How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Kinophile]

@Zeleban @Haiduk

Is this really in Lviv? 

 

[womble]

19 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

 

 

That's a bit like a WW2 "Portee" unit, a "2 pdr Universal carrier portee" on steroids.

But what is it firing at? Elevation looks high, and it doesn't appear to be regulated sufficiently to be putting indirect fires in... Maybe just lettin' 'er rip for the cameras at that point; 100mm ammo probably isn't in short supply.

[Kinophile]

Interesting idea, break up the jet with cones

 

[Butschi]

13 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Except politics in time of crisis doesn't work proportionally like that- it's about will and action. Biggest player on continent and literal "shadowy" owner of several sorrounding economies is expected to behave like a leader, not random country from the rank that everybody need to drag for his ears. Add special historical duty (not my words, but successive German politicians) and ostensible aversion to entire war effort on behalf of large part of establishment (ranging from "hide and seek" play to actively excpecting Ukraine defeat) and you will have reasons why this constant nagging is taking place here. Not even touching subject of before-the-war geopolitical stance. Yeah, I get it is not pleasant for you but this is how the things stands- mind, we are talking about people being murdered daily, not a football match. Small Germany-bashing is not that terrible price,  if lead to correction of policy.

Sorry, but other Germans on this board does not demand from us constantly to stop criticizing Germany when it is clearly doing wrong. They provide much needed context, though. Your society as a whole showed big heart toward refugees and did significant financial-humanitarian contributions, nobody can deny that. But political stance is different issue. I really hope this war will be lesson for German elites that leading is not an easy thing, that Russia can't be trusted in long way and can't be tamed with money and talking alone.

 

Ok folks, let's maybe move away from these rather heavy topics.

I think we can afford a little more nuance. Go through my posts if you like and count how many times I have said "criticize Scholz as much as you like". I am as unhappy as everyone else with his style of running things. Scholz is clearly doing much wrong. But, again, Scholz is not Germany and therefore saying Germany is doing much wrong just doesn't cut it.

Maybe I am guilty of being more emotional than I'd like to at times. % gdp wise we are average and by total aid far up. But all that stuff is not paid for by Scholz but by us Germans. And so constantly hearing "You provided Iris-T but who cares because Scholz and anyway PzH2000 was too late, too." makes me wonder. The way those contributions came forth were often - but not always - far less than optimal but how does that make the contribution itself smaller?

But you are right, let's move on.

[Beleg85]

24 minutes ago, Der Zeitgeist said:

I think in these cases, it's always helpful to remember that we're not here as representatives of our respective governments. I feel no need to support or defend Scholz's behavior simply because I'm not the one being adressed when people here are criticizing Germany.

I find that providing some context especially on domestic political realities in a country can be quite important to understand what's going on, especially since these things are often lost in translation through the international media.

Very accurate words. We are not and should never be prisoners of our national pride.

On personall note, I find it small geopolitical wonder that the very same nation that put my grandfather's entire family in concentration camp is now democratic, allied and bound to us in myriad ways. History can be such a mysterious beast.

23 minutes ago, Der Zeitgeist said:

I don't want to drag this too far off-topic, but about the issue of military capabilties and readiness of the Bundeswehr up until 1990, you might want to read this relatively recent title by Sönke Neitzel.

Ths is the author of this famous book about German prisoners in British camps and their views on Hitler, right?  I remember it as very good read.

[Butschi]

24 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is Germany's time to decide how much it wants to be involved in European leadership for decades to come.

I can't argue with your post. Not everything makes me happy, but I grudgingly have to admit that you have made it balanced probably true in most points. Just my comment to this one line. I don't think we ever wanted to lead Europe (well after 1945, obviously) - I'm not entirely certain about that though. Way more ironically, I am fairly certain that the rest of Europe never wanted is to lead, either (pay the most, yes, take responsibility, sure, lead? Hell, no!).

[Battlefront.com]

5 minutes ago, Kraft said:

I've read entirely too much about Scholz, a character I'd rather forget

What are your predictions about Bakhmut front instead?

Heh.  In fact, I would like us to talk much more about what we think is going on more generally now and what we expect to happen in the near future.  I'll try to get that conversation started

We expected to see more offensive activities by both sides, in particular Ukraine, as soon as the ground hardened up.  For the most part there hasn't been much of anything.  Two significant fights continue in the Bakhmut and Kreminna areas, with maybe a little more activity running along the Zaporizhzhia front (too early to say yet).  So far the fighting appears to have very limited goals which have remained the same for months now.

The question is... should we expect a major offensive action by either side for this winter? 

My own opinion is that one or both sides will do something which is "out of character" of the current fighting.  There's still 2 months of good weather before things become less certain.  That's a long time relative to what's happened before.

It seems to me that the Russian strategy is to keep fighting in the winter to a minimum so that it can focus on a large summer offensive.  This means:

1. reinforce the front to make it less likely there will be a repeat of Kharkiv
2. keep pressure on Bakhmut (offensive) and Kreminna (defensive) to keep Ukraine preoccupied and bleeding
3. continue rebuilding units well behind the front and do not repeat the desperate premature deployments we saw through most of last year
4. continue trying to weaken Ukraine strategically through terror strikes on civilians as well as grinding Ukrainian units at the front

I major Russian offensive action can't be ruled out, but I think they might have learned that a half assed offensive today gains little and results a half assed defense tomorrow for Ukraine to take advantage of.  The evidence for this, I think, is the 20-30k forces evacuated from Kherson have not been used to start a new offensive.  Instead, they have been used as defensive reinforcements from what I can tell. 

I think it is pretty clear that Russia will not stop fighting this war until either a) Ukraine has been outright defeated, b) Ukraine is forced to negotiate enough concessions that Russia can live with, or c) Russian military and/or civil collapse.  Continuing this war into 2024 probably rules out the first (most desirable) option, makes the second option even less likely, and on the other hand increases the chances of the third option.  Therefore, Russia must realize it has one and only one shot at something better than surrender.

Russia's summer offensive, if it should happen, is likely going to be designed to cause Ukraine a huge loss of life, a huge loss of territory, or (ideally) both.  Trying to take Kyiv again is a possible way to shorten the war, so it can't be ruled out (ISW's report yesterday had a good discussion about this).  However, there are so many practical reasons this will fail that I think an offensive in Zaporizhzhia is more likely.  Break through Ukraine's lines, take a whole bunch of territory in Donetsk, kill a large number of Ukrainians, then see if Ukraine is willing to accept some sort of peace deal.

What do others think?

Steve

[chuckdyke]

11 minutes ago, Butschi said:

I can't argue with your post. Not everything makes me happy, but I grudgingly have to admit that you have made it balanced probably true in most points. Just my comment to this one line. I don't think we ever wanted to lead Europe (well after 1945, obviously) - I'm not entirely certain about that though. Way more ironically, I am fairly certain that the rest of Europe never wanted is to lead, either (pay the most, yes, take responsibility, sure, lead? Hell, no!).

The French about Germany during the Cold War. We love Germany so much that we want to have two Germanies. 

[chuckdyke]

Patton better execute a good plan today than a perfect plan next week. Hope the Russians didn't read it.

[Der Zeitgeist]

18 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

This is the author of this famous book about German prisoners in British camps and their views on Hitler, right?  I remember it as very good read.

Yes, that's him, one of our few real military historians. He's getting a lot of air time these days, obviously. 

"Deutsche Krieger" is his magnum opus of sorts, where he shows certain cultural continuities of German armies from 1871 all the way to the modern Bundeswehr. One of his main themes is that every successive German state always tried to shape its military politically with its own ideology, but never really succeeded in doing so. 

[Battlefront.com]

24 minutes ago, Butschi said:

I can't argue with your post. Not everything makes me happy, but I grudgingly have to admit that you have made it balanced probably true in most points. Just my comment to this one line. I don't think we ever wanted to lead Europe (well after 1945, obviously) - I'm not entirely certain about that though. Way more ironically, I am fairly certain that the rest of Europe never wanted is to lead, either (pay the most, yes, take responsibility, sure, lead? Hell, no!).

Yes to all of this.  However, I will say that Germany was very happy to lead Europe's economic policy during times of peace.  I'm not sure how much it wanted to, but when it was called upon during the debt crisis it certainly showed strong leadership.  This is perhaps an example of "be careful what you wish for" or "you can't have your cake and eat it too".

Steve

[Bulletpoint]

40 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Interesting idea, break up the jet with cones

 

Cope pads?

The only way I can see this working is if the rubber spikes cushion the impact of the bomblet so much that the fuze doesn't trigger.

[DesertFox]

33 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Ths is the author of this famous book about German prisoners in British camps and their views on Hitler, right?  I remember it as very good read.

Yep, a must read IMHO to get an idea about the mentality of german soldiers during WW2.

Actually he published two books on that topic based on POW interviews of Generals (2005) and ordinary soldiers (2011):

»Abgehört. Deutsche Generäle in britischer Kriegsgefangenschaft 1942–1945« (2005).

and

»Soldaten. Protokolle vom Kämpfen, Töten und Sterben« (2011)

[Huba]

32 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

What do others think?

First, I doubt in possibility of anything major happening in the south. It's probable that the ground won't ever freeze solid there and as we see, nobody in his right mind should plan major mech movements through rasputitsa, even in XXIst century.
In the northern Donetsk/ Luhansk? Perhaps, though both sides seems to be counting on recuperating and generating more forces for the campaigning season later that year. Both sides seem to be doing shaping operations in Luhansk (UA) and Donetsk (RU), but it's hard to see any major follow on to that.

As for where the RU would strike when the weather improves, my bet is firmly on anywhere else but the Zaporizhya. The logistics of Melitopol are done through Crimea, and with perspective of UA gaining even more long range strike capability, planning offensive from there would be quite risky.
IMO the best hope for RU would be to attack somewhere through the international border - Lviv, Kyiv or Kharkiv. Idea would be to leverage the ban on HIMARS (and perhaps other long range western systems) to be used against Russia proper. This could allow much easier concentration of forces, logistics etc. Of course it runs a risk of US lifting the ban, but it's still a better bet than Zaporizhya. As to where:
Kyiv is very defendable, and second failure there would be just unacceptable.
Lviv is tempting, but that's a lot of ground to cover and it will be both risky and difficult to do it with NATO ISR assets just few kilometers away.
Kharkiv is closest to the border, does not require BY cooperation, and is a key to Donbas too. This would be my type.
 

[NamEndedAllen]

Wha? Is this an April Fool’s joke in January?? This is all just speculation by a non policy making official over stating the situation? Sorry if already picked apart. I’ve been off dealing with a family medical crisis that is worse daily.

https://ukrainetoday.org/2023/01/21/the-usa-reacted-to-the-potential-transfer-of-f-16s-by-the-netherlands-to-ukraine/

“Asked whether the White House was ready to allow the Netherlands to supply Ukraine with F-16 fighter jets, the ambassador said: “We have long held the view that what our allies supply is their business. And we support the countless (defense) contributions that our allies contributed for Ukraine”.”

 

Followed this tweet

 

 

[MikeyD]

Quote

...top attack protection kit fitted to the turret. Also used on Puma, this is a dense mat of rubber spikes

I've also seen those mats on a Dutch(?) Boxer that was being deployed on a peace keeping mission somewhere. Wow, I can't believe I was actually able to locate the references on that vague distant memory.

[NamEndedAllen]

1 hour ago, Butschi said:

I think we can afford a little more nuance. Go through my posts if you like and count how many times I have said "criticize Scholz as much as you like". I am as unhappy as everyone else with his style of running things. Scholz is clearly doing much wrong. But, again, Scholz is not Germany and therefore saying Germany is doing much wrong just doesn't cut it.

Maybe I am guilty of being more emotional than I'd like to at times. % gdp wise we are average and by total aid far up. But all that stuff is not paid for by Scholz but by us Germans. And so constantly hearing "You provided Iris-T but who cares because Scholz and anyway PzH2000 was too late, too." makes me wonder. The way those contributions came forth were often - but not always - far less than optimal but how does that make the contribution itself smaller?

But you are right, let's move on.

After pages of debate about Germany’s politics, its leadership policies, the historical background, and how this all bears on aid to Ukraine, I am sure we can expect similar latitude in discussing the USA’s politics, leadership, and historical background as its government struggles to decide whether or not to pay its recent bills. Let alone increase or continue current levels of military and financial support to Ukraine. The recent Congressional committee assignments by the new Speaker of the House suggest…interesting times ahead. As talk that the War will continue for years becomes more prominent, these matters will become increasingly fraught for Ukraine’s most critical supplier of weapons and intelligence.

[Harmon Rabb]

Paul Massaro interviews Ben Hodges. Don't know about you guys but I never get tired of hearing general Hodges speaking.

[dan/california]

45 minutes ago, Huba said:

First, I doubt in possibility of anything major happening in the south. It's probable that the ground won't ever freeze solid there and as we see, nobody in his right mind should plan major mech movements through rasputitsa, even in XXIst century.
In the northern Donetsk/ Luhansk? Perhaps, though both sides seems to be counting on recuperating and generating more forces for the campaigning season later that year. Both sides seem to be doing shaping operations in Luhansk (UA) and Donetsk (RU), but it's hard to see any major follow on to that.

As for where the RU would strike when the weather improves, my bet is firmly on anywhere else but the Zaporizhya. The logistics of Melitopol are done through Crimea, and with perspective of UA gaining even more long range strike capability, planning offensive from there would be quite risky.
IMO the best hope for RU would be to attack somewhere through the international border - Lviv, Kyiv or Kharkiv. Idea would be to leverage the ban on HIMARS (and perhaps other long range western systems) to be used against Russia proper. This could allow much easier concentration of forces, logistics etc. Of course it runs a risk of US lifting the ban, but it's still a better bet than Zaporizhya. As to where:
Kyiv is very defendable, and second failure there would be just unacceptable.
Lviv is tempting, but that's a lot of ground to cover and it will be both risky and difficult to do it with NATO ISR assets just few kilometers away.
Kharkiv is closest to the border, does not require BY cooperation, and is a key to Donbas too. This would be my type.
 

Ukraine still has the interior lines advantage. An advantage that effectively gets stronger as it air defenses improve, and there is even less risk of a unit getting hit on the move much past ~40km in depth. It would improve even more if the U.S. allowed precision strikes at the rail net work for a hundred kilometers or so into Russia. The new Shaheed 136 copies Ukraine is threatening to roll out shortly might serve here as well. There is at least a theoretical possibility of pressuring Luhansk Until the Russians have to move their major reserves in that direction, and then heading back south to for the real attack at Melitipol faster than the Russians can shift forces to counter. Again the more pressure Ukraine could bring to bear on the rail system in the immediately adjacent parts of Russia the better this would work.

The other possible opportunity is if the Southern front has a short period of deep freeze. Ukraine could theoretically attack while the ground was frozen, get all the way to the Sea of Azov, or at least far enough to bring a great many more systems to bear on the Russian logistics across the land bridge. And then the let inevitable Russian counter attack founder as the mud returns. Is this to cute by half? Probably, but it would be MacArthur at Inchon level brilliant if it worked.

The big unknown at the moments is are the Mobiks capable of meaningful offensive action. I don't think Russia has enough of its pre war forces left to attempt a large scale anything. So there is a large question about what an almost all mobik force can accomplish in terms of offensive action that does not amount to performative suicide. To put it mildly the plan they have been following in Bakmuht does not scale well, not well at all.

32 minutes ago, MikeyD said:

I've also seen those mats on a Dutch(?) Boxer that was being deployed on a peace keeping mission somewhere. Wow, I can't believe I was actually able to locate the references on that vague distant memory.

I would love to see some specs/test results on these vs Russian DPICM bomblets.

[FancyCat]

Ambassadors are important, but i dunno if we can take the word of the Ambassador just yet... 

[FancyCat]

5 hours ago, Butschi said:

Seriously, this is no beauty contest. No extra points for delivering weapons and looking good while doing it. Scholz plays a  very convincing scapegoat, for sure. But a) Scholz is not Germany, try to remember that and b) your constant belittling of absolutly everything Germany does is not just a bit self-righteous.

If you need the details again: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/military-support-ukraine-2054992

That's without the 12.something billion Euro on top.

In absolute terms we are on place 3 or 4 and even in % gdp we are not looking too shabby.

The Greens are coalition partners and therefore freer to swipe at Scholz than were they in the position of Chancellor but from everything I've heard of, Habeck and Baerbock, even when defending Scholz's policies have been able to do so in a manner less likely to make mistakes than Scholz, which is the worst part about this, Germany has absolutely done its job with supporting Ukraine, but Scholz has catastrophically mismanaged the PR image. 

If you think I refer to Germany rather than Scholz, not really, its just Scholz. 

[DesertFox]

35 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

If you think I refer to Germany rather than Scholz, not really, its just Scholz. 

I am pretty sure it is the man behind him, Mützenich pulling the strings. However, only my personal opinion. FWIW.

[dan/california]

 

Quote

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/01/21/germany-ukraine-leopard-tanks-biden/

Washington Post thinks Scholz needs a little push, and if that takes a company of Abrams, so be it.

[chuckdyke]

Does the Ukraine has trained crews for Leo 2s and if they have who trained them? We probably never know or this is part of the overal strategy.

[JonS]

7 hours ago, Butschi said:

Worse than some better than quite a few others. Room for improvement, sure, but nothing that warrants this constant nagging.

Has Germany taken in many refugees?