How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Blazing 88's]

3 hours ago, Bannon said:

I do enjoy a good Clint Eastwood movie

'The Bridges of Madison County'. Why Clint?! WHY?!...

[Vet 0369]

1 hour ago, NamEndedAllen said:

Their pants were down and the light was on. 
 

PS Agree about your reasons for murk. And hardly anyone declares war any more. Anyone? So murk remains a fixture, perhaps out of the flexibility and uncertainty it offers? Re the USA, pretty sure most countries understand the Bush doctrine that harboring non-state terrorist actors that have harmed the USA makes you complicit, and vulnerable to…Operation Depantsification. 

At the risk of derailing the thread by continuing political statements, (in order to be non political, it should have been worded as “the United States, not “Bush doctrine,”) believe that “doctrine” was put in place by Clinton as a result of an Al Quadra bombing in Africa. Clinton ordered a cruise missile attack on a AQ training camp, well before Bush was elected.

Please try to keep things politically neutral unless it is necessary for context. For what it’s worth, I’m not a Republican or a Democrat.

[LongLeftFlank]

On 1/29/2023 at 12:52 AM, NamEndedAllen said:

AND FROM ISW, new summary:

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces launched another massive series of missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on January 26.
• A recent altercation between Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and former Russian officer Igor Girkin is exposing a new domain for competition among Russian nationalist groups for political influence in Russia against the backdrop of Russian military failures in Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continued his campaign against critical and opposition voices by cracking down on several major opposition media outlets.
• The United States Treasury Department announced new sanctions targeting the Wagner Group’s global support network, likely in response to the Wagner Group’s renewed efforts to reinvigorate its operations outside of Ukraine.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces relaunched counteroffensive operations near Kreminna.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, on the western outskirts of Donetsk City, and in the Vuhledar area.
• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast are not conducting offensive operations at the size or scale necessary for a full-scale offensive.
• Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued to conduct limited and localized ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Wagner Group likely experienced significant losses in attritional offensive operations in eastern Ukraine over the past few months.
• Russian occupation officials are reportedly continuing to “nationalize” property and close places of worship belonging to the Ukrainian Evangelical Baptist Christian communities in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast in an effort to establish the Kremlin-affiliated Moscow Patriarchate Orthodox Church as the dominant faith in the region.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-26-2023

(Page 1987. Last mention of the actual battlefield situation in this thread: page 1980).

UA may simply be in a defensive pause cuz regearing or cuz training or cuz mud or wev and then unleash their next stunning surprise. But an alternate thesis is that their best formations are getting badly hammered right now and cycling through. Even if Ivan is faring much worse.

Fine, yielding the ruins of Bakhmut is irrelevant to the strategic situation. But regardless of where the lines are drawn, thousands of Ukrainians are getting shot up. Meanwhile, the Russians still show no signs of running short of meat or firepower. Not June peak shell volumes, but hardly shell famine either.  No stream of surrenders of desperate, freezing mobiks.  In short, no real signs of Collapse, but disturbing glimpses of strain on the Ukraine side in spite of the veil of secrecy.

 

 

 

(this thread is worth a read. Defmon stays on top of the frontline situation)

....And last time I checked in mid Jan, Kreminna and Svatove were allegedly becoming untenable for Ivan. Not now, it seems. The UA has fallen back nearly to Torske.

https://ukrainevolunteer297689472.wordpress.com/2023/01/27/i-have-now-been-in-three-wars/

The old snakeater's outfit looks like it's pulling from the woodlands as well.

****

Initiative has passed back to Moscow, it looks like to me. Both sides are fighting Russia's war right now. While on the static fronts (land bridge), Ivan just keeps on digging and mining, (I'd guess) planning  some kind of Zitadelle rematch to absorb  a straight punch by the Western heavies.

****

Here's Jack Watling in the Spectator (not gonna post the clickbaity German bashing headline, far too much of that here already). Here's the useful bit, the rest is the usual wailing about Western foot dragging:

Russia is currently at the nadir of its capabilities, fielding poorly trained troops with older and more varied equipment, and with shortages of munitions.

At the same time Russia has enough forces on the ground to mean that Ukraine can only make progress with a deliberate offensive.

Russia can also mobilise and train more personnel [than Ukraine].

Russia’s defence industry is also increasing production, so that if Ukraine does not retain the initiative, it will become progressively harder to liberate territory.  

Edited January 31, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Initiative has passed back to Moscow, it looks like to me. Both sides are fighting Russia's war right now. While on the static fronts (land bridge), Ivan just keeps on digging and mining, (I'd guess) planning  some kind of Zitadelle rematch to absorb  a straight punch by the Western heavies.

****

Here's Jack Watling in the Spectator (not gonna post the clickbaity German bashing headline, far too much of that here already). Here's the useful bit, the rest is the usual wailing about Western foot dragging:

Russia is currently at the nadir of its capabilities, fielding poorly trained troops with older and more varied equipment, and with shortages of munitions.

At the same time Russia has enough forces on the ground to mean that Ukraine can only make progress with a deliberate offensive.

Russia can also mobilise and train more personnel [than Ukraine].

Russia’s defence industry is also increasing production, so that if Ukraine does not retain the initiative, it will become progressively harder to liberate territory.  

Do we actually know that Russia can effectively mobilize, arm and train more personnel than Ukraine? 

I have some significant doubts on that score. The Soviet system is dead and gone and the Russian military industrial complex is reportedly short some 400,000 workers already. How is Russia going to generate force to levels that will make a war winning difference relative to the quantity and quality of Ukrainian personnel/equipment when it can't mobilize without cutting into production and it can't raise production without stifling mobilization? .

Edited January 31, 2023 by billbindc

[LongLeftFlank]

2 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Do we actually know that Russia can effectively mobilize, arm and train more personnel than Ukraine? 

I have some significant doubts on that score. The Soviet system is dead and gone and the Russian military industrial complex is reportedly short some 400,000 workers already. How is Russia going to generate force multiplication to levels that will make a difference relative to the quantity and quality of Ukrainian personnel/equipment when it can't mobilize without cutting into production and it can't raise production without stifling mobilization? .

Sure, and that's been the party line here, just be patient, quote Hemingway, etc.  And may you all be correct, and soon.

But to repeat: Ukraine can only make progress with a deliberate offensive.  Russia doesn't just crumble, it has to be pushed.

But if they can't pull off that offensive with the Western wunderwaffen, then Putin eventually wins by default. There will be no coup, and no revolution.

To date, it looks to me like Russia's ability to defend territory has *increased*, not decreased, on aggregate, since Feb 2022, even with regression to a (rocket-enhanced) 1940s infantry-centered army.

Their frontline formations now seem adequately manned and far less AFV-tied, which was their fatal flaw for most of 2022. And as I and others predicted a year ago, they've ditched BTGs, and moved to a VDV grenadiers-and-mortars model, with 152mm (enough so that the Ukies have to assume it will arrive) on call. 

All in all, it seems they are getting better, not worse, at killing Ukrainians although that data is foggy, by design. It's only their jawdroppingly costly offensives that are clouding that.

My read is that with a little quiet help from China on the basic tech side (already happening), they can keep this game up for another year. 

Unless Ukraine can transform the ground game again, but I don't think it's NATO mech that does that.

IMHO.

 

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

(Page 1987. Last mention of the actual battlefield situation in this thread: page 1980).

UA may simply be in a defensive pause cuz regearing or cuz training or cuz mud or wev and then unleash their next stunning surprise. But an alternate thesis is that their best formations are getting badly hammered right now and cycling through. Even if Ivan is faring much worse.

Fine, yielding the ruins of Bakhmut is irrelevant to the strategic situation. But regardless of where the lines are drawn, thousands of Ukrainians are getting shot up. Meanwhile, the Russians still show no signs of running short of meat or firepower. Not June peak shell volumes, but hardly shell famine either.  No stream of surrenders of desperate, freezing mobiks.  In short, no real signs of Collapse, but disturbing glimpses of strain on the Ukraine side in spite of the veil of secrecy.

 

 

 

(this thread is worth a read. Defmon stays on top of the frontline situation)

....And last time I checked in mid Jan, Kreminna and Svatove were allegedly becoming untenable for Ivan. Not now, it seems. The UA has fallen back nearly to Torske.

https://ukrainevolunteer297689472.wordpress.com/2023/01/27/i-have-now-been-in-three-wars/

The old snakeater's outfit looks like it's pulling from the woodlands as well.

****

Initiative has passed back to Moscow, it looks like to me. Both sides are fighting Russia's war right now. While on the static fronts (land bridge), Ivan just keeps on digging and mining, (I'd guess) planning  some kind of Zitadelle rematch to absorb  a straight punch by the Western heavies.

****

Here's Jack Watling in the Spectator (not gonna post the clickbaity German bashing headline, far too much of that here already). Here's the useful bit, the rest is the usual wailing about Western foot dragging:

Russia is currently at the nadir of its capabilities, fielding poorly trained troops with older and more varied equipment, and with shortages of munitions.

At the same time Russia has enough forces on the ground to mean that Ukraine can only make progress with a deliberate offensive.

Russia can also mobilise and train more personnel [than Ukraine].

Russia’s defence industry is also increasing production, so that if Ukraine does not retain the initiative, it will become progressively harder to liberate territory.  

I still think Russia committing its better troops to grinding offensive action in the Donbas is a win for Ukraine. The Russians simply do not have a training pipeline to replace those guys. Virtually every piece of equipment Russia loses is replaced by something older or less capable, or both.  To this point almost every single data point indicates that the AFU General staff has a coherent plan. I am not letting go of that assumption because the Russians gained a few kilometers of in the Donbas by literally crawling over a carpet of their own dead.

That doesn't mean Ukraine doesn't need every every shell, missile, drone, artillery piece, and AFV that can physically be shipped to them. It does mean they will win if we keep shipping stuff to them like we mean it. And for an extra bonus the guy who planned the original fiasco back in March is back in charge. If you put that in a bad novel they would make you take it out.

[NamEndedAllen]

3 hours ago, Vet 0369 said:

At the risk of derailing the thread by continuing political statements, (in order to be non political, it should have been worded as “the United States, not “Bush doctrine,”) believe that “doctrine” was put in place by Clinton as a result of an Al Quadra bombing in Africa. Clinton ordered a cruise missile attack on a AQ training camp, well before Bush was elected.

Please try to keep things politically neutral unless it is necessary for context. For what it’s worth, I’m not a Republican or a Democrat.

Nothing at all political intended, and unclear why you took it that way. I didn’t recall Clinton saying that. But I did recall Bush - following 9/11. I called it by his name for that reason. And because I am not clear whether that was an Executive Order and thus carried the weight of new law. Also, whether each of the preceding similar acts were one-off orders, or always came under a single past Executive Order that authorizes all such acts. Bush’s statement came across as broadly applicable policy, any time, anywhere. If that was just stating an earlier President’s Executive Order, thanks for the correction. The continuity of specific anti-terrorism approaches by each Admin isn’t always clear to the public. You may be better informed on all the layers and histories of current and past anti terrorism directives, so thanks again.if the referenced policy started earlier.  The policy itself was the point in the discussion.

 

[dan/california]

 

450 dead or so wounded they might as well be dead Russians per day has been the minimum for months. Not infrequently it is double that. That would be a another 90,000 thousand dead by July if the trend holds. As The_Capt likes to say it is an attritional semi modern war with some new bells and whistles.

[LongLeftFlank]

15 minutes ago, dan/california said:

 

450 dead or so wounded they might as well be dead Russians per day has been the minimum for months. Not infrequently it is double that. That would be a another 90,000 thousand dead by July if the trend holds. As The_Capt likes to say it is an attritional semi modern war with some new bells and whistles.

OK, now do Ukrainians.  Because this is really just whataboutism and yet another 'just hold on and they'll Collapse' handwave. (nothing personal, it just tends to be the default response here)

What about the 'just hold on' bit?

Edited January 31, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Kinophile]

The only way Ukraine can win is to hit the Ivan at the operational level. 

Ukraine has no strategic options to defeat Russia,  and at a tactical level its own forces are still too similar to Russia's to give it any major or lasting advantage. True NATOization across the board is a year+ away, at best. 

That leaves operational, which is logistics, which has proven to be Russia's most consistent weak point, and can be amplified by major C2 decap. 

Ukraine cannot undertake any major offensive without a major forming process beforehand. That process cannot be countered or stalled before or during the assault. 

The HIMARS effect at this point has run its course, the Ivan has adapted and is surviving and solidifying. 

If/when Ukraine implements a new operational level effector  (or better, a system of effectors) it will need to work for several months, throwing up whatever possible responses/defences RUS might have or develop.  Once those have been proven useless or defeatable, then can an offensive begin. 

Ref system,  RUS has proven it can adapt - slowly, costly adaptation but the end result is the same. But a system of different platforms,  hitting Russian forces on perpendicular operational tangents would amplify effects and outcomes, and make adaptation much slower and more difficult. 

Into that carved out space in Russia's operational adaptability is where the assault should cut. 

My gut says logistics, which for Russia is railways. 

As for systems,  I think an operational size bubble of air dominance is a good start. Cram a lot of AD into a certain region and use it to fend off RUS Air. Use those forced openings to rapidly attrit the regional RUS logistics. Interplay Air strikes with HIMARS,  HIMARS 2.0, etc and really go full pyscho on their C2 hierarchy, from Col upwards. Erode a whole section of the Russian logistics zone, front to back, and its C2 from top to bottom. 

Initiate this when Russia has already launched its own offensive and is too commited on forces and logistics formatting to pivot quickly enough. 

Hit the right place and UKR can both cut out a section and undercut the Russian attack elsewhere. 

Essentially, let Russia commit to an attack then crunch its logistics in an area that it cannot easily cover, but is vital to the attack. 

Weather Ukraine can do this with its current force format and posture us another question... 

Edited January 31, 2023 by Kinophile

[chrisl]

25 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

OK, now do Ukrainians.  Because this is really just whataboutism and yet another 'just hold on and they'll Collapse' handwave.

What about the 'just hold on' bit?

If you look at the ratio of RU/UA losses on Oryx and assume that it's a similar undercount, Ukraine's losses are about 1/3 those of Russia. Which doesn't sound too out of whack with them being primarily on defense and having used a corrosive offense rather than a tank rush or other high casualty massed attack.  

But Ukraine is replacing their destroyed equipment with better equipment, and can send troops to train both completely out of reach of RU, but also to train with professional trainers, while Russia spent a lot of their experienced trainers at the front earlier in the war.  I suspect that part of why you're perceiving Russian troops to be less dependent on their IFVs is that Russia is running low on operable units, so they just aren't available for troops to become dependent on.

Edited January 31, 2023 by chrisl

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, chrisl said:

If you look at the ratio of RU/UA losses on Oryx and assume that it's a similar undercount, Ukraine's losses are about 1/3 those of Russia. Which doesn't sound too out of whack with them being primarily on defense and having used a corrosive offense rather than a tank rush or other high casualty massed attack. 

Yup, that is about the best strategic picture we have as to how each side is doing relative to each other.  Remember, we're not sure about what losses EITHER side have really taken because NEITHER side is making their losses publicly known.  Ukraine is more transparent about their own losses than Russia, but it's still not anything we can use to build up a big picture.  And Russia's numbers are just laughably wrong.

1 hour ago, chrisl said:

But Ukraine is replacing their destroyed equipment with better equipment, and can send troops to train both completely out of reach of RU, but also to train with professional trainers, while Russia spent a lot of their experienced trainers at the front earlier in the war.  I suspect that part of why you're perceiving Russian troops to be less dependent on their IFVs is that Russia is running low on operable units, so they just aren't available for troops to become dependent on.

We keep coming back to this.  Ukraine has more replacement options than Russia does.  Russia has lost the bulk of its ground equipment in Ukraine already and seems to be trying very hard to keep something back home in case of emergency.  Hence T-62s and other rusty stuff getting put into the front.  Ukraine is doing exactly the opposite, though of course some things are taking longer to develop than others.

We've also seen Russia dip into its cadre system by sending them to the front to be slaughtered.  Ukraine has its own cadres and is increasingly accessing Western training.  Even if Russia somehow manages to recover from wasting their cadres and trainers, what are they likely to be taught?  The same crappy way to fight as Russia has been fighting so far with a few tweaks here and there.  Therefore, we should expect about the same for Russia in 2023 that we've seen in 2022, except with much crappier equipment and ammo stocks.

These are facts, not assumptions.  How much they might matter for the battles in 2023 to come is, however, up for debate.  But we should make sure we start from reality and not the moldy positions held by pre-war analysts who have been continually proven wrong throughout this war.

Steve

 

[LongLeftFlank]

3 hours ago, Kinophile said:

The only way Ukraine can win is to hit the Ivan at the operational level. 

Ukraine has no strategic options to defeat Russia,  and at a tactical level its own forces are still too similar to Russia's to give it any major or lasting advantage. True NATOization across the board is a year+ away, at best. 

That leaves operational, which is logistics, which has proven to be Russia's most consistent weak point, and can be amplified by major C2 decap. 

Ukraine cannot undertake any major offensive without a major forming process beforehand. That process cannot be countered or stalled before or during the assault. 

The HIMARS effect at this point has run its course, the Ivan has adapted and is surviving and solidifying. 

If/when Ukraine implements a new operational level effector  (or better, a system of effectors) it will need to work for several months, throwing up whatever possible responses/defences RUS might have or develop.  Once those have been proven useless or defeatable, then can an offensive begin. 

Ref system,  RUS has proven it can adapt - slowly, costly adaptation but the end result is the same. But a system of different platforms,  hitting Russian forces on perpendicular operational tangents would amplify effects and outcomes, and make adaptation much slower and more difficult. 

Into that carved out space in Russia's operational adaptability is where the assault should cut. 

My gut says logistics, which for Russia is railways. 

As for systems,  I think an operational size bubble of air dominance is a good start. Cram a lot of AD into a certain region and use it to fend off RUS Air. Use those forced openings to rapidly attrit the regional RUS logistics. Interplay Air strikes with HIMARS,  HIMARS 2.0, etc and really go full pyscho on their C2 hierarchy, from Col upwards. Erode a whole section of the Russian logistics zone, front to back, and its C2 from top to bottom. 

Initiate this when Russia has already launched its own offensive and is too commited on forces and logistics formatting to pivot quickly enough. 

Hit the right place and UKR can both cut out a section and undercut the Russian attack elsewhere. 

Essentially, let Russia commit to an attack then crunch its logistics in an area that it cannot easily cover, but is vital to the attack. 

Weather Ukraine can do this with its current force format and posture us another question... 

I think we're on the same page, mate, and that is more my point in bringing this stuff up than Roepcke style defeatism.

I don't believe in a Ukrainian collapse; everybody in the country now knows the price of defeat all too well.

...But I also have little faith in a Panzerkiel of Western ubertanks, with or without supporting EW / CSIR / TAC and accompanying waves of combat sappers (Ukrainian dac cong) blasting and slashing a way through the Russian mine belts to Melitopol, or more likely the (partisan contested) heights between Melitopol and Mariupol.

...So, you're exactly right: it's logistics. Rot these bastards out first, before you hit them.  Then eat them using technoed up assault infantry, selectively supported by AFVs.  Snow eating fog.

And you already know my best guess on that: kill all the trucks -- everything that moves on 2-3 axles, preferably to a depth of 30 - 50km.  24x7 switchblade swarms, ersatz grenade droppers, SOF minelayers, whatever.

Make em walk. Starve their hedgehog front positions, so they can't properly overwatch their mine belts, or shift reserves.  

Note that given enough time to prepare, Ivan will try to do the same, using Chinese knockoff tech. They already have their own kamikaze drones in use.  And if I'm China, I'd be happy to let someone else (deniably) find out the hard way how drone swarms work.

Azerbaijan did it to Armenia in summer 2021, on a much smaller scale.

****

Edit:  Fortified belts.  Don't assume this is all Potemkin zero rebar crapola or prefab mass grave slit trenches.

 

 

Edited January 31, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[paxromana]

Australia has partnered with France to pay for the cost of artillery shells for Ukraine ... we're providing the explosive filler as well.

https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/the-gunpowder-pact-australia-france-cast-aside-past-for-unity-on-ukraine-20230131-p5cgt3.html

It's behind a paywall, sorta - you get 10 (IIRC) free articles a month.

[panzermartin]

I remember one basic argument of Russian military collapse a few months ago was that Russia was running out of micro chips essential for manufacturing precision weapons. And China would be too afraid to provide these because of West's reaction. Well neither happened, there is a surge of chip imports and China was more than willing to provide these. 

I have started to think It's a global war already that probably can't be won only in Ukraine. 

 

 

[Butschi]

8 hours ago, Vet 0369 said:

Please try to keep things politically neutral unless it is necessary for context. For what it’s worth, I’m not a Republican or a Democrat.

You guys over there seriously need to grow up. We have discussed politics in a number of countries in a very non-neutral way - so far (mostly) without being at each other's throats. From the USA, one of the oldest modern democracies, we shouldn't expect less.

[chuckdyke]

1 hour ago, Butschi said:

From the USA, one of the oldest modern democracies, we shouldn't expect less.

I have been in the US over there you don't discuss politics, religion, or guns. The only thing out of three we can talk about is guns. Everything else is too sensitive. 

[Bulletpoint]

5 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

OK, now do Ukrainians.  Because this is really just whataboutism and yet another 'just hold on and they'll Collapse' handwave. (nothing personal, it just tends to be the default response here)

What about the 'just hold on' bit?

I think the "Russia will collapse due to losses" argument is basically due to the Western mentality where we can't stand losing our guys. If Americans lose just a single Blackhawk, they'll make a movie about it.

We'd rather pay a million dollars rather than get a soldier home in a body bag, so we find it difficult to imagine a society and culture that can expend lives like munitions and stomach hundreds of thousands of casualties.

But modern Russian culture is both highly politically oppressed and culturally based on the foundation legend of the Great Patriotic War where casualties ran in the millions. So I don't think they are close to being war weary yet.

Also, I'd assume that most of the human wave losses in recent months were prison inmates, intended to keep the Ukrainians busy and expend ammo while most of the actual conscripts were sent through basic training.

[chuckdyke]

They kept making movies the M1 Garand always hits even from the hip.

 

[chuckdyke]

Wow Vick Morrow has his finger inside the trigger guard in the beginning of each movie. Always in a Purple Heart Formation.

Edited January 31, 2023 by chuckdyke

[Kraft]

4 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

Also, I'd assume that most of the human wave losses in recent months were prison inmates, intended to keep the Ukrainians busy and expend ammo while most of the actual conscripts were sent through basic training.

For 2+months its mostly been Wagner PMCs inflating the number.

They are dying like flies but nobody even in Russia cares about murder convicts getting smashed by artillery. 

[Zeleban]

9 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

(Page 1987. Last mention of the actual battlefield situation in this thread: page 1980).

UA may simply be in a defensive pause cuz regearing or cuz training or cuz mud or wev and then unleash their next stunning surprise. But an alternate thesis is that their best formations are getting badly hammered right now and cycling through. Even if Ivan is faring much worse.

Fine, yielding the ruins of Bakhmut is irrelevant to the strategic situation. But regardless of where the lines are drawn, thousands of Ukrainians are getting shot up. Meanwhile, the Russians still show no signs of running short of meat or firepower. Not June peak shell volumes, but hardly shell famine either.  No stream of surrenders of desperate, freezing mobiks.  In short, no real signs of Collapse, but disturbing glimpses of strain on the Ukraine side in spite of the veil of secrecy.

 

 

 

(this thread is worth a read. Defmon stays on top of the frontline situation)

....And last time I checked in mid Jan, Kreminna and Svatove were allegedly becoming untenable for Ivan. Not now, it seems. The UA has fallen back nearly to Torske.

https://ukrainevolunteer297689472.wordpress.com/2023/01/27/i-have-now-been-in-three-wars/

The old snakeater's outfit looks like it's pulling from the woodlands as well.

****

Initiative has passed back to Moscow, it looks like to me. Both sides are fighting Russia's war right now. While on the static fronts (land bridge), Ivan just keeps on digging and mining, (I'd guess) planning  some kind of Zitadelle rematch to absorb  a straight punch by the Western heavies.

****

Here's Jack Watling in the Spectator (not gonna post the clickbaity German bashing headline, far too much of that here already). Here's the useful bit, the rest is the usual wailing about Western foot dragging:

Russia is currently at the nadir of its capabilities, fielding poorly trained troops with older and more varied equipment, and with shortages of munitions.

At the same time Russia has enough forces on the ground to mean that Ukraine can only make progress with a deliberate offensive.

Russia can also mobilise and train more personnel [than Ukraine].

Russia’s defence industry is also increasing production, so that if Ukraine does not retain the initiative, it will become progressively harder to liberate territory.  

The whole current situation with the Russian offensive in the Donetsk region is of no particular strategic importance. But it is of great importance both in terms of raising morale on the part of the Russians (look, despite all the statements from the West, we are strong and can successfully attack). So it is in terms of the decline in morale in the West (We were wrong, Russia is so strong and effective). From myself I can advise not to succumb to Russian tricks. Russia has ALWAYS tried to appear stronger than it really is (this is her strategy, let everyone be afraid seeing how strong you are). 

They have been preparing this offensive for four months (recruiting personnel, remoting equipment removed from storage). Russia's adaptability to the Hymars strikes is also exaggerated. Ukraine strikes successfully every week. Just the other day, a bridge was destroyed near Melitopol.

[LongLeftFlank]

42 minutes ago, Kraft said:

For 2+months its mostly been Wagner PMCs inflating the number.

They are dying like flies but nobody even in Russia cares about murder convicts getting smashed by artillery. 

Unnütze Esser...

Who's denazifying who again?

[Maciej Zwolinski]

7 hours ago, chrisl said:

f you look at the ratio of RU/UA losses on Oryx and assume that it's a similar undercount, Ukraine's losses are about 1/3 those of Russia. Which doesn't sound too out of whack with them being primarily on defense and having used a corrosive offense rather than a tank rush or other high casualty massed attack.  

Russia has about 3 times the Ukraine's fighting age population. So 3:1 in losses means that proportionally, they are losing the same quantum of fighting power, and anything below that ratio means that the Ukraine's doing worse in terms of attrition.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

1 hour ago, Bulletpoint said:

I think the "Russia will collapse due to losses" argument is basically due to the Western mentality where we can't stand losing our guys. If Americans lose just a single Blackhawk, they'll make a movie about it.

This, and the unspoken assumption, that because of losses and economic crises Russian governement will be under political pressure from the electorate. Except that Russia is a dictatorship and there are no meaningful elections there, so the major usual source of that pressure does not exist. Actually, pretty much the only remaining  kind of pressure from Russians on Putin's governement is threat of armed rebellion, and things need to be far worse for people to contemplate that. It took 3 years of constant hammering at the front, acute economic crisis and loss what was then considered Russian territory to rebel against the Tzar in 1917. Lowered living standards because of sanctions are not going to cause that.