How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[kluge]

8 minutes ago, Yet said:

can anyone explain why Kerch br. is still standing if Ukr had Storm Shadow and its not part of logistics? 

are the shadows not getting through air defence? or is it strategically important to still keep it standing?

A Storm Shadow has a 450 kg payload.

The truck that bombed the bridge reportedly carried roughly 22,000 kg of explosives.

Ukraine would need to expend every Storm Shadow it has and then some to damage the bridge, and even then the bridge might be left standing.

[Harmon Rabb]

I'm really surprised...Said no one!

But seriously, really happy to hear this.

[Kinophile]

25 minutes ago, kluge said:

A Storm Shadow has a 450 kg payload.

The truck that bombed the bridge reportedly carried roughly 22,000 kg of explosives.

Ukraine would need to expend every Storm Shadow it has and then some to damage the bridge, and even then the bridge might be left standing.

That's not a good comparison,  as they are very different effects. The Kerch explosion was unfocussed and inaccurate (if one was trying to hit the weakest part of the bridge structure). It exploded above a strong,  flexible surface that deflected and absorbed a lot of the blast. A lot of the explosive force went up and away from the structure. 

The road sections jumped their fixings but,  structurallly, not much happened (that we can see,  although those cracks from a few weeks ago are interesting, if they were the same columns).

A storm shadow strike would be wasted punching a hole through a replaceable road section. Also,  now that the supervising engineers have gone through an actual replacement process I would expect them to do another one quicker and better. 

Better for a Shadow to directly impact the connection point of the column and base, compromising both, below the road/rail surface,  using gravity to compound the damage and stressors. 

Two successive hits close together in the same spot would cut the bridge off at its knees and cause enormous headaches for the repair crew, giving them an entirely new set of problems. 

Edited June 16, 2023 by Kinophile

[zinz]

1 hour ago, kevinkin said:

Another somewhat concerning thing is all the mention (ISW) of RA "counterattacks". This does not seem to be the behavior of a demoralized / defeated armed force. Sure, the attacks might just be hit and run spoiling shots. But the RA is to some degree is leaving their protection to engage the UA at times. Too early to tell if this is out of desperation, just blind doctrine or the result of on the spot planning. I am betting it's blind doctrine. 

https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-16-june-2023-not-an-inch

Tom Cooper is giving his opinion on those counterattacks. In his views it is to buy time for more trained mobiks that are at least capable enough to hold the line.

In the end it will not prevent Russia from losing this war, but it gives those people in power more time to stay in power. And that is all that matters for them. Sadly with the attritional nature of the current battles lots of lives are lost on both sides.

[Battlefront.com]

9 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

On this episode of the Russia Contingency, Mike is joined by Rob Lee, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Eurasia program, and Franz Stefan-Gady, founder and chief executive officer of Gady Consulting.

https://warontherocks.com/episode/therussiacontingency/28970/ukraines-offensive-first-impressions/

my summary notes:

• Careful optimism but lots of unknowns
  • Ukrainians seem to be managing well with green formations in an environment where even Western professionals would likely struggle
  • progress within the realm of expectations
  • nobody in the analyst community was expecting this to look like Harkiv
  • The question is not "have the Ukrainians reached a certain point" but where they were planning to be at this point in time
    • Mike guesses it is unlikely Ukrainians are where they hoped to be at this point but also that actually doesn't tell us much.
  • how are the relative attrition and commitment of forces?
  • How much Ukraine has ammo available and for how long time?
• Ukraine could choose to reinforce one of the current attacks or open a new one
  • western axis is having difficulties but the eastern axis is advancing well and on a wide front
  • the main effort is still to show itself. "we know it when we see it"
• Ukraine seems to be trying to get Russia to commit reserves
  • This is still unclear
• We are in the attritional phase of this operation
  • Transition to maneuver phase is often sudden
• Ukraine approaching the Russian mainline
  • expectedly everything takes time when advancing on fortified positions. 
  • Russia likely aiming to make this approach attritional as possible but not to stop Ukrainians
    • Russia likely trying to make the attack culminate at the mainline or shortly after it
    • Early Russian hard counterattacks are surprisingly hard (and unsuccessful)
• Experienced Ukrainian units are making gains at this moment. New formations are still mostly not committed
  • Ukraine is also mixing the new formations with its more experienced forces
• Ukrainian Positive indicators
  • Ukraine seems to be capable of hitting the depth of the Russian rear effectively
    • can they isolate the battlefield?
  • Ukraine seems to be winning the counter-battery war
  • Ukraine seems to be learning and adapting already
  • Night fighting capacity paying off
• Ukrainian Challenges
  • Some Russian units fight stubbornly even when these same formations have disintegrated in the past
    • 42nd mot.rifle div. and the two Spetsnaz brigades seem to have held on the western axis
  • Doing combined arms breaches without air superiority and NATO level of enablers and without total fires dominance.
    • Russian rotatory aviation 
    • Mines
  • A possible shortage of short-range air defense on the Ukraine side
    • although rotatory aviation operations would be expected in any case

Thanks for yet another summary.  Although it is always good to hear the words and details, there's only so much time in the day and you just sved me a bunch!

It seems that these guys are thinking things are going about as well as we here think they are.  I think this is the key thing right here:

"nobody in the analyst community was expecting this to look like Harkiv"

This is a conclusion we collectively came to in this thread many months ago.  Might have even been late 2022.  There are simply too many Russian forces dug in for this to be possible.  Or more accurately, where Russia is weak doesn't really supply Ukraine with the possibility of a large success.  Northern Luhansk, for example, is just not that big of a prize for it to be the focus.

The one exception to everything these guys said is Bakhmut.  I think Ukraine is going to get back a small scale Kharkiv result from its operations there.  Especially because Russia put so much into taking it.  As we've speculated, along with others, it seems Ukraine will continue to alternate between minimum pressure and relatively strong pushes until the main counter offensive starts (and as these guys put it, we WILL have no doubts when that is).  Once that happens, I expect we'll see increased offensive activity and terrain gains to the point that Russia will have to abandon Bakhmut entirely.

Lastly, I am inclined to agree Kofman about this:

"The question is not "have the Ukrainians reached a certain point" but where they were planning to be at this point in time

• Mike guesses it is unlikely Ukrainians are where they hoped to be at this point but also that actually doesn't tell us much."

I have expected more instances of Russian lines breaking under pressure than we have been made aware of so far.  I'm not thinking catastrophic collapse (these guys know there's a strong line to retreat to, after all), rather more drone images of platoon and company sized forces streaming back to the primary defenses with just their personal gear.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, zinz said:

https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-16-june-2023-not-an-inch

Tom Cooper is giving his opinion on those counterattacks. In his views it is to buy time for more trained mobiks that are at least capable enough to hold the line.

In the end it will not prevent Russia from losing this war, but it gives those people in power more time to stay in power. And that is all that matters for them. Sadly with the attritional nature of the current battles lots of lives are lost on both sides.

I don't think Cooper is correct here.

Counter attacks of this nature is what Russian/Soviet doctrine calls for.  It is also completely consistent with Russia's behavior so far.  As Haiduk reminded us, sometimes it even works as it was exactly this sort of thing that caused the Kharkiv offensive to stall out without taking Kreminna.

So, I'm not seeing any reason for people to scratch their heads or ponder some there's some larger meaning to these attacks.  What we're seeing is simply what Russia does when it is able to.

The problem for Russia is the ability to keep this up and how much it might come back around to bite them in the butt later on.  Similar to the idiotic winter offensive they conducted this year.  The penalty for expending so many resources on fruitless attacks has not yet been felt.

Steve

[Kinophile]

 

Quote

To follow up on that photo if the damaged Bradley v Grad post:

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/06/15/7406966/

Quote

The first photo depicts a Ukrainian Bradley following a direct hit from a Grad rocket [BM-21 Grad – a self-propelled 122 mm multiple rocket launcher – ed.]. The second photo shows the crew of this Bradley successfully evacuating after the hit and further performing tasks on other vehicles.

Then, 

Quote

The crew safely evacuated, and the driver moved the armoured vehicle to a safe position and extinguished it.

And, sadly, 

Quote

One of the soldiers suffered a mild contusion

If this is the kind of vehicle the Pentagon Wars (*caveats galore) throws up,  well I for one welcome our Beaurocratic Overlords. 

[Kinophile]

I guess yesterdays activity was a real thing? 

 

[TheVulture]

4 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

Another Russian telegram update:
https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7968

 

I'd be surprised if this was a full-blown attempt to attempt a pontoon crossing. Given the uncertain stability of land either side of the river (and the newly exposed land in the reservoir), I'd imagine it was more likely to be a 'proof of concept' attack - make some plans, give it a go, see what unexpected complications and problems the troops run across, and gauge the Russian response .

More of a feasibility study to determine what would be required to seriously attempt a crossing.

That's my uneducated guess anyway.

[DesertFox]

7 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

I guess yesterdays activity was a real thing? 

 

I guess the night activity had something to do with that. Good that they cross the river and spread confusion. That keeps the threat active and binds resources.

[Splinty]

1 hour ago, Yet said:

can anyone explain why Kerch br. is still standing if Ukr had Storm Shadow and its not part of logistics? 

are the shadows not getting through air defence? or is it strategically important to still keep it standing?

I'm hoping that Ukraine is just biding their time, waiting for the most useful moment.

[hcrof]

27 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I don't think Cooper is correct here.

Counter attacks of this nature is what Russian/Soviet doctrine calls for.  It is also completely consistent with Russia's behavior so far.  As Haiduk reminded us, sometimes it even works as it was exactly this sort of thing that caused the Kharkiv offensive to stall out without taking Kreminna.

So, I'm not seeing any reason for people to scratch their heads or ponder some there's some larger meaning to these attacks.  What we're seeing is simply what Russia does when it is able to.

The problem for Russia is the ability to keep this up and how much it might come back around to bite them in the butt later on.  Similar to the idiotic winter offensive they conducted this year.  The penalty for expending so many resources on fruitless attacks has not yet been felt.

Steve

I don't think there is any difference between what you and he said. Russia is buying time with blood. They hope Ukraine will run out of ammo before they run out of bodies. I hope they are wrong...

[Battlefront.com]

44 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

That's not a good comparison,  as they are very different effects. The Kerch explosion was unfocussed and inaccurate (if one was trying to hit the weakest part of the bridge structure). It exploded above a strong,  flexible surface that deflected and absorbed a lot of the blast. A lot of the explosive force went up and away from the structure. 

The road sections jumped their fixings but,  structurallly, not much happened (that we can see,  although those cracks from a few weeks ago are interesting, if they were the same columns).

A storm shadow strike would be wasted punching a hole through a replaceable road section. Also,  now that the supervising engineers have gone through an actual replacement process I would expect them to do another one quicker and better. 

Better for a Shadow to directly impact the connection point of the column and base, compromising both, below the road/rail surface,  using gravity to compound the damage and stressors. 

Two successive hits close together in the same spot would cut the bridge off at its knees and cause enormous headaches for the repair crew, giving them an entirely new set of problems. 

I agree with you that the blast force from the truck bomb is not necessary to disrupt the road and/or rail use.  However, I disagree with what a single Storm Shadow hit could do on the rail sections of the bridge.  Unlike road, which can be driven around or have steel plate put over it within hours, damage to rails will take a lot more time and effort to fix.

I think it really comes down to timing.  If it were me, I'd put a half dozen Storm Shadows onto both rail and bridge sections as soon as it was obvious to everybody that the main effort of the counter offensive had started.  Russia would work like crazy to get things up and running again, but it would be days at a minimum before it could do that.  Which is important because Russia is apparently using a "just in time" delivery system because it is obligated to minimize what it keeps in Ukraine due to deep strikes.  Also, much of the ammo and food being consumed by its forces is coming straight out of the factories because stockpiles are long since running on empty.

Disrupting Russia's supplies for a few days at a critical moment is likely going to produce outsized results.

Steve

[kluge]

37 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

That's not a good comparison,  as they are very different effects.

Agreed, my comparison was definitely an oversimplification-

The point I wanted to make was that it would likely take multiple uses of a highly valuable and scarce resource to achieve the desired effect, and I suspect that UKR commanders are choosing to prioritize easier targets for now.

[womble]

Storm Shadow has a two stage warhead designed to bust bunkers. If it's accurate enough to hit an actual bridge pillar or the junction of a pillar and the cross member, the HE charge will go off buried in the concrete. Whether that would be enough to drop the thing, I couldn't say for sure, but "bunker buster" seems like a smaller, or at least comparable job to "bridge pillar breaker", so I'd guess it should be. If that string of assumptions is true, it's entirely possible that the aspect that would require multiple birds would be the saturation of the AD around the bridge. UKR has decoy missiles, and Storm Shadow has penaids built in, AIUI, but it's a subsonic, not particularly evasive target over flat water, so potentially a turkey shoot.

My guess is that UKR are waiting for a psychologically significant moment. Or maybe the target (or at least the critical bit that SS would have to hit) is just a bit too small for the accuracy capability of the system. You don't want to miss, or even hit but cause trivial damage; that would just be handing RUS propaganda ammo.

[danfrodo]

56 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The question is not "have the Ukrainians reached a certain point" but where they were planning to be at this point in time

• Mike guesses it is unlikely Ukrainians are where they hoped to be at this point but also that actually doesn't tell us much."

Even this is not necessarily the point.  If UKR expected to be farther by now that could be based on RU making rational decisions about delaying vs holding + counterattacks.  Normandy's a good example.  The allies expected to move much faster but were stuck for nearly two months.  However, during that time the allies were inflicting crippling casualties on the germans which led to allies breaking out into huge areas that were basically empty of the enemy.  And then the allies found themselves back on schedule after the thunder run to the Seine. 

Hopefully RU is expending lots of men & material to hold those first ~10-20km and when UKR breaks thru it will be thunder run time. 

[Jr Buck Private]

2 hours ago, danfrodo said:

I saw above someone said UKR tried a pontoon across Dnieper but was shelled by RU, according to RU blogger.  Interesting.  Maybe UKR simply wants the threat of crossing to fix at least some RU troops & arty along the river.  Good idea as long as cost of feint is much less than RU has to spend.

I remember the first gulf war, where marines were practicing an amphibious assault that was filmed by the media, all just deceive of course.   I figured the USA would at least pledge a bunch of assault type boats in an aid package just to keep the Russians honest down south.   I think a massive "Bridge Too Far" river assault is the last thing on the Russian's worry list.   It definitely would be a shocker.   Does everybody think a massive river assault is completely unreasonable, even after the Russians moved some of their troops north east after the damn break?     

[DesertFox]

Slow but steady. Don't know if it is still too early to draw that conclusion, but the pattern looks a lot like what the allies did around CAEN. Let the enemy counterattack himself to death.

 

 

[dan/california]

9 minutes ago, Jr Buck Private said:

I remember the first gulf war, where marines were practicing an amphibious assault that was filmed by the media, all just deceive of course.   I figured the USA would at least pledge a bunch of assault type boats in an aid package just to keep the Russians honest down south.   I think a massive "Bridge Too Far" river assault is the last thing on the Russian's worry list.   It definitely would be a shocker.   Does everybody think a massive river assault is completely unreasonable, even after the Russians moved some of their troops north east after the damn break?     

The answer requires information on soil conditions and river flows we just don't have. Whether most of the revealed bottom in that reservoir is firm gravel or soft sticky silt makes a very large difference. How big the main channel is matters a very great deal. At least five other things matter, a lot. AFU general staff probably has those answers though. So if the entire Russian defense suddenly gets flanked by four mechanized brigades, well we will know, now won't we. Of course for many of the Russians in those defenses it would one of the very last things they ever get to ponder.

Edit: and many of these factors change with time, weather, and the management of the dams upstream.

Edited June 16, 2023 by dan/california

[sburke]

33 minutes ago, Jr Buck Private said:

I remember the first gulf war, where marines were practicing an amphibious assault that was filmed by the media, all just deceive of course.   I figured the USA would at least pledge a bunch of assault type boats in an aid package just to keep the Russians honest down south.   I think a massive "Bridge Too Far" river assault is the last thing on the Russian's worry list.   It definitely would be a shocker.   Does everybody think a massive river assault is completely unreasonable, even after the Russians moved some of their troops north east after the damn break?     

getting across is only part of the problem and the easier part.  Supply across that river is going to determine whether you should even bother.

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, danfrodo said:

Even this is not necessarily the point.  If UKR expected to be farther by now that could be based on RU making rational decisions about delaying vs holding + counterattacks.  Normandy's a good example.  The allies expected to move much faster but were stuck for nearly two months.  However, during that time the allies were inflicting crippling casualties on the germans which led to allies breaking out into huge areas that were basically empty of the enemy.  And then the allies found themselves back on schedule after the thunder run to the Seine. 

Hopefully RU is expending lots of men & material to hold those first ~10-20km and when UKR breaks thru it will be thunder run time. 

Exactly.  Which is why Kofman stated that even if we knew for a fact that Ukrainian expectations for where they are at now have fallen short of where they expected to be, it means nothing.

I can not count how many times in wargaming I found myself in a situation that was not what I expected only to find myself in a way better position later on.

In a very crude way, Ukraine needs to kill X number of Russians, without burning out its own resources, before it can advance to Azov.  The pace of territorial gains is not really the right measurement for success.  If Russia wants to kill off a significant percentage of its forces keeping Ukraine's territorial gains to a minimum, then let them.

As the WOTR interview stated, the transition from seemingly endless static warfare to deep exploitation often comes without much warning.  Normandy being the most famous example of this phenomena.  However, we saw the same thing with Kherson last year.  Months of Russia stubbornly yielding ground and then, in a matter of days, the entire battle was over with Ukraine in control of everything on the right bank.  It was absolutely impossible to know when it was going to happen and how it would play out.  We need to be mindful of that with this counter offensive.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, sburke said:

getting across is only part of the problem and the easier part.  Supply across that river is going to determine whether you should even bother.

Case in point...

Russia got over the river at Bilohorivka and had an armored company sized force in the town itself.  But Ukraine zapped the bridges (and tons of vehicles) to the point that the force had to withdraw.  Unfortunately for them, they wound up having to drive their tanks into the river because they had no means of retreat.

Steve

[Taranis]

UKR Uragan :

 

[cesmonkey]

I find it interesting that we monitor the Russian bloggers, and then, in turn, monitor ours.

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I agree with you that the blast force from the truck bomb is not necessary to disrupt the road and/or rail use.  However, I disagree with what a single Storm Shadow hit could do on the rail sections of the bridge.  Unlike road, which can be driven around or have steel plate put over it within hours, damage to rails will take a lot more time and effort to fix.

I think it really comes down to timing.  If it were me, I'd put a half dozen Storm Shadows onto both rail and bridge sections as soon as it was obvious to everybody that the main effort of the counter offensive had started.  Russia would work like crazy to get things up and running again, but it would be days at a minimum before it could do that.  Which is important because Russia is apparently using a "just in time" delivery system because it is obligated to minimize what it keeps in Ukraine due to deep strikes.  Also, much of the ammo and food being consumed by its forces is coming straight out of the factories because stockpiles are long since running on empty.

Disrupting Russia's supplies for a few days at a critical moment is likely going to produce outsized results.

Steve

The Storm Shadow is specifically designed to take out stuff like bridges, unlike a truck.  The system is going to come in horizontally and likely strike perks, which weakens the entire structure.  It ability to penetrate and then blast is really bad for load bearing concrete structures.  The weight of the structure under these circumstances just makes it worse.  So I would not worry about that bridge too much and the RA should not count on it.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BROACH_warhead