How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[LongLeftFlank]

1.   Somewhat evenhanded assessment of the Bakhmut street fighting from a pro-Russian Middle Eastern source.  ACHTUNG!

From the thread:

Over the past few days there has been talk of Ukraine's near defeat in Bakhmut. However, this claim, even from NATO-linked media is probably premature, as there is a strong possibility that the battle will drag on into April. 

The reason for thinking this way has to do with Kiev's decision to continue defending the city, an objective that is primarily political, as it is intended to force an outcome similar to that of Mariupol, in which Ukrainian troops confronted the Russian offensive in Azovstal, in this case, the AZOM plant.

But it is also a strategic objective, and that is to gain time, not only to strengthen the next line of defence but also to allow new units to arrive at the front, many of them from the reserve and territorial defence groups.

****

2.  ACHTUNG!  MilitaryLand net can also be a little suss sometimes (Roepcke doomerism category), and Zoka quotes them both a LOT, so this RUMINT needs to be confirmed:

NOTE:  Russian troll Geroman is claiming Wagner are in the outskirts of Orikhovo-Vasilivka, in the NW corner of the above map. We shall see, but if true and if not ejected, it may be time to go....

3.  Curious though, when the DC beltway mainstream is more pessimistic than the other team and their fellow travelers....

Petraeus: '[The Russians] literally only have one division that's not already committed in battle.'

Edited March 12, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Haiduk]

Just a spring....

 

[LongLeftFlank]

17 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Meanwhile Russians gradually activate own actions on Kupiansk direction in Kharkiv oblast. Since 6th of February they began attacks on Hrianykivka village and at last about 17th of Feb could push off UKR trops from this villlage completely. After about three weeks pause, Russians, according to Mashovets, tried to push off UKR troops from positions around tiny village Masiutivka (22 inhabitants before a war). They attacked twice with platoon- size forces without armor support. First time that were elements of 138th motor-rifle brigade, attacked from Hrianykivka. In the second time these were elements of 25th motor-rifle brigade, attacked from positions south from Horobivka. Both attempts failed.

According to Mashovets, Russians probably have a plans of combined offensive operations in first order on Kupiansk direction with forces of Troops Groupment "Zapad" ("West") and in case of significant success, they can launch offensive on Vovchansk direction with forces of Operative Group "Belgorod" (about 7500-8000 troops) 

In recent days, Russians, probably preparing to offensive, began to make in hidden way passages in own minefields and to remove our minefields on section Dvorichna - Lyman Pershyi. For this were involved units of 30th engineer-sapper regiment of 6th CAA of Western military district. 

In area of Tavilzhanka village deployed 2 BTGs of 138th motor-rifle brigade, including assault units "Storm". In area of Vilshana village, were concentrated also 2 BTGs of 25th mech. brigade. Both 138th and 25th belong to 6th CAA of Western military district.

VDV desantniki debark from BMDs in muddy conditions in the northern sectors (Zoka is pro-RU so, wev).

Roads, from primary to secondary to.... mush [oops, raspu-ninjaed by Haiduk]

 

[Haiduk]

First documented usage of Russian FAB-500 UMPK - analog of JDAM. It fell and didn't explode in some private yard of Donetsk

UMPK kits can have four levels of guidance:

1. Bomb just equipped with simpliest MPK (flight and correction module) kit, contraining only "wings". As if this allows to drop bombs from 50-200 m altitude with range 6-8 km (very doubtful)

2. MPK kit + inertial guidance bloc. It allow to increse the range to 12-15 km.

3. MPK kit + inertial syatem + flight correction engines + GLONASS/GPS. Range 40-60 km with accuracy about 10 m 

4. MPK kit + inertial system + flight correction engines + GLONASS/GPS + jet engine. Range 80-100 km. 

Likely falling bomb was assembled by 1st or 2nd variant.

UMPK kits were introduced in 2009-2010, but in that time this equipment wasn't interested Russian MoD. Probably only not long ago Russians recalled about this.

It's claimed the bomb can be used effectively against point targets from 6-16 km range and against areal targets - from 40 km.

 

 

Edited March 12, 2023 by Haiduk

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

1.   Somewhat evenhanded assessment of the Bakhmut street fighting from a pro-Russian Middle Eastern source.  ACHTUNG!

From the thread:

Over the past few days there has been talk of Ukraine's near defeat in Bakhmut. However, this claim, even from NATO-linked media is probably premature, as there is a strong possibility that the battle will drag on into April. 

The reason for thinking this way has to do with Kiev's decision to continue defending the city, an objective that is primarily political, as it is intended to force an outcome similar to that of Mariupol, in which Ukrainian troops confronted the Russian offensive in Azovstal, in this case, the AZOM plant.

But it is also a strategic objective, and that is to gain time, not only to strengthen the next line of defence but also to allow new units to arrive at the front, many of them from the reserve and territorial defence groups.

****

2.  ACHTUNG!  MilitaryLand net can also be a little suss sometimes (Roepcke doomerism category), and Zoka quotes them both a LOT, so this RUMINT needs to be confirmed:

NOTE:  Russian troll Geroman is claiming Wagner are in the outskirts of Orikhovo-Vasilivka, in the NW corner of the above map. We shall see, but if true and if not ejected, it may be time to go....

3.  Curious though, when the DC beltway mainstream is more pessimistic than the other team and their fellow travelers....

Petraeus: '[The Russians] literally only have one division that's not already committed in battle.'

Whatever happened to that “1:1” attrition ratio claim from last week?  Did anyone follow up with details?  And of course was that straight casualties or combat power attrition?  

[Haiduk]

Moment of Russian newest guided UPAB-1500 bomb hit main administrative building of Avdiivka coke chemical plant. This happened several days ago and since this time Russians repeated strikes with smaller bomb calibers. On LostArmor was quoted report of plant management that worker was killed with this explosion, on undergroud level - the bomb penetrated several storeys and passed through about 4 m concrete floor with sand layer - Soviet big plants are built with heavy fortified undergrounds

   

 

[Haiduk]

Some rare news about UKR Navy actions - Navy Command reported during last missile attack crew of Island-class patrol boat could shot down Russian Kalibr missile over the sea with guns fire near the shores of Mykolaiv oblast.

On Feb 24th UKR had four Island-class boats. On 3rd of March of 2022 one of them - the boat P190 "Sloviansk" (former WPB-1321 "Cushinhg") at 2-00 of night, being on radar surveillance patrol mission near Kinburn spit, was hit at starboard of engine compartment with Kh-31P ati-radar missile, launched by Su-30SM/Su-35S fighter. The boat sank. Only 5 sailors could resque, rest of 11 crewmen, including commander to this time consider as MIA.

Edited March 12, 2023 by Haiduk

[DesertFox]

Spring is coming...

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

10 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Ed is not pro-Russian by any means, he just lives in his own pure strategy world. Or more properly, it's like a ''Philosophy of Strategy', even more abstract and detached from empirical observation.

I found a rather interesting Pro-Russian blog (Substack) from a link off of Ed's Twitter feed by the name of Big Serge:

https://substack.com/profile/102984907-big-serge

The analysis he does is fairly even handed and even insightful for the most part.  He lets is political ideology slip through here and there, but in one section he derides both Macgregor and Kofman as being out of touch with reality; Macgregor because he's insane and Kofman because he's so optimistic about Ukraine and pessimistic about Russia.  My guess is Big Serge thinks we're even more wrong than Kofman

In a way, Big Serge and Kofman are fairly similar in their outlook as both downplay Russia's deficiencies and highlight Ukraine's.  Both believe that Russia can play the long game and win.  Ironic that a critic of Kofman is making almost the same arguments.

The difference, though, is that Big Serge is inherently political and pro-Russian in his beliefs.  He thinks Ukraine is a "failed state" acting as a puppet for NATO and that this whole war is NATO's fault.  Yet the core of his analysis of the fighting isn't all that bad, in fact in some ways it's quite good.

In fact, some of his opinions are pretty much inline with ours here (i.e. Ukraine didn't retake Kherson, rather it obligated Russia to leave).  He even admitted that he called the Kharkiv offensive incorrectly, though he gave himself credit for correctly calling out that Ukraine wouldn't be able to get much further than it did (he cherry picks a little about his mistakes, but still he admits making some).

For those who want an opinion that is pessimistic about Ukraine's military capabilities, yet isn't crazy deluded like Macgregor, I think it's a good read. 

Steve

[DesertFox]

 

 

[poesel]

11 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

My daughter and 2 friends are studying WWI in school at the moment, so I pulled Diplomacy off the shelf last weekend and played 8 turns

With that game, the correct way to phrase it is: 'my daughter and her 2 former friends...'

[sross112]

I was watching a Kofman presentation yesterday that someone linked on here in the last couple days. I got to thinking about the analysts and their predictions. How much did their consensus on the Russian ability to prosecute a 3 day victory affect the actual decision to invade? If they had properly predicted the course of events would the Kremlin still have pulled the trigger? Did it affect their planning? Did it add to their air of overconfidence? Or did it not play any part?

[Vet 0369]

22 hours ago, sross112 said:

I don't want to be understood wrong or people think that I am equating these countries or their people to the cesspool that is Russia. It is just that the Russians once were one of the two super powers

No, “Russia” was never one of the “two super powers,” the Soviet Union was. Saying that Russia was is like saying that Texas or Hawaii was one of the “two super powers.” Russia also tends to “forget” that the two strongest leaders, Stalin and Khrushchev weren’t even “ethnic Russians,” they were Georgian and Ukrainian respectively.

[NamEndedAllen]

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-leopard-1-tanks-will-arrive-this-spring

”One of NATO’s legacy Cold War tanks will soon be on the way to Ukrainian units, with the Danish Ministry of Defense announcing the first of its Leopard 1A5DK tanks will be delivered by spring.

Acting Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen, along with German Defense Ministry State Secretary Thomas Hitschler, visited Flensburger Fahrzeugbau Gesellschaft (FFG) to speak on the planned transfer. FFG is renovating the formerly Danish, Dutch, and German Leopard 1A5s before their delivery.

The plan calls for two tank battalions, or approximately 80 tanks, for Ukrainian forces. While the standard Leopard 1 entered service in the 1960s, the 1A5 upgrade variant began its career in the 1980s with a modern fire control system and all-weather night sights. While the Leopard 1 and its derivatives, including the Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft gun, remain in service in several countries, Germany retired its last Leopard 1s in 2003. “

 

[sburke]

who knew CMCW might become the game to depict 2023 fighting.  Leo 1 and T62s

[Bulletpoint]

2 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Moment of Russian newest guided UPAB-1500 bomb hit main administrative building of Avdiivka coke chemical plant. This happened several days ago and since this time Russians repeated strikes with smaller bomb calibers. On LostArmor was quoted report of plant management that worker was killed with this explosion, on undergroud level - the bomb penetrated several storeys and passed through about 4 m concrete floor with sand layer - Soviet big plants are built with heavy fortified undergrounds

   

 

So the Russians wanted to destroy what this factory produces in order to punish Ukraine, or were they thinking the underground areas were used for command and control and/or ammo storage?

It sounds like there are several more explosions in the video after the first.

Edited March 12, 2023 by Bulletpoint

[Rokko]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

I found a rather interesting Pro-Russian blog (Substack) from a link off of Ed's Twitter feed by the name of Big Serge:

https://substack.com/profile/102984907-big-serge

The analysis he does is fairly even handed and even insightful for the most part.  He lets is political ideology slip through here and there, but in one section he derides both Macgregor and Kofman as being out of touch with reality; Macgregor because he's insane and Kofman because he's so optimistic about Ukraine and pessimistic about Russia.  My guess is Big Serge thinks we're even more wrong than Kofman

In a way, Big Serge and Kofman are fairly similar in their outlook as both downplay Russia's deficiencies and highlight Ukraine's.  Both believe that Russia can play the long game and win.  Ironic that a critic of Kofman is making almost the same arguments.

The difference, though, is that Big Serge is inherently political and pro-Russian in his beliefs.  He thinks Ukraine is a "failed state" acting as a puppet for NATO and that this whole war is NATO's fault.  Yet the core of his analysis of the fighting isn't all that bad, in fact in some ways it's quite good.

In fact, some of his opinions are pretty much inline with ours here (i.e. Ukraine didn't retake Kherson, rather it obligated Russia to leave).  He even admitted that he called the Kharkiv offensive incorrectly, though he gave himself credit for correctly calling out that Ukraine wouldn't be able to get much further than it did (he cherry picks a little about his mistakes, but still he admits making some).

For those who want an opinion that is pessimistic about Ukraine's military capabilities, yet isn't crazy deluded like Macgregor, I think it's a good read. 

Steve

I remember reading a post by this guy and was also surprised by how relatively accurate it was. One thing I noted was his extremely low estimate for the initial RU invasion force, I think he even put it below 100k, which is way less than any other estimate I've ever seen, even after it became apparent how many RU units went into Ukraine extremely under strength, partially without their conscripts, etc. I assume this is to retroactively manage expectations and explain away the lackluster performance of the initial invasion force. If I remember right, he also has the usual lalaland estimates of UKR and RU casualties, like basically all pro-RU numbnuts. I suppose this is a required feature though, or else their world view would implode.

 

An interesting picture I saw a few days back. These exceptionally clean looking and well-equipped allegedly belong to the 155th NIB. Since they don't quite look like they belong to a unit that has been reconstituted 7 times and mostly consists of re-assigned Pacific Fleet sailors, that has been bashing itself against Vuhledar for the past weeks, I'd say I would dare to question this claim. Although I find the idea rather funny that the Russians have troupe of guys looking like RU wet dream of Speznaz for the purpose of dispelling rumors of extraordinary losses and assure people everything "is going according to the plan".

Another possibility might be, that even utterly trashed units manage to maintain a core (like a recon company) of veterans that are deliberately kept out of the typical human-wave meat assaults and retain some measure of combat efficiency.

Edited March 12, 2023 by Rokko
tweet embedding

[dan/california]

4 hours ago, Haiduk said:

Just a spring....

 

More than ample evidence of a full up thaw, at least in places. Isn't Russia continuing to push when any real attempt at a breakout is going to end in a bottomless bog just nuts? I mean maybe Gerasimov has some semi miraculous plan he has been holding back until Russia has half a million casualties for some inexplicable reason but???

[dan/california]

6 minutes ago, Rokko said:

I remember reading a post by this guy and was also surprised by how relatively accurate it was. One thing I noted was his extremely low estimate for the initial RU invasion force, I think he even put it below 100k, which is way less than any other estimate I've ever seen, even after it became apparent how many RU units went into Ukraine extremely under strength, partially without their conscripts, etc. I assume this is to retroactively manage expectations and explain away the lackluster performance of the initial invasion force. If I remember right, he also has the usual lalaland estimates of UKR and RU casualties, like basically all pro-RU numbnuts. I suppose this is a required feature though, or else their world view would implode.

 

An interesting picture I saw a few days back. These exceptionally clean looking and well-equipped allegedly belong to the 155th NIB. Since they don't quite look like they belong to a unit that has been reconstituted 7 times and mostly consists of re-assigned Pacific Fleet sailors, that has been bashing itself against Vuhledar for the past weeks, I'd say I would dare to question this claim. Although I find the idea rather funny that the Russians have troupe of guys looking like RU wet dream of Speznaz for the purpose of dispelling rumors of extraordinary losses and assure people everything "is going according to the plan".

Another possibility might be, that even utterly trashed units manage to maintain a core (like a recon company) of veterans that are deliberately kept out of the typical human-wave meat assaults and retain some measure of combat efficiency.

I would add that third possibility is that these guys were literally fresh off the mobik bus, and were photographed in the three hour window between their delivery, and their suicidal assault. The Russian command structure may have realized that only way to get a new batch of mobiks to do the required suicide charge is to throw them straight in before they can talk to the survivors of the last five attempts.

[The_Capt]

Just now, Rokko said:

I remember reading a post by this guy and was also surprised by how relatively accurate it was. One thing I noted was his extremely low estimate for the initial RU invasion force, I think he even put it below 100k, which is way less than any other estimate I've ever seen, even after it became apparent how many RU units went into Ukraine extremely under strength, partially without their conscripts, etc. I assume this is to retroactively manage expectations and explain away the lackluster performance of the initial invasion force. If I remember right, he also has the usual lalaland estimates of UKR and RU casualties, like basically all pro-RU numbnuts. I suppose this is a required feature though, or else their world view would implode.

 

An interesting picture I saw a few days back. These exceptionally clean looking and well-equipped allegedly belong to the 155th NIB. Since they don't quite look like they belong to a unit that has been reconstituted 7 times and mostly consists of re-assigned Pacific Fleet sailors, that has been bashing itself against Vuhledar for the past weeks, I'd say I would dare to question this claim. Although I find the idea rather funny that the Russians have troupe of guys looking like RU wet dream of Speznaz for the purpose of dispelling rumors of extraordinary losses and assure people everything "is going according to the plan".

Another possibility might be, that even utterly trashed units manage to maintain a core (like a recon company) of veterans that are deliberately kept out of the typical human-wave meat assaults and retain some measure of combat efficiency.

Given the suppressors on the on the rifles these are likely specialized troops such as Recon, or a photo op.

[Battlefront.com]

14 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Given the suppressors on the on the rifles these are likely specialized troops such as Recon, or a photo op.

I have no doubt that the picture is not what it seems to be.  The easiest explanation is this is the Brigade HQ defense squad.  I have no doubts that the Colonel in charge isn't being guarded by a bunch of disheveled mobiks armed with rusty AK-47s. 

Steve

[Yet]

1 hour ago, Rokko said:

I remember reading a post by this guy and was also surprised by how relatively accurate it was. One thing I noted was his extremely low estimate for the initial RU invasion force, I think he even put it below 100k, which is way less than any other estimate I've ever seen, even after it became apparent how many RU units went into Ukraine extremely under strength, partially without their conscripts, etc. I assume this is to retroactively manage expectations and explain away the lackluster performance of the initial invasion force. If I remember right, he also has the usual lalaland estimates of UKR and RU casualties, like basically all pro-RU numbnuts. I suppose this is a required feature though, or else their world view would implode.

 

An interesting picture I saw a few days back. These exceptionally clean looking and well-equipped allegedly belong to the 155th NIB. Since they don't quite look like they belong to a unit that has been reconstituted 7 times and mostly consists of re-assigned Pacific Fleet sailors, that has been bashing itself against Vuhledar for the past weeks, I'd say I would dare to question this claim. Although I find the idea rather funny that the Russians have troupe of guys looking like RU wet dream of Speznaz for the purpose of dispelling rumors of extraordinary losses and assure people everything "is going according to the plan".

Another possibility might be, that even utterly trashed units manage to maintain a core (like a recon company) of veterans that are deliberately kept out of the typical human-wave meat assaults and retain some measure of combat efficiency.

different helmets, different backpacks, different ammo-belts, different masks, different badge-wear, different rifles even it seems. 

[Battlefront.com]

59 minutes ago, Rokko said:

I remember reading a post by this guy and was also surprised by how relatively accurate it was. One thing I noted was his extremely low estimate for the initial RU invasion force, I think he even put it below 100k, which is way less than any other estimate I've ever seen, even after it became apparent how many RU units went into Ukraine extremely under strength, partially without their conscripts, etc. I assume this is to retroactively manage expectations and explain away the lackluster performance of the initial invasion force. If I remember right, he also has the usual lalaland estimates of UKR and RU casualties, like basically all pro-RU numbnuts. I suppose this is a required feature though, or else their world view would implode.

Absolutely required.  When he wrote of the Ukrainian losses in Bakhmut, he made zero mention of the Russian Human waves, the 9 months of getting nowhere, etc.  Why not?  Well, it doesn't help his argument.

As for the force ratios at the start of the war, he is playing fast and lose with the numbers for sure.  First, the lowest estimate I've seen for the force as a whole was 190,000.  If we grant a 1:1 ratio of combat:support (this is generous) we come up with a little more than his number (IIRC 80,000).  OK, that's not a terrible estimate, however he compares that against the entire standing UAF, including all the forces sitting way back in Lviv.  If he's going to do that then he has to include not only all of the invasion force (combat + logistics), but also all the forces sitting in Russia.  But again, this doesn't fit his narrative.

Another fun thing is he talks about how the 300k partial mobilization has stabilized the frontlines by backfilling existing units or providing infantry units (i.e. not logistics).  On this we agree.  However, obviously the entire Russian military in Ukraine wasn't wiped out, so the 300,000 were on top of whatever was there.  Let's be generous and say 100,000 combat troops.  This means Russia should have about 400,000 combat troops in Ukraine right now.  That's about 5 times what he said initially went into Ukraine.  So where are the results from this massive force?  Nowhere to be seen, right?  Right.  So either a large portion of this supposed 400,000 men are sitting on their butts or they are dead, wounded, captured, or "lost".  My bet is on the latter.

 

59 minutes ago, Rokko said:

An interesting picture I saw a few days back. These exceptionally clean looking and well-equipped allegedly belong to the 155th NIB. Since they don't quite look like they belong to a unit that has been reconstituted 7 times and mostly consists of re-assigned Pacific Fleet sailors, that has been bashing itself against Vuhledar for the past weeks, I'd say I would dare to question this claim. Although I find the idea rather funny that the Russians have troupe of guys looking like RU wet dream of Speznaz for the purpose of dispelling rumors of extraordinary losses and assure people everything "is going according to the plan".

Another possibility might be, that even utterly trashed units manage to maintain a core (like a recon company) of veterans that are deliberately kept out of the typical human-wave meat assaults and retain some measure of combat efficiency.

The latter is the correct answer.  It's a fairly standard practice in high casualty wars.  By Big Serge's logic all those massive casualties that were supposedly lost at Stalingrad must have just been Soviet propaganda because if I look at maps from 1943-1945 I clearly see the 6th Army on the maps.  Rumors of its destruction appear to be exaggerated!

Snark aside, Big Serge clearly knows enough about the Russian replacement system to know that the administrative unit (in this case the 155th NIB) is never going to disappear.  Instead it will keep receiving new men, from whatever source, in order to keep up appearances.  Even if it is only a couple of company's in strength, it will still appear on the map as a Brigade.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, Yet said:

different helmets, different backpacks, different ammo-belts, different masks, different badge-wear, different rifles even it seems. 

This is typical of Russian units, so I do not think anything of it.  Not just this war but previous wars as well.  Speaks to the chaos in Russian supply system.

That said, special forces units generally have more freedom to choose their own kit, so there is that as well.

Pictures from Chechnya:

[Rokko]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

I have no doubt that the picture is not what it seems to be.  The easiest explanation is this is the Brigade HQ defense squad.  I have no doubts that the Colonel in charge isn't being guarded by a bunch of disheveled mobiks armed with rusty AK-47s. 

Steve

I like that explanation even better. So they are not only there to make the brigade look like a competent and capable military force but also to protect their colonel from said disheveled mobiks fragging him at the earliest opportunity.