How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[poesel]

10 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I think they can, but I'm thinking it's even more tilted towards creating conditions within Russia that even the Russians won't accept.  And this is where I think the US and Europe should accept reality and work towards toppling Putin's regime using the full array of tools at its disposal.  It's a huge risk, I know, but the devil we know seems to be bad enough to gamble on the devil we don't know.  Especially because I think the only real solution to the threat of Russia is to have a much smaller Russia.

This, but that is missing the other half: making the Russians an offer for a Russia without Putin and his apparatus where the average Ivan has a better life than now.

Such an offer does not exist. And that is IMHO a severe mistake. The opposition in Russia, as small as it is, needs some hope. A Kindle which may spark a fire. Small chance of happening, but cheap to create.

Why this does not exist is pretty obvious. It would be quite a hard sell with Ukraine and probably other EECs. But even they need to think of how their relation with Russia after the war will look like. You cannot count on that Russia will look like Germany in 1815 after this war.

[cesmonkey]

Interesting interview with a German politician who I can agree with:

https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-hamas-israel-interview-lange/32635953.html
With Ukraine War And Now Israel, German Politician Asks 'How Bad Does It Have To Get' For West To Step Up?

[Kraft]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Man, all kinds of doomers coming out of the woodwork. Gonna have to work my connections at the Consulate to secure enough smokes and brandy for the club.

Cant shake the feeling this is directed at my post, care to elaborate?

[Letter from Prague]

1 hour ago, poesel said:

This, but that is missing the other half: making the Russians an offer for a Russia without Putin and his apparatus where the average Ivan has a better life than now.

Such an offer does not exist. And that is IMHO a severe mistake. The opposition in Russia, as small as it is, needs some hope. A Kindle which may spark a fire. Small chance of happening, but cheap to create.

Why this does not exist is pretty obvious. It would be quite a hard sell with Ukraine and probably other EECs. But even they need to think of how their relation with Russia after the war will look like. You cannot count on that Russia will look like Germany in 1815 after this war.

Is there even opposition in Russia? Navalny is considered exactly like Putin but backed by different group, and other than him, there seem to be only Ultranationalists whose problem with the current situation is that Russian not in total war against the world and should be.

[Haiduk]

Two infographics:

Dynamic of daily artillery shots. It's claimed now in first time Ukraine makes more daily shots than Russia. The source is unknown

X coordinate is a year quarters, Y coordinate southands of shots.

 

Official RosStat statistic concerning death rate in Russia among 20-29 y.o. males in 2022 (digits are roughly rounded).

From 18 000 of died (from left to right):

- 7000 were killed at the war (about 40 %)

- 1900 died in road traffic accidents

- 1100 died of suicides

- 3700 of "other external reasons" (murdered, died from traumas at home or at work, here can be included also "postponed" war deaths beacuse of wounds)

- 1300 of heart attacks and circullatory system diseases.  

- 3300 of other diseases

[Haiduk]

12 hours ago, Simcoe said:

I'm guessing the reserves from the south were used to reinforce this new offensive.

No, Russians are not in situation to weaken southern front. Main forces around Avdiivka are best DPR brigades - 1st motor-rifle and 114th motor-rifle (ex 11th regiment "Vostok") as well as 9th motor-rifle naval infantry brigade, "Sparta" and "Somali" assault units. Russin army represented by numerous mobik regiments and reportedly by 21st motor-rifle brgade, moved here from Lyman direction, but it still in reserve

[The_Capt]

12 hours ago, Simcoe said:

Any other thoughts?

Well Steve did a pretty good job already.  I would say your view is definitely skewed.  I am not sure this last RA offensive was “strategic” or “massive”.  We really have no idea how hard the RA is “sweating” but did it occur to you they did this to try and project the narrative you are buying into?  

As to massed fires, well you do not cite a single source or fact in your entire analysis so it is really hard to follow up on what is essentially an opinion piece.  Do you have stats on the levels of fires?  Haiduk just posted some that show RA fires dropping, which kind of matches a lot of observations.  Also I would offer you go back and look at Severodonetsk last summer, the level of fires there was surpassing WW1 concentrations.  Do you have credible sources that show they exceeded this at Aviidka?

My thoughts are that this is a local tactical offensive designed to demonstrate and signal that the RA is not solely on the Defensive…but the cost of this demonstration likely exceeds its actual impact.  It shows the UA employing the same elements of Denial they themselves are facing, and they appear to be just as effective.  

We seem to be at a point where neither side is able to achieve operational levels of offensive success - no break throughs or break outs.  In a war of attrition it is very hard without detailed inside knowledge to see breaking points.  Back in WW2 Germany was doing counter offensives nearly to the end, even though it was clear they were broken at Kursk.  In this war the UA currently has offensive initiative and has been trying to string a series of tactical offensives into operational conditions setting.  We will see if they are successful.

I guess my “analysis” is that the first tactical twitch out of the RA since last Winter does not merit the level threat that you have assigned it.  I think some of your basic assumptions are skewed in RA favour -  likely not out of support to RA but honest concern - and you need to revisit them.  Further, you may want to provide some citations or links that are shaping your thinking so we can check them for ourselves.

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Man, all kinds of doomers coming out of the woodwork. Gonna have to work my connections at the Consulate to secure enough smokes and brandy for the club.

So much for exclusive…every nutter with a cardboard sign will be bogarting the brandy glasses.

[beardiebloke]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

Dynamic of daily artillery shots.

English version of the infographic here: https://t.me/uawarinfographics/2874?comment=25382

Also curious of the source but a good sign even if it's only roughly correct.
A month old Reuters article quoting a "Western official":

Quote

"If you expended 10 million rounds last year and you're in the middle of a fight and you can only produce 1 to 2 million rounds a year, I don't think that's a very strong position."

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-ramps-up-artillery-production-still-falling-short-western-official-says-2023-09-09/

If we assume production of 1-2m shells per year then any usage above 5500/day means your stocks disappear and eventually reach 5500/day *assuming* you produce 2m per year *and* get them to the front where they are actually fired.  Just my amateur back of envelope take.

 

Edited October 14, 2023 by beardiebloke
typo

[LongLeftFlank]

29 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Well Steve did a pretty good job already.  I would say your view is definitely skewed.  I am not sure this last RA offensive was “strategic” or “massive”.  We really have no idea how hard the RA is “sweating” but did it occur to you they did this to try and project the narrative you are buying into?  

As to massed fires, well you do not cite a single source or fact in your entire analysis so it is really hard to follow up on what is essentially an opinion piece.  Do you have stats on the levels of fires?  Haiduk just posted some that show RA fires dropping, which kind of matches a lot of observations.  Also I would offer you go back and look at Severodonetsk last summer, the level of fires there was surpassing WW1 concentrations.  Do you have credible sources that show they exceeded this at Aviidka?

My thoughts are that this is a local tactical offensive designed to demonstrate and signal that the RA is not solely on the Defensive…but the cost of this demonstration likely exceeds its actual impact.  It shows the UA employing the same elements of Denial they themselves are facing, and they appear to be just as effective.  

We seem to be at a point where neither side is able to achieve operational levels of offensive success - no break throughs or break outs.  In a war of attrition it is very hard without detailed inside knowledge to see breaking points.  Back in WW2 Germany was doing counter offensives nearly to the end, even though it was clear they were broken at Kursk.  In this war the UA currently has offensive initiative and has been trying to string a series of tactical offensives into operational conditions setting.  We will see if they are successful.

I guess my “analysis” is that the first tactical twitch out of the RA since last Winter does not merit the level threat that you have assigned it.  I think some of your basic assumptions are skewed in RA favour -  likely not out of support to RA but honest concern - and you need to revisit them.  Further, you may want to provide some citations or links that are shaping your thinking so we can check them for ourselves.

Just to add, David Glantz made a career out of digging out and chronicling (in English)  the countless failed Red Army offensives of the GPW, some of them quite huge, and lasting up to the end of the war.

In short, for every Sandomierz or Korsun pocket,  there were about 3-4 'neverwozzers' that yielded little more than another heap of dead T34s and Ivans, generally piled up at some river crossing and then plastered mercilessly by German artillery.

Since May 2022, the Russians have yet to show anything more than a few shattered factory towns that took them literally months to pry away from the defenders.

But their command staffs seem doctrinally willing to continue launching these forlorn hopes, presumably hoping that one Big Win will make up for all the failures.

[The_Capt]

4 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Just to add, David Glantz made a career out of digging out and chronicling (in English)  the countless failed Red Army offensives of the GPW, some of them quite huge, and lasting up to the end of the war.

In short, for every Sandomierz or Korsun pocket,  there were about 3-4 'neverwozzers' that yielded little more than another heap of dead T34s and Ivans, generally piled up at some river crossing and then plastered mercilessly by German artillery.

Since May 2022, the Russians have yet to show anything more than a few shattered factory towns that took them literally months to pry away from the defenders.

But their command staffs seem doctrinally willing to continue launching these forlorn hopes, presumably hoping that one Big Win will make up for all the failures.

Oh absolutely.  Grant showed the same thing in the US Civil War, you can be winning but still losing battles at the same time.  The USSR was keeping up pressure and tempo and it cost them a lot of people to do it - they had the people and force generation system to back it up.  Germany tried same but it was in backward trajectory that it never recovered from.  

Again we are back to option spaces.  Battles, won or lost, only matter if they impact options spaces.  Are Russia’s options spaces fundamentally changed in these latest actions…nope.  Are Ukraine’s after months of offensives…I really don’t think so either, at least not yet.  The only dimension that Ukraine could be expanding options spaces is in RA attrition but we won’t see those results until something breaks.  One has to assume that the UA also has not suffered enough attrition to collapse Ukrainian options spaces or they would have stopped by now.

So none of these actions have created operational, let alone strategic results as of yet.  This is what Denial is all about really.  I guess my main concern here is that overestimating Ukraine’s progress is just as dangerous as overestimating Russia’s position.

[danfrodo]

6 hours ago, Kraft said:

- Russia controls Bakhmut

- Russia got rid of its prison population, net societal gain. Nobody misses them and will march through the streets in protest.

- In return, UA had some of the better units exhausted, among them 93rd if Im correct and tens of thousands of some of the best people dead and many more wounded, crippled.

- Keeping supply line was very costly, watch drone footage of the road of life, its littered with UA vehicles that were taken out there, trying to evac and resupply the city with the frontline hundreds/sometimes just dozens of meters away. Loss rates were not nearly as in favor as in other areas, with street fighting leveling the playing field a lot.

 

Operationally, I dont think it matters but if you count it, small Russian win. Strategically -> politically, they won.

In a raw balance of what was used up, Russia also comes out ahead far better than in any other engagement in this war, with the exception of the current counter offensive.

_________________________________________________

The fact that the Russian army can throw away hordes of tanks and infantry and level the frontline with massed artillery, as if it was 2022 tells me that they do not suffer "shortages" as much as people would like them. Major use of airpower, both fixed wing and rotary, yet the only confirmed downed aircraft are friendly fire in a completely different place - funny but also tells a story about the state of UA frontline AD.

It seems to me that there are enough resources to hold the line in the south for a quite a while longer.

Well thought out & well spoken, Kraft.  I don't really agree, but I can see that your points make sense.  I still think the cost to RU of taking some unimportant pile of rubble wasn't worth the cost.  UKR took casualties but also believed the math worked in their favor so chose to use Bakhmut as an area to hold w goal of killing lots of russians.  Morale & politically, I think Bakhmut was a UKR victory.  They stood for months, slowly giving ground.  RU looked inept and had heavy infighting that led to a botched coup (or whatever that was) and burned up hundreds of thousands of shells and now has a shell shortage.  Maybe RU doesn't care about the convicts it killed but it does miss the ordnance.

[Aragorn2002]

4 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

Interesting interview with a German politician who I can agree with:

https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-hamas-israel-interview-lange/32635953.html
With Ukraine War And Now Israel, German Politician Asks 'How Bad Does It Have To Get' For West To Step Up?

Interesting point of view. 

[The_Capt]

24 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Well thought out & well spoken, Kraft.  I don't really agree, but I can see that your points make sense.  I still think the cost to RU of taking some unimportant pile of rubble wasn't worth the cost.  UKR took casualties but also believed the math worked in their favor so chose to use Bakhmut as an area to hold w goal of killing lots of russians.  Morale & politically, I think Bakhmut was a UKR victory.  They stood for months, slowly giving ground.  RU looked inept and had heavy infighting that led to a botched coup (or whatever that was) and burned up hundreds of thousands of shells and now has a shell shortage.  Maybe RU doesn't care about the convicts it killed but it does miss the ordnance.

On convicts - Am I the only one who sees this as a bad thing for the RA?  I mean when you are out of trained troops and down to hurling penal units at a problem most reasonable military analysis would see that as a systemic force generation failure.  If the UA were down to this approach the MacGregors of the world would be making so much hay out of it 24/7.

Yet when Russia does it...well it is sign of Russian resolve and never-ending manpower!

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Oh absolutely.  Grant showed the same thing in the US Civil War, you can be winning but still losing battles at the same time.  The USSR was keeping up pressure and tempo and it cost them a lot of people to do it - they had the people and force generation system to back it up.  Germany tried same but it was in backward trajectory that it never recovered from.  

Hence the old saying, "if we win any more battles like this we will lose the war".  The Germans learned the hard way that it didn't matter if they won 8 out of 10 battles if the Soviets retained the ability to come back for another 10. 

Glantz was also critically important in digging into Soviet successes to better understand how they succeeded.  He gave credit for the good where it was due, he slammed them when it was appropriate.

Steve

[danfrodo]

Incredible UKR combat video here.  Video bounces between trench fighting and the drone above watching it all.  Confusion amid fighting in the trench maze, particularly on RU soldiers who seem to have less situational awareness.  Especially when they come flying out from dugouts trying to escape.  Some shooting just a couple meters apart.  From above, we get the big picture while the guys on the ground only see what's right in front of them.  

 

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, Kraft said:

- Russia controls Bakhmut

So what?  It controls all kinds of places that it didn't expend tens of thousands of dead to secure.  Bakhmut offers them nothing to further their war effort.  And, in fact, they now have to invest significant resources in defending it because if they don't Ukraine will take it back, and wouldn't that look bad?

7 hours ago, Kraft said:

- Russia got rid of its prison population, net societal gain. Nobody misses them and will march through the streets in protest.

- In return, UA had some of the better units exhausted, among them 93rd if Im correct and tens of thousands of some of the best people dead and many more wounded, crippled.

No matter how you look at it, Russia burned through a LOT of resources to take Bakhmut.  Those resources, which included Wagner regulars (some of the only units in Russia's control that were worth a damned), could have been invested elsewhere with perhaps a better return.

The damage done to Ukrainian forces is regrettable, but that had little to do with Bakhmut.  It was the direct result of Russians attacking, which they would have done somewhere else if not Bakhmut.  However, if Russians were smarter they could have chosen a time and place where they affected a more favorable loss ratio.  Meaning, Russia could have caused the same amount of damage to Ukraine's forces with less damage to its own.

7 hours ago, Kraft said:

-Operationally, I dont think it matters but if you count it, small Russian win. Strategically -> politically, they won.

I agree that technically they "won", but I don't think there was any real value gained.  Not even politically.  Bakhmut became a symbol for both Russians and Ukrainians about the tenacity and resolve of Ukraine to defend its land AND to do it effectively.  Russian mil bloggers were absolutely scathing in their opinions about this battle and it almost certainly led to the Wagner mutiny with the subsequent dismantling of one of Russia's only reliable offensive forces.

In sum, I think Russia "won" this battle in name only.  In all meaningful metrics they came out far behind where they started or where they could have been.

7 hours ago, Kraft said:

The fact that the Russian army can throw away hordes of tanks and infantry and level the frontline with massed artillery, as if it was 2022 tells me that they do not suffer "shortages" as much as people would like them. Major use of airpower, both fixed wing and rotary, yet the only confirmed downed aircraft are friendly fire in a completely different place - funny but also tells a story about the state of UA frontline AD.

I think the shortages are real and they are significant.  That chart Haiduk just posted about artillery shell usage, even if inaccurate in detail, is correct that Russian artillery usage is way down from what it once was.  This is important because Russian doctrine relies upon artillery to make up for tactical shortcomings.  It's like a big gas guzzling truck... works great until there's a fuel shortage.  Then what?  Less driving of the truck.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Again we are back to option spaces.  Battles, won or lost, only matter if they impact options spaces.  Are Russia’s options spaces fundamentally changed in these latest actions…nope.

I don't think you'd argue with me qualifying your last remark in the way I'm about to...

The actions of Avdiivka, Kupyansk-Lyman, 2023 winter offensive, and the countless counter attacks have not fundamentally changed Russia's options in a positive way.  However, it seems that with each one of these failed actions Russia's options have been reduced.  So the qualification I'd offer is "are Russia's options spaces fundamentally IMPROVED in these latest actions... nope".

I will keep hammering away on this point because I'm still not sure it's being fully appreciated by commentators out there.  The Avdiivka offensive is the first major offensive Russia has launched that did not involve "premiere" line (like 1st Guards Tank Army) or "elite" (VDV, Spetsnaz, Marines) units.  Why not?  Because they've been burnt up leading previous attacks and defensive actions.  Further, the regular line units are in such a sorry state that not only can't they conduct meaningful offensive operations on their own, they seem incapable of defending even with historically strong prepared positions.  Hence (all?) of Russia's "elite" units being committed to the defense of the south.

It's difficult to identify a turning point in a war like this, but the Avdiivka attack will likely be seen as an indicator that the war has fundamentally changed in favor of Ukraine.  I predict that no future Russian set piece attack will come out better than the shambles we just witnessed.  Avdiivka, in my view, confirms that Russia is done as an offensive player in this war.  I don't think they can reconstitute their forces in a way that will ever change this equation short of freezing the conflict for several years.  Even then, I'm not sure that sort of thing would work out either.

It is important to state that what I just said does not imply that the opposite is true for Ukraine.  Just because Russia is spent as an offensive force doesn't necessarily mean Ukraine will see success on the offense.  It could be that neither side is capable of large scale offensive ops leading to a stalemate.  I don't see any reason to conclude that about Ukraine, just saying that just because Russia keeps flipping "heads" doesn't mean Ukraine automatically flips "tails".

Steve

[Beleg85]

110th Brig. repelling muscovite attacks (perhaps was already posted). Casette munitions (?) visible.

 

[Aragorn2002]

1 hour ago, danfrodo said:

Incredible UKR combat video here.  Video bounces between trench fighting and the drone above watching it all.  Confusion amid fighting in the trench maze, particularly on RU soldiers who seem to have less situational awareness.  Especially when they come flying out from dugouts trying to escape.  Some shooting just a couple meters apart.  From above, we get the big picture while the guys on the ground only see what's right in front of them.  

 

God bless Ukraine, Dan. Thanks for that. Great action.

[Haiduk]

19 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

110th Brig. repelling muscovite attacks (perhaps was already posted). Casette munitions (?) visible.

 

looks like the episode of battle for waste heap. At 1:38 a body of DPR fighter (red tape, usual for LDPR trops) lies on the grey slope of it

I wonder whose were Tigr (?) armored cars. Never seen them in LDPR units. 

Edited October 14, 2023 by Haiduk

[Battlefront.com]

41 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

110th Brig. repelling muscovite attacks (perhaps was already posted). Casette munitions (?) visible.

 

Some of this footage was released in other videos (or at least from other drones), but some is new to me.  Looking at 1:27 mark I think what we're seeing is a BMD that took a Javelin hit to the rear and went straight through and exploded underneath, causing the vehicle to flip and taking most of the running gear off.  A direct 155 hit would be even more likely to do that, but I'm leaning more towards Javelin because the chances of a 155 scoring a direct hit like that is very small (especially because Ukraine uses shells sparingly).

There were a lot of BTRs used in this attack from what I've seen.  That's a little unusual I should think.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

29 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

looks like the episode of battle for waste heap. At 1:38 a body of DPR fighter (red tape, usual for LDPR trops) lies on the grey slope of it

I wonder whose were Tigr (?) armored cars. Never seen them in LDPR units. 

I was wondering the same thing.  Maybe a Spetsnaz company was used to spearhead one of the attacks?  A small force like that would likely escape notice by OSINT watchers.  There is also what looks to be a BMD as I noted before, but I could be wrong about that.  I don't know the undersides of either vehicle well enough to tell the difference   But if the BMD was there than that indicates VDV's presence (again, probably small unit).

Note that Dimitri's translation of the Russian view that what Russia needs is a sort of "shock troop" mentality where a few units are specifically trained and outfitted for offensive operations, the rest of the armed forces are there to hold the line.  Russia has already been doing this for the past year or so with VDV, Spetsnaz, and Marines.  It hasn't worked out very well because those forces are also used to defend and counter attack Ukrainian advances.  Russia can not afford to keep "elite" units sitting around waiting for an attack, so this is likely to continue.

The blogger is also not looking at historical examples of trying to have dedicated offensive units.  There are endless examples of all sides trying this in the 1930s through the end of WW2.  It never worked as intended.  The assault forces wound up being used defensively and suffering because they weren't really intended for this.  Western Allied airborne forces were the closest that I can think of, however they were generally so chewed up after being used that they were out of the fight.  And the Battle of the Bulge showed that they also would be used as defensive infantry in a pinch.

Steve

[Haiduk]

39 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Looking at 1:27 mark I think what we're seeing is a BMD that took a Javelin hit

Hah! This was BTR-50!

 

[dan/california]