How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[danfrodo]

nothing particularly new here, but when there's good news might as well enjoy it

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/10/13/2199210/-Ukraine-Update-Russian-sources-are-pessimistic-about-their-disastrous-attacks-on-Avdiivka?pm_campaign=front_page&pm_source=top_news_slot_2&pm_medium=web

It's always lovely when RU decides to destroy it's reserves out in the open.  This is huge amount of men & material that won't be around to cause trouble later.

[Simcoe]

Some thoughts on the Avdiivka Offensive.

Timing: the fact the Russians can conduct a massive strategic offensive so soon after the summer offensive failed tells me they barely broke a sweat. I'm guessing the reserves from the south were used to reinforce this new offensive. It also shows they confident the Kherson region will continue to be a minor backwater. 

Preparation: I think Avdiivka is being used as a testing ground for new offensive strategies. for a month now the Russians have saturates the area with artillery, drones and now airstrikes. The FAB's with glide kits are being used as fast as they can produce them. All this in an effort to suppress the defenses from front to back. 

This is the first time we have seen this level of fires massed on a single area. The Ukrainians were able to briefly amass large amounts of fires to support tactical movements(even using Himars on individual artillery pieces) but never long enough to sustain for long periods of time.

Execution: in the first days of the attack, videos were posted of long lines of Russian armor unmolested by artillery or drones. The losses were primarily from ATGM'S and other hand held AT weapons. This all allowed the Russians to make quick early gains.

Evolution: those early victories were short lived. Even with the suppression of artillery the Russians are taking heavy losses and now footage of small drone attacks are trickling in. If they cannot close the noose today or tomorrow I think Ukrainian reinforcements will stop or cut off the spearhead and end the offensive.

Conclusions: I think this offensive is showing that ATGM'S, mines and small drones can inflict incredible losses without fires support. Time will tell if the losses were worth it for the Russians but I think they will be going back to the drawing board on this one. This was a monumental expenditure of munitions to support failure.

If so, what is the next option? Are major offensives a thing of the past? Will the war only continue as small groups of infantry passing trenches back and forth?

Any other thoughts?

As always, I do not support the invasion of Ukraine.

[Kinophile]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

It probably was, but the vehicle loss count is at battalion level (eg 45 or whatever).  A formation has around 300 F and A1 ech vehicles.pm give or take.  Mauled the hell outta whatever went through there but it wasn’t the loss of an entire brigade.

Copy. 

[Kinophile]

https://en.defence-ua.com/news/ukraines_air_force_showed_the_operation_of_british_supacat_asraam_frankensam_for_the_first_time_video-8226.html

Soviet era AAD firing ASRAAM. Madness! 

Plus,  Norway being sensible about heavy tanks v AAD

https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/10/12/norway-leopard-air-defense/

[danfrodo]

19 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

Timing: the fact the Russians can conduct a massive strategic offensive so soon after the summer offensive failed tells me they barely broke a sweat. I'm guessing the reserves from the south were used to reinforce this new offensive. It also shows they confident the Kherson region will continue to be a minor backwater. 

Or maybe it shows that RU decision makers are really, really f-ing stupid?  Like w endless waste of men & material to take Bakhmut?  Like every other offensive they've tried this year?  They have basically gained nothing while burning out huge resources. 

UKR hasn't gained much territory, but at least they are working toward something important -- cutting major landbridge east-west supply lines.  If UKR can just get another 20km then RU in serious trouble -- but can they get another 20km??  But instead of ensuring this doesn't happen, RU burns up its reserves in pointless disasters.

[Simcoe]

1 hour ago, danfrodo said:

Or maybe it shows that RU decision makers are really, really f-ing stupid?  Like w endless waste of men & material to take Bakhmut?  Like every other offensive they've tried this year?  They have basically gained nothing while burning out huge resources. 

UKR hasn't gained much territory, but at least they are working toward something important -- cutting major landbridge east-west supply lines.  If UKR can just get another 20km then RU in serious trouble -- but can they get another 20km??  But instead of ensuring this doesn't happen, RU burns up its reserves in pointless disasters.

I do not support the invasion of Ukraine and hope they regain their lost territory but if the Russians were as stupid as you say the Ukrainians would be celebrating in Sebastopol by now.

You have to recognize that they have adapted and learned from their mistakes. I guarantee the Ukrainian generals are aware of this. 

I was hoping for more nuanced analysis but Ohh well.

Edited October 14, 2023 by Simcoe
forgot to add "do not"

[chrisl]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Can’t they hit the Kerch Bridge now?  Storm Shadow and all that?  Regardless, this would not be a bad idea.  This is increasing friction.  Would likely be temporary but if you timed it right, it could do some solid shaping.

This is still in the space of “annoyance” as opposed to decisive, but it would create pressures.  Ukraine is not going to lose the war if it can’t do this nor is Russia going to win it because they can still use Kerch bridge.  Longer Range deep strike will create more options - which is a good thing - but they may not be translatable into decisions given some of the constraints and restraints.

Create that friction for supplies, and then keep working on gaining land once the mud starts, despite the mud being just as much (if not worse) a problem for the attacker.  Russia having to truck all supplies hundreds of km through mud will be a lot of friction.

But if I were going to do that, I'd wait til there was actually a lot of mud so they have to sort out both long distance trucking and mud at the same time.

[danfrodo]

6 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

I support the invasion of Ukraine and hope they regain their lost territory but if the Russians were as stupid as you say the Ukrainians would be celebrating in Sebastopol by now.

You have to recognize that they have adapted and learned from their mistakes. I guarantee the Ukrainian generals are aware of this. 

I was hoping for more nuanced analysis but Ohh well.

They were just absolutely obliterated, even their own propagandists are saying it was a disaster.  Yet again, another offensive action that leads to massive losses for nothing.  Exactly what did they learn??  

I was hoping for more nuanced analysis, but Ohh well.  

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Could be feinting or could be sizing up for something else.  A crossing (or set of crossings) down in the Kherson sector could collapse the entire RA left flank.  But…and it is a big one, you need surprise and sustainment.  Surprise I’d damned hard in this environment.  The build up of forces could get cover in urban areas but is really hard to hide. 

Then you don’t just cross once, you need to sustain a breakout force, which is dodgy until you can push those crossings out of gun range.  Does the UA have this sort of engineering capability?  Did we give them any?  Or were we too busy rubbing ourselves over Leo 2s?  These are not easy crossings - right up there with amphib on the difficulty scale.  First sign is usually stuff like we see here, shaping - cutting nodes and connectors.  Then airborne or airmobile drops along with infantry assaults come next.  If the UA pulls it off, it will be the first crossing of its type since Yom Kippur (I think) and even that was not really opposed.

 

2 hours ago, danfrodo said:

You have been mentioning how if UKR could, it should initiate a breakthrough attack in some significantly weakened section of the RU lines.  When summer started, this was I thought would happen.  They'd attack at one end of the front then once RU reserves were solidly committed, they'd launch attack at other end of line.  Sadly, this did not happen.  

But where on the line would UKR attack that doesn't require a surprise-destroying investment to get through the minefields?  By the time they clear the forward lines/obstacles, RU has had plenty of time to respond, robbing from some other quiet sector to the newly threatened one. 

Crossing the Dnieper seems super risky, but it's the one place that isn't strewn w mines & defensive networks.  And it would put UKR right into RU backfield.  But how on earth to supply such an operation over time???  RU aint great at precision but they can certainly throw enough ordnance at the bridges to knock them out, over & over again.  I guess Dnieper is at it's yearly lowest depth right now, which helps.  But w the coming rain it will rise and also the banks will get very, very muddy.  But dang, wouldn't this be amazing?  I don't think it'll happen but it would be one for the history books, like you said.

  

The thing about the river crossing, is that if it works they won't need to be supplied over the Dnipro for long. If the operation is a success it should fracture the furtherest west portion of the Russian line almost immediately. They would be the Russian forces at the very highest risk. If Ukraine breaks thru their they would be able to feed supplies to crossing forces from their current supply lines to the southern front. I grant you there have been some first class disasters built on assumptions like that one. But the war is reaching a point where Ukraine might need to take a risk. 

[Simcoe]

29 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

They were just absolutely obliterated, even their own propagandists are saying it was a disaster.  Yet again, another offensive action that leads to massive losses for nothing.  Exactly what did they learn??  

I was hoping for more nuanced analysis, but Ohh well.  

Lol I wrote out a neutral, detailed analysis and concluded that the Russian offensive would fail. Sorry for not sugarcoating things enough.

[danfrodo]

7 minutes ago, dan/california said:

 

The thing about the river crossing, is that if it works they won't need to be supplied over the Dnipro for long. If the operation is a success it should fracture the furtherest west portion of the Russian line almost immediately. They would be the Russian forces at the very highest risk. If Ukraine breaks thru their they would be able to feed supplies to crossing forces from their current supply lines to the southern front. I grant you there have been some first class disasters built on assumptions like that one. But the war is reaching a point where Ukraine might need to take a risk. 

great point, thanks for that.  But like you say, pretty sketchy 'what if' to hang one's hat on.  But damn that would be great if it happens and it works.  

[danfrodo]

3 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

Lol I wrote out a neutral, detailed analysis and concluded that the Russian offensive would fail. Sorry for not sugarcoating things enough.

Yes, well, I am a very stupid person, obviously.  Sugarcoating would be nice, and use small words.  

[fry30]

1 hour ago, Simcoe said:

Conclusions: I think this offensive is showing that ATGM'S, mines and small drones can inflict incredible losses without fires support. Time will tell if the losses were worth it for the Russians but I think they will be going back to the drawing board on this one. This was a monumental expenditure of munitions to support failure.

I don't mean to be rude but what's really new here that we didn't learn in the opening phases of the "SMO"? 

[Artkin]

1 hour ago, Simcoe said:

I support the invasion of Ukraine and hope they regain their lost territory but if the Russians were as stupid as you say the Ukrainians would be celebrating in Sebastopol by now.

You have to recognize that they have adapted and learned from their mistakes. I guarantee the Ukrainian generals are aware of this. 

I was hoping for more nuanced analysis but Ohh well.

Not happening around here. 

I assume the forces being pushed into battle now are the 50,000 strong corps that we heard about earlier this year. Idk though. I knew they announced the formation of a new unit some time ago and I dont think I've seen it pop up before this. 

[Battlefront.com]

22 minutes ago, Simcoe said:

Lol I wrote out a neutral, detailed analysis and concluded that the Russian offensive would fail. Sorry for not sugarcoating things enough.

We don't want sugar coating, and sugar coating something that isn't very good wouldn't have helped anyway.  There's been much better accounting of the Avdiivka in the previous pages if you cared to look at it, but I'll attempt to point out flaws in your analysis and conclusions....

1 hour ago, Simcoe said:

Timing: the fact the Russians can conduct a massive strategic offensive so soon after the summer offensive failed tells me they barely broke a sweat. I'm guessing the reserves from the south were used to reinforce this new offensive. It also shows they confident the Kherson region will continue to be a minor backwater.

First, this wasn't strategic or massive in any sense of either word.  It was a large scale localized attack.  Even if they took Avdiivka that would be the end of the operation. 

Second, you seem to not be aware that Russia has repeatedly made dumb investments of large amounts of troops and material on attacks clearly intended on drawing Ukrainian forces away from where Russia felt threatened.  The winter offensive was intended to forestall Ukraine's summer counter offensive, and it failed miserably.  They also launched a sizeable attack in Luhansk to draw Ukrainian forces away from the counter offensives (including Bakhmut) after they were in motion.  That failed miserably as well.  Countless examples last year as well.

Third, the bulk of the forces used for this offensive were forces that were, for the most part, already in place.  The bulk of the forces were former (and effectively still) DPR that could not be moved out of Donetsk without risking a mutiny.  They were never going to be reserves for the south.  I am also aware of no unit Russian unit moved from the south to take part in this operation.

To put it bluntly, the basis for your premise is factually off the mark by a wide margin.

1 hour ago, Simcoe said:

Preparation: I think Avdiivka is being used as a testing ground for new offensive strategies. for a month now the Russians have saturates the area with artillery, drones and now airstrikes. The FAB's with glide kits are being used as fast as they can produce them. All this in an effort to suppress the defenses from front to back.

Er, no.  The only thing done differently in this attack was they used all the resources of an attack backing up their better forces (VDV/Spetsnaz/Marines) except with utter crap infantry instead.  That's because all of their "elite" units had to go to the south and have been bled out.  So Russia made do with with it had, not what it likely would have wanted.

1 hour ago, Simcoe said:

This is the first time we have seen this level of fires massed on a single area.

Er, hardly.  Russia massed this amount of artillery at multiple points simultaneously last year for most of the year.  The reason why it stands out as exceptional is that they haven't been able to do it lately.  I've speculated they stripped all the artillery and ammo from their failed Luhansk offensive in part because the logistics of moving it to Donetsk City is wildly easier than trying to get it into the south.

1 hour ago, Simcoe said:

Execution: in the first days of the attack, videos were posted of long lines of Russian armor unmolested by artillery or drones. The losses were primarily from ATGM'S and other hand held AT weapons. This all allowed the Russians to make quick early gains.

Ukraine never has had adequate resources to adequately man all sectors of the front equally.  This sector has managed to hold out for 9 years without massive resources, so of course Russia was able to mass for this attack.  Especially because Donetsk City offers major advantages for staging an attack.

The scale of the attack is what allowed them to make some gains.  However, they also suffered MASSIVE losses and whatever they were attempting to do failed utterly.  Which shows that Ukraine's forces were up to the challenge.

1 hour ago, Simcoe said:

Evolution: those early victories were short lived. Even with the suppression of artillery the Russians are taking heavy losses and now footage of small drone attacks are trickling in. If they cannot close the noose today or tomorrow I think Ukrainian reinforcements will stop or cut off the spearhead and end the offensive.

Ukraine largely defeated this massive attack, by recent standards, with the forces it had on hand.  Taking ground back will require new forces, which may or may not be desirably to commit.  After all, Russia almost certainly launched this attack in order to draw Ukrainian forces away from the south, so why give Russia what it wants?

1 hour ago, Simcoe said:

Conclusions: I think this offensive is showing that ATGM'S, mines and small drones can inflict incredible losses without fires support. Time will tell if the losses were worth it for the Russians but I think they will be going back to the drawing board on this one. This was a monumental expenditure of munitions to support failure.

On this we mostly agree.  I also clearly demonstrates that all of Russia's inherent weaknesses were on display here.  Bad quality forces being chief amongst them.  Whatever the Russians use for a drawing board they don't seem to learn much because they keep making these sorts of attacks and Ukraine keeps demonstrating Russia's not up for it.

1 hour ago, Simcoe said:

If so, what is the next option? Are major offensives a thing of the past? Will the war only continue as small groups of infantry passing trenches back and forth?

This is the thing all of us have been wondering about since last year.  Is this the death of maneuver warfare, or is it that Russia sucks at it so badly that they just make it seem impossible.  Ukraine's experience with large scale attacks is limited and is in the context of ungodly dense defenses handled by a competent defender, plus being under resourced for such a task and the defender having air superiority.  So, not really clear what to take away from that.

Steve

[Simcoe]

33 minutes ago, fry30 said:

I don't mean to be rude but what's really new here that we didn't learn in the opening phases of the "SMO"? 

Not rude at all. The difference here is the addition of massive airstrikes. Neither side has been able to making meaningful use of aircraft to support an offensive until the mass production of FAB glide kits. The Russians have been dropping FAB 250, 500, 1500 bombs consistently for the last month. Not to mention Tornado S which has given the Russians a HIMARS like ability to strike rear areas. This has allowed the Russians to suppress fires, logistics and C2 to a greater degree than at any other point in the war. 

I think if they are unable to achieve their goals this will show that even with complete suppression of defenses, the proliferation of handheld ATGM's and mines can still stop an offensive by themselves.

[Battlefront.com]

39 minutes ago, fry30 said:

I don't mean to be rude but what's really new here that we didn't learn in the opening phases of the "SMO"? 

Absolutely nothing

As I said a few pages ago, I think the "innovation" Russia tried this time was to not use crap infantry without massive artillery, air, and armored support.  I suspect the reason for this was they didn't have better forces to commit and tried to figure out how to make this attack work when so many previous crap attacks had not.

Steve

[Kinophile]

32 minutes ago, Artkin said:

Not happening around here. 

I assume the forces being pushed into battle now are the 50,000 strong corps that we heard about earlier this year. Idk though. I knew they announced the formation of a new unit some time ago and I dont think I've seen it pop up before this. 

that 50k "army" was anything but, and certainly not the punching force it was made out to be. It was, i believe? used up to a good degree in the Kremina theatre, and is now just dissipated across the northern lines/

[Simcoe]

5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

We don't want sugar coating, and sugar coating something that isn't very good wouldn't have helped anyway.  There's been much better accounting of the Avdiivka in the previous pages if you cared to look at it, but I'll attempt to point out flaws in your analysis and conclusions....

First, this wasn't strategic or massive in any sense of either word.  It was a large scale localized attack.  Even if they took Avdiivka that would be the end of the operation. 

Second, you seem to not be aware that Russia has repeatedly made dumb investments of large amounts of troops and material on attacks clearly intended on drawing Ukrainian forces away from where Russia felt threatened.  The winter offensive was intended to forestall Ukraine's summer counter offensive, and it failed miserably.  They also launched a sizeable attack in Luhansk to draw Ukrainian forces away from the counter offensives (including Bakhmut) after they were in motion.  That failed miserably as well.  Countless examples last year as well.

Third, the bulk of the forces used for this offensive were forces that were, for the most part, already in place.  The bulk of the forces were former (and effectively still) DPR that could not be moved out of Donetsk without risking a mutiny.  They were never going to be reserves for the south.  I am also aware of no unit Russian unit moved from the south to take part in this operation.

To put it bluntly, the basis for your premise is factually off the mark by a wide margin.

Er, no.  The only thing done differently in this attack was they used all the resources of an attack backing up their better forces (VDV/Spetsnaz/Marines) except with utter crap infantry instead.  That's because all of their "elite" units had to go to the south and have been bled out.  So Russia made do with with it had, not what it likely would have wanted.

Er, hardly.  Russia massed this amount of artillery at multiple points simultaneously last year for most of the year.  The reason why it stands out as exceptional is that they haven't been able to do it lately.  I've speculated they stripped all the artillery and ammo from their failed Luhansk offensive in part because the logistics of moving it to Donetsk City is wildly easier than trying to get it into the south.

Ukraine never has had adequate resources to adequately man all sectors of the front equally.  This sector has managed to hold out for 9 years without massive resources, so of course Russia was able to mass for this attack.  Especially because Donetsk City offers major advantages for staging an attack.

The scale of the attack is what allowed them to make some gains.  However, they also suffered MASSIVE losses and whatever they were attempting to do failed utterly.  Which shows that Ukraine's forces were up to the challenge.

Ukraine largely defeated this massive attack, by recent standards, with the forces it had on hand.  Taking ground back will require new forces, which may or may not be desirably to commit.  After all, Russia almost certainly launched this attack in order to draw Ukrainian forces away from the south, so why give Russia what it wants?

On this we mostly agree.  I also clearly demonstrates that all of Russia's inherent weaknesses were on display here.  Bad quality forces being chief amongst them.  Whatever the Russians use for a drawing board they don't seem to learn much because they keep making these sorts of attacks and Ukraine keeps demonstrating Russia's not up for it.

This is the thing all of us have been wondering about since last year.  Is this the death of maneuver warfare, or is it that Russia sucks at it so badly that they just make it seem impossible.  Ukraine's experience with large scale attacks is limited and is in the context of ungodly dense defenses handled by a competent defender, plus being under resourced for such a task and the defender having air superiority.  So, not really clear what to take away from that.

Steve

Thank you for the detailed response. I hope to continue this discussion when I have time to write out a suitable reply.

[Battlefront.com]

Just now, Kinophile said:

that 50k "army" was anything but, and certainly not the punching force it was made out to be. It was, i believe? used up to a good degree in the Kremina theatre, and is now just dissipated across the northern lines/

Which force are we talking about here?  3rd Army Corps?  Yes, that was burned up.  Russia also had a reserve force (forget the designation) was supposed to be training through December but parts of it were committed to the south last month.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

ISW has all but declared the Avdiivka operation as effectively dead:

Quote

Ongoing Russian offensive operations throughout the Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast area on October 13 reportedly faced setbacks around the city. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued to attack areas north and south of Avdiivka, and geolocated footage published on October 12 and 13 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Krasnohorivka (5km north of Avdiivka) and southeast of Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka).[1] Russian sources also published conflicting reports about previous claims by Russian sources of Russian control of the Avdiivka Coke Plant, and ISW has not observed any evidence to confirm that Russian forces control the plant as of publication.[2] Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces continue to repel Russian attacks around Avdiivka.[3] A Russian milblogger noted that Ukrainian forces are using minefields to slow down Russian advances in the Avdiivka direction.[4] A Russian volunteer in the 4th Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Brigade (2nd Army Corps, Southern Military District) claimed that worn out barrels are reducing the accuracy of Russian artillery near Avdiivka, a complaint about Russian artillery that ISW has previously observed from Russian sources.[5] The volunteer assessed that Russian forces can ”compress the [Ukrainian] perimeter” by capturing less fortified Ukrainian-held territory near Avdiivka, but expressed concern that Russian generals will misinterpret these limited advances and try to speed up offensive efforts towards Avdiivka. The volunteer noted that such a misinterpretation may lead Russian forces to “beat on concrete” fortifications until these forces run out.

Of course ISW did not even hint at what I just said, but when you read this it's not hard to see the authors saying "well, we've seen this play out before so we can guess where this is headed"

And if any of you think I'm reading too much into ISW's first paragraph of the report, read the second one:

Quote

The Russian military command appears to be restricting discussion of the Russian offensive operations around Avdiivka in the Russian information space, likely in an attempt to adapt to previous information shocks and control any narratives that emerge in the Russian information space around these operations. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on October 12 that the Russian military command was “dispensing information [about Russian offensive operations] in doses,” but then claimed on October 13 that the Russian military command was ”minimizing the release of information into the public domain” as the Russian military does not want “media hype” surrounding operations near Avdiivka.[6] Another Russian milblogger also claimed on October 13 that unspecified actors, likely Russian military leadership, instructed milbloggers to not discuss the details of the fighting near Avdiivka.[7] A Russian source stated that he supported the Russian military’s decision and urged milbloggers to discuss only information that does not affect Russian military operational security, whereas other Russian milbloggers noted that this is the time to figure out which of the Russian milbloggers are lying about the situation on the frontlines.[8] The Russian military command likely seeks to adjust for previous major offensives in which it lost control of perceptions of Russian actions in the Russian information space. Some milbloggers are following (and will likely continue to follow) the MoD-imposed narrative line, but this attempt at centralized control may provoke a backlash from select milbloggers.

Evidence that the Russian MoD has determined that further hyping of Avdiivka is over and that they now need to be quite because things are going to (at a minimum) peter out to nothing.

Steve

[dan/california]

We haven't advanced an inch, and we can't treat all the wounded really screams sucess doesnt it.

[dan/california]

Dmitri is on it today.

[Kraft]

7 hours ago, danfrodo said:

Like w endless waste of men & material to take Bakhmut?

- Russia controls Bakhmut

- Russia got rid of its prison population, net societal gain. Nobody misses them and will march through the streets in protest.

- In return, UA had some of the better units exhausted, among them 93rd if Im correct and tens of thousands of some of the best people dead and many more wounded, crippled.

- Keeping supply line was very costly, watch drone footage of the road of life, its littered with UA vehicles that were taken out there, trying to evac and resupply the city with the frontline hundreds/sometimes just dozens of meters away. Loss rates were not nearly as in favor as in other areas, with street fighting leveling the playing field a lot.

 

Operationally, I dont think it matters but if you count it, small Russian win. Strategically -> politically, they won.

In a raw balance of what was used up, Russia also comes out ahead far better than in any other engagement in this war, with the exception of the current counter offensive.

_________________________________________________

The fact that the Russian army can throw away hordes of tanks and infantry and level the frontline with massed artillery, as if it was 2022 tells me that they do not suffer "shortages" as much as people would like them. Major use of airpower, both fixed wing and rotary, yet the only confirmed downed aircraft are friendly fire in a completely different place - funny but also tells a story about the state of UA frontline AD.

It seems to me that there are enough resources to hold the line in the south for a quite a while longer.

Edited October 14, 2023 by Kraft

[LongLeftFlank]

Man, all kinds of doomers coming out of the woodwork. Gonna have to work my connections at the Consulate to secure enough smokes and brandy for the club.