How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Seedorf81 said:

New camo Russian Black Sea fleet, first spotted on 22nd of june 2023.

http://www.hisutton.com/Russian-Navy-Deceptive-Camouflage.html

 

 

What's old is new again.  German heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen in WW2:

Steve

[A Canadian Cat]

2 hours ago, Carolus said:

Instead they will continue to terrorize Ukraine with long-range air attacks, every month, every week, since that is what they can afford and what Ukraine cannot stop at the source. 

Nearly everything thing you said is a possibility. I think it will go better for the Ukrainians but we don't know yet. But the above is just wrong. If they did end up in a place where there was a stale mate in the ground and people moved on but the Russians kept targeting civilians the Ukraines would get methods to strike the source. They would happily be given to them or they would get them themselves. The Russian airfields and or launch sites would be targeted and relentlessly so.

[Battlefront.com]

1 minute ago, IanL said:

Nearly everything thing you said is a possibility. I think it will go better for the Ukrainians but we don't know yet. But the above is just wrong. If they did end up in a place where there was a stale mate in the ground and people moved on but the Russians kept targeting civilians the Ukraines would get methods to strike the source. They would happily be given to them or they would get them themselves. The Russian airfields and or launch sites would be targeted and relentlessly so.

Agreed, and such attacks would become less and less effective as Ukraine was able to concentrate on air defense.  The shoot down rate even now, with a stressed out and stretched thin Ukrainian AD network, is pretty impressive.  It's a safe bet that Ukraine would continue to strengthen its AD to the point where Russia would just give up as effort would be not worth doing.

Recently I've started to view the Russian terror strikes on civilians as being some combination of sadistic pleasure and practical distraction.  In terms of distraction, think of what Ukraine would do with its AD if the Russians reduced or stopped their terror campaign.  Those systems, which include fixed wing aircraft, would be able to concentrate on the frontlines.  Given how tenuous Russia's grip on air ops is... they really can't afford Ukraine having more capabilities concentrated there.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Washington Post (paywalled, probably) article on the recent visit of the head of the CIA's visit to Ukraine:

 

Quote

Publicly, Ukrainian officials have expressed frustration with critics of the pace at which the counteroffensive has played out thus far. But in private, military planners in Kyiv have relayed to Burns and others bullish confidence in their aim to retake substantial territory by the fall; move artillery and missile systems near the boundary line of Russian-controlled Crimea; push further into eastern Ukraine; and then open negotiations with Moscow for the first time since peace talks broke down in March of last year, according to three people familiar with the planning.

“Russia will only negotiate if it feels threatened,” said a senior Ukrainian official.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/06/30/cia-director-burns-ukraine-counteroffensive/?utm_campaign=wp_post_most&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most

It is really the only sensible plan, therefore not really surprising because Ukraine is run by sensible people!

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

1 hour ago, cesmonkey said:

Not sure this has article has been linked yet, from a few days ago:

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/06/28/world/europe/ukraine-counteroffensive-obstacles.html

 

These are the hard yards. We all know by now to put limited weight on historical analogues, but this echoes the June 1944 period where the Allies seemingly floundered in the bocage, with daily progress measured in single hedgerows, and large mech attacks stalling miserably on 'fronts of one vehicle'.

...Meanwhile though, the German ability to man their defences, and to supply them across France, was progressively melting away, in spite of favourable terrain and capable fire support.

****

My thoughts, fwtw:

1.  Russia is already finding it hard to sustain large unit operations along its extended (ahem) Long Left Flank (the 'land bridge' zone), as the road LOCs running parallel behind come under interdiction by longer ranged Ukrainian weapons.

2. While UA ground gains don't look impressive yet on a map, the Russians have their backs to the Azov. Sure, it's deeper than their Kherson bridgehead was last summer, but each km lost, and each east-west roadway cut reduces their options.

3. Gen. Zaluzhny (I think) observed early in the war that one thing the Russians did do capably was to shift large formations around quickly, especially their VDV 'fire brigades'. Perhaps not so easy now in this zone, methinks....

4. Corollary questions:

-> What's the average round trip in kms for each truckload of essential frontline Russian consumables (or urgent casevac) on this front? There aren't any railheads west of Donetsk or north of Crimea, this is all trucks.

-> What happens to supply volumes delivered if/when that mileage doubles?

-> What happens if/when most of that mileage becomes subject to constant day/night attack by killer drones, rockets and infiltrators?

-> What's the effect of supply starvation on the RU frontline forces' ability to cover their fortified/mined fronts? or even to patrol their own LOCs?

Does their front then devolve into semi-isolated hedgehogs, as happened in the culminating phase of the Kherson push last summer?

Final thought: can all these static defences become a liability to the Russians as well at some point, especially when coordination and info sharing between units is weak?

Edited July 1, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Battlefront.com]

Russian history weighs in on what the Wagner mutiny likely signals for Putin's regime.  Finally, someone is saying the things that should have been said last week!

Quote

While the authorities didn’t switch to Prigozhin’s side during his revolt, they also didn’t stand in his way. Talk of authorities rallying around Putin are nonsense, says Zubov, “if it were true, then Prigozhin wouldn’t have even made it as far as Rostov.” It became clear that Putin’s “power vertical” simply doesn’t exist.

...

Could this rebellion trigger a change of power? “Now that the trigger has been pulled, it’s just a matter of months. Or perhaps even a matter of weeks,” predicts Zubov.

...

Zubov adds that “without a doubt,” the Russian army “will play a role in the future change of power.”

https://meduza.io/en/feature/2023/06/30/if-the-authorities-had-rallied-around-putin-prigozhin-wouldn-t-have-even-reached-rostov

Where I disagree with Zubov is his optimism that some form of credible democratic government will follow the overthrow of Putin.  His arguments are purely pragmatic rather than realistic.  The most likely outcome is a reset to the autocratic system that Putin started out with, which was a mix of real democratic norms that were only allowed to function when it didn't conflict with elite's plunder and power.

Steve

[akd]

Video from a small unit leader in the 47th Mech Bde over two days of assault operations:

Video (part 1) from some American volunteers on MRAPs participating in attack in the south several weeks ago:

 

Edited July 1, 2023 by akd

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

These are the hard yards. We all know by now to put limited weight on historical analogues, but this echoes the June 1944 period where the Allies seemingly floundered in the bocage, with daily progress measured in single hedgerows, and large mech attacks stalling miserably on 'fronts of one vehicle'.

...Meanwhile though, the German ability to man their defences, and to supply them across France, was progressively melting away, in spite of favourable terrain and capable fire support.

****

My thoughts, fwtw:

1.  Russia is already finding it hard to sustain large unit operations along its extended (ahem) Long Left Flank (the 'land bridge' zone), as the road LOCs running parallel behind come under interdiction by longer ranged Ukrainian weapons.

2. While UA ground gains don't look impressive yet on a map, the Russians have their backs to the Azov. Sure, it's deeper than their Kherson bridgehead was last summer, but each km lost, and each east-west roadway cut reduces their options.

3. Corollary questions:

-> What's the average round trip in kms for each truckload of essential frontline Russian consumables (or urgent casevac) on this front? There aren't any railheads west of Donetsk or north of Crimea, this is all trucks.

-> What happens to supply volumes delivered if/when that mileage doubles?

-> What happens if/when most of that mileage becomes subject to constant day/night attack by killer drones, rockets and infiltrators?

-> What's the effect of supply starvation on the RU frontline forces' ability to cover their fortified/mined fronts? or even to patrol their own LOCs?

Yup!

Perun's latest video covers this EXACT topic in his usual detail.  He then compared it to Kherson and discussed the scale.  His thinking about the south, basically, boils down to the old adage of "the bigger they come, the harder they fall".  The scale of EVERYTHING is bigger than Kherson, which means Russia has to maintain LOCs on a much, much larger scale than it did for an expanded bridgehead.

Perun pointed out what we've long discussed here which is that rail is critical for Russia to get the amount of stuff it needs brought to the front.  And even then, that rail capacity ends at Melitopol.  Cut off the rail access and everything has to move by truck, and the distances are indeed vast.

As Perun put it, defending from well prepared defenses works very differently when there's not enough food and ammo to actually defend.

This is why the "progress is slow" people need to chill out.  Kherson went slowly and those who knew what they were talking about said "yeah, but Russia's LOCs are crap.  We'll wake up one day and it will all be over.  We just don't know which day that will be, but not likely tomorrow".

4 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Does their front then devolve into semi-isolated hedgehogs, as happened in the culminating phase of the Kherson push last summer?

Probably.  The more strategic and fortified a position is, such as Melitopol, the less willing Russia will be to abandon it.  But ultimately Russia hasn't shown any interest in being surrounded so as soon as that threat becomes real, whatever they're holding will be abandoned.  Ukraine knows this and therefore won't be looking to frontal assault important nodes but to perform classic maneuver warfare and go around them.  Russia knows this too, but they lack numbers and mobility to do much about it once the lines are breached.

4 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Final thought: can all these static defences become a liability to the Russians as well at some point, especially when coordination and info sharing between units is weak?

Yes.  It's Maginot Line all over again.  Russia put so much emphasis on fixed defenses because they know they can't win a war of mobility.  Ergo, their strategy for holding the south relies on those defenses.  They don't really have a credible Plan B aside from falling back to more rearward lines of defense.

The liability is that since they have no Plan B they will be tempted to continue sticking with Plan A beyond it's ability to function.  This is what we saw in Kherson.  They just kept doing the same old same old even though there was absolutely no viable plan to change the situation into something more favorable.

This is really not a knock on Russia per se.  A nation on the defensive due to unfavorable strategic level circumstances vs. a determined and well resourced enemy is likely to find themselves in the same spot.  Which is why Putin tried so hard last year to figure out some way to scare off the West or obligate Ukraine to sue for peace.  Putin doomed all those efforts to failure by insisting on maximal objectives that Ukraine and the West would never agree to.  Not smart.

Steve

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

These are the hard yards. We all know by now to put limited weight on historical analogues, but this echoes the June 1944 period where the Allies seemingly floundered in the bocage, with daily progress measured in single hedgerows, and large mech attacks stalling miserably on 'fronts of one vehicle'.

...Meanwhile though, the German ability to man their defences, and to supply them across France, was progressively melting away, in spite of favourable terrain and capable fire support.

****

My thoughts, fwtw:

1.  Russia is already finding it hard to sustain large unit operations along its extended (ahem) Long Left Flank (the 'land bridge' zone), as the road LOCs running parallel behind come under interdiction by longer ranged Ukrainian weapons.

2. While UA ground gains don't look impressive yet on a map, the Russians have their backs to the Azov. Sure, it's deeper than their Kherson bridgehead was last summer, but each km lost, and each east-west roadway cut reduces their options.

3. Gen. Zaluzhny (I think) observed early in the war that one thing the Russians did do capably was to shift large formations around quickly, especially their VDV 'fire brigades'. Perhaps not so easy now in this zone, methinks....

4. Corollary questions:

-> What's the average round trip in kms for each truckload of essential frontline Russian consumables (or urgent casevac) on this front? There aren't any railheads west of Donetsk or north of Crimea, this is all trucks.

-> What happens to supply volumes delivered if/when that mileage doubles?

-> What happens if/when most of that mileage becomes subject to constant day/night attack by killer drones, rockets and infiltrators?

-> What's the effect of supply starvation on the RU frontline forces' ability to cover their fortified/mined fronts? or even to patrol their own LOCs?

Does their front then devolve into semi-isolated hedgehogs, as happened in the culminating phase of the Kherson push last summer?

Final thought: can all these static defences become a liability to the Russians as well at some point, especially when coordination and info sharing between units is weak?

Who are you and what have you done with the real LLF?

It brings up the central challenge the RA faces, density.  They have got an extremely long frontage to try and cover with not enough troops.  The UA is poking and probing to 1) draw out RA reserves and support, 2) gauge just how effective RA systems are right now (e,g, logistics, air support, ISR and logistics) and 3) to get inside the heads of Russian leadership - classic shaping.

All this adds up to continual stress on the RA which will either hold or break.  If they hold we are into a different endgame.  If they break options open up for the UA.  Considering that Russia appears to be a complete psycho-f#ck family right now given the events of the last couple weeks, my money is on “break”.

Edited July 1, 2023 by The_Capt

[NamEndedAllen]

https://www.pcmag.com/news/wagner-hackers-say-they-shut-down-russian-satellite-internet-provider?zdee=gAAAAABjNL8PmPe1NVwXmsDz8u4vSBveiNgx9PrBRN7r8ioXhCPYQf9r8MTGbPb8VidcggehfuHNBYyHzuH4Bs9gxdWcd7aHBGYzEud9Yp2tH6xrHV4VqVs%3D

[sburke]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Sorry, you are wrong.  Very, very, very wrong.  It makes me wonder if you're really watching this counter offensive play out in sufficient detail .

Steve

He can correct me if I am wrong, but I think he was specifically referring to use by the UA. With the RA having limited offensive capacity I assume his thinking there is less need for them.  Not sure I agree but he wasn’t saying what think your response implied. 

[Beleg85]

There was a clip somewhere from Bakhmut, where Ukrainians raided muscovite trenches and reportedly found this leflets...(can be fake, but looks real- unfortunatelly cannot provide original movie, only best shots form it). Sheer beauty. You basically don't need to translate, pretty self explanatory.

 

Edited July 1, 2023 by Beleg85

[Bulletpoint]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Sorry, you are wrong.  Very, very, very wrong.  It makes me wonder if you're really watching this counter offensive play out in sufficient detail .

We just saw Ukraine lose more heavy armor in a couple of hours than the US lost taking over Iraq.  This was almost completely due to mines, either directly or indirectly.  Did you watch the horror show video of the Ukrainian squads trapped in an AP minefield?  This made an entire platoon sized unit combat ineffective while trying to extract their soldiers, almost all of whom lost limbs.

Mines are the #1 thing that Ukraine is trying to figure out how to address.  Not artillery, not tanks, not airpower... mines.  If they can't "solve for mines" then this counter offensive is going to be at significant risk of failure (worst case) or major disappointment (best case).  Either because Ukraine takes too little territory for the effort or the effort is considered too high for the rewards.

If it were not for the thick belts of Russian mines, Ukraine would be approaching the Sea of Azov within a few weeks instead of still trying to figure out how to get through minefields without taking horrendous losses.

You did see I wrote AP mines? AT mines are of course a big factor in this war.

[kimbosbread]

2 hours ago, IanL said:

Nearly everything thing you said is a possibility. I think it will go better for the Ukrainians but we don't know yet. But the above is just wrong. If they did end up in a place where there was a stale mate in the ground and people moved on but the Russians kept targeting civilians the Ukraines would get methods to strike the source. They would happily be given to them or they would get them themselves. The Russian airfields and or launch sites would be targeted and relentlessly so.

Meh, I’m less concerned about long range missles.

TU-95/22/160: Cheap drone/cruise missiles will start having much better range quickly, and one could imagine a truckload of these things flying from Kazakhstan somewhere and then flying 1000km to the airfield and using a camera to identify the target. Russia just doesn’t have that many of these.

Black Sea Fleet: Won’t exist for that much longer.

Iskanders/Khinzals: They can’t make enough to overwhelm air defences, plus those factories are nice targets for drones/sabotage.

I’d be much more worried about terrorism honestly.

Edited July 1, 2023 by kimbosbread

[kevinkin]

11 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

You did see I wrote AP mines? AT mines are of course a big factor in this war.

All mines are a big factor. Even if you can create a mine free avenue into and past the MLR, that channels the attacker into defined kill zones. For example, if choppers remain hidden they can fly direct to a kill zone with having to hunt, they are far safer and effective. 

[dan/california]

28 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

There was a clip somewhere from Bakhmut, where Ukrainians raided muscovite trenches and reportedly found this leflets...(can be fake, but looks real- unfortunatelly cannot provide original movie, only best shots form it). Sheer beauty. You basically don't need to translate, pretty self explanatory.

 

Accuse your enemies of what you are guilty of. It is the iron rule of Russian Propaganda, from the very top to the very bottom

[Haiduk]

4 hours ago, akd said:

Video from a small unit leader in the 47th Mech Bde over two days of assault operations:

 

Author of video Valeriy Markus, he is not squad leader, he is in a rank of master-sergeant and he is chief sergeant of 47th brigade. Very ineteresting video, alas, only UKR subs. 

Some episodes - Markus detained Russian POW. He is convicted. Enlisted from correctional facility in May 2023. Nobody ask their agreement, they just were sent "to dig trenches". They dug trenches near Vasylivka, then were deployed near Tokmak. This guy told "alot of armor and Grads" around Tokmak in fields. To this place, where he was captured they were moved five days ago. He had AK-12 rifle. Markus says to him "nobody will risk to evacuate you now, so the only way for you to survive is that we must kill all your friends in next tree-line. This is a war" 

In trench Markus is planning tactiacal actions - he ordered to put two MGs on flanks and wants that artillery conduct short, but concentrated and intensive strike on enemy position, then assault group with fast attack wil burst into tranches

In the night, Markus again plans next assault. He say there need two pairs, which have to silently crawl along tree-line, where Russian trenches and to throw grenades there, when other group will attack from other side. He says he will in this "grenadier group" and ask who are ready to go with him. One soldier answered, that nobody of them didn't do these things, so Markus says "If we don't take in dare rush this positions, we will must withdraw, because enemy artillery will smash us here"

Looks like he has found volunteers, we are hearing sounds of explosions in the night and next cadre is a group of Markus after the rest in seized trenches. This is about Markus meant in short video where they are slept on corpses of Russians (and this turned out not a joke). Next Markus again plans mopping up the tree-line with two groups, which have to crawl along the plant and seek a trail, leading inside the tree-line, He ordered the sapper to move first and he checks the way in tree-plant with a probe tool. Next by radio we are hearing Russians withdrew to blindage and shooting is starting.

Next cadres - UKR soldiers comletely captured enemy positions. They say Kadyrov troops were here, but on my opinion there was just regular troops of 42nd division, which mainly consists of Chechens.     

Edited July 1, 2023 by Haiduk

[poesel]

Good to see that stuff gets salvaged.

 

[poesel]

We had this one a few pages ago and IIRC we were puzzled why it exploded that way. Here it is why:
(apologies if we already had that)

 

[Fenris]

I think this is an as yet unseen example of precision counter battery

https://twitter.com/i/status/1675133004614696962

[Taranis]

6 hours ago, Haiduk said:

The map of southern flank of Kreminna sector, according to recent post of Mashovets. According to him, Russians intensified attacks here, likely having main objective to push off UKR troops to the line Serebrianka - Verkhniokamyans'ke in order to eliminate at last potentialy dangerous Bilohorivka salient, which UKR troops can use as bridgehead of advansing to Rubizhne, Lysychansk and Siverodonetsk. 

In recent weeks Russians have been conducting many probes and attack in this area, espesially from Dibrova - Kuzmyne line and they could push UKR behind main forestal cut-through, passing from west to east. It happened again during rotation, when 100th TD brigade substituted previous troops. But since this local success Russians couldn't advance anymore. Now is next attempt.

On the video 54th TD battalion of 100th TD brigade (of Volyn' oblast) repels Russian attack

 

 

 

I am impressed with this video. When we say TD, I expect a rather poorly equipped unit with old AKs without optics, very basic training, a doctrine of mainly defensive use... Yet from what I see, the TD brigades attack and are having success in the south. In this video, the shooters are well equipped and change positions between shots (really smart and seems good training/experience unit). These units have no more Territorial than the name? They seem to be real Infantry Brigades. According to your sources and what you see, what do you think of the evolution of the TD Brigades since the beginning of the conflict?

[LongLeftFlank]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yup!

Perun's latest video covers this EXACT topic in his usual detail.  He then compared it to Kherson and discussed the scale.  His thinking about the south, basically, boils down to the old adage of "the bigger they come, the harder they fall".  The scale of EVERYTHING is bigger than Kherson, which means Russia has to maintain LOCs on a much, much larger scale than it did for an expanded bridgehead.

Perun pointed out what we've long discussed here which is that rail is critical for Russia to get the amount of stuff it needs brought to the front.  And even then, that rail capacity ends at Melitopol.  Cut off the rail access and everything has to move by truck, and the distances are indeed vast.

Haven't had time to listen to Perun but I am astounded to learn the Russian railhead gets to Melitopol!

You'd think severing that (bridges, mainly) at all costs to force long haul trucking would have been pretty much Job One for the UA since last year, but I've not heard of any strikes on it. Anyone have any insights on this?

[Haiduk]

34 minutes ago, Taranis said:

These units have no more Territorial than the name? They seem to be real Infantry Brigades. According to your sources and what you see, what do you think of the evolution of the TD Brigades since the beginning of the conflict?

They are not "territorial" since beginning of 2022, when TD units were allowed to use out of their oblasts. All what left "territorial" is enlisting and deployment. Alas, training, motivation and equipment level VERY depends of battalions and brigade command. In hard spring and summer 2022, many TD were thrown in fire of positional warfare to compensate lack of infantry, because number of existing brigades (even together with National Guard, Foreign Legion, etc) didn't allow to cover all frontline. Commanders not always were competent, often higher commanders used TD units as "trench shell catchers" like and "rifle battalions" to save more regular troops

TD brigades from western Ukraine as far as at beginning of war already looked as "space troopers" in comparison with TD units of rest of Ukriane (except large cities lile Kyiv, Dnipro or Kharkiv) - local civil volunteers and oblast authorities equipped them enough (and, alas, there were many incidents, when TD troops frorced volunteer buses, passing to east with equipment, to "donate" them their stuff), but they didn't hurry to go to frontline. Enough number of people especially in Transcarpathia, Lviv oblast enlisted to TD with a hope they will serve in own region and will not be sent to front. So, when these TD units were getting an order to move east, there were many of refuses and protests of their wives. So, many TD battalions and brigades initially were going to front as combined forces from those who were ready to fight. 

Alas, pre-war conception of TD forces showed many mistakes during the war, so for this 1,5 years were made some steps to increase TD units capabilities, gradually TD units have been receiving more of heavy infantry weapon, DP-27 and Maxims have been substituting on modern MGs, but this process is still ongoing. With support of "Back-and-Alive" charity fund was fundrised big program "Long hand of TD brigades" - to equip each TD brigade with a full-equipped 120 mm mortar battery with mortars, jeeps, UAVs, fire control equipment, radio and network equipmnet etc. Now is continuing fundrising for program "The teeth of TD brigades" - to equip TD ALL battalions with modern AGL, MG, HMG etc. So, TD gradually becoming a "capable light infantry", approaching to pre-war motorized infantry brigades 

Edited July 1, 2023 by Haiduk

[dan/california]

20 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Haven't had time to listen to Perun but I am astounded to learn the Russian railhead gets to Melitopol!

You'd think severing that (bridges, mainly) at all costs to force long haul trucking would have been pretty much Job One for the UA since last year, but I've not heard of any strikes on it. Anyone have any insights on this?

Well they have hammering various bits of it the last two weeks.

 

[kevinkin]

The n-word is surfacing. Mines Mines Mines. The aim is not to recapture all of Ukrainian land, maybe not even 75%, but to destroyed the RA in place, while rolling the dice for a major moral collapse in the RA where by the UA cuts off Crimea and then can negotiate from strength. 

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/cia-director-on-secret-trip-to-ukraine-hears-plan-for-war-s-endgame/ar-AA1dhlSJ

With arty shells at a premium and no air support to pound Russian conscripts, those mines are force multipliers for a the defender. On a much larger scale, this sort of reminds me of the US urgency over solving IEDs in Iraq. NATO supplied ordnance has killed thousands of Russians. What's the big deal with precision NATO airstrikes on Ukrainian soil that will by definition kill less? 

Edited July 1, 2023 by kevinkin