when oligarchs are running half of everything.

 

 

On 12/15/2023 at 8:31 PM, Battlefront.com said:

It doesn't track because they are not related.  The mistake with WW1 was the "Guilt Clause", impossibly high reparations, obvious selfish land grabs by the victors, as well as giving traditionally German controlled lands to other nations without the people's consent.

The analogy does not apply to Russia at all.  The Soviet Union broke itself apart, it was not defeated.  Lands were not given away by foreign powers.  Lands were not occupied by foreign powers.  Russia was not forced to pay reparations to any of the countries it subjugated for decades, including two bloody military actions.  Russia was not forced to pay the West for all the money it spent over the years confronting the Soviet Union.  Russia wasn't forced to sign some declaration that everything that happened since 1945 was its fault.

None of that.

 

Apologies, I'm not comparing Versailles to the breakup of the Soviet Union. I'm illuminating an example of how decisions made in the past have a tendency to plant seeds for ugly futures. This is obviously not a 1:1 comparison. My firm belief is that Russia was so dramatically weak in the early 90s that the West was firmly in the driver seat on how to approach it. If you believe their actions in regards to their economy and the dubious elections of Yeltsin were "friendly" to Russia's interests, then we'll just have to disagree. I'll just point out one thing: it seems to be quite the contradiction that a defense alliance would push their borders toward Russia, and then at the same time this same Western group would be sincerely trying to help Russia.

 

 

On 12/15/2023 at 8:31 PM, Battlefront.com said:

Could the West have done more to help Russia not slide back into authoritarianism?  Some say yes, some say no.  I take the position that no was more likely than yes, given 100s of years of history.

I believe we only live in the history that we know, but that does not mean it is the way things have to be. In my measurement of the 90s, it was the West who had all the resources and capabilities to try and assist Russia and they chose not to. If you think otherwise, fair enough. 

[Harmon Rabb]

Perun has General Hodges on his YouTube channel again. 

Timestamps created by Perun.

00:00:00 — Opening Words

00:01:35 — What Are We Talking About?

00:03:37 — Lessons From The Battlefield

00:03:56 — Q: Ensuring Training Delivers Value

00:07:44 — Q: Training For The Environment

00:12:56 — Q: Keeping Up With Adaptation

00:15:56 — Q: Observers And Lessons Learned

00:19:41 — Q: Lessons So Far?

00:22:28 — Q: Wargaming and Assumptions

00:25:32 — Q: Training Pre-2022

00:28:08 — Q: Evolution Of The Training Mission

00:34:30 — Q: Training Efforts Post 02/2022

00:37:22 — Q: Higher Level Training Requirements

00:40:47 — Q: Force Regeneration

00:43:24 — Cohesion And Training As A Unit

00:44:36 — Answer Pt.2: Force Regeneration

00:46:09 — Training Program Abbreviation

00:47:35 — Evaluating 2023

00:48:21 — Q: Outcome Vs Commitment

00:52:12 — Priorities, Resources & THAAD

00:54:01 — Q: The Path To 2025

01:02:20 — Conclusion

01:03:50 — Channel Update

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

14 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

This is also why Western support for Ukraine is now being dialled down. We are in a process of Ukrainian leadership and public slowly getting more and more used to the idea of not being able to win a total victory.

This I don't agree with at all and the facts certainly do not support it.

The US executive leadership wants to secure another $61b for Ukraine, which is nearly as much as has already been provided to Ukraine since the war started.  That isn't "dialled down" in any meaningful sense of the concept.

What is happening is rather mundane, predictable domestic political pressure about the prolonged expense and traditional isolationist populism.  It has nothing to do with national policy and, in fact, is contrary to it.

Steve

[FlemFire]

16 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

I think most people here will agree on this part. At least I do.

Here is where it gets a bit controversial. I think the USA (and therefore NATO) is pretty happy about where the current frontline goes.

Ukraine's independence has been saved, because there is no way Russia can take the rest of the 80 percent of the country.

But on the other hand, Russia won't lose the remaining 20 percent of Ukraine that they are most interested in - large amount of Russian speakers and a vital land bridge to Crimea.

This means Putin will be able to sell this war as a win, despite the cost. He feels secure he will stay in power, and no real escalation happens.

This is also why Western support for Ukraine is now being dialled down. We are in a process of Ukrainian leadership and public slowly getting more and more used to the idea of not being able to win a total victory.

(I should add that I would personally like Ukraine to regain everything, but I do not think this will happen).

So everyone is coming around to the realities other acknowledged more than a year ago, slowly but surely.

I'd just caution, as I personally said a year ago, that the longer you fight the war, the more likely it is that it ends with Russia taking more and more. Because you're right that Putin has to sell a win, but what if it gets to a state where they're obviously going to get what they want (like right now), but they can see Ukraine no longer has the fighting capabilities to stop them from taking more? Because one could not submit to the realities of the situation, they end up at the worst position possible.

Ukraine's available bargaining chips were very strong after they counter-attacked and the Russian shock attack limped back to the east. It was my thought they should have immediately pursued peace from there, and likely would have ended up in an absolutely awesome state had they done so (massive prestige gain, a sense of solidarity, a sense of independence, even if there's no NATO/EU). But this just wasn't good enough for those who think war is a Marvel movie. 

[The_Capt]

17 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Well put.

I think we're in a "period of adjustment" where expectations have to be "recentered" after getting misaligned this summer.  Ukrainian political and military leaders dialed up the hubris to 11 and that set the tone for much of what followed.  Even here, where we tend towards pessimistic realism on what is right in front of us (even if we are optimistic about where it winds up), our expectations were higher than what Ukraine was able to achieve.  Which indicates pretty much everybody was caught, to some extent, by surprise at how little ground Ukraine took back under its control and how Russia (yet again) managed to prevent a collapse by sheer expenditure of Russian lives.

So now us pessimistic realist types are talking about "defensive primacy" and exploring what it might mean for the frontlines in the near future.  The term "stalemate" is being used now whereas it was not being used before.

What distinguishes the pessimistic realists from ordinary pessimists is well thought through analysis.  Where the pessimist only sees what can't be done by the Ukrainians, the realist variety also sees what can't be done by the Russians.  Specifically, take ground easily and in quantity.

It is very clear that Russia has much higher territorial objectives than what it currently possesses, yet equally clear it lacks the means of achieving them.  Ukraine's primary territorial objectives are already met (i.e. not being fully overrun), however its secondary objectives (retaking what it lost) are for now unrealistic.  To be realistic Russians need to adjust its primary objectives, Ukraine its secondary ones.  I believe Ukraine can adjust, I do not believe Russia can.  Advantage Ukraine.

Ukraine needs to refocus on maintaining its primary objective (i.e. not being ethnically cleansed) and put aside secondary aspirations of regaining territory for now.

It's not going to be pretty or easy, but Ukraine's alternative (defeat) is vastly worse.  Russia has made sure to communicate that to the Ukrainian people and the world.  I have faith that will be enough to keep Russia from getting what it wants.

Steve

Being totally honest, I was very surprised by the stalemate of this summer.  My assessment was that the UA would break that line and likely threaten that entire corridor.  I was not thinking Melitopol, that was likely a stretch too far but engineering another RA collapse to the coast was definitely viable.  Why:

The RA had demonstrated itself over-stretched over Summer '22 and into the Fall.  It took enormous loses in its pre=war front line forces.  These were the best trained and equipped expeditionary forces Russia had.  Two operational collapses, some hasty force generation - pulling old tanks out of stocks, rapidly mobilized troops etc all pointed to a military in failure.  The RA had not demonstrated that its C4ISR game had improved, quite the opposite.  About the only thing it had going for it was shortened and narrowed logistical lines, but it logistics were a mess too.

Then Russia spent just criminal numbers of men on Bakhmut.  But as we have seen, people are cheap.  An ability to not only lay mines, but effectively defend them...and coordinate that defence was a surprise to me.  To be able to do it all summer was beyond the capabilities of the RA as far as I could see.

Some people "called the ball" on this one, but really these were nothing more than guessing.  No one truly knew or understood force ratios until they happened.  Find me a ground warfare doctrine book that says a deliberate defence can be sustained at 300 troops per km...even with minefields.  And no conventional air cover to speak of.  This wasn't about Russian stick-too in my opinion.  This was something else.  And now analysts are starting to catch up.

Something fundamental has happened to mass.  Honestly I am not sure why this surprises everyone.  Something happens to mass in just about every major war we have had - WW1, WW2, Korea, Vietnam and Gulf War.  Mass worked very differently in each of those wars for various reasons.  Why one earth we thought it would work like the Gulf War in this one is beyond me. 

Corrosive warfare should have worked, again.  But it did not.  I am fascinated to understand why.  What prevented the UA from engineering another collapse?  They were still attacking all along the RA system.  Did that drop off?  Was it not enough for the new shortened lines?  Was it a shift in RA capability?  Corrosive warfare failed.  Instead the UA fell back on more conventional attritional warfare and basically went nowhere because you can gnaw at the front end for years before the RA will break.     

I am not sure where we go from here.  But here are some pretty solid assumptions:

- Manoeuvre warfare is not going to suddenly start working.  It needs pre-conditions that constitute entire operations.  This is well beyond "better training".  I have heard the reason - "well both Ukraine and Russia are using the old Soviet system."  Ok, the old Soviet System was all about operational manoeuvre and combined arms.  The West does not have some secret dancing sauce that allows us to drive between minefields either.     

- Mass is not suddenly going to start working.  I have seen far too many examples of force concentrations failing gloriously.  I have no idea what a distributed offence looks like but I think it needs some thought.

- No amounts of hardware are going to change those first two.  At least not realistic levels for this war.  Hardware = status quo.  At least for now.  If some new hardware, or technology is introduce we can revisit.

- Software might.  I am not sure where things are going in the backfield but I am betting tiger teams are working on new ways to do targeting and C4ISR right now.  Unmanned and PGM almost constitute a Sharpware, somewhere in between.  They are not only hardware capable, but they are a system expression of the software, and feedback into it.

- Attrition rules...for now.  Attrition is all its forms will be how this war is waged until it isn't.  This one is really hard as the West has not fought a truly attritional high intensity conventional war since Korea.  But here we are.  So what?  We need to get a lot better at attrition and its underlying calculus.  Stop this "just one more time over the top and manoeuvre will come back".  Learn the new rules quickly and exploit them better.

So what now?  Well Ukraine digs in and hold on.  We might see some tactical offensives but over the winter it may just be static.  Unless the UA have a rabbit somewhere.  Maybe they can see a weakness in the line and are waiting for the cold weather to exploit.  I do not know.  Now is the time to lean on operational objectives.  The primary one being, do not let the RA advance.  The second, kill the RA as much as possible at high ratios.  The third, wait for opportunity and seize it when it comes.  Last, make opportunity if you can...learn faster than the RA.

  

[Haiduk]

This night according to Russian reports, they shot down about 30 UKR UAVs, which attacked Rostov, Lipetsk and Volgograd oblast. 

Later became knowingly part of UKR frones have struck Morozovskoye airfield in Rostov oblast, where is deployed 559th bomber aviation regiment of 1st mixed aviation division of Air-Space Forces. This regment is aremed with Su-24M and Su-34 aircraft. 

On one of videos, filmed by locals it's seen at least two explosions on the horizon and he told about sound of 6 UAVs. 

Later theses photos from airfield appeared

Damaged Su-34...

 

And remainings of kamikadze drone (probably Mugin-5 or UKR analog)

 

 

Later Russian TG wrote that in result of strike one Su-34 and one S-300 launcher were damaged with unknown perspectives of their quick returning to service

[FlemFire]

1 minute ago, The_Capt said:

 

Some people "called the ball" on this one, but really these were nothing more than guessing.  No one truly knew or understood force ratios until they happened.  Find me a ground warfare doctrine book that says a deliberate defence can be sustained at 300 troops per km...even with minefields.  And no conventional air cover to speak of.  This wasn't about Russian stick-too in my opinion.  This was something else.  And now analysts are starting to catch up.

Not really guesswork if one articulates the exact problems arrayed against the offensive side in this war, and then those issues rear their head when you go on offense. I would certainly hope the analysts are not "catching up", but perhaps instead hitting the book of yore that can tell them everything they need to know before they decide on sending men to a meatgrinder. This applies to both sides, but it's fair to say that the Ukrainians need to be far more careful than the side who is pulling actual prisoners out of cages and using them to catch bullets as a form of recon.

 

1 minute ago, The_Capt said:

Something fundamental has happened to mass.  Honestly I am not sure why this surprises everyone.  Something happens to mass in just about every major war we have had - WW1, WW2, Korea, Vietnam and Gulf War.  Mass worked very differently in each of those wars for various reasons.  Why one earth we thought it would work like the Gulf War in this one is beyond me. 

Corrosive warfare should have worked, again.  But it did not.  I am fascinated to understand why.  What prevented the UA from engineering another collapse?  They were still attacking all along the RA system.  Did that drop off?  Was it not enough for the new shortened lines?  Was it a shift in RA capability?  Corrosive warfare failed.  Instead the UA fell back on more conventional attritional warfare and basically went nowhere because you can gnaw at the front end for years before the RA will break.     

It is really not that hard. Russians pre-sited the entire front. You have a battlefield which is Normandy-esque in that it's large expanses of terrain cut up with tree lines (instead of hedges). The Russians sited every single one of those tree lines and if you watch enough Russian-side footage it's becoming very clear their response time and accuracy have improved. One of the "famous" clips I saw was of a Russian tank "solely" taking on a Ukrainian attack. Except it wasn't just that Russian tank -- it was an obvious kill zone with a crossfire of ATGMs and soon enough artillery.

Because Russians are on defense, enemy forward units are very unlikely to be carrying heavy AA assets as their primary concern will be the capture of trenches and significant territories. That means Russian aircraft can actually freely operate, which is why we saw a huge amount of Ka-52 and other strike-craft vids coming out during the counter-offensive and just blowing up Ukrainian units left and right, virtually free of charge. If you thought this counter-offensive would "work like the Gulf War" while sharing almost none of its attributes, well, I dunno. Maybe read more. For starters, the Gulf War started with a massive, around-the-clock air campaign completed by the most well-trained and equipped air force on the planet...

 

 

[Haiduk]

Well... Next "ethernal flight, bro" from Fighterbomber. Even our sources didn't report today about Russian Su-25 loss. But maybe non-combat reason or friendly fire.

PS. Likely friendly fire - Russian TG with glad reported Russian Buk M3 shot down UKR Su-25 over Mykolaiv oblast near Yellizavietove village (wrong name - Yelyzavetivka indeed - 27 km north from Kozachi Laheri). I think, the author will be dissapointed soon %)

 

 

Edited December 17, 2023 by Haiduk

[Battlefront.com]

9 minutes ago, FlemFire said:

Ukraine is not in the driver seat, per the Israeli PM, and frankly per anyone with a set of eyes. Let's just assume the opposite case, that the West didn't want conflict with Russia. Do you think Ukraine is able to "take the wheel" so to speak and run off to war anyway? The West has far more influence than you are letting on, and has been all over Ukraine for nearly 10 years now. If the West told Ukraine we're out, then Ukraine would have never buckled down to fight a war with a much larger enemy next door.

Sure, if the West had decided to do a Chamberlain "Peace in our Times" move, then Ukraine would likely have been overrun and would now cease to exist as a true independent country.  So yes, the West decided that it didn't want to repeat one of the biggest geopolitical f'ups of the 20th Century.

This is absolutely NOT what you have argued.  You have stated that Ukraine was "pushed" into this war by the West.  That is such a ridiculous heap of steaming bull dung because it requires us to believe that Ukrainians have no will of their own, especially not a will to remain a free people.

If you want to argue a non-nonsensical conspiracy theory with people that see it for what it is, do it somewhere else.  Push this line of Russian propaganda again and you're out of here for good.

Understood?

9 minutes ago, FlemFire said:

If your point is neocons do not have imbalanced influence on the world stage we'll just have to disagree.

There is a difference between outsized influence and control.  Again, you push a conspiracy theory that I have no interest in seeing derail this thread.  Drop it or you're out.

Understood?

9 minutes ago, FlemFire said:

I'm not an interlocutor for those people but they do exist and with plenty of credentials to back up their viewpoints. You should seek them out and bring them here heh.

Credentials don't mean much when it comes to a debate.  If all you wish to do is dump some credentials and say "I've won the argument", that just shows the weakness of position.  Kissinger has plenty of credentials, he believed in NATO expansion... so hey, I win the argument?  Poppycock.

The only way you can hold NATO Expansion responsible for this war is to erase Russia's historical and cultural history from the discussion.

History shows us that Russia is acting now as it would have acted 20 years ago if NATO had not expanded.  A pathological serial killer doesn't require an excuse to kill again.

This nonsense has already been debated here by anti-globalist and/or pro-Russians (an alignment that Russia loves to leverage).  It serves only to distract us from more relevant discussion.  Bring this topic up again and you're out.

Understood?

9 minutes ago, FlemFire said:

Apologies, I'm not comparing Versailles to the breakup of the Soviet Union. I'm illuminating an example of how decisions made in the past have a tendency to plant seeds for ugly futures.

Sure, but you seem fine with ignoring the 100s of years of seeds that have been planted by Russians in Moscow and think, somehow, that the West was capable of fixing all of Russia's ills. 

By your logic Afghanistan should be a thriving democracy right now.

9 minutes ago, FlemFire said:

I believe we only live in the history that we know, but that does not mean it is the way things have to be. In my measurement of the 90s, it was the West who had all the resources and capabilities to try and assist Russia and they chose not to. If you think otherwise, fair enough. 

This is both naive and dangerous thinking.  Russia is the autocratic, imperialistic, nationalist state it is today because it is what it has always been.  To think some sort of Western policy could have changed the leopards spots is... well... head shakingly at odds with the history of our species (not just Russia).

And whatever the case is, it doesn't matter.  Russia is waging a war of annihilation against the Ukrainian people.  How we got to this point isn't as important as how we get out of it.

Steve

[Haiduk]

What do you know about HERA - Hunan ERA? 

UKR Javelin team of 14th mech.brigade hit Russian BMP with embarked infantry on the top. This is Syn'kivka area, Kupiansk direction. Red marks - previously destroyed Russian armor

PS. Extended version of this video (but with violence warning) - it's seen how first BMP has driven some dozen meters forward and halted, and how infanryman of teh second BMP was hit directly by 120 mm mortar shell

 

Edited December 17, 2023 by Haiduk

[Bulletpoint]

30 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This I don't agree with at all and the facts certainly do not support it.

The US executive leadership wants to secure another $61b for Ukraine, which is nearly as much as has already been provided to Ukraine since the war started.  That isn't "dialled down" in any meaningful sense of the concept.

What is happening is rather mundane, predictable domestic political pressure about the prolonged expense and traditional isolationist populism.  It has nothing to do with national policy and, in fact, is contrary to it.

 

My comment was based on a graph in this video from the official channel of the Austrian Army:

https://youtu.be/EWjMr3RZ8Ss?t=1549

It shows that since July, little aid has been pledged to Ukraine.

Of course, if the US manages to agree on sending 61 billion more, despite increasing political opposition, then that will make a big diference to that graph going forward.

[Artkin]

9 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

What do you know about HERA - Hunan ERA? 

UKR Javelin team of 14th mech.brigade hit Russian BMP with embarked infantry on the top. This is Syn'kivka area, Kupiansk direction. Red marks - previously destroyed Russian armor

 

That is wild coordination.

[Carolus]

14 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Well... Next "ethernal flight, bro" from Fighterbomber. Even our sources didn't report today about Russian Su-25 loss. But maybe non-combat reason or friendly fire.

 

There was news about a Su-25 plunging into the ground in Iran. I hope he didn't mean that one, but a Russian machine we haven't heard of.