How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_Capt]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Return to doing recon by force?  Units with the appropriate levels of training, doctrine, and equipment probe to determine what might be in front of them (in a static situation they should already have some clue) while the main attack force waits for information necessary to formulate a viable attack plan.  The recon force might get hammered by the ambushes, true enough, but that's part of the reason they exist.  If they do get hammered then the attacking force has information to act upon, which should include the option to NOT ATTACK until something changes such as hitting the suspected positions with artillery fire, seeking alternative routes, using feints to draw away defenders from A so you can attack B, etc.

The issue is the range. Recon by force at these ranges means that in order to create a controlled bubble you would need massive amounts of recon, well above the 1/3 rd rule.  First problem are ATGMs, small man portables with the range and better lethality than the old vehicle mounted systems.  Two guys in a bunch at 2km.  You now need to sweep every shrub 2+kms out along the route of advance - the manpower bill for this is enormous.  A good offset would be micro-unmanned but again…volume.

Second problem, UAS/UGS, recon in force now includes air superiority below 2000 feet and sweeping ground level for mines with legs and possibly sub-surface systems lying dormant to pop up and hit your main force or logistics.  We have talked at length on the challenges to this.  

Third problem, observation. This environment is one where if you can be seen you can be killed.  So how does one blind an opponent with recon in force?  In the old days it was effective artillery and air power deep strikes combined with recon but ISR is now on every street pole, smart phone from ground level all the way up to space-based…that is one helluva recon in force battle.  The attrition recon forces will face will be extreme, which is frankly the weakest part of the western approach - we throw some of the highest trained soldiers into most attritional processes and expect magic to happen.

And all of that will do little against PGM artillery where a single gun can do the damage a big fat and easily found battery used to do.  Cheap disposable unmanned PGM arty is the next obvious move in this crazy game.

I think we may need to reinvent reconnaissance to be honest.

Edited November 7, 2022 by The_Capt

[poesel]

8 hours ago, chrisl said:

Against Russia a 500m digital link would be great.  Against a technologically advanced military maybe less so.  A military that has sensors looking for radio signals that could indicate presence of an enemy position (e.g. for suppressing joysticked AVs) will be putting them on ground vehicles for similar purposes.  They may not detect the operator, who will be mostly in receive mode except when the "fire" signal is being sent, but it will detect the launcher.  A wired connection leaks a lot less signal for someone to detect.

A laser link would be nearly undetectable, and a glass fiber cable absolutely undetectable (unless you stumble over it).

A laser link would be very susceptible to interfering obstacles and somewhat to bad weather, so maybe not a wise choice unless you fight in a desert. Glass fiber is not very robust, but then it is also not expensive. Range is basically unlimited for both methods.

A laser link could also be used for communication with drones. More useful for the more autonomous types, which likely have a more 'bursty' transmission characteristic.

[chuckdyke]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

I think we may need to reinvent reconnaissance to be honest.

Fly on the wall drones. The future will be nano technologies.

[paxromana]

6 minutes ago, chuckdyke said:

Fly on the wall drones. The future will be nano technologies.

The problem is the same as for powered armour suits - you will need high density power sources to make such things even vaguely feasible ... then there are the environmental factors. In anything above dead calm wind the things will either burn through whatever power bank they have (assuming they're flying) or they'll simply be blown so far off course that they'll never get to their target.

I suppose if you had something like FASCAM (FASCAD?) then it would be more doable - but someone has already mentioned the problems with making electronics able to withstand launch by artillery (though rockets as a delivery system may be less problematic) ... 

Edited November 7, 2022 by paxromana

[akd]

More failure at Pavlivka.  Looks like tank is getting hit from trenches at very close range:

 

[The_Capt]

25 minutes ago, chuckdyke said:

Fly on the wall drones. The future will be nano technologies.

We already have micro-drones.  Nano is something else entirely - it is extending warfare to a molecular level: https://www.nano.gov/nanotech-101/what/nano-size#:~:text=Just how small is “nano%3F” In the International System,is about 100%2C000 nanometers thick

This will likely be a lot like cyber, an omni-domain in military terms; however, the major difference is that nano is all physical.  Like cyber it will transaction information; however, the information is more the basic "bits" of physics itself.  I honestly think the destructive power of nanotechnology is simply too high and will cross into the same strategic weapon status of nuclear weapons, but there is so much risk of it leaking out do to practical tactical applications.  The good news is that true mastery and exploitation of this tech is still a ways out.

[Huba]

RUSI released a lengthy report about the air war and Ukrainian AD needs. Below is the executive summary of the paper. There isn't really much new stuff in it, what's worth mentioning is that report emphasizes the need for supplying Ukraine with Western-build fighters.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/russian-air-war-and-ukrainian-requirements-air-defence

Quote

• Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted significantly more extensive fixed-wing strike operations during the first days of the invasion than has been previously documented, while Ukrainian ground-based air-defence (GBAD) capabilities were suppressed by initial attacks. 
• During this period, Ukrainian fighter aircraft inflicted some losses on VKS aircraft but also took serious casualties due to being totally technologically outmatched and badly outnumbered.
• Russian fighters have remained highly effective and lethal against Ukrainian aircraft near the frontlines throughout the war, especially the Su-35S with the R-77-1 long-range missile and, in recent months, the Mig-31BM with the R-37 very long-range missile.
• From early March, the VKS lost the ability to operate in Ukrainian-controlled airspace except at very low altitudes due to its inability to reliably suppress or destroy increasingly effective, well-dispersed and mobile Ukrainian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
• Russian GBAD has also been highly effective since March, especially the long-range S-400 SAM system supported by the 48Ya6 ‘Podlet-K1’ all-altitude long-range surveillance radar system.
• Numerous MANPADS provided to Ukrainian troops and later mobile air-defence teams meant that low-altitude Russian fixed-wing and rotary penetrating sorties beyond the frontlines proved to be prohibitively costly during March, and ceased by April 2022.
• Throughout the war, most Russian airstrikes have been against pre-designated targets with unguided bombs and rockets. The Su-34 fleet has regularly also fired stand-off missiles such as the Kh-29 and Kh-59 against fixed targets, and Su-30SM and Su-35S fighters have regularly fired Kh-31P and Kh-58 anti-radiation missiles to suppress and target Ukrainian SAM radars.
• Without air superiority, Russia’s attempts at strategic air attack have been limited to expensive cruise and ballistic missile barrages at a much more limited scale. These failed to achieve strategically decisive damage during the first seven months of the invasion. However, the latest iteration is a more focused and sustainable bombardment of the Ukrainian electricity grid, blending hundreds of cheap Iranian-supplied Shahed-136 loitering munitions against substations with continued use of cruise and ballistic missiles against larger targets.
• The West must avoid complacency about the need to urgently bolster Ukrainian air-defence capacity. It is purely thanks to its failure to destroy Ukraine’s mobile SAM systems that Russia remains unable to effectively employ the potentially heavy and efficient aerial firepower of its fixed-wing bomber and multi-role fighter fleets to bombard Ukrainian strategic targets and frontline positions from medium altitude, as it did in Syria. 
• It follows that if Ukrainian SAMs are not resupplied with ammunition, and ultimately augmented and replaced with Western equivalents over time, the VKS will regain the ability to pose a major threat.
• In the short term, Ukraine also needs large numbers of additional man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) and radar-guided anti-aircraft guns, such as the Gepard, to sustain and increase its ability to intercept the Shahed-136s and protect its remaining power infrastructure and repairs to damaged facilities.
• In the medium term, Ukraine needs cost-effective ways to defend itself against the Shahed-136. One option could be compact radar and/or laser ranging and sighting systems to allow numerous existing anti-aircraft guns to be much more accurate and effective against them. 
• The Ukrainian Air Force fighter force needs modern Western fighters and missiles to sustainably counter the VKS. Russian pilots have been cautious throughout the war, so even a small number of Western fighters could have a major deterrent effect.
• Any Western fighter supplied in the short–medium term needs to be capable of dispersed operations using mobile maintenance equipment and small support teams, and flying from relatively rough runways, to avoid being neutralised by Russian long-range missile strikes. 

 

[Vanir Ausf B]

• Quote

  Russian GBAD has also been highly effective since March, especially the long-range S-400 SAM system supported by the 48Ya6 ‘Podlet-K1’ all-altitude long-range surveillance radar system

  That's interesting. We've heard very little about S-400s.

[dan/california]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I do not think it is crackpot at all.  In fact it is one of the few solutions that makes sense - up-armoured dispersed “light” infantry in powered suits.  You gain survivability, mobility and firepower where you need it, directly on the operator.  But you also can keep a lower battlefield profile and dispersion.  

The biggest issue is power.  If you want armoured infantry battle suits like Starship Troopers (book not movie) or The Expanse, one needs very high density but low weight power generation and I do not thin’ we are there yet.

Please tell me you can get Steve to experiment with these in the next game, even if the technology is not quite there yet? It would even make a good module, I think.

Edit, I seem to be out of likes so let me add that all your other posts are excellent as always, and much appreciated.

Edited November 7, 2022 by dan/california

[chrisl]

3 hours ago, poesel said:

A laser link would be nearly undetectable, and a glass fiber cable absolutely undetectable (unless you stumble over it).

A laser link would be very susceptible to interfering obstacles and somewhat to bad weather, so maybe not a wise choice unless you fight in a desert. Glass fiber is not very robust, but then it is also not expensive. Range is basically unlimited for both methods.

A laser link could also be used for communication with drones. More useful for the more autonomous types, which likely have a more 'bursty' transmission characteristic.

Lasers do need a direct LOS, or else a relay station (or a few of them) if you can work out how to do it with UAVs and make them switch among them while maneuvering.  Weather is less of an issue if you pick the right wavelength.  Optical fiber can actually be pretty tough.  Bare fiber is extremely fragile, but with the right jacket it can be quite durable.  It's still susceptible to all kinds of loss for things that don't affect wire, but you could probably spool out 500m of thin fiber and expect it to last longer than your launcher.

2 hours ago, paxromana said:

The problem is the same as for powered armour suits - you will need high density power sources to make such things even vaguely feasible ... then there are the environmental factors. In anything above dead calm wind the things will either burn through whatever power bank they have (assuming they're flying) or they'll simply be blown so far off course that they'll never get to their target.

I suppose if you had something like FASCAM (FASCAD?) then it would be more doable - but someone has already mentioned the problems with making electronics able to withstand launch by artillery (though rockets as a delivery system may be less problematic) ... 

Yeah, it always comes down to power (of the energy/time kind). I think making electronics launchable in an artillery tube is probably not too tough, but launching quality optics has some real challenges.

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

We already have micro-drones.  Nano is something else entirely - it is extending warfare to a molecular level: https://www.nano.gov/nanotech-101/what/nano-size#:~:text=Just how small is “nano%3F” In the International System,is about 100%2C000 nanometers thick

This will likely be a lot like cyber, an omni-domain in military terms; however, the major difference is that nano is all physical.  Like cyber it will transaction information; however, the information is more the basic "bits" of physics itself.  I honestly think the destructive power of nanotechnology is simply too high and will cross into the same strategic weapon status of nuclear weapons, but there is so much risk of it leaking out do to practical tactical applications.  The good news is that true mastery and exploitation of this tech is still a ways out.

The ultimate in nano-technology really becomes bio.  When you get to tiny life forms, many of their parts are very machine like and even though they're made from chemistry they have a lot of mechanical features that make them do what they do. Making mechanical things at those size scales you have to mimic or incorporate a lot of those kinds of features.  Conspiracy theorists notwithstanding, that's probably a very long way off (including any vaguely effective bioengineered weapons) - I don't think we'll have to worry about Wesley Crusher's nanites for a while.

Edited November 7, 2022 by chrisl

[dan/california]

 

[Tenses]

28 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Please tell me you can get Steve to experiment with these in the next game, even if the technology is not quite there yet? It would even make a good module, I think.

Edit, I seem to be out of likes so let me add that all your other posts are excellent as always, and much appreciated.

Platoon of Fallout-like power armor troops with plasma rifles VS platoon of T72B3? What is there not to like?

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Steve,  I do not disagree on the “force generation” sucking - I am not sure how much of that is “sucking” and how much is crisis of their own creation, but why split hairs?  

Exactly   Which is why this whole situation in this one video is an indication of Russia Sucks™, highest level at a minimum but also translating down to the tactical level.  As I said, even if we grant Russia credit for coming up with a sensible, though inhumane, way of dealing with battlefield reversals, the apparently universal rule of Russia half assing their plans is evident.  It really does seem that whatever Russia does one can count on them doing a crappy job implementing it.  There's been almost nothing in this war so far that shows Russia has ever done anything other than half arsed implementation.

That said, I want to know A LOT MORE about Kherson.  I'm guessing that Russia managed to do at least a 3/4 arsed job defending the area.  I'd say I'm sure of it except I don't know what the Ukrainians are doing or not doing.

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

As to the video, the two guys moving down the road are unarmed as far as I can see and I suspect they may have been hit in the initial strike and were already in shock.  This is consistent with them simply getting back up even after getting hit by the drone and trying to march back down the road - those two were very well in shock the whole time but we do not see the first strike. In fact this whole outfit looks like it is in shock.

Fair point, however if this was their first engagement (and with mobiks their first tends to be their last) we could be seeing poor soldiering.  We just don't know, in part due to the horrible editing of the video.

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

As to Russia Sucks - here is a clear example of my point.  This video, heavily edited for propaganda purposes, does not scream “Russia Sucks” to me.  It screams “UA is crushing it”.  The RA troops are likely inexperienced and may even be conscripts but that ambush was done from very long range/remotely - not a single UA soldier in view, and with extreme speed and precision.  Without several billion dollars of defensive system investments I am not sure a Canadian Combat Team would have survived it either.

In isolation I don't disagree.  But would the Canadians conduct a dozen such attacks every day for months with this sort of outcome?  I know you guys well enough to say that's a big fat no.  Yet Russia does.  Why?  Because it thinks this is the way to win the war.  And that, my friend, gets me right back to Russia Sucks™

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I think where we differ on “Russia Sucks” is that I think Russia Sucks for very specific reasons related to this specific war.  Their strategy was and is a mess, peace on that; however, operationally and tactically they suck because they are in the wrong war.  They are fighting a 20th century war against an opponent with 21st century capability (even limited).  An opponent who has adapted that capability very rapidly and integrated it into something else.  

I've disagreed with you on this point more times than I can count, so here's one more for the uncounted pile I predicted Russia would get its arse handed to it on a silver platter years before this war started.  Russia's strategy was a mess, true.  it's operational capabilities terrible and it's tactical execution horrible, but not due to the specific circumstances of this war, rather because decades of structural flaws made it inevitable that it would fail to perform the basic mission of the large combined arms force it spent trillions creating.

Could Russia have done better if it fought a more limited and focused war to enlarge the Donbas?  I am convinced it would have, but Russia would still show itself to suck in that it would have lost a lot more men and material than it should for the amount of territory gained.  I think Russia would view this as "we won the war in the first battle, war is over" in Russia's mind, but from Ukraine's standpoint it would have simply "they won the first battle of the war, war has just stared".

I don't think things would have gone so well for Russia after the initial gains, provided Ukraine did indeed opt to keep the war hot (I think they would have).  Russia's inability to combat things like HIMARS and Excalibur deep strikes would be interesting to see played out over a year or two of static positional warfare.  I think eventually Russia would have been forced into trying to knock Ukraine out the way it did in February, which would probably have worked even worse than it did this time around.

So, in broad strokes, before this war stared I presumed Russia Sucks™ and Ukraine Rocks™ based on what each had to work with before the first shot was fired.  Even if Russia's war aims and plans were less grandiose, the basic dynamic would be unchanged, though it might not be fatal to Russia's military and (hopefully) regime's existence.

Steve

[Harmon Rabb]

Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin appears to admit to US election interference

Prigozhin is back in the news.

[Beleg85]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Your point on UA capacity accepted but we have seen the ISR/PGM/light infantry tirade too many times in the last 8 months to be able to ignore it - this last video is just a repeat of that theme.  We have heard opposite reports on ATGMs - the Javelin doing 80%+ percent shot/kill etc.  Without an operational AAR we cannot know how widespread the phenomenon really is but I have seen enough to come to the conclusion that something fundamental is afoot in the evolution of warfare.

To your points, I would pushback on ISR.  I think that for this war the ISR asymmetry between the UA and RA has been a definitive factor.  It has been widely reported that it is not only the mass use of tactical UAS but a layered western architecture going all the way to space plugged into the UA at multiple levels.  We are seeing a smaller, lighter force destroying a large heavy one largely due to that ISR dynamic - the UA can see the RA likely better than RA commanders are able to see themselves.

Oh I have no doubt new way of warfare is heavily present on battlefield. My point was that considering size of the playground and means available, we shouldn't visualize UAF as crack elite infantry structure with fantastic ISR all along the front. On crucial sectors- yes, usually UAF are trying to press this ISR/PGM?/elite light combo to their advantage. Note for example that Kraken/SSO videos is made by such elite spearhead, who probably had top assets available on demand that other Ukrainian soldiers could dream of. But compare it to Pisky position, where (despite being important sector) defenders in their own words for months only had mortar or old soviet cannon as support on regular basis. There are also numerous videos of Ukrainian vehicles and infantry falling into obvious ambushes, even made by Russian tanks hunting alone (with the help of their own drones, perhaps).

As for effectivness of ATGM's it is much more complicated. There was detailed discussion lately by one polish expert about how Javelins/NLAW's are effective in this war, and the conclusion was that they work differently than in shooting range. For example they tend to hit engine compartments of enemy tanks much more often and are indeed effective, but mainly due to very caucious and selective use by Ukrainian crews. After anti-tank bonanza of first weeks of the war, average AT teams at this point need to conserve them only for "sure kill" situations. Which usually means lower ranges; that is why Javelins are still very effective weapons overall. There also seems to be widespread problems with batteries for various more fancy AT weapons that limit their use.

So it seems chief AT defence of average (not elite) UA soldiers remains RPG-types, mines and normal barrell artillery rounds but heavily corrected by drones. Of course situation improved significantly over time especially in the field of artillery and drones, but blanket of western help is still too short when we consider Ukrainian needs.

Edited November 7, 2022 by Beleg85

[dan/california]

10 minutes ago, Tenses said:

Platoon of Fallout-like power armor troops with plasma rifles VS platoon of T72B3? What is there not to like?

I will settle for every guy being able to carry a Javelin class missile, either an LMG or a sniper rifle, and enough ammo to stay in the fight without being exhausted in a hundred yards. That is the level of stuff that is wandering around proving grounds with varying degrees of success.

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

The issue is the range. Recon by force at these ranges means that in order to create a controlled bubble you would need massive amounts of recon, well above the 1/3 rd rule.  First problem are ATGMs, small man portables with the range and better lethality than the old vehicle mounted systems.  Two guys in a bunch at 2km.  You now need to sweep every shrub 2+kms out along the route of advance - the manpower bill for this is enormous.  A good offset would be micro-unmanned but again…volume.

Second problem, UAS/UGS, recon in force now includes air superiority below 2000 feet and sweeping ground level for mines with legs and possibly sub-surface systems lying dormant to pop up and hit your main force or logistics.  We have talked at length on the challenges to this.  

Third problem, observation. This environment is one where if you can be seen you can be killed.  So how does one blind an opponent with recon in force?  In the old days it was effective artillery and air power deep strikes combined with recon but ISR is now on every street pole, smart phone from ground level all the way up to space-based…that is one helluva recon in force battle.  The attrition recon forces will face will be extreme, which is frankly the weakest part of the western approach - we throw some of the highest trained soldiers into most attritional processes and expect magic to happen.

And all of that will do little against PGM artillery where a single gun can do the damage a big fat and easily found battery used to do.  Cheap disposable unmanned PGM arty is the next obvious move in this crazy game.

I think we may need to reinvent reconnaissance to be honest.

Yup, we're in full agreement.  The recon by force suggestion I made would likely have produced better results, but I'm not convinced it would be good enough to change the ultimate outcome.  That outcome, for Russia, is a lot of casualties for no gain.

That said, blundering into such a sophisticated enemy ambush with your main force is likely to be worse than blundering a recon element into the same ambush.  However, it seems that's all that Russia is capable of doing.  If it blunders into a Ukrainian weak spot it can make gains, but in all other scenarios it gets turned back with losses (sometimes significant ones).  Even where it makes gains it isn't always able to maintain them, not to mention exploiting them.  The battle for Pavlivka is yet another example of this.

Pavlivka is a really good example of the impact of Russia's moronic pursuit of daily small scale suicide attacks.  Russian forces initially gained something and then faltered because it had "nothing left in the tank" to hold it, not to mention exploit the gain.  The thousands of men and hundreds of vehicles lost even in the past month or two for no gain would have come in handy here, but they're soldiers are buried in a median strip and their vehicles are either rusting in the fields or abandoned.

Steve

[Tenses]

4 minutes ago, dan/california said:

I will settle for every guy being able to carry a Javelin class missile, either an LMG or a sniper rifle, and enough ammo to stay in the fight without being exhausted in a hundred yards. That is the level of stuff that is wandering around proving grounds with varying degrees of success.

What is fun about this vision is that when you replace plasma rifle with Javelin, nothing really changes. Both are massive overkill and along with PGM, ultimate reason why this war looks like that.

This is an age of sword, which massivly overcame the shield. Next era will be all about shield and how to effectively implement it(APS, lasers, UAVs and UGVs of all sizes, personal armor).

[kevinkin]

Several scenarios that boil down to a long war.

https://www.businessinsider.com/ways-russia-war-in-ukraine-might-end-2022-11

Just a bit:

According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the newly appointed Russian General Sergey Surovikin plans to build a solid line of defense in occupied territories and effectively freeze the war over the winter. Russia would not seek to begin any new large-scale offensive into Ukrainian territory at this time and would take the time to build back up its fighting capabilities, the think tank said.

Thing is, time is not on Putin's side. Perhaps the world and his own inner circle aim to wait the mad man out. 

[danfrodo]

11 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yup, we're in full agreement.  The recon by force suggestion I made would likely have produced better results, but I'm not convinced it would be good enough to change the ultimate outcome.  That outcome, for Russia, is a lot of casualties for no gain.

That said, blundering into such a sophisticated enemy ambush with your main force is likely to be worse than blundering a recon element into the same ambush.  However, it seems that's all that Russia is capable of doing.  If it blunders into a Ukrainian weak spot it can make gains, but in all other scenarios it gets turned back with losses (sometimes significant ones).  Even where it makes gains it isn't always able to maintain them, not to mention exploiting them.  The battle for Pavlivka is yet another example of this.

Pavlivka is a really good example of the impact of Russia's moronic pursuit of daily small scale suicide attacks.  Russian forces initially gained something and then faltered because it had "nothing left in the tank" to hold it, not to mention exploit the gain.  The thousands of men and hundreds of vehicles lost even in the past month or two for no gain would have come in handy here, but they're soldiers are buried in a median strip and their vehicles are either rusting in the fields or abandoned.

Steve

Exactly.  The bad tactics are one thing, but the whole operation is just nonsense.  What prize does RU get with a victory?  Not much.  And even if they broke through they have nothing with which to exploit, as per above.  So why do this at all?  I doubt it's just dumb generals making dumb high level choices of where to fight.  It's got to come from higher up, from some Putin obsession with either this territory or he thinks he's degrading or tying up UKR forces here.  It just makes no sense to lose so much men & material that will be much missed when UKR breaks through somewhere in the near future.

[Beleg85]

Video of Russian tanks entering Pavlivka without infantry cover, circa 4 days ago:

 

[Thomm]

Why not use quad bikes instead of fantasy power armor?

They should transport the weapons just fine, and the rider could dismount for extra mobility.

 

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

Several scenarios that boil down to a long war.

https://www.businessinsider.com/ways-russia-war-in-ukraine-might-end-2022-11

Just a bit:

According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the newly appointed Russian General Sergey Surovikin plans to build a solid line of defense in occupied territories and effectively freeze the war over the winter. Russia would not seek to begin any new large-scale offensive into Ukrainian territory at this time and would take the time to build back up its fighting capabilities, the think tank said.

Thing is, time is not on Putin's side. Perhaps the world and his own inner circle aim to wait the mad man out. 

I think this is more of what Westerners think is logical and therefore predict that Russia will do it.  The track record of applying Western logic to Russia's motivations and actions hasn't borne much fruit so far, therefore I don't see any reason to start investing in it now.

One theory for why this large scale war in 2022 is because time was a factor that the West didn't appreciate (amongst other things).  Putin felt that it was "now or never" and so he did the illogical move by Western thinking and that was a full scale invasion. 

Logically Russia should freeze the conflict and spend the next few years rebuilding its military, but it's not practical because it doesn't have that sort of time.  It also doesn't have the resources.  And the Russia Sucks™ school of thinking is that even if they did try and buy more time they still wouldn't have a military capable of winning the war. 

Using probable Russian logic, freezing the war over the winter doesn't really do much for it so keep on the attack and hope something more positive comes of it.  At least that's been the Russian behavior so far.

Steve

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

In isolation I don't disagree.  But would the Canadians conduct a dozen such attacks every day for months with this sort of outcome?  I know you guys well enough to say that's a big fat no.  Yet Russia does.  Why?  Because it thinks this is the way to win the war.  And that, my friend, gets me right back to Russia Sucks™

You mean like going out and playing whack a mole with the TB for 5 years? - the very definition of conducting useless attacks repeatedly for years with no successful outcome.  Now this war compared to COIN is apples to oranges but I do not believe for a second that western militaries are immune to banging their heads against a wall repeatedly.  Russia is really doing the only thing it can think of, and frankly it kind of worked in WW2, or at least that is the myth - just keep feeding live Russian teenagers into combat until the other side runs out of bullets.  I think it is myth as the Soviet military had developed a lot with respect to operational manoeuvre by the end of that war but Putin and his hand picked generals have clearly been reading whatever the Russian version of Ambrose is on WW2 mythology.

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

I've disagreed with you on this point more times than I can count, so here's one more for the uncounted pile I predicted Russia would get its arse handed to it on a silver platter years before this war started.  Russia's strategy was a mess, true.  it's operational capabilities terrible and it's tactical execution horrible, but not due to the specific circumstances of this war, rather because decades of structural flaws made it inevitable that it would fail to perform the basic mission of the large combined arms force it spent trillions creating.

Well we are going to have to continue to agree to disagree...cordially of course.  I think you are becoming enraptured with the after glow of the accuracy of your prediction, or at least are at risk of it.  I would red-team the assumptions that your predictions are directly and solely causal to where things are today, maybe just a little bit. 

I do not think it was possible to predict the outcome of this war beforehand unless one knew the Russian strategy.  If Russia had gone for a limited "sewing up of the Donbas", they could have afforded to suck tactically and even operationally but they still may very well have secured their objectives before the world got all up in arms.  I am convinced the response from the West would have been pretty much in line with what it was last time...all squawky and sanctiony but we would not be seeing the massive amounts of military support over a few more acres of Donbass.  It was places like Mariupol and Kharkiv that created the attention and the drama, that and a brilliant IO campaign by the Ukrainian government.

It wasn't until the UA got all the resources to connect the dots on whatever this has become did the fate of the RA become truly sealed, and that needed the political/strategic over-reach mis-step of trying to take the entire country in flagrant violation of the global order.  I do not argue that you very likely predicted the tactical outcomes of this war before it started but the operational and strategic outcomes were impossible to predict until we are about 3 days into this war.  Even then HIMARs and full western support took longer to form up, allowing the RA as poor as it was to still hold onto large swaths of territory and severely damage its opponent.

Finally, the overall Russian offset to sucking tactically has always been overwhelming mass.  You are good Steve but I am not sure Arquilla himself would have predicted just how much the utility of dumber mass would drop in this war, I know I sure didn't.  The Russian initial attack was with the best troops they had, the same approach that worked very well in 2014, and the fall back was Enemy at the Gates with the mountains of Soviet era equipment and ammo - recall everyone freaking out about that back in Apr/May?  No one could predict that would fail on Feb 21st unless they 1) knew the Russian strategy and 2) knew the West would put in place the enablers and support to make the UA able to do something no one thought possible before the war.

I am of a firm mind that a whole lot of conditions had to fall into place in order for us to be where we are in this war today.  Some of those conditions were predictable, like the growing tactical disparity between the two sides as one was modernizing while the other was rotting from corruption.  Others, such as the Russian baffling strategic choices and the UA breaking the rules of warfare to the extent they did, were not predictable and yet were just as determinative to being where we are.  Sure Russian's suck at this war, but that is the beginning of the analysis of this event, not the end of it in my opinion.

Edited November 7, 2022 by The_Capt

[The_Capt]

30 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I think this is more of what Westerners think is logical and therefore predict that Russia will do it.  The track record of applying Western logic to Russia's motivations and actions hasn't borne much fruit so far, therefore I don't see any reason to start investing in it now.

One theory for why this large scale war in 2022 is because time was a factor that the West didn't appreciate (amongst other things).  Putin felt that it was "now or never" and so he did the illogical move by Western thinking and that was a full scale invasion. 

Logically Russia should freeze the conflict and spend the next few years rebuilding its military, but it's not practical because it doesn't have that sort of time.  It also doesn't have the resources.  And the Russia Sucks™ school of thinking is that even if they did try and buy more time they still wouldn't have a military capable of winning the war. 

Using probable Russian logic, freezing the war over the winter doesn't really do much for it so keep on the attack and hope something more positive comes of it.  At least that's been the Russian behavior so far.

Steve

And here we agree fully.  I do not think Russia is capable of freezing this conflict either.  The West and UA have far too many options left to them while the Russian option space has pretty much collapsed.  We can go around the tree a few more times on why - Russia Sucks vs UA-is-bending-theories-of-warfare-in-the-same-scope-as-the-Mongols-did^tm- but at the end of the day the reality we are in now is that the Russia is so far behind the UA that it would take Russian military reforms to come anywhere near being able to compete. Reforms that would need to be conducted from the forward edge, back through the operational and strategic, to the industrial, legal and political levels. Russia would realistically need to freeze this conflict for the better part of a decade - even without being under crushing sanctions and isolation - in order to re-tool the military it needed to counter the UA and the West on an equal footing.

I am not sure that is even the play to be honest.  Right now it looks like Russia is desperately playing for time, hoping that Ukraine fatigue will set in and western support will wane.  That, or the west will decide and push for some arbitrary line that "there is where Ukraine has won enough and Russia has lost enough", my money is on the post-2014 lines but even that will require Putin to have a 9mm headache, along with his power circle.  I think the worry that western support will dry up and the RA will be able to resume offensive operations is highly unlikely, the RA is pretty much shattered at this point as far as major offensive operations as far as I can tell.