How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Zeleban]

A new word in military technology, Russian tanks are terrified

[Zeleban]

Video of raising the flag on the opposite bank of the Dnieper from Kherson. Looks like the Russians don't guard their side of the river very well.

[danfrodo]

26 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

Video of raising the flag on the opposite bank of the Dnieper from Kherson. Looks like the Russians don't guard their side of the river very well.

While I don't expect any offensive from across the river for all the the reasons posted earlier (logistics), I do wonder just how much mischief UKR can cause w smaller operations.   UKR forces would be on foot once they crossed unless there were partisans waiting on the other side w vehicles.  But they'd still be super vulnerable to chance meetings from RU patrols of just any little unit they might run into by accident.  The kind of tiny raid shown above is great for UKR morale (and bad for RU morale) but not sure what else it does. 

What kind of targets could UKR go after I wonder?

edit:  looking more closely at map I guess there is that main road running east-west not too far from the river.  Could plant IEDs and mines and cause trouble for that supply line I suppose. 

Edited December 3, 2022 by danfrodo
edit

[Zeleban]

10 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

While I don't expect any offensive from across the river for all the the reasons posted earlier (logistics), I do wonder just how much mischief UKR can cause w smaller operations.   UKR forces would be on foot once they crossed unless there were partisans waiting on the other side w vehicles.  But they'd still be super vulnerable to chance meetings from RU patrols of just any little unit they might run into by accident.  The kind of tiny raid shown above is great for UKR morale (and bad for RU morale) but not sure what else it does. 

What kind of targets could UKR go after I wonder?

Yes, such sorties are purely reconnaissance in nature. As for the supply through the Dnieper, I think it is quite possible. Do not forget that despite the absence of bridges, the Russians were able to organize the supply of their troops on the opposite bank of the Dnieper with the help of numerous, mobile pontoon crossings. I am sure that the withdrawal of the Russians from the bridgehead was caused not by a difficult supply situation, but by a strategic decision to abandon a further offensive on Nikolaev. Thus, the further presence of the most combat-ready Russian troops on the bridgehead became meaningless. As you can see, these troops were very useful to the Russians for the development of the offensive under Bakhmut.

[Battlefront.com]

11 minutes ago, Zeleban said:

Yes, such sorties are purely reconnaissance in nature. As for the supply through the Dnieper, I think it is quite possible. Do not forget that despite the absence of bridges, the Russians were able to organize the supply of their troops on the opposite bank of the Dnieper with the help of numerous, mobile pontoon crossings. I am sure that the withdrawal of the Russians from the bridgehead was caused not by a difficult supply situation, but by a strategic decision to abandon a further offensive on Nikolaev. Thus, the further presence of the most combat-ready Russian troops on the bridgehead became meaningless. As you can see, these troops were very useful to the Russians for the development of the offensive under Bakhmut.

If Ukraine makes the decision to push across the river I think it could do it over time.  First phase would be to push light forces over to establish at foothold in multiple locations that are reasonably close to each other.  Logically this would be done around the destroyed bridges.  The ultimate goal, of course, eventually using these bridges for resupply.  Russia has almost no chance of knocking them out of action once they are repaired due to the lack of PGMs, therefore it's worth the effort.

On the right bank very large quantities of artillery would stand at the ready to pound into dust any Russian concentrations, in particular enemy artillery.  HIMARS could be the make or break weapon for this battle.  It also goes without saying that SEAD and ISR would be needed in large quantities.

The initial goal would be to determine the strength of the Russian defenses.  Too strong?  Pull back and come up with a different plan.  Weak?  Push more light forces across in appropriate places. For the first phase resupply could be done by small boats.  Ammo, food, and replacements in one direction, wounded and damaged equipment in the other.  This would be very, very easy to sustain because light forces do not require slow, heavy ferries or vulnerable bridges.

Presuming that Russian defenses aren't very good, Phase 2 would see Ukraine's light forces would expand the bridgehead outward wide and deep enough to have multiple crossing points that are not under any sort of direct fire and/or effective artillery. The multiple crossing points would allow Ukraine to randomly switch between them at random times to prevent the Russians being able to effectively interdict resupply.  These points would be used to ferry across heavier weapons, vehicles, and large scale resupply.

Phase 3 would be to reestablish one or more of the bridges.  We have not seen any detailed shots of the damage since Russia pulled out, but I'd guess that with enough time something could be fabricated ahead of time and put into place quickly once the conditions were right for it.  Smaller bits of damage could be repaired during Phase 2.

Once the bridge is reestablished, the rest is pretty straight forward... strike out eastward to isolate Crimea and to cause the defenses between the Dnepr and Donetsk to be threatened from the rear.  Ukrainian fixing attacks along this line should be enough to keep them in place or force them to retreat.

Looks pretty easy, doesn't it   In theory it is.  The difficulty comes in two forms.  First, this would require a huge commitment of Ukraine's best supporting arms and light infantry.  It would come at a cost to any other offensive operations Ukraine might be contemplating.  The second issue is that the Russians likely will fight hard against the bridgehead, making it a particularly bloody affair.  The result is that other offensive operations might be less risky and have better chances of a big payoff than this one.

Steve

[dan/california]

 

[danfrodo]

18 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

If Ukraine makes the decision to push across the river I think it could do it over time.  First phase would be to push light forces over to establish at foothold in multiple locations that are reasonably close to each other.  Logically this would be done around the destroyed bridges.  The ultimate goal, of course, eventually using these bridges for resupply.  Russia has almost no chance of knocking them out of action once they are repaired due to the lack of PGMs, therefore it's worth the effort.

On the right bank very large quantities of artillery would stand at the ready to pound into dust any Russian concentrations, in particular enemy artillery.  HIMARS could be the make or break weapon for this battle.  It also goes without saying that SEAD and ISR would be needed in large quantities.

The initial goal would be to determine the strength of the Russian defenses.  Too strong?  Pull back and come up with a different plan.  Weak?  Push more light forces across in appropriate places. For the first phase resupply could be done by small boats.  Ammo, food, and replacements in one direction, wounded and damaged equipment in the other.  This would be very, very easy to sustain because light forces do not require slow, heavy ferries or vulnerable bridges.

Presuming that Russian defenses aren't very good, Phase 2 would see Ukraine's light forces would expand the bridgehead outward wide and deep enough to have multiple crossing points that are not under any sort of direct fire and/or effective artillery. The multiple crossing points would allow Ukraine to randomly switch between them at random times to prevent the Russians being able to effectively interdict resupply.  These points would be used to ferry across heavier weapons, vehicles, and large scale resupply.

Phase 3 would be to reestablish one or more of the bridges.  We have not seen any detailed shots of the damage since Russia pulled out, but I'd guess that with enough time something could be fabricated ahead of time and put into place quickly once the conditions were right for it.  Smaller bits of damage could be repaired during Phase 2.

Once the bridge is reestablished, the rest is pretty straight forward... strike out eastward to isolate Crimea and to cause the defenses between the Dnepr and Donetsk to be threatened from the rear.  Ukrainian fixing attacks along this line should be enough to keep them in place or force them to retreat.

Looks pretty easy, doesn't it   In theory it is.  The difficulty comes in two forms.  First, this would require a huge commitment of Ukraine's best supporting arms and light infantry.  It would come at a cost to any other offensive operations Ukraine might be contemplating.  The second issue is that the Russians likely will fight hard against the bridgehead, making it a particularly bloody affair.  The result is that other offensive operations might be less risky and have better chances of a big payoff than this one.

Steve

I like it.  But it could be really risky.  If UKR pushes some light, easily retrievable across it could cause a disproportionate reponse by RU, causing huge disruption to enemy w relatively little cost & risk.  The key is to make RU at least think it's a prelude to phase 2&3 above. 

[Huba]

2 hours ago, NamEndedAllen said:

Thanks for your extensive and informative comments! Much appreciate your elimination of countering missile attacks. But that’s why I included artillery/ missiles (should have specified GLSDB and all)and GLOCS as well. . I am pretty sure Ukrainians, even while suffering cold this winter would be heartened to know that the Russian invaders were being cut off,  starving, and freezing. Now. Right now. Or yesterday.

Respectfully, I am not sure this is entirely accurate. Destroying the Russian invaders’ supplies within and their GLOCS sooner than later is a good start. And I am definitely not convinced that turning Russian lights and heat off will unite them in love for their government. 

True. Except we not trying to live and fight in Ukraine, in our homes and workplaces are also getting slowly cooked - even if our resolve isn’t weakened. Our sons and daughters, mothers and fathers are being killed, raped, stolen, “filtered”. Our cities ruined. My question remains, is there NOTHING that Russia can do to Ukraine that will trigger the Allies to deliver the modern Leopards, Abrams, F-16s, much longer range artillery/missiles that are being withheld?

Ok, so let me answer that. 

My whole tirade was made with the assumption that West's 'slow boiled frog', escalation averse strategy is non-negotiable because of various underlaying reasons that we don't have much visibility at. Quite possibly these reasons are very realpolitik like, and if stated explicitly would be extremely infuriating and unacceptable for the public - but here we are  From that perspective the course of action, scope of the weapons deliveries and other support makes sense in my opinion, and will eventually lead to Russia's defeat. 

If it was up to me, I'd love to have Biden say "Non possumus! Get out of Ukraine or else... " already in March, followed by all kinds of weapons being delivered, formation of volunteer air corp flying F15s and whatnot. It would be short and ugly. 

 

[Beleg85]

In case the info slip off- there are again some developments on Belarus directon.

Shoigu visit may mean Lukashenko is sliding on path into joining the war; some opposition leaders are convinced decision was already made while date is still negotiated. This could have ofc different forms, not necessarly direct attack. I am personally not so sure, but there are some further signals BL military may finally become subjegated to Russian one.

Edited December 3, 2022 by Beleg85

[danfrodo]

34 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

This could have ofc different forms,

Yeah, I wonder what those snakes are up to.  We have evidence that Belarus already sent it's artillery ammo to Russia, so any conventional attack would be a disaster.  It also sets up a military coup, potentially.  Maybe RU has put loyalists in all the highest command positions, but majors & colonels sometimes lead military rebellions.  I am more worried about missiles & other mischief coming from there.   Or it's just another amateur ploy, trying to get UKR to move troops to the border.

If Belarus did cross the border then Lukashenko will receive whatever sanctions & penalties that Russia has.  It also is an escalation that UKR allies could use as pretext to send longer range missiles.

[Huba]

I'd say that Belarus actively joining the war would be the escalation that could lead to West uppping the game with new weapon systems. Also I could see the ban on attacking Russia territory not being extended to Belarus. Shooting taking place just beyond the Polish border cannot be left unanswered - if RU attempts to push in the direction of Lviv, I'd expect our gov to invoke Article 4.

Looking at the broader picture, from Machavellian perspective one might view this as desired. Fall of Lukashenko and Belarus being pulled into the Western sphere would be the most desired outcome of this war, allowing much much more robust security arrangement post-war. Surely Ukrainians would also preffer to fight on foreign soil for a change, instead of destroying their own land. 

That being said, the risk would be immense. It could lead to incidents along the border involving NATO soldiers. It could also lead to Belarus being annexed by RU, greatly complicating the post-war geopolitical map. 

[kraze]

21 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Yeah, I wonder what those snakes are up to.  We have evidence that Belarus already sent it's artillery ammo to Russia, so any conventional attack would be a disaster.  It also sets up a military coup, potentially.  Maybe RU has put loyalists in all the highest command positions, but majors & colonels sometimes lead military rebellions.  I am more worried about missiles & other mischief coming from there.   Or it's just another amateur ploy, trying to get UKR to move troops to the border.

If Belarus did cross the border then Lukashenko will receive whatever sanctions & penalties that Russia has.  It also is an escalation that UKR allies could use as pretext to send longer range missiles.

Belarus is a russian ally, there will be no coup, just like there was no coup in Italy in 1943. Russians and belarussians are training together and belarussians happily provide logistics to train russian mobiks. Belarus is already taking part in the war and there's zero opposition to it from both military and general population. They just know their army alone is not numerous enough to make any difference (whole army of Belarus across its whole border is smaller than what we have on the northern border).

Their whole army is 60k or so, which means they can dedicate 20k troops at most. Russians had 3-4 times more in the north and we know how well that went.

Unless russians send them 100k of their own to help - no invasion is happening (or it gets to be very short lived). But spare 100k troops isn't something russians even have at this point.

Edited December 4, 2022 by kraze

[dan/california]

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/03/world/europe/ukraine-kherson-evacuation.html?action=click&algo=bandit-alpha-decay-0.4-eng30s-shadow-lda-unique&alpha=0.02&block=trending_recirc&fellback=false&imp_id=627931637&impression_id=2446627d-736f-11ed-abef-632a64b2cb28&index=2&pgtype=Article&pool=pool%2F91fcf81c-4fb0-49ff-bd57-a24647c85ea1&region=footer&req_id=610391436&shadow_vec_sim=0.2518985097807295&surface=eos-most-popular-story&variant=2_alpha-bandit-decay-0.4-eng30s-shadow-refined-lda-unique

Ukraine has called for civilian evacuations on the left bank of the Dnipro. It is unclear if this is the lead in to a real attempt to cross in force, or just an info op to make the Russians keep more forces there.

 

[sburke]

38 minutes ago, kraze said:

Belarus is already taking part in the war and there's zero opposition to it from both military and general population.

i think your bias is showing again.  Folks from Belarus are fighting in UKr army, Belarus citizens have been arrested for sabotaging rail network and there is a significant Belarus opposition movement.  You'll need to back up your statements with some facts to counter that.

[LongLeftFlank]

5 hours ago, Zeleban said:

Russian telegram channels report that three powerful groups of Polish and German mercenaries have been identified in the Kremennaya area at once. So a new force enters the arena - German mercenaries . Based on this, it can be assumed that the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kremennaya area is developing successfully.

GFM von Brauchitsch called from OKH; he wants his map back.

[Huba]

Rare news from the EW front:

 

[LongLeftFlank]

Kekekekekekekekekeke!!!!

 

...i assume the unedited version is kind of nasty.

[kevinkin]

Their brands were still on fire and their hooves were made of steel
Their horns were black and shiny and their hot breath he could feel
A bolt of fear went through him as they thundered through the sky
He saw the riders coming hard... and he heard their mournful cry
… Yippie i ay Yippie i oh
Ghost riders in
Ghost riders in the sky

- Stan Jones

[FancyCat]

Belarus, I see no reason why Putin wouldn't order the Belarusian military to invade Ukraine. He and the General Staff had no qualms about ordering mobilized conscripts into Ukraine to shore up defenses. If a new front can be opened, it would require forces to counter.

Recall that moves have been made for the deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus, can Ukraine actually push into Belarus or is that now off-limits?

Could be another scenario where like the rest of the Russian-Ukrainian border, no units can really invade.

If off-limits, if it manages to allow Putin to escape with frozen Donbas front line, then certainly a desperate Putin is probably fully willing to toss the Belarusian people into the meatgrinder.

[kevinkin]

I thought I read that the UA defenses arrayed against a front toward Belarus are pretty solid given the forested swampy terrain. And Lukashenko might be on even more tenuous political ground with his own people than Putin. If Lukashenko said no to save his butt, what could Putin do? Open a front vs. Belarus? 

https://www.voanews.com/a/never-again-ukraine-bolsters-defenses-along-belarus-russia-border-/6822234.html

https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2022-10-12/belarus-army-would-likely-have-little-impact-in-ukraine-war

However, Lukashenko’s army is relatively small — just 45,000 troops, including conscripts — and largely inexperienced. The Belarusian military holds regular drills, but hasn’t taken part in combat since World War II.

After mass protests of 2020, when hundreds of thousands of people demanded that Belarus' leader step down, Lukashenko is afraid of arming Belarusians. It can provoke another domestic explosion.

I can see a UA raid into Belarus more than the opposite at this point. But it's interesting to ponder if Belarus offers anything and, if so, what. 

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, FancyCat said:

Belarus, I see no reason why Putin wouldn't order the Belarusian military to invade Ukraine. He and the General Staff had no qualms about ordering mobilized conscripts into Ukraine to shore up defenses. If a new front can be opened, it would require forces to counter.

This very well could be what Putin is thinking, but I am still doubtful.  We've seen endless posturing by both Russia and Belarus to make it look like some sort of direct action is near at hand.  And every single time (so far) it hasn't happened.  Shoigu going to Belarus is no more troubling to me than a dozen other things we've seen in the past months.

The primary reason Putin should NOT want to push Belarus into action is exactly the same reasons we've been discussing since this war started.  Namely that Lukashenko's regime is not solid.  Putin had to invest significant resources to keep Lukashenko in power over the past 2 years.  The underlying reasons for the intervention still exist, they are simply kept under control for now. 

Pushing Belarus into war risks upsetting the current balance of power in a very unfavorable way.  If the war for Belarus goes badly, it is probable that there will be major domestic unrest (again).  Putin would then likely have to do a military occupation of Belarus to quiet it down.  This would bog down more Russian resources than is gained by distracting Ukrainian forces.  And that's assuming Russia can successfully keep Lukashenko in power.  Putin's track record of success, as of late, doesn't give me much confidence he can pull it off.

Belarus slipping into an out of control chaos is really, really bad for Russia.  First, it provides Russians with yet another example of their declining power and influence.  That might not change the equation in Russia right away, but as I've said many times the collapse of Russia is going to be the result of cumulative challenges.  Losing Belarus from the fold is a big one for sure.

Second, Russia is already actively using Belarus for its war against Ukraine.  Chaos in Belarus, therefore, would upset all of those activities to some degree.  Those disruptions count against whatever gains Russia may get from attacking across the border.

Third, there is almost no chance of making any real headway into Ukraine.  We've done the terrain and force analysis before and it's highly unfavorable to Belarus.  It is unlikely to distract Ukraine for more than a few days or weeks before Russia has definitively lost more than it gained by attacking.

And so on

To sum up, pushing Belarus into war against Ukraine is a terrible idea that almost certainly will blow up in Russia's face.  This means there's every LOGICAL reason to think Belarus won't attack.  However, Putin has shown that his grasp of logic isn't the same as ours.  So yeah, it's possible he makes another massive strategic mistake, however I think if he was goign to do it he would have done it by now.

Steve

[MikeyD]

Belarus appears to have spent the better part of the year not exactly saying 'no' to Putin but not exactly saying 'yes' either. It was mid-summer when I wondered how much longer their stalling tactics are going to work. Say 'no' to Putin and you're likely to find yourself 'accidentally' falling out of a 6 storey hospital window.

[Battlefront.com]

And the circle is complete.  Snowden is now officially a Russian citizen, not just an agent:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/edward-snowden-swears-allegiance-to-russia-and-receives-passport-lawyer-says/ar-AA14PjI7

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

So the Russian copium machine and its Western amen corner seems to have adopted the 4th grade 'I'm rubber, you're glue' strategy.

Basically everything we're tracking here about the Russians: mass casualties, desertions, surrenders, mutiny, low ammo, tank hatches welded shut, etc. -- is being claimed to be afflicting the Ukrainians 2x.  It's us, not them, who are on the verge of ignominious collapse.

****

So being paranoid, I'm gonna ask again, what is the status of total war mobilization inside Ukraine? Guns and butter is not a thing when 20% of your territory remains under a Russian boot and your power grid is half knocked out.

Search "Ukrainian army" + "mobilisation" or "war economy" and you still get 98% articles about Russia's woes.  What little you do get on Ukraine is mainly about missile strikes and blackouts and refugees.

So where are those additional 500k troops plus 250k in support units that TDF should have been training up and kitting out since the front stabilised in July?  Even if there aren't enough tanks and artillery yet, you can still configure them as light infantry.

[Per CNN (Nov) the US has trained about 20,000 specialists to date, and is gearing up to train about 2000 more each month. The UK has trained about 10k; other NATO countries, hundreds here and there. Poland keeps mum, obviously. But that ain't no half a million.... ]

....and if for some reason their frontline services aren't urgently needed to drive out the Russians, then shouldn't about half a million Ukie kids be part time training anyway as Seabees, to be ready to work on the relief and rebuilding programs postwar? That Marshall plan don't build itself.

Recovery and reconstruction will require at least $349 billion, or more than 1.5 times the size of Ukraine's pre-war economy. 

...And if even *that* isn't needed somehow, just to give those extra half million Ukrainian guys (and girls) a more direct stake in their own Republic that's fighting for its existence.

They're really letting an all volunteer force carry the weight for a war on their own soil?

This still mystifies me. Why WOULDN'T Ukrainian society be totally mobilised now?

And why would they be keeping that a secret from the affected populace, their allies and their enemies? You'd think they would be shouting it from the rooftops.  Why We Fight!

What's missing?

*****

 

[dan/california]

19 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

So the Russian copium machine and its Western amen corner seems to have adopted the 4th grade 'I'm rubber, you're glue' strategy.

Basically everything we're tracking here about the Russians: mass casualties, desertions, surrenders, mutiny, low ammo, tank hatches welded shut, etc. -- is being claimed to be afflicting the Ukrainians 2x.  It's us, not them, who are on the verge of ignominious collapse.

****

So being paranoid, I'm gonna ask again, what is the status of total war mobilization inside Ukraine? Guns and butter is not a thing when 20% of your territory remains under a Russian boot and your power grid is half knocked out.

Search "Ukrainian army" + "mobilisation" or "war economy" and you still get 98% articles about Russia's woes.  What little you do get on Ukraine is mainly about missile strikes and blackouts and refugees.

So where are those additional 500k troops plus 250k in support units that TDF should have been training up and kitting out since the front stabilised in July?  Even if there aren't enough tanks and artillery yet, you can still configure them as light infantry.

[Per CNN (Nov) the US has trained about 20,000 specialists to date, and is gearing up to train about 2000 more each month. The UK has trained about 10k; other NATO countries, hundreds here and there. Poland keeps mum, obviously. But that ain't no half a million.... ]

....and if for some reason their frontline services aren't urgently needed to drive out the Russians, then shouldn't about half a million Ukie kids be part time training anyway as Seabees, to be ready to work on the relief and rebuilding programs postwar? That Marshall plan don't build itself.

Recovery and reconstruction will require at least $349 billion, or more than 1.5 times the size of Ukraine's pre-war economy. 

...And if even *that* isn't needed somehow, just to give those extra half million Ukrainian guys (and girls) a more direct stake in their own Republic that's fighting for its existence.

They're really letting an all volunteer force carry the weight for a war on their own soil?

This still mystifies me. Why WOULDN'T Ukrainian society be totally mobilised now?

And why would they be keeping that a secret from the affected populace, their allies and their enemies? You'd think they would be shouting it from the rooftops.  Why We Fight!

What's missing?

*****

 

I suspect we will have a conclusive answer to that question the day after spring mud season ends if we don't before. My suspicion is that the Russians won't like the answer much, but we shall see.