How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_Capt]

5 hours ago, akd said:

This is ridiculous. This has already happened repeatedly through normal judicial processes following liberation of territories. I can’t think of a single proven example of extrajudicial violence against civilian collaborators by the Ukrainian government or military.

Well as Haiduk has already mentioned, revenge killing do happen and are very likely to continue.  Plus we are comparing areas that were occupied for about 6 months to a region that has been under Russian rule for nearly a decade - untangling that mess is going to pretty brutal.  I honestly hope and expect that official government process will be done in accordance with the law but these are slippery slopes for all the reasons our friends in Ukraine have noted.  Finding “collaborators” on the scope and scale of the Crimea or entire Donbas is going to be messy no doubt about it.  If that messy starts to look like oppression we are back to feeding fuel into resistance.

I honestly do not understand what it is about Westerners and their firm belief that rule of law will triumph.  We keep running headlong into situations completely missing the fact that war and conflict are deeply personal and build resentment that last generations.  How many interventions where we don’t get the bloody parades or locals running into our arms do we need to experience?  How many crappy civil wars that are never really settled and conditions for re-emergence are always just under the surface do we need to see?  War is not about military units firing at each other and the rules we try to throw over that.  It is about entire societies killing each other.  It is deeply personal and tends to unravel the best intentions. 

[The_Capt]

4 hours ago, L0ckAndL0ad said:

I do have all the pre-2014 documents, both originals and digital backup scans in the cloud.

But it doesn't matter, because I have reasons to believe I may not reach your side of the border. Not particularly fond of the idea of figuring if I am wrong or not. I am 95% sure it's not gonna end well. So I stay put for now.

Uhm. I was born in Crimea ('89), so as my mother and grandparents. My father is originally from Russia, but came here also during Soviet era and was registered here with Ukrainian documents before 2014. I do have all the old documents, but I never left Crimea to renew them after 2014. It costs money, and there's always something more important, like dental, or clothes, or broken boiler. I was going to when I felt comfortable to properly resettle. But who cares? I've never collaborated nor commited any crimes. Those who did know it and take their own risks by staying.

I do get your point about documents disappearing when things blow up and burn, and it's a good one, but it's not like someone intends to repeat Soviet style deportations in the middle of the night with freight trains. Not the country commited to join the EU, at least. Ministry of reintegration and other state services have a lot of experience with this sort of thing by this point, I'm sure. 

 

The ethnic hatred, on the other hand, is something to watch out for, definitely. I've identified myself as ethnically Russian my whole life. I speak Russian in my head 75% of the time. 20% my thoughts are in English, and sometimes I think like 5% in Ukrainian (mostly Poderev'yansky memes ;D).

After 24th February 2022, it suddenly became clear that ethnicity and even culture does not define me. I felt it in my gut and still do. Our actions define who we are. But also laws. By international law, and by Ukrainian law, I am Ukrainian citizen. Even if Estonians did not recognize me as such. That's who I am.

I do see your concerns as valid and they are worth the discussion.

I cannot express enough that I hope you are right.  And I totally respect your identity and citizenship.  If there is any justice left in the world Crimea will be liberated - let me be clear on all of that.

It is human: error, fear, biases, ignorance, hatred and greed that I point out as major concerns on post conflict…and not just for the Ukrainians themselves.  The conditions for things going badly and organized resistance/insurgency exist in Crimea and the Donbas.  They did before the 2014, they do now.  A major weakness of this thread is to put Ukrainians on an unfair pedestal.  The defence and retaking of their homeland is one for the history books but they are still human beings and are just as capable of losing the post-conflict bubble as anyone else.

The points of failure have already been outlined.  Loss of property, deportation, revenge killings/swift justice, collaborators.  All of that will be done within a very large population overseen by a Ukrainian military who is very pissed off.  An idea would be to bring in international security forces to assist but that comes with its own issues.

Regardless, I think this topic has been flogged enough.  I have provided my analysis and assessment, everyone can take it or leave it as they wish.  Hopefully it does get people thinking about post-war and the challenges we are likely going to face.

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, kraze said:

the other alternative is them killing you. Not sure if that one's better than preventing them doing this via prison.

after all the reminder here is that this isn't some border dispute. This is russians and their collaborators wanting to completely eliminate Ukrainians. We can not exist in a russian world. They don't see us being alive as an option.

This is where the “it will be fine camp” are sucking and blowing at the same time.  “All the bad people will leave back to Russia, the locals will do nothing but we will need to hunt down collaborators before they try to get us killed again”.

I do not disagree with you or Haiduk in the least.  The stakes here are very high.  Collaborators can become the skeleton of an insurgency and they will try and kill you.  The problem is finding them without alienating or pushing larger groups of the population into a situation where they see violence as the only way out.  It takes precision. These situations always go badly. Neighbours snitch before they can be snitched on.  People get mis-identified.  People take the law into their own hands. All of that can turn very ugly very quickly.  

This will take a masterful steady hand and an intelligence architecture for the ages.  It may take outside the box thinking like amnesty for low low level offenders to catch the big fish.  Or accepting a few big fish to get the rest.

 

[LongLeftFlank]

6 hours ago, Eddy said:

Bloody hell! If you can, it's worth reading the whole thread as there is images embedded. Suffice it to say, the whole idea that the Ukrainians would succeed if only they did it the NATO way is questionable (i.e. bollocks). This would appear to be a tough nut to crack.

"Translation:

Much has been written about the battles in the South. I wouldn't say that this is the case where it's better to see once (or multiple times) than to hear/read about it many times. Especially through the eyes of the frontline units. A thread about battles from the perspective of aerial reconnaissance:

Environment. Steppe. Fields, tree lines. Slight elevations and dips, villages, small rivers. Minefields. Whoever you may be, an armored assault group, evacuation team, aerial or infantry reconnaissance, your movement is visible from afar. The enemy has long been preparing.

Equipment and personnel can be spotted from a distance and targeted. Both sides understand that there are limited places for positions and deployment. Most likely, there's something to shoot at in almost every tree line. Confirmation is needed, of course. Primarily, it's necessary to determine the priority of the target

There's a limited number of access roads, logistical routes. Everything's been calibrated and fired upon repeatedly every day. You certainly can be spotted. Carrying out the mission while maintaining complete concealment from the enemy is mostly impossible

There has been a great deal of talk about fortifications and minefields. Every tree line has been dug up. On one stretch of the Mariupol highway, anti-tank fortifications have been installed. We're not just talking about trenches. There's an entire system of trenches, dugouts, and even undeground tunnels in some places

In each tree line, there's a network of trenches and firing positions for various weapons. AGS, DShK, ATGMs. Anti-tank ditches and mine obstacles stretch across the fields. From regular TM and POM mines to more "sophisticated" ones, all lying in wait for infantry.

Once again, it's crucial to emphasize that we're specifically discussing a system of trenches, interconnected by passageways and pathways. These pathways facilitate the movement of personnel, weaponry, and ammunition. As for what remains unexcavated, it's mined. All of this must be navigated to make progress forward.

For those who are "overly smart" and believe that the Ukrainian Armed Forces took an incredibly long time to drive the Russians out of the village of Robotyne, they must have missed the defense system that needed to be overcome in order to push the russians away from the Mariupol highway and gradually approach the village, encircle it, and finally seize control. Truly, a monumental task has been accomplished.

The russians are establishing firing points (AGS, heavy machine guns), and they mine the routes to them. They themselves move along designated paths. Our positions in the liberated territory are surrounded by mines and tripwires. Paths are cleared for ingress, and sappers gradually clear the area.

Frequently, the hidden "surprises" detonate during shelling, triggered by fires that start due to the shelling (weeds, shrubs, and trees catch fire, setting off tripwires). At times, we ourselves discover and call in sappers to clear specific areas.

There's much talk about armored vehicle losses, but the issue of initial setbacks is overlooked. In the long run, it's impossible to entirely avoid armor losses, even due to the enemy's advantage in the air. However, armor serves a specific purpose that entails risks.

There's much talk about armored vehicle losses, I'll skip the topic of initial setbacks. In the long run, it's impossible to entirely avoid armor losses, especially due to the enemy's advantage in the air. However, armor serves a specific purpose that entails risks.

These actions are justified by the fact that they save lives. I spoke with a soldier who survived two direct hits on a Bradley during shelling. Even the most critically damaged equipment is recovered and taken for repairs. You can replace a piece of metal, even if it's expensive, but you can't repair a human life

Enemy ATGM operators position cameras in advance of their positions. This way, they can spot targets (all types of vehicles) in advance and engage them effectively. If successful, artillery finishes off the targets. Alternatively, they might start with air force, followed by artillery.

They hunt for evacuation teams – both vehicles and stations. Right under our noses, they hit an armored vehicle, and an evacuation vehicle arrived for the guys. They had to maneuver in a tight spot, moving very slowly on a narrow road, avoiding going off-road into a mined field. Taking risks as well. Fortunately, they managed to get them out.

KAB's are one of the biggest fears. The russians use them extensively. I can't speak to their accuracy, but the weaponry is powerful. They attempt to target logistics and command centers, just as we do. They don't hesitate to simply fire on roads. Forward defenses in settlements are constantly under shelling.

The aerial reconnaissance linked system Orlan-Zala-Supercam is effective and causing issues. They identify targets and launch Lances, releasing them in swarms along with KAB's. They attempt to break through and hunt down vehicles. 

The recaptured positions are even more calibrated. Bombs are not spared. No lack of mines either. The tree line where one of the crews was operating was simply leveled. Only a palisade remained, and a well-made trench ceased to be usable.

The russians use a standard tactic for their armor. The route to the firing position is determined, usually in a way that keeps the vehicles under visual cover of the tree lines and eventually positions them in an open space for shooting. They quickly expend their ammunition and retreat

Vehicle cannot be completely concealed. Dust clouds are visible during movement, and the vehicles can be seen shifting between tree lines, while drones provide visibility as well. The main task here is to execute the firing mission quickly enough to prevent artillery targeting or counterattacks using FPV or ATGMs.

I understand why the russians are intensively butthurt due to the loss of the village with six streets. They put in significant effort to prevent the Ukrainian Armed Forces from advancing. Defending is easier according to all norms. On the other hand, we're putting in a tremendous effort to break through. And when we succeed, it shows that our efforts are paying off

Thank you for your attention. I might continue sharing in the future."
 

Many thanks to you, @The_MonkeyKing and others here for providing reports on the on-the-ground military situation and tactical dynamics.

I don't do Xwitter ever since Musk made it nonnavigable for nonsubscribers, so threadreaders or copypastes of key points and graphics are greatly appreciated!

[fireship4]

57 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

I don't do Xwitter ever since Musk made it nonnavigable for nonsubscribers

https://nitter.net/

[LongLeftFlank]

22 minutes ago, fireship4 said:

https://nitter.net/

yes cheers, bookmarked, but in my experience it often doesn't capture the latest threads or posts.

EDIT: Ah, ok, you need to enter the full handle of the author (e.g. Tatarigami_UA) to bring up the full feed. I'm not great at this stuff; other oldsters here may be in the same boat. 

Edited August 27, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[cesmonkey]

Large update from the Ukrainian Konstantin Mashovets. Here's a small excerpt:
https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1155

Quote

So, the Armed Forces of Ukraine started fighting for mastering the first positions of the enemy’s main line of defense in the Tokmak-Melitopol direction.

At the moment I do not have concrete, verified data about their first results. But, according to a number of, as my readers say, “reports from the field”, the advanced units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have already managed, at least in one sector, to penetrate to a depth of 1 km into the first position of the enemy’s main line of defense.

And another excerpt from his ending thoughts:
 

Quote

As we can see ... the enemy’s forces and means, in order to to simply "stop" the advance of the Armed Forces of Ukraine towards Tokmak - not so much ...

I think the main question lies elsewhere - how will he use them ... And will the Russian command find something "essential" in the near future to hold the main line of defense. For, "crack" in the area of Novoprokopovka and Verbovoe is already quite clearly audible in Tokmok...

 

[Vet 0369]

18 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Ok, let’s use your facts then.  At 15% of the local population actively supporting annexation that is around 330,000 who appears to be solidly in the pro-Russian camp…in 2014.  It is a major leap of logic to assume that the dynamics of 2014 apply ten years later but after ten years of Russian rule it is safe bet that the area was “Russified” pretty intensely.

And then there is the very awkward question of “how much civil resistance did the Russian’s see when they took over the entire region?”  This is also a major indicator you are skipping over.

Here is the point most people miss on insurgencies, and you are doing it here as well - they are very often if not always a very small minority of the population.  If all 2.2 million Crimeans decide “nope” and take up active or violent resistance then Ukraine will not take back Crimea.  However, as you note and here I do agree, this is very unlikely.  But they don’t have to. The majority of civilians need only stay neutral or play both sides - here the nearly 68 percent who identify as Russia come into play.  A fraction of a fraction of the 15% who actively were onside need only take up arms and be supported by an outside power for this to constitute a major insurgency.  Say only 33,000 Crimeans get really riled up, hidden amongst a neutral population that really have no love or loyalty to either side, you have the conditions right there for a decades long problem.  It will be very much in Russia’s interest to make that happen, which is another major factor.

”Crap happens plan for the worst”.  Really?  Ok, once again let’s review the key factors that provide the fuel for insurgents, all that “happening crap” that we teach a joint war colleges:

- A cause.  Very often tied to identity, ethnicity or religion (often all three) and a belief in an idea of a political framework other than the one they are living under.  In simpler terms a certainty.  Is there a population in either of the occupied regions who are likely to have “a cause”?  Well 2014-2023 says “likely”. https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/conflict-ukraines-donbas-visual-explainer

- Failure in mechanism of change/representation.  Re-integration of these regions is going to be dicey in the extreme as it will mean re-enfranchisement of potentially hostile citizenry into a democratic process.  This was a major flash point in the Donbas pre-2014, perceived lack of representation and failures in representative governance.https://www.ponarseurasia.org/wp-content/uploads/attachments/Pepm351_Kudelia_Sept2014.pdf.  This situation boxes some people in to the point that violent resistance is the only agent of change.  So is there likely to be a portion of the Crimean population that is at risk of feeling dis-enfranchised after liberation?  Are they going to feel boxed in?

- Weak governance.  This is an area you have already admitted is a risk and frankly it will become a key battleground post-conflict.  If governance slips, corruption and old habits come into play then popular sentiment can swing pretty fast. Insurgencies thrive on poor governance and inequities, which they link immediately to their cause as the solutions for. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-choice-corruption-or-growth/

- Popular support.  This does not need to be active support, it can simply be passive.  Both you and our Ukrainian posters point to largely “neutral populace in these regions”, that is more than enough to set conditions for effective insurgencies.  They will play that neutrality and use money and other incentives to create transactional networks that allow them freedom of movement.  The other viable tactic is effectively staging over reaction from the “liberators” in order to push neutrality in their direction.  As has already been covered, this is a very likely condition in these regions.

- Repression.  Perceived or manufactured narratives, conditions of repression of populations are rich soil for insurgency.  You, and other posters have already leaned into mass deportations, which is going to look and feel pretty repressive in the regions.  This sort of stuff can split families and friends along “citizenship and true loyalty” lines.  As has also been noted Ukrainian security services are in high gear and will be very likely pushing hard to root out cells before they can metastasize.  Is there a likely perception of repression under these conditions?  Is there a vulnerable narrative that can be exploited?

- External support with interests.  Normally passive support by a neighbouring nation, safe havens and blind eyes (eg Taliban in Pakistan) is bad enough.  Active support at the levels Russia is likely to provide is something else.  This is a North Vietnam/Mujahideen situation.  Is this likely?  We already saw Russia do this for years in these regions.  Will Russia have an interest in making life a living hell for Ukraine in Crimea and Donbas?  Will they have means and opportunity?  Short of a complete collapse of Russia (and then we have a whole new set of problems), I suspect the answer is a hard “yes”.

That is not great risk calculus nor is it “hype”.  And in the “crap happens” camp of "no insurgency": “Solvyanks did not blow up, all the bad people will leave, those left are too lazy to do anything about it anyway and LNR/DPR and Russians suck.”

Ok, well let’s put this one down on record then because we are not likely to agree.  I believe that there is a high probability of civilian violent opposition to Ukrainian liberation in Crimea, and even though it will be a very small minority it will cause strategic effects. It will likely happen in the 1-5 years after liberation, faster if Ukraine gets too heavy handed.  To counter this will take significant effort not only by Ukraine but by it allies to ensure those conditions above are stamped out. This will come at significant cost and risk, and cannot be the piecemeal support we have seen from the West so far.  It will also take an epic reconciliation, reconstruction and enfranchisement effort on the part of the Ukrainian people as well as major reforms in Ukrainian government, some of which are facing off against generational internal cultures.  Can it be done? Yes.  Will it be done?  Unknown

You are on record as stating it is “unlikely”.  Let’s see where it lands.  The good news in all this is that if we get a chance to find out the region will have been retaken in the first place.

This! To distill this whole thing down:

1) Remember our own history. In the American Revolution of 1775, a maximum of 33% of the population of the thirteen British Colonies even supported the Revolution. Of that one third that supported it, only about one-third of them  i.e. one ninth or 16.5 % of the entire population, actively supported it. And, there was a full 33% of the entire population that “actively” opposed it.

2) Always plan for the worse case scenario. This is something that for some reason, most military and political leaders do not do. If the Joint Staff War Colleges are teaching that leaders must do this, it is apparent that most leaders aren’t listening, maybe because they’re smarter than everyone else, otherwise, they wouldn’t be the leaders?

Edited August 27, 2023 by Vet 0369

[Seedorf81]

Two situations where people had good reasons for insurgencies (if there are any good reasons), but nothing happened, were Germany and Japan right after the end of WW2.

Both countries had, until defeated, completely different (political and social, mainly) beliefs compared to the conquering and occupying nations (Ehm, just the Western Allies, because Russia.., well, Russia just being Russian.)

So that could be a reason for an insurgency, because there was a (kind of) repression from the Allied occupants. (Warning: this is not my personal opinion, I describe what lots of Germans and Japanese might have felt in 1945.) Some political views were suddenly FORBIDDEN, and some people were hunted down and punished for things that were totally acceptable in their countries until the end of the war.

Medical experiments, massive exploitation of slave-labourers, killing Jews and Russian POW's and Chinese civilians and Allied POW's, killng innocent hostages, looting occupied countries, and so on and so forth. Suddenly the people who were engaged in those things, weren't allowed to do that no more. So those people, and were talking about not just hundreds, but at least hundreds of thousands, were "forced" to live differently, which also can be a reason for wanting to participate in, or instigate, an insurgency/rebellion.

Besides that a huge percentage of all people in Germany and Japan had experienced personal loss. Either by being wounded, familymembers killed or wounded or missing, friends and neighbours and colleagues killed, or having their houses and shops and factories being destroyed or through evacuations and/or ending up homeless. And those who didn't experience a personal loss, saw their countries being humiliated and being bombed to smithereens.

Which, considering the fact that we humans always feel our own suffering much more than that of others and the tendency to ignore what we (Germany and Japan in this case) did to others, can create resentment and a lust for revenge.

So why was there no big insurgency then? Why practically no attacks on the occupiers?

 

Well, it seems to me that there are two ways to prevent an insurgency.

1. Utter and total repression.

Immediate and murderous hunting down of every possible bit of revolt or resistance. Like Stalin did. Kill everyone you suspect. As a result most people won't even think about protesting or speaking up, just out of fear and self-preservation.

 

2. Being much better than what was.

The Western Allies brought, even for fanatical nationalists, better circumstances on nearly all parts of life for the Germans and Japanese. Freedom of thought and speech and what to read, freedom of travel and movement, freedom to choose your occupation, freedom of religion, entrepeneurial freedom, and much more.

But there was something else; which seems a little weird: people were not being persecuted for wrong-doings except the worst. In stead of shooting all Germans (like I would have done if I was Eisenhower when he discovered what the Germans really did during WW2), stunning amounts of "wrong-doers" got away with sometimes stunning crimes. And even some of those who were convicted, had their sentences absurdly reduced, a few years later.

But unbelievably so, that - for most people despicable - "forgiveness behaviour" created better circumstances in the long run. It helped to create a better, much less belligerent, Germany and Japan. (Eh, until today al least .)

Somehow accepting that people do bad/stupid things, and try to cope with that, works better than revenge and retalliation. Not always and not perfectly, but it works.

 

So as I see it: when (NOT IF) Ukraine gets Crimea (and the rest) back, there's just two ways to prevent an insurgency.

Be extremely ruthless, or be forgiving.

 

 

 

[Haiduk]

11 hours ago, Eddy said:

Bloody hell! If you can, it's worth reading the whole thread as there is images embedded. Suffice it to say, the whole idea that the Ukrainians would succeed if only they did it the NATO way is questionable (i.e. bollocks). This would appear to be a tough nut to crack.

UKR army is now acomplishing tasks and overcoming such obstacles and resistance level, which no army in the world have been encoutering since WWII or Korea. But even during these wars Allies had at least parity in air and in that times there were no drones, long-range guided weapons, EW and other stuff which make these tasks more complicated. But we hadn't variants except to gnau their defense tree-line for tree-line.

A videocollage about fighting for Robotyne

 

[Haiduk]

Russians after concentration of reserves in Novoprokopivka area has began to do own usual thing - to trow them in counter-atatcks on Robotyne. To compensate insufficient of effectiveness of own artillery, Russians much more increased number of airstrikes. Despite this UKR troops could repel Russian atatcks on southern part of Robotyne and even more, reportedly UKR troops completely sezed height 166 east from Novoprokopivka, pushing back from there units of 201st MRR regiment of LNR. 

Sitaution around Klishchiivka and Andriivka - UKR troops in recent two weeks were forced to withdrew to heights over Klishchiivka, repelling intensive Russian attacks. As our soldiers say, no more Russian Shtorm Z infantry meat attacks. Now they have a deal against with regular units armored attacks. But their advantage in positions on heights and good artillery work allow to beat up each Russian assault. Now UKR troops again entered to Klishchiivka and reteken several parts of this village. Assault actions inside the village mostly conducring asault brigade "Liut' " ("Rage"), formed from special police units as a part of "Offensive Guard"

The map of heights in section of UKR offensive (height 166 this is probably height 163.7 on this map)

Edited August 27, 2023 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

Loclas in Kherson write they felt shockwawe like eartquake at 01:10 of night. There is some information UKR forces hit some "interesting target" near Oleshky on left bank of Dnipro. 

PS. Here is a video of this "nuke"

 

Edited August 27, 2023 by Haiduk

[Seedorf81]

Russian investigators conclude after "genetic testing" that both Prigozjin and Utkin were on the crashed plane.

[akd]

3rd Assault Brigade working another tree line:

 

[poesel]

2 hours ago, Seedorf81 said:

Two situations where people had good reasons for insurgencies (if there are any good reasons), but nothing happened, were Germany and Japan right after the end of WW2.

Both countries had, until defeated, completely different (political and social, mainly) beliefs compared to the conquering and occupying nations (Ehm, just the Western Allies, because Russia.., well, Russia just being Russian.)

So that could be a reason for an insurgency, because there was a (kind of) repression from the Allied occupants. (Warning: this is not my personal opinion, I describe what lots of Germans and Japanese might have felt in 1945.) Some political views were suddenly FORBIDDEN, and some people were hunted down and punished for things that were totally acceptable in their countries until the end of the war.

Medical experiments, massive exploitation of slave-labourers, killing Jews and Russian POW's and Chinese civilians and Allied POW's, killng innocent hostages, looting occupied countries, and so on and so forth. Suddenly the people who were engaged in those things, weren't allowed to do that no more. So those people, and were talking about not just hundreds, but at least hundreds of thousands, were "forced" to live differently, which also can be a reason for wanting to participate in, or instigate, an insurgency/rebellion.

Besides that a huge percentage of all people in Germany and Japan had experienced personal loss. Either by being wounded, familymembers killed or wounded or missing, friends and neighbours and colleagues killed, or having their houses and shops and factories being destroyed or through evacuations and/or ending up homeless. And those who didn't experience a personal loss, saw their countries being humiliated and being bombed to smithereens.

Which, considering the fact that we humans always feel our own suffering much more than that of others and the tendency to ignore what we (Germany and Japan in this case) did to others, can create resentment and a lust for revenge.

So why was there no big insurgency then? Why practically no attacks on the occupiers?

 

Well, it seems to me that there are two ways to prevent an insurgency.

1. Utter and total repression.

Immediate and murderous hunting down of every possible bit of revolt or resistance. Like Stalin did. Kill everyone you suspect. As a result most people won't even think about protesting or speaking up, just out of fear and self-preservation.

 

2. Being much better than what was.

The Western Allies brought, even for fanatical nationalists, better circumstances on nearly all parts of life for the Germans and Japanese. Freedom of thought and speech and what to read, freedom of travel and movement, freedom to choose your occupation, freedom of religion, entrepeneurial freedom, and much more.

But there was something else; which seems a little weird: people were not being persecuted for wrong-doings except the worst. In stead of shooting all Germans (like I would have done if I was Eisenhower when he discovered what the Germans really did during WW2), stunning amounts of "wrong-doers" got away with sometimes stunning crimes. And even some of those who were convicted, had their sentences absurdly reduced, a few years later.

But unbelievably so, that - for most people despicable - "forgiveness behaviour" created better circumstances in the long run. It helped to create a better, much less belligerent, Germany and Japan. (Eh, until today al least .)

Somehow accepting that people do bad/stupid things, and try to cope with that, works better than revenge and retalliation. Not always and not perfectly, but it works.

 

So as I see it: when (NOT IF) Ukraine gets Crimea (and the rest) back, there's just two ways to prevent an insurgency.

Be extremely ruthless, or be forgiving.

 

 

 

Very well put.

One thing to add: one reason why Germany and Japan were treated so well by the allies was that they were needed vs Russia and/or China. Without that, I guess the willingness to forgive would have been a bit less.

The willingness of Ukraine to forgive Russia or Russians will pay out in good PR in the West, which translates to money or things like EU membership.
Ukraine has managed to stay the 'good guy' in a horrible war. When the war ends, it needs to stay that for its own future.
That will be a very hard thing to do - not to pay back what the bastards have done to you. But the West is not in this war, we are only observing. And the West will judge Ukraine by its own standards, which are not adjusted by having been into that war.

Winning the war is only halfway to peace.

[Haiduk]

Just an example of M58 MICLIC work. Too short range as for me in comparison with UR-77

 

Edited August 27, 2023 by Haiduk

[The_MonkeyKing]

Much needed clarification on the different "defense lines":

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1695463241235734632.html

Some pickings:

[The_Capt]

7 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Much needed clarification on the different "defense lines":

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1695463241235734632.html

Some pickings:

Looking more and more like Tokmak is the overall operational objective for this years offensive.

[cesmonkey]

Russia report on the Rabotino sector:

https://t.me/SolovievLive/205338
 

Quote

SOLOVIEV
Forwarded from 
Newspaper 1430 Polka
The situation in Rabotino at 15.30

At the moment, the forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have transferred all their available reserves to Rabotino. On the air you can hear the negotiations of foreign mercenaries.

Our troops at Rabotino received reinforcements from special forces units of the Airborne Forces and the Marine Corps. The RF Armed Forces successfully deter enemy attacks.

Artillery and mortars are working massively.

There is information about the concentration of up to 80 units of NATO armored vehicles near Orekhov, including Challenger-2 tanks, Stryker armored personnel carriers, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, as well as EW systems of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The enemy is also trying to attack the area between Rabotino and Verbov. But our fighters with incredible efforts destroy the enemy's assault groups, preventing him from breaking through in the direction of Tokmak.

 

[Haiduk]

It's claimed SBU attacked with 16 drones Russian airfield in Kursk. Drones atatcked 4 Su-30, MiG-29, radars of S-300 and 2 Pantsyr S1. 

The source claimed Russians heard at least 13 explosions. Result of attack will be known in "nearest time". Attack was conducted by counter-intelligence service of 13th Main Directorate of SBU

Let's see if true...

 https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/27/7417295/

[cesmonkey]

 

[Haiduk]

16 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

Russia report on the Rabotino sector:

https://t.me/SolovievLive/205338
 

 

Russians today write completely mismatching info.

We threw out ukies from Rabotino!

We abandoned Rabotino and now it's grey zone, which is demolishing by our artillery and aviation!

We heroically repelling hordes of western armor near Verbove!

Ukr assault group entered to Verbove! 

Edited August 27, 2023 by Haiduk

[Teufel]

Tokmak…(Russian 58th CAA) …main news is that around 24-25 August, the ZSU has entered Novoprokopivka. What is unclear is how far did it get by now. The Russians began reporting the village – held by the 56th and 108th VDV Regiments (both from the 7th VDV Division) – as ‘lost’, and that already two days ago. Around the same time Ukrainians reported the re-deployment of the 503rd MRR into the village.

As for the stretch of the frontline from Novoprovopivka via the Hill 166 to Verbove: ZSU seems to have deployed the 46th Airborne in this area, but is otherwise zip-lip. With one exception: have received a denial that the ZSU has reached the Hill 166.

The Russian contacts say their frontline was ‘penetrated in two sectors’; furthermore, some are indicating that half of Verbove should be under ZSU’s control. Heavy fighting is reported from the Novopokrovka area, too.

Further to the (Russian) rear, Ukrainian artillery is (heavily) pounding Chervonohirka and Ocheretuvate, some 10km south of the frontline, as well as Novofedorivka, north-east of Verbove. The Russian artillery is reported as ‘not active’ in this sector of the frontline, i.e. ‘sillenced’ by Ukrainian artillery.

However, the VSRF is deploying lots of Lancets, mortars, Su-25s (either one or two were claimed shot down ‘in the Robotyne area’, yesterday), plus – on average – some 9-10 MPK/UMPK glide bombs from Su-34s per day.

Full post from Tom Cooper found here, including update from other sectors - https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-26-august-2023

[Teufel]

Tokmak…(Russian 58th CAA) …main news is that around 24-25 August, the ZSU has entered Novoprokopivka. What is unclear is how far did it get by now. The Russians began reporting the village – held by the 56th and 108th VDV Regiments (both from the 7th VDV Division) – as ‘lost’, and that already two days ago. Around the same time Ukrainians reported the re-deployment of the 503rd MRR into the village.

As for the stretch of the frontline from Novoprovopivka via the Hill 166 to Verbove: ZSU seems to have deployed the 46th Airborne in this area, but is otherwise zip-lip. With one exception: have received a denial that the ZSU has reached the Hill 166.  The Russian contacts say their frontline was ‘penetrated in two sectors’; furthermore, some are indicating that half of Verbove should be under ZSU’s control. Heavy fighting is reported from the Novopokrovka area, too.

Further to the (Russian) rear, Ukrainian artillery is (heavily) pounding Chervonohirka and Ocheretuvate, some 10km south of the frontline, as well as Novofedorivka, north-east of Verbove. The Russian artillery is reported as ‘not active’ in this sector of the frontline, i.e. ‘sillenced’ by Ukrainian artillery. However, the VSRF is deploying lots of Lancets, mortars, Su-25s (either one or two were claimed shot down ‘in the Robotyne area’, yesterday), plus – on average – some 9-10 MPK/UMPK glide bombs from Su-34s per day.

Full post including update on other sectors is found here - https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-26-august-2023

Edited August 27, 2023 by Teufel

[billbindc]

27 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Looking more and more like Tokmak is the overall operational objective for this years offensive.

And the more I look at it, it seems like it will be a pretty decisive campaign if they get there.