How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, sburke said:

you mean advance to the Amur line as part of their regrouping to spare civilians. 

You jest, but this is one of the truest things that Russian MoD has ever said.  First, by pulling back they can't murder as many civilians as they could before (artillery, abductions, etc.).  So they are, in fact, sparing civilian lives.  Second, since their forces all ran away in disorder, after they are rounded up by Kadyrov's people or border guards, they will be regrouped into ineffective combat units.

I'm fairly sure this isn't what the MoD intended to convey to everybody, but at least it's true from SOME perspective.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:

That is indeed interesting for various reasons... if the Ukrainian project just needed a little push (and new facilities) that would be probably a cheaper and politically safer way of empowering Ukraine with long range strike capabilities.

The article implied that Hrim-2 was operationally ready by the time the Saki strike happened.  Ergo, we've already seen what the Hrim-2 can do.  It also is consistent with the speculation we had that they were waiting until they had enough built to make an impression, which is why we saw none before and (we guessed correctly) none since.

As for Dan's thinking that it could be built in Poland, I very much doubt it.  These things require a massive amount of extremely specialized machining.  They'd have to relocate the entire plant.  Even on an accelerated schedule that would take months.  Under normal circumstances more than a year.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, Huba said:

If that's actually going on, and Saki attack was a final field test of sorts, I bet next in line would be assembling a big enough inventory that would allow striking Crimea bridge, so perhaps a half a dozen launchers, and maybe 30 missiles? 

My guess is they can only produce a couple a month maximum.  Launchers would likely take even longer to make, but they could have been working on them already while making the missiles that hit Saki.

Given the inevitable time needed to make all this stuff, I'd say they might have 6 missiles from 3 launchers ready sometime this Fall.

We saw what 4 missiles were able to do to Saki.  Imagine 6 missiles striking the piers that support the large arches; 3 for the road bridge and 3 for the rail bridge.  2 or 3 direct hits could drop the arch and severely damage the piers.  It would take years to repair such damage.  As a bonus, dropping either span would likely block efficient access to/from the Sea of Azov as all maritime traffic of any significance has to pass through this and only this spot.

Based on what HIMARS did to the Kherson bridges you might not think that a couple of Hrim-2 hits could cause sufficient damage to drop the span or, worst case, make it too unstable to use.  As a reminder, each Hrim-2 has something like 8-10x the explosives that a HIMARS has.  So that means 2 hits on one spot is equal to roughly 20 HIMARS hits striking at exactly the same time.  Maybe 30 hits or more striking at different times (physics says that 1 big hit is more than 10 smaller hits spaced out).

Here's a picture of the section I'm talking about:

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Check this out:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/navy-unveils-truck-mounted-sm-6-missile-launcher-in-european-test/ar-AA11PZy6?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=a78b4cd594984ada81e708532f667469

Basically, it's a shipping container with 2x SM-6 missiles capable of hitting ground targets at a range of 240km.

I'm not saying this is a system that is likely to go to Ukraine, but it could.  At the very least Russia and China need to be worried about this in the context of how this war's logistics have been working out.  These things can be moved around VERY QUICKLY and VERY EASILY by a wide range of transportation methods.  Once on the ground they can be transported by a standard tractor trailer.  Yup, no special launcher vehicle needed.

What is unsaid in the above article is these things can be camouflaged to be indistinguishable from standard civilian containers.  This greatly complicates enemy ISR abilities to interdict the missile systems even if they know roughly when and where to look.

The missile itself has been in service for a few years now, so production capacity is likely significant and can be scaled up fairly readily.  The missile is used the Navy for both long distance anti-air and anti-ship purposes.  The Army has adapted it to hit ground targets.  It has active radar and GPS guidance systems and more explosives than a HIMAR/ATACAM.  This means that if Ukraine had these they could conceivably be used to destroy Russian bombers, ships, or ground targets at massive distances.  I bet swapping out the guidance module is not a big deal, so with some notification the missile could be used for any of these roles on relatively short notice (Hours?  Maybe.  Days?  Surely).

It is not surprising that the US decided to demonstrate one of these in Europe this month.  It is very much intended to let Putin know there's yet another thing he can't stop from blowing up stuff.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

7 hours ago, sburke said:

I hear the Volga makes a good defensive line

 

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Maybe it's time for an updated count?

Steve

Via Schlottman....

 

[LongLeftFlank]

9 hours ago, billbindc said:

The tell will be if the Russians can either reinforce the Kherson salient or if they are able to rotate units out.

Intriguing hypothesis (and map) here: the Russians were already evacuating Izyum to reinforce the lower Dnepr fronts when they got hit.

 

 

 

 

 

...so the hypothesis is that the latest straw Putin is clutching at is to slowly vacate the Kherson bridgehead and deploy his best remaining forces to hold the "land bridge" area and whatever chunks of Lukhansk/Donetsk he can keep, while retreating to the 2014 borders elsewhere. 

And then start angling for a cease fire and declaiming that 'securing' Crimea and the Republics from Ukrainian terror shelling is all he really wanted all along. Cuz 11D chessmaster....

Thing is, that region's one holy hell of a lot harder to supply than Kupyansk-Izium (and that was no picnic).  And air support needs to fly farther too; the air bases around Melitopol are in UA gun range.

Edited September 17, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Battlefront.com]

Intense first person footage of the fight against Russian rearguards in Irpin in April.  The commander of this unit, South Korean Lt. Rhee Keun, was a well known YouTuber before the war.  He got injured (torn ligaments in his knees) and had to return home.  Most recent info I saw on him is he's being prosecuted for passport violation.  Like many countries South Korea has laws against traveling to Ukraine to fight.  Given his high profile in foreign contingent, it was inevitable that the authorities would have to do something about it.

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarRoom/comments/xg6cez/fpv_korean_volunteers_gopro_footage_operation_by/

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

13 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

...so the hypothesis is that the latest straw Putin is clutching at is to slowly vacate the Kherson bridgehead and deploy his best remaining forces to hold the "land bridge" area and whatever chunks of Lukhansk/Donetsk he can keep, while retreating to the 2014 borders elsewhere. 

And then start angling for a cease fire and declaiming that 'securing' Crimea and the Republics from Ukrainian terror shelling is all he really wanted all along. Cuz 11D chessmaster....

Thing is, that region's one holy hell of a lot harder to supply than Kupyansk-Izium (and that was no picnic).  And air support needs to fly farther too; the air bases around Melitopol are in UA gun range.

Yeah, that totally tracks with what we've been talking about here as well as the constant reports of Russia moving forces out of Izyum for months now.  It was also clear that the continued offensive activity towards Slavyansk has been nothing more than local fixing/recon/spoiling attacks.  Most likely to keep Ukraine's forces there from getting too aggressive.

The theory that much of the abandoned equipment was non-functional, but intended to be withdrawn, makes sense too.  Given how crappy Russia's logistics are and how long the war has been going on, it is not difficult to imagine a lot of mechanical breakdowns too serious to address in the field.

I also agree with DefMon's take on the captured supplies, small arms, artillery ammo, etc.  Looks to be significant, but in terms of what Russia burns through maybe not so much.  Of course we have to remember that Ukraine smashed a whole bunch of the big ones, so it's likely that Russia dispersed what it had left and that makes it harder to assess what was captured.

OK, so let's say that Russia decided (as we here would do) to pull forces out of the Donbas area to reinforce the south, thereby keeping Ukraine from retaking the land bridge and/or getting close enough to cause Crimea a lot of problems.  I can totally buy Russian miscalculations about how much time they had to make this decision and it was made far later than it should have been.  Signs that Ukraine was getting ready to attack were either missed, dismissed, or ignored.  Ukraine attacked and their holding force got clobbered along with a lot of stuff they would have preferred to have relocated rearward.  That sounds fine and consistent with all that we've been hearing.

What about Kherson, though?  For sure Russia knew to expect a major Ukrainian ground offensive there and they must have known roughly when it was going to be launched.  The time to evacuate Kherson was BEFORE Ukraine took out the bridges.  Hell, Ukraine apparently gave Russia some time to withdraw before they made a concerted effort to take out the bridges.  So if Russia's plan was to withdraw the forces from Kherson in good order, they should have done it over a month ago.  They did not.  This indicates to me one of three possibilites:

1. Kherson was intended to hold out against the first Ukrainian offensive and then withdraw later after the rest of the southern line had been reinforced.
2. same as #2 but no intention of withdrawing.
3. originally #1 was the plan, but Command dithering on deciding to do it resulted in having to go with #2 for the time being.

To me it seems like Russian forces on the right bank of the Dnepr were not in the middle of a withdrawal, unlike Kharkiv.  So I'm not so certain they intended to pull out of there any time soon.  Now they have a lot fewer options.

Steve

[chuckdyke]

Indeed, it starts to look like Mad Max.

 

[LongLeftFlank]

23 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yeah, that totally tracks with what we've been talking about here as well as the constant reports of Russia moving forces out of Izyum for months now.  It was also clear that the continued offensive activity towards Slavyansk has been nothing more than local fixing/recon/spoiling attacks.  Most likely to keep Ukraine's forces there from getting too aggressive.

The theory that much of the abandoned equipment was non-functional, but intended to be withdrawn, makes sense too.  Given how crappy Russia's logistics are and how long the war has been going on, it is not difficult to imagine a lot of mechanical breakdowns too serious to address in the field.

I also agree with DefMon's take on the captured supplies, small arms, artillery ammo, etc.  Looks to be significant, but in terms of what Russia burns through maybe not so much.  Of course we have to remember that Ukraine smashed a whole bunch of the big ones, so it's likely that Russia dispersed what it had left and that makes it harder to assess what was captured.

OK, so let's say that Russia decided (as we here would do) to pull forces out of the Donbas area to reinforce the south, thereby keeping Ukraine from retaking the land bridge and/or getting close enough to cause Crimea a lot of problems.  I can totally buy Russian miscalculations about how much time they had to make this decision and it was made far later than it should have been.  Signs that Ukraine was getting ready to attack were either missed, dismissed, or ignored.  Ukraine attacked and their holding force got clobbered along with a lot of stuff they would have preferred to have relocated rearward.  That sounds fine and consistent with all that we've been hearing.

What about Kherson, though?  For sure Russia knew to expect a major Ukrainian ground offensive there and they must have known roughly when it was going to be launched.  The time to evacuate Kherson was BEFORE Ukraine took out the bridges.  Hell, Ukraine apparently gave Russia some time to withdraw before they made a concerted effort to take out the bridges.  So if Russia's plan was to withdraw the forces from Kherson in good order, they should have done it over a month ago.  They did not.  This indicates to me one of three possibilites:

1. Kherson was intended to hold out against the first Ukrainian offensive and then withdraw later after the rest of the southern line had been reinforced.
2. same as #2 but no intention of withdrawing.
3. originally #1 was the plan, but Command dithering on deciding to do it resulted in having to go with #2 for the time being.

To me it seems like Russian forces on the right bank of the Dnepr were not in the middle of a withdrawal, unlike Kharkiv.  So I'm not so certain they intended to pull out of there any time soon.  Now they have a lot fewer options.

Steve

Hmm, inviting defeat in detail isn't the best idea. 

1. But it is pragmatic of the Russians to shorten the front, knowing the Ukes won't cross the border (in force), and to concentrate their dwindling combat power to make  'Novorossiya' a tough nut to crack before whining for a ceasefire (as it gets cold).

The UA has certainly solved for breakthrough and exploitation now, but their ability to bust (tolerably) well manned prepared defences without taking huge casualties, not so much. Yet....

[glances expectantly over at Steve @Battlefront.comand @The_Capt  ]

2. As noted, that's one *hell* of a long supply trail, subject to UA interdiction all along the land route. On the Crimea side though, even if the Kerch bridge goes down, there are boats and barges and ports. So blowing the bridge creates a problem, but not a catastrophe for RA.

If DefMon is correct, it looks like they've already completed their major troop movements for now, and chosen the place of their last stand.

3. And if this has been the plan for 2 months now, they've had time to stockpile a fair amount in Crimea and maybe Melitopol (HIMARS time).

4. I wonder if anyone's studied interdicting the Perekop isthmus? (ha, of course they have)

Edited September 17, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Battlefront.com]

Two things from yesterday's (most recent) ISW report.  First is about Kherson:

Quote

Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian forces continued their interdiction campaign on September 16, targeting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) across the Inhulets and Dnipro Rivers and notably disrupting Russian food and water supplies.[36] GUR reported that Ukrainian strikes have cut off Russian troops in Kherson from their food and water supplies, and that an unspecified Russian Air Assault unit based in Kakhovka (in Russian rear areas on the left bank of the river) cannot supply its frontline units.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff claimed that Ukrainian strikes are severely degrading Russian morale.[38] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian missile and artillery units struck Russian concentrations in Beryslav, Darivka, and Stara Zburyvka, as well as a pontoon crossing in the Kozatske Raion.[39]

This is expected and rather predictable.  The question is how widespread this is at the present time.  That will determine how the Kherson front collapses.  Specifically, is it going to go in pockets over time or a large scale event or two.  No way to know which way this is headed because we lack information.  However, it's pretty much certain something fairly dramatic will happen soon (even if we don't hear about it right away).  There's only so many bullets and artillery shells for them to fire even if they can source food and water.

Here's the other piece:

Quote

Unidentified assailants detonated an IED in the office of the Russian-appointed LNR Prosecutor General in Luhansk City, Luhansk Oblast, killing LNR Prosecutor General Sergey Gorenko and Deputy Prosecutor General Yekaterina Steglenko on September 16.[71] LNR head Leonid Pasechnik called the attack a “terrorist act” that demonstrated that the “Kyiv regime has gone beyond all limits.”[72] DNR Head Denis Pushilin also denounced it as a Ukrainian terrorist attack.[73] Russia’s Investigative Committee immediately ordered the opening of a criminal investigation into the attacks.[74]

 The immediate and coordinated Russian responses to the attack suggests that Ukrainian partisans may not be responsible for the LNR assassinations. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mykhailo Podolyak did not attribute the attack to partisans, but instead offered two theories: that the killings were the result of organized crime groups feuding over sharing looted property, or that Russian forces conducted a “purge” of those who witnessed Russian war crimes.[75] Russian forces have already proven themselves capable of large-scale false-flag attacks that threaten their own personnel or infrastructure, as they did with their falsified strike on the Olenivka prison on July 28.[76]

Interesting that they think some of the killings of occupation officials were coordinated by Russia and/or LPR.  As these are inherently criminal murders in charge of what happens, it's certainly possible.

One theory that ISW did not mention is that this might have been a purge against "defeatists", which obviously is better to do as a false flag operation than to admit that the puppet regime is splintering.  They are already dealing with people heading to the border, so it's not unreasonable to think this might be linked.

However, it is definitely possible that some criminal element did this as the targets were the top law (well, whatever the their equivalent is) enforcement officers for LPR.

I'm hoping for "defeatists" because that's more interesting.  Criminal battles are so 2014

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

16 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Hmm, inviting defeat in detail isn't the best idea. 

Sure isn't.  But then again, not much Russia has done so far fits into the "best idea" category.  The pullout from Kyiv and around Kharkiv might be exceptions, but only because the alternative was decidedly worse.

16 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

1. But it is pragmatic of the Russians to shorten the front, knowing the Ukes won't cross the border (in force), and to concentrate their dwindling combat power to make  'Novorossiya' a tough nut to crack before whining for a ceasefire (as it gets cold).

The UA has certainly solved for breakthrough and exploitation now, but their ability to bust (tolerably) well manned prepared defences without taking huge casualties, not so much.  Yet....

2. As noted, that's one *hell* of a long supply trail, subject to UA interdiction all along the land route. On the Crimea side though, even if the Kerch bridge goes down, there are boats and barges and ports. So blowing the bridge creates a problem, but not a catastrophe for RA.

If DefMon is correct, it looks like they've already completed their major troop movements for now, and chosen the place of their last stand.

Agreed.  We've not heard of massive redeployment of forces from the south back up north, so I think however Russia arrived at the current situation it's the one they are going to stick with the land bridge and Crimea, hope LPR and DPR can hold out on their own, and abandon the idea of regaining the rest of Donetsk or any further terrain lost in the Donbas.

16 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

3. And if this has been the plan for 2 months now, they've had time to stockpile a fair amount in Crimea and maybe Melitopol (HIMARS time).

4. I wonder if anyone's studied interdicting the Perekop isthmus? (ha, of course they have)

Heh.  There's no doubt a shelf full of plans ready to be implemented.  Ukraine has never been short on creativity.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

28 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

[glances expectantly over at Steve @Battlefront.comand @The_Capt  ]

....Well let my much tinier brain take a stab at it first:

(a) Let me assume the Kherson bridgehead as something the Russians will vacate or be forced out of over the next 6 weeks ('winter', by which I mainly mean the end of foliage, starts 30 October or thereabouts)

(b) So the battleground we are looking at is the left bank of the Dnepr to the bend, and then overland to Volnovakha; cultivated steppelands, lazy streams.

(c) The average depth of the front is around 60km? (backs to the Azov), so that places some deployment limits on the (battered) RA artillery, which we'd expect to be the linchpin of the defence.

(d) If the UA gunners are not yet in a position to simply outrange and outshoot the RA (brute force) -- I don't know whether they are or not tbh....

(e) .... could *air power* be the solution? Wouldn't it be ironic and delightful if the Ukrainians ended up being the first to successfully employ Tacair at scale in this war?  They can definitely put bases and SAMs a lot farther forward.  And again, the Russian air defences are operating in a more cramped space (I am well over my skis here, but someone will be in to advise).

That could complete the hat trick of humiliation for the ex-Soviet war machine, all arms.

Thoughts?

Edited September 17, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[dan/california]

29 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yeah, that totally tracks with what we've been talking about here as well as the constant reports of Russia moving forces out of Izyum for months now.  It was also clear that the continued offensive activity towards Slavyansk has been nothing more than local fixing/recon/spoiling attacks.  Most likely to keep Ukraine's forces there from getting too aggressive.

The theory that much of the abandoned equipment was non-functional, but intended to be withdrawn, makes sense too.  Given how crappy Russia's logistics are and how long the war has been going on, it is not difficult to imagine a lot of mechanical breakdowns too serious to address in the field.

I also agree with DefMon's take on the captured supplies, small arms, artillery ammo, etc.  Looks to be significant, but in terms of what Russia burns through maybe not so much.  Of course we have to remember that Ukraine smashed a whole bunch of the big ones, so it's likely that Russia dispersed what it had left and that makes it harder to assess what was captured.

OK, so let's say that Russia decided (as we here would do) to pull forces out of the Donbas area to reinforce the south, thereby keeping Ukraine from retaking the land bridge and/or getting close enough to cause Crimea a lot of problems.  I can totally buy Russian miscalculations about how much time they had to make this decision and it was made far later than it should have been.  Signs that Ukraine was getting ready to attack were either missed, dismissed, or ignored.  Ukraine attacked and their holding force got clobbered along with a lot of stuff they would have preferred to have relocated rearward.  That sounds fine and consistent with all that we've been hearing.

What about Kherson, though?  For sure Russia knew to expect a major Ukrainian ground offensive there and they must have known roughly when it was going to be launched.  The time to evacuate Kherson was BEFORE Ukraine took out the bridges.  Hell, Ukraine apparently gave Russia some time to withdraw before they made a concerted effort to take out the bridges.  So if Russia's plan was to withdraw the forces from Kherson in good order, they should have done it over a month ago.  They did not.  This indicates to me one of three possibilites:

1. Kherson was intended to hold out against the first Ukrainian offensive and then withdraw later after the rest of the southern line had been reinforced.
2. same as #2 but no intention of withdrawing.
3. originally #1 was the plan, but Command dithering on deciding to do it resulted in having to go with #2 for the time being.

To me it seems like Russian forces on the right bank of the Dnepr were not in the middle of a withdrawal, unlike Kharkiv.  So I'm not so certain they intended to pull out of there any time soon.  Now they have a lot fewer options.

Steve

So how how much Lugansk province do you think Putin is prepared to give up after the big production he made about taking all of it six weeks ago? My question about what terrain features would make a decent defensive line north of Lugansk City? Or is Putin prepared to cut the whole oblast and its miserable little pseudo state free? He has to keep a fair bit of Donestk just. to maintain the land bridge.

 

7 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

 The immediate and coordinated Russian responses to the attack suggests that Ukrainian partisans may not be responsible for the LNR assassinations. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mykhailo Podolyak did not attribute the attack to partisans, but instead offered two theories: that the killings were the result of organized crime groups feuding over sharing looted property, or that Russian forces conducted a “purge” of those who witnessed Russian war crimes.[75] Russian forces have already proven themselves capable of large-scale false-flag attacks that threaten their own personnel or infrastructure, as they did with their falsified strike on the Olenivka prison on July 28.[76]

This works with the developing theory that Putin has decided Lugansk is a luxury he cannot afford. He is willing to kill major figures in the "government" there to cow the rest. It also make sense with something else I read today. Apparently some of L/DPR units are being broken up and fed into the Russian replacement system. They said it was because of accumulated battle damage, but it might be to break up their units and make it harder for separatist units to rebel. Some of them seem to believe their own propaganda about the L/DPR being actual countries.It will be a very good clue if whatever portion of their governments administration that hasn't absconded to Rostov on Don and points east does so with alacrity.

[LongLeftFlank]

52 minutes ago, dan/california said:

So how how much Lugansk province do you think Putin is prepared to give up after the big production he made about taking all of it six weeks ago? My question about what terrain features would make a decent defensive line north of Lugansk City?

Looking at a map, it depends on whether the UA flanks and retakes Rubizhne. If they don't, Russia can probably hold the river line at Sieverdonetsk. 

[FancyCat]

I would be cautious, now that we know with pretty good certainty that their military and command is prone to lying, and there is little reason for change and little sign of change, and that has caused massive distortion, for example, instead of the military bloggers lying or making stuff up, it may well be their sources are relaying what they perceived to be true, truth being utterly distorted by corruption and covering their own failures, I think it’s worth asking ourselves if the Russian General Staff is getting true enough ISR of their own forces to strategize vs the Ukrainians effectively. I think the surprise from the ZSU at their rapid advance without much resistance indicates that. (I mean I assume Ukraine has good ISR of their opposing forces and yet a lot of apparently their reactions was stunned at the advance no?)

I assume ZSU ISR is very in depth and NATO will provide any gaps, so that this advance was stunning, maybe the tea leaves that the Russians are reading are the same NATO reads.

[Grigb]

And RU Nats are preparing to do what we discussed earlier they would do:

Quote

Spread this message among your friends and acquaintances.
https://t.me/smersh_kgb

Partisans are needed in Europe and in Ukraine to fight NATO forces.

If you have friends, compatriots or acquaintances who are ready to fight using partisan methods with NATO - write to the SMERSH duty officer.

We are looking for partisans:
- to cover the location of NATO personnel and equipment;
- to block the transfer of NATO personnel and equipment;
- to hold demonstrations and actions of the local population of Europe against the war with the Russian Federation;
- to do other tasks

To receive tasks, write to the attendant @SMERSH_Zeos

 

Edited September 17, 2022 by Grigb

[G.I. Joe]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Check this out:

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/navy-unveils-truck-mounted-sm-6-missile-launcher-in-european-test/ar-AA11PZy6?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=a78b4cd594984ada81e708532f667469

Basically, it's a shipping container with 2x SM-6 missiles capable of hitting ground targets at a range of 240km.

I'm not saying this is a system that is likely to go to Ukraine, but it could.  At the very least Russia and China need to be worried about this in the context of how this war's logistics have been working out.  These things can be moved around VERY QUICKLY and VERY EASILY by a wide range of transportation methods.  Once on the ground they can be transported by a standard tractor trailer.  Yup, no special launcher vehicle needed.

What is unsaid in the above article is these things can be camouflaged to be indistinguishable from standard civilian containers.  This greatly complicates enemy ISR abilities to interdict the missile systems even if they know roughly when and where to look.

The missile itself has been in service for a few years now, so production capacity is likely significant and can be scaled up fairly readily.  The missile is used the Navy for both long distance anti-air and anti-ship purposes.  The Army has adapted it to hit ground targets.  It has active radar and GPS guidance systems and more explosives than a HIMAR/ATACAM.  This means that if Ukraine had these they could conceivably be used to destroy Russian bombers, ships, or ground targets at massive distances.  I bet swapping out the guidance module is not a big deal, so with some notification the missile could be used for any of these roles on relatively short notice (Hours?  Maybe.  Days?  Surely).

It is not surprising that the US decided to demonstrate one of these in Europe this month.  It is very much intended to let Putin know there's yet another thing he can't stop from blowing up stuff.

Steve

Anyone else thinking of the potential to turn a large container ship into a really nasty Q-Ship? (For the Honor Harrington fans out there, almost a real life analog to HMAMC Wayfarer and the other Trojan-class Armed Merchant Cruisers if you merge that idea with a reboot of the Eighties Arapaho program to convert container ships into escort carriers).

[chuckdyke]

5 minutes ago, G.I. Joe said:

Anyone else thinking of the potential to turn a large container ship into a really nasty Q-Ship

They have already been thinking that. North West Coast of Australia has three big Iron Ore Ports. Ships of over 200000 tons are not an exception. These capable of putting a few Chinese Divisions on shore. It is more then 30 years ago a US, Australian military exercise was held. Nobody called the fictious country by name. 

[sburke]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Maybe it's time for an updated count?

Steve

You may see a couple duplicates, there were a couple guys who got posted more than once as additional info came in but only a couple.  Still a work in progress... I mean by me, not that the UA keeps adding to it, but there is that as well.  

VDV/SpetsNaz/Airborne

Guards Colonel Konstantin Zizevsky commander of the 247th Guards Air Assault Regiment 
Colonel Sergey Karasev, Commander, 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade (Ulyanovsk) (Killed Mar 11)
Colonel Sergey Sukharev, commander of 331st Guards Airborne Regiment (of the 98th VDV Division)
Colonel? Denis Shishov, the commander of the 11th Air Assault Brigade
Col. Alexey Vasilyev, commander 137th Guards Airborne Regiment, 106th Guards Airborne Division Rumored (The Sun, so awaiting confirmation) death by GMLRS
Colonel Andery Vasilyev, deputy commander of 106th Guard VDV division (Tula), VDV Command, Western Military District
Colonel Maksim Kudrin, Deputy Commander for Armaments 106th Guards Airborne Division
Col. Alexei Smirnov, Chief of Communications for 98th Guards Airborne Division
Col. Sergei Kuzminov 106th Guards Airborne Division Kuzminov was "zampotyl" - brief name of duty "zamestitel' po tylu" - commander's deputy of rear. He responses for supply and logistic of unit

Lieutenant Colonel Okruzhnov Alexander Nikolaevich, Head of Artillery, 104th VDV Regiment, 76th Airborne Division (killed Mar 7)
Lieutenant Colonel Vitaly Slabtsov The Deputy Commander of the VDV's 83rd Air Assault Brigade
lt.colonel Alexandr Okruzhnov, artillery chief of 104th Guard air-assault regiment of 76th Guard air-assault divosion
Lt. Col. Albert Karimov, GRU Spetsnaz
Lt. Col. Alexander Dosyagaev, commander 2nd Airborne Battalion, 104th Guards Airborne Regiment, 76th Guards Air-Assault Division
Lt. Col. Pavel Kislyakov, Deputy Chief of Staff, Head of Operations, 11th Guards Separate Air-Assault Brigade
Lt. Col. Alexander Smirnov, Deputy Commander of the 11th Guards Air-Assault Brigade.  Says he was killed at the CP of the 6th Separate Cossack Motor Rifle Regiment “Matvey Platov,” 2nd AK, LPR on the night of June 30-July 1.
Lieutenant Colonel Denis Glebov, Deputy Commander of the 11th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade (killed Mar 5, given Order of Courage)
Lt. Col. Alexander Stefanov, commander 1st Battalion, 104th Guards Air-Assault Regiment, 76th Guards Air-Assault Division:
Lt. Col. Ivan Pozdeev, commander (?) 31st Guards Air-Assault Brigade: This Ukrainian article says he was killed by a sniper on the 28th of July, but IDs him as commander of the 331st Airborne Regiment in the “88th Airborne Division”.  While the unit ID is clearly confused, given the previous casualties (brigade commander Colonel Sergey Karasev and battalion commanders Major Alexey Oskin and Lieutenant Colonel Denis Yagidarov) in the 31st Air-Assault Brigade, it is possible he was the Brigade commander at this time.
Lt.colonel Anatoliy Vasin, 16th Guard Spetsnaz brigade, Western Military District
lt.colonel Igor Zharov a VDV officer and RVVDKU graduate, was killed in Ukraine. He was the chief of staff for a regiment
Lt. Col. Denis Sorokin, air-assault battalion commander, 11th Guards Air-Assault Brigade 
Lt. Col. Aleksey Afonin, a deputy commander in 234th Guards Air-Assault Regiment, 76th Guards Air-Assault Division
Lt. Col. Pavel Krivov, battalion commander, 137th Guards Airborne Regiment, 106th Guards Airborne Division, killed in an ambush near Izium on Sept. 9th

Major Dmitri Semenov, chief of staff / deputy commander of ?? Spetsnaz Detachment, 16th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade
Major Alexei Ilnitsky, deputy battalion commander, VDV 11th Air Assault Brigade (Ulan-Ude) (killed, given Order of Courage)
Major Sergey Vladimirovich Kashansky, GRU/GU 24th SpetsNaz Brigade? (killed)
Major Patskalev Oleg Mikhailovich, Deputy Commander, 2nd Battalion, 331st VDV Guards Airborne Regiment (Kostroma), 98th Guards Airborne Division (killed)
Major Sergei Krylov, Deputy Commander, 331st VDV Guards Airborne Regiment (Kostroma), 98th Airborne Division (killed Mar 17)
Major Alexey Osokin, the commander of the VDV's 31st Air Assault Brigade's 1st battalion
Major Oleg Patskalev, deputy battalion commander, 331st Guards Airborne Regiment, 98th Guards Airborne Division.
Mayor Denis Yagidarov, commander of airborne battlion of 31st separate air-assault brigade
Major Vorsyuchenko Alexey Vasilyevich, VDV Unit #81430 HQ, 76th Airborne SAM Regiment (killed)
Major Ruslan Leonov, Spetsnaz company commander (killed Mar 10)
Major Alexandr Lyubanov. VDV.
Major Azamat Alinov, company commander in 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade 
Major Alexey Dineka, 247th Air Assault Regiment, 7th Air Assault Division
Mayor Vasiliy Tynnyi, deputy of company comamnder of Spetsnaz. unit unknown
Mayor Andrey Kunakov, chief of the staff, 153rd separate SOF detachment of 346th separate SOF brigade, Special Operations Command.
Mayor Azamat Alimov, company commander of 3rd Special forces brigade
Maj. Anton Morozov, air-assault company commander, 542nd Separate Air-Assault Battalion
Mayor Sergey Borisenko, 106th guard airborne division
Maj. Sergei Borisenko, 106th Airborne Division
Major Yuri Melekhin, commander 1st Spetsnaz Detachment of the 16th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade
Maj. Ivan Budkin, chief of staff of 2nd Airborne Battalion, 234th Airborne Regiment, 76th Air-Assault Division
Maj. Alexander Denisov deputy of battalion commander of 137th guard airborne regiment of 106th guard airborne division
Major ??? Kuzmin, commander 2nd Company, 2nd Separate Spetsnaz Brigade
Major Alexander Indrikov, VDV, unknown unit
Major Alexey Kalmykov, deputy commander of a Spetsnaz unit (22nd Spetsnaz Brigade detachment?
Maj. Kalmykov was Deputy Commander - Chief of Staff for the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade
Mayor Aleksey Kalmykov, deputy commander of spetrnaz detachment
major Sergey Kononov (probably), commander of mixed unit, created on 18th July from spetsnaz company of 331st VDV regiment of 98th VDV division and PMC. I wrote that Russians as far as after Popasna seizing operated with mixed groups of VDV and PMC. Looks like they desided as experiment to form mixed special purpose units under VDV command instead just combined units of VDV and PMC acting together, but with own commanders.
Major Evgeny Sulokhin, deputy commander of 331st Guards Airborne Regiment, 98th Guard Airborne Division
Major (recently promoted) Alexander Shishkov, commander 1st Company, 3rd Airborne Battalion, 31st Separate Air-Assault Brigade (may have taken on higher command duties with promotion)
Major (posthumous promotion) Denis Nosenko, unknown unit (maybe 24th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade in Novosibirsk?)
Maj. Pavel Shtepa was GRU Spetnaz, but specific unit still unknown
Maj. Igor Voloshkin, deputy commander of an air-assault battalion, unknown unit
Maj. Vladimir Chilin, deputy battalion commander in 83rd Separate Air-Assault Brigade
Maj. Ruslan Kononovich, unknown VDV unit
Mayor Sergey Gorin, VDV
Mayor Gennadiy Khalcheko, probably VDV
Major Anton Kuznetsov, deputy battalion commander, VDV, he is from Tula, so likely served in 106th VDV division.

Captain Alexey Glushchak, GRU/GU 22nd Spetsnaz Brigade (killed, given Order of Courage)
Captain Ilya Kuptsov, VDV 76th Air Assault Division, Intelligence Department (Pskov) (killed)
Captain Alexander Vladimirovich Shokun, Chief of Communications, VDV 11th Guards Air Assault Brigade (Ulan-Ude) (killed)
Captain Nikitin Alexey Nikolaevich, 1141st Guards Artillery Regiment, 7th VDV Guards Mountain Air Assault Division (Novorossiysk) (killed)
Captain Eduard Gilmiyarov Rinatovich, Commander, 5th Airborne Assault Company, 31st VDV Separate Guards Airborne Assault Brigade (Ulyanovsk) (killed)
Captain Aleksey Aleksandrovich Chuchmanov, GRU/GU 3rd SpetsNaz Brigade (Tolyatti) (killed Mar 3, 2022)
Captain Yevgeny Ivanov, platoon commander, Russian 247th Guards Assault Caucasian Cossack Regiment (killed)

Senior Lieutenant Nurmagomed Gadzhimagomedov, company commander, 247th Guards Air Assault Regiment (killed, given Hero of Russia)
Senior Lieutenant Aleksey Aleshko, Platoon Commander, VDV, RVVDKU graduate. (killed Feb 25, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Nikolai Symov, 331st VDV Airborne Regiment (Kostroma), 98th Airborne Division (killed)
Senior Lieutenant Sukhovskoy Semyon Mikhailovich, Company Commander, 234th Air Assault Regiment, VDV 76th Guards Air Assault Division (killed Mar 5)
Senior Lieutenant Ilya Sergeevich Chernyshev, Commander, Armored Battery, 331st Guards Airborne Regiment (Kostroma), 98th VDV Guards Airborne Division (killed, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Nikita Samoilov, Deputy Commander, VDV Reconnaissance Company (killed)
Senior Lieutenant Andrei Shamko, VDV, GRU/GU 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Pskov) (killed)
Lieutenant Stanislav Olegovich Kutelev, VDV, RVVDKU graduate (killed)
Lieutenant Alexander Osipov, VDV (killed)
Lieutenant Georgy Alexandrovich Dudorov, Deputy Commander, Military-Political Affairs, Recon company, 137th Airborne Regiment, 106th VDV Airborne Division (Tula) (killed March 6)
Lieutenant Dmitry Chernyshev, VDV 247th Air Assault Regiment (killed, given Order of Courage)
Lieutenant Georgy Dudorov, Deputy Commander, Reconnaissance Company, 137th VDV Airborne Regiment, 106th Guards Airborne Division (Tula), son of Alexander Durorov, the Deputy Governor of Nenets Autonomous Okrug (killed Mar 6)
Lieutenant Ovchinnikov Lev Aleksandrovich, VDV 331st Airborne Regiment (Kostroma) (killed)

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Regular Army

Andrei Sukhovetsky, Deputy Commander of the 41st Combined Arms Army Confirmed
MG Vladimir Frolov, deputy commander of 8th Guard CAA, Southern military district Confirmed
LTG Kutuzov. He was shadow commander of DPR "army" (1st Army Corps of DPR People's miltia)  Confirmed

MG Andrey Kolesnikov, Russia’s 29th Combined Arms Army commander Claimed
Major-general Oleg Mitiayev, commander of 150th motor-rifle division Claimed
LTG Yakov Rezantsev, Russia’s 49th CAA commander, in Chornobaivka near Kherson. Claimed
Major General Simonov Deputy chief of Electronic Warfare Troops of Armed Forces of Russian Federation Claimed
Major-General Nasbulin, Chief of Staff of Russia’s 22nd Army Corps Claimed

Lieutenant General Roman Berdnikov Commander of the Russian Federation’s 29th Army

Colonel Andrei Zakharov, Battalion-tactical group Commander, 6th Tank Regiment (Chebarkul) , 90th Tank division (killed Mar 10) (given Order of Courage in 2016)
Colonel Alexander Vladimirovich Zakharov, 6th tank regiment commander
Colonel Yuryi Agarkov, the commander of 33rd motor-rifle regiment (Kamyshyn, Volgograd oblast) of 20th Guard motor-rifle division
Col. Alexey Gorobets, commander 20th Guards MRD
Col. Aleksey Avramchenko (a Crimean defector) Deputy Commander for Military-Political Affairs (Zampolit) 20th Gds MRD
Col. Nikolai Kornelyuk artillery chief  20th Gds MRD
Colonel Igor Nikolaev Commander of 252nd Motor Rifle Regiment, the 3rd Motor Rifle Division.
Colonel Alexander Bespalov, commander of 59th Tank Regiment, 144th Motor Rifle Division Lublin
Colonel Alexei Sharov, commander of the 810th Marine Brigade
Col. Sergei Kens, commander 810th Seperate Naval Infantry Brigade - Possibly - Chief of Staff - Deputy Commander of the 20th Guards Motor Rifle Division?
Col. Denis Kurilo commander of the 200th infantry brigade (detachment #08275, Pechenga city)
 twice Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov and Kutuzov Regiment
Colonel Ivan Grishin, the commander of Russia's 49th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (1st Tank Army)
Colonel Mikhail Nagamov, commander of 6th engineer-sapper regiment of 1st Guard tank army of Western military district.
Colonel Sergei Porokhnya commander of the 12th separate guards engineering brigade
Col. Denis Kozlov 12th Guards Engineering Brigade’s (Central Military District) commander This is the second loss of a commander for the Brigade
Colonel Nikolay Ovcharenko  commander of the 45th Engineer-Sapper Regiment a part of the 1st Guards Tank Army
Colonel Viktor Ivanovich Isaikin (killed Mar 2)
Colonel Vladimir Ivanov, unit unknown
Col. Vladimir Ivanov was a press officer for the MoD.
Colonel Ruslan Shyrin, chief of the staff of 336th Guard naval infantry brigade, Baltic Fleet
Col. Kanat Mukatov, Deputy Commander for Combat Training for the Division (confirming that basically the entire senior command staff of the Division was killed in the HIMARS strike on July 9th)

Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Agarkov, Commander, 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment. (killed Mar
Lieutenant Colonel Renat Ravilovich Gaisin
Lieutenant Colonel Dmitry Sofronov, Commander of the 61st Separate Marine Brigade of the Russian Armed Forces, (killed Mar 5)
Lt Colonel Mikhail Orchikov was deputy commander of a motor-rifle brigade 19th motor-rifle division
lt.colonel, Ruslan Gashiyatullin, but only motor-rifle battalion commander. Odd.
According to Russian media, he lived in Dagestan, so probably he is from 136th Guard motor-rifle brigade of 58th CAA.
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Kornik, head of the HQ for 40th Engineer-Sapper Regiment (but I can’t find a reference to this unit, so I wonder if it was actually 45th Engineer-Sapper Regiment
Lt.colonel Dmitriy Dormidontov, MLRS battalion commander 20 of March Ukrainian mortar shell directly hit Russian blindage. Three officers were killed
    - battalion commander (probably motor-rifle, so mayor or lt.colonel too)
    - forward air-controller (usually lt. or captain)
Lieutenant Colonel Georgy Petrunin, the military commandant of Samara
Lt.colonel Dinar Khametov, MLRS battalion commander of 200th motor-rifle brigade of 14th Army Corps of Joint Strategical Command "Northern Fleet".
Lt.colonel Dibir Dibirov, 291st motor-rifle regiment of 42nd MRD, 58th CAA
Lt.colonel Viacheslav Savinov, deputy chief of the staff, chief of artillery recon of 49th CAA 
Lt.colonel Miras Bashakov, commander of 133th separate guard tank battalion of 138th separate guard motor-rifle brigade
Lt.colonel Denis Mezuyev, commander of 1st Guard motor-rifle regiment of 2nd Guard "Tamanskaya" MRD.
Lt.colonel Eduard Dmitriev, senior officer of combat training department of 2nd guard CAA, Central military district, killed 24th of April.
Lt.Colonel Grigoriy Tarasenko.
Interesting person. He already participated in the war on Donbas during 2016-2019 probably as a shadow comamnder and even was wounded in 2019. Then participated in Syria operation. 
Lt.colonel Alexandr Blinov, senior officer of combat training of 150th motor-rifle division, Novoherkassk, Rostov oblast, 8th CAA
Lt. Col. Denis Sukhanov, artillery officer for unknown unit
Lt. Col. Valentin Kuzmin, HQ staff of 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division
Lt. Col. Sergey Nikitin, 74th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade
Lieutenant Colonel Zaur Dimayev, the deputy commander of the 4th battalion of the Akhmat Kadyrov special forces regiment
Lt. Col. Vladimir Nigmatullin, artillery officer unknown unit
Lt. Col. Oleksandr Kuvshinov, 336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade
Lt.colonel Sergey Moskvichyov Head of the Armored Service (начальник бронетанковой службы) for the 155th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade
Lt. Col. Yegor Meleshenko  He was killed on 24th of June on Chuhuiv direction, Kharkiv oblast when Russian command post was hit by UKR artillery.  PS. Thanks to @akd "targeting" we can find his unit - 11th separate tank regiment of 18th guard motor-rifle division, 11th Arme Corps, Coastal troops of Baltic Fleet. Dislocation - Gusev, Kaliningrad oblast.
Lt. Col. Alexander Sorochinsky 4th Guards Tank Division
Lt. Col. Valentin Danilov RAV chief (missile and artillery ammunition service) of 58th CAA
Lt. Col. Dmitry Orekhov, regimental artillery chief, 291st Guards Motor Rifle Regiment, 42nd Guards Motor Rifle Division
Lt. Col. Sergey Mikhailov
Lt. Col. Artem Kormilitsyn, commander of 1st Training Battalion (probably not acting position), 6th Guards Tank Regiment, 90th Guards Tank Division
Lt. Col. Andrey Lutsko Judging by red sripes on shoulder straps he was a serviceman of Ground forces, not VKS. Also about this say motor-rifle signs on shoulder starps. In his biography pointed he served in Stavropol. This could be either 49th CAA HQ, or 66th control brigade of this army. If so, he could be killed in Kherson oblast, where 49th CAA operates.
Lt. Col. Tsikul was a deputy commander in a tank regiment (6th or 80th Guards Tank Regiment) of the 90th Guards Tank Division
Lt. Col. Evgeny Vyrodov, Deputy Chief of Logistics for the 20th Guards Motor Rifle Division
Lt.colonel Vyacheslav Proskuryakov, chief of EW service. Pointed, he served in Karachayevo-Cherkesiya Republic on Caucaus. The single ground forces unit, deployed in this republic is 34th motor-rifle brigade (mountain). So, more likely he was brigade's chief of EW service and got killed in Kherson oblast - Snihurivka, Inhulets bridgehead or Vysokopollia areas - locations were 34th brigade was involved in different times.
Lieutenant Colonel Fezul Bichikaev from Vladikavkaz was the deputy commander of a regiment in Yekaterinburg, possibly the 288th MRR
Lt. Col. Ruslan Mukhametkhanov, unknown tank unit
Lt. Col. Sergey Koval, Deputy Chief of Staff - Head of Operations Division, 20th Guards Motor Rifle Division 
Lt. Col. (probably) Pavel Apanovich, Deputy Commander for Military-Political Work (Zampolit), 114th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment, 127th Motor Rifle Division
Lt.colonel Dmitriy Golosenko, deputy regimental commander of rear service (supply), 1st GTR of 2nd GMRD "Tamanskaya"
Lt.colonel Igor Yarmanov, artillery, got lost on 1st of Sep.
Lt. Col. Georgiy Khudik, unknown unit
Police lt.colonel (retired) Denis Korostelyov. Probably volunteer unit
Lt. Col. Kirill Evstigneev, Wagner PMC field commander (not sure if rank is within Wagner, or former military)
Lt. Col. Pavel Matashuk, unknown 49th CAA unit In 2003 he was captain of engineer-sapper unit of 42nd MRD. Probably now he could be a commander of some engineer battalion, for example pontoon.
Lt. Col. Dmitry Kochetkov, Commander 1st Motor Rifle Battalion, 70th Motor Rifle Regiment, 42nd Motor Rifle Division

Major Dmitry Bukatin, 336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltiysk, Kaliningrad) (killed)
Major Alexander Viktorovich Shchetkin, Deputy Commander for Military-Political Work, 1st Guards Motor Rifle Regiment (Sevastopol), 2nd Guards Tamanians Motor Rifle Division (killed)
Major Ratmir Kudayev (Police) (killed, given Order of Courage)
Major Ruslan Vladimirovich Petrukhin, deputy battalion commander in the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 35th Army, Eastern Military District (killed Mar 11)
Major Dmitry Toptun motorized rifle battalion commander 488th Motor Rifle Regiment, 144th Guards Motor Rifle Division
Major Viktor Maksimchuk possible deputy commander of a motorized rifle regiment or battalion commander
Marine Major Alexey Sukhanov 177th Naval Infantry Regiment
Major Livoskiy Deputy Commander of 35th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade’s rocket artillery battalion
Major Sergei Panov was reportedly the tank battalion commander in the 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade (other sources say 90th GTD)
Major Alexander Sergeevich Fedorov, Chief of Communications and Deputy Chief of Staff of Unit #47130, 103rd Rocket Brigade (Ulan-Ude, Divizionnaya station) (killed Mar 15)met with our SOF...
Major Ruslan Petrukhin, a graduate of the Kazan Higher Military Command School and a deputy battalion commander in the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade, was killed in Ukraine.
Maj. Pavel Suslov, Tyumen is his city. 40th engineer-sapper regiment, Ishym town of Tiumen oblast
Mayor Dmitriy Tiunin, commander (?) of engineer-sapper battalion of 136th guard motor-rifle brigade, 58th guard CAA
Captain Timur Suleymanov acting commander for 228th motor-rifle regiment?
Major Dmitriy Stakheev
Mayor Yegor Sannikov. No other info. Probably artillery officer.
Mayor Alexey Martiushev
Mayor Denis Golovko, deputy commander of 2nd motor-rifle battalion of 71st guard motor-rifle regiment, 42nd guard motor-rifle division, 58th guard CAA
Maj. Roman Gribchenko, missile / artillery staff officer, probably 42nd Guards Motorized Division (in Shali)
Mayor Sergey Reznichenko, chief of the staff of some supply battalion.
Mayor Pavel Gareyev, unit and data of death unknown. Judging by the signs on lapels he served in air defense unit and his rank is AD battalion command/staff duty.
Major Artyom Lazarenko was the operations officer for the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade
Maj. Konstantin Fedorenko, unknown unit
Mayor Alexey Varnavskiy. Data of death and unit unknown. He has signs of signal troops on lapels. His rank corresponds to HQ of divisional level signal unit.
Mayor Nikolay Kolesnikov, unit unknown, signs on the shoulder strips similar to ground forces (except tank trops)
Maj. V.V. Lemesh, unknown unit
Mayor Grigoriy Artemyev, officer of military commandant unit.
Mayor of reserve Valeryi Statilko.
Mayor Sergey Kotelnikov, killed 7th of May, unit unknown
Maj. Dmitry Vostrikov, deputy commander of 810th Naval Infantry Brigade’s air-assault battalion
Major Galiev Artyom Radikovich, KIA
Maj. Ivan Zaika, possibly from 41st CAA headquarters or some subordinate unit
Mayor Ramis Zagretdinov, motor-rifle battalion commader of 35th guard motor-rifle brigade, 41st CAA
Mayor Leonid Sharshukov, unit unknown, likely engineer. Died in hospital on 9th of May
Mayor Viacheslav Karenko, due to anchor signs he served in Black Sea Fleet, but in some coastal unit. He had Ukrainian citizenship, served in Ukrainian naval forces and betrayed in 2014.
mayor Alexandr Shchetkin, 1st GTR of 2nd GMRD
mayor Dmitriy Lytnyev, 423rd GMRR of 4th GTD
mayor Ilgiz Usmanov, 423rd GMRR of 4th GTD
mayor Maxim Khlebko, 7th separate recon battalion of 47th GTD
Major Dmitry Lytnev, 4th Guards Tank Division
Major Gregory Artemiev, head of military commandant’s office in Volsk, Saratov Oblast.
Maj. Roman Sarychev, military commandant
Maj. Valentin Ivanov, unit unknown
Reserve Maj. Denis Sorokin
Mayor Nikolay Kolomoyets, 61st Naval infantry brigade, 14th Army Corps of Norhern Fleet coastal units
Major Roman Khlynovsky, engineering officer (probably) in the 64th Guards Separate Motor Rifle Brigade
Major Vyacheslav Kazakov
Major Alexey Moskovchenko
Mayor Artyom Lazarenko, chief of operative department of 439th Guard reactive artillery brigade (MLRS "Tornado-S"), Southern military district
Mayor Yevgeniy Kushenko, instructor-chief of the staff of training motor-rifle battalion of 467th guard training center
Major Andrey Spirin
Major Maxim Klebko 7th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, 47th Tank Division
Major Yuri Borisov, Deputy Battalion Commander (for Armament), naval infantry battalion, 155th Guards Separate Naval Infantry Brigade
Mayor of police (retired) Mikhail Goryaynov. He was a member of some volunteer unit
Major Roman Kuznetsov, battalion commander, 39th Motor Rifle Brigade
Major Vladimir Efremo was with the 49th Separate Operational Brigade of the National Guard North Caucasian Regional Command.
Major Alexey Loshkarev, commmander 2nd Motor-Rifle Battalion, 136th Guards Separate Motor Rifle Brigade  "Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion commander (I think)"
Major Andrey Melikhov, senior expert of the Military Scientific Committee of the Airborne Forces of the Russian Federation
Major Aleksandr Kovrikov from the 152nd Missile Brigade head of the command post
Maj. Nikolai Balyatin
Major Oleg Lyamin, unit unknown
Major Tarkhan Khordaev, commander 3rd Tank Battalion, 80th Tank Regiment, 90th Guards Tank Division - battalion chief of staff?
Major Sergei Rzhavin, unit unknown
Maj. Artyom Reutov, artillery officer in a Naval Infantry unit
Maj. Sergey Gorin, unit unknown
Maj. Dmitry Vlasov, battalion commander in 6th Separate Tank Brigade
Maj. Alexander Yusupov commander of the Howitzer Artillery Battalion in the 126th Guards Coastal Defense Brigade
Maj. Beslan Bachaev, 64th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade
Maj. Almaz Agliev (possibly 15th Guards Peacekeeping Motor Rifle Brigade?
Major Vasiliy Lushnikov, tank battalion commander of 291st MRR of 42nd MRD
Maj. Danil Mupkin, Deputy Commander for Military-Political Work (Zampolit), 810th Separate Guards Naval Infantry Brigade (presumably)
Police Maj. Maxim Daibov, unknown unit
Maj. Alexander Telyatnikov, unknown unit
Maj. Dmitry Kopantsev, Chief of Operations for 165th Artillery Brigade, 35th CAA
Maj. Alexander Ananichev, unit unknown
Maj. Vladimir Kholin, unit unknown
Maj. Alexander Starchkov, unit unknown
Maj. German Yudin, deputy battalion commander, unknown unit
Maj. Igor Kaipov, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications, 252nd Guards MRR, 3rd MRD
Maj. Chermen Bagaev was with the 37th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade
Maj. Alexander Nakonechny, unit unknown
”Major” Maxim Sokolov, deputy battalion commander in PMC Wagner
Maj. Tkharo Abataev, battalion commander, (probably) 5th Separate Tank Brigade

Captain Andrey Paliy
Capt. Fakhretin Gasanov, commander 1st MRB, 394th MRR, 127th MRD
Captain Maklagin Vyacheslav Vyacheslavovich (killed Feb 25, given Order of Courage)
Captain Sergei Aleksandrovich Visyach (killed)
Captain Dmitry Nikolayevich Chumanov, Commander, MLRS Battery (Ulan-Ude) (killed Mar 4)
captain Aleksey Litvinov, arty battery commander was killed in Nova Kakhovka on 31st of Aug some group  of 146th SP-howitzer regiment of 2nd "Tamanskaya" MRD.

Senior Lieutenant Alexei Aleshko, Military Intelligence Officer (killed Mar 10)
Senior Lieutenant Nikolai Shumitsky, Tank Company Commander, 81st Tank Battalion, 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (killed, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Nikita Ivanovich Perfilov, VKS Russian Aerospace Forces (killed Mar 6)
Senior Lieutenant Lazarenko Alexander Alexandrovich (killed, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Sergey Alekseevich Zuykov (killed, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Vokhmyanin Alexander Viktorovich, Chief of Staff, Artillery Battalion (killed)
Senior Lieutenant Maxim Vadimovich Susloparov, Unit #90600, 15th Separate Motorized Rifle Peacekeeping Brigade of Alexandria (Roshchinsky), 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army (killed)
Senior Lieutenant Maxim Kholkin, Air Defense, 4th Military Base (South Ossetia) (killed March 7, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Anton Volkov, Translator, GRU/GU, (killed Feb 27)
Senior Lieutenant Sergei Chudnik, Commander, Tank Platoon (killed March 16, given Hero of DPR)
Senior Lieutenant Dmitry Vyacheslavovich Vdovin, Company Commander (killed, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Alexei Ivanov, 5th Separate Guards Tank Brigade (Ulan-Ude) (killed)
Senior Lieutenant Khrebet Pavel
Senior Lieutenant Izmailov Ildar

Lieutenant Alexander Lebedev (killed)
Lieutenant Vitaly Olegovich Golub , Platoon Commander, 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Guards Combined Arms Army (Volgograd) (killed, given Order of Courage)
Lieutenant Daniil Dmitreievich Kurin, Reconnaissance Platoon Commander, 34th Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade (killed, March 3)
Lieutenant Vsevolod Vasilyevich Yaroslavtsev, Commander, Mortar Platoon, Motorized Rifle Battalion, 126th Gorlovskaya Separate Coastal Defense Brigade (Perevalnoe), 22nd Army Corps. (killed Mar 3)
Lieutenant Brian Andrei Yurkov, Ground Forces Air Defense Officer (North Ossetia) (killed)

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

SOBR/Rosgvardiya/OMON/FSB

Colonel Konstantin Ogiy, Head of Kemerovo SOBR unit, Rosgvardiya (killed Feb 28)
Col. Evgeny Gerasimenko,Rosgvardiya spetsnaz. He served in 12th sep.special force detachment "Ural" (Nizhniy Tagil). But he got lost early of 8th of April.
Colonel Sergey Savvateeyev, Deputy commander of Rosgvardia SOBR
Colonel Sergey Postnov, Rosgvardia media relations officer
Police Col. Igor Murzin, Deputy Commander, Kuzbass SOBR
Artyom Bardin, colonel, military commandand of Berdiansk. Presumably he is (or already was?) first deputy of Rosgvardiya directorate of Rostov oblast.

Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Savvateev, Deputy Commander, SOBR unit (Vladimir), Rosgvardiya
Lt.colonel Ilya Piatkin, 38 years  SOBR
Lt.colonel Roman Ryabov, 50 years  SOBR
Lt.colnel Mikhail Rodionov, senior operative investigator of Vladimir oblast SOBR detachment, 46 years   SOBR
Lt. Col. Dzhabrail Dzhabatyrov, Dagestan SOBR “Yastreb”
Lt. Col. Aleksey Kryukov, possibly FSB Special Purpose Center Alfa group FSB 
Lt.colonel (retired) Dmitriy Savchenko. Veteran of SOBR special police, participated in wars in Chechnya and Dagestan. Last place of the service before retirement - UFSNK (Directorate of Federal Service of drugs control).
Lt.colonel Dmitriy Molchanov, FSB, probably from Krasnodar RSSN FSB (regional "Alfa" special force detachment)
Lt. Col. Oleg Vostrikov Sakhalin OMON officer killed in the HIMARS strike on court house in Lysychansk
Chechen police Lt. Col. Zaur Dimaeva, Deputy Commander, 4th Battalion, Special Police Regiment "Akhmat"
Lt.colonel Aleksey Tikhonov, regiment commander deputy of personnel of 94th operative purpose regiment (Urus-Martan, Checnya) of 46th separate operatrive purpose brigade (Chechnya) of Rosgvardia, Northern-Caucasian District of Rosgvardia.
FSB Spetsnaz Lt. Col. Nikolai Gorban, 4th Branch of the First Department of the FSB Special Operation Directorate
Lt.colonel Sergey Privalov, Privalov was a member of the FSB VOG-9 unit and was killed trying to arrest a drunk 8th Separate Artillery Regiment soldier in Kherson.
Police Lt. Col. Denis Lazutin, commander Samara OMON operational company “Smerch”

Guards Major Andrei Petrovich Burlakov, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Secret Service, Chief of Intelligence of Regiment, Rosgvardia (killed Mar 10)
Major Bezborodov Dmitry Valeryevich, Rosgvardiya battalion commander (killed)
Major Dmity Bezborodov Bezzhizninski, Operational Battalion Commander, Rosgvardia (killed)
Major Andrey Meshcheriakov, SOBR police detachmnet of Khabarovsk region
Mayor Sergey Kashanskiy, 19th separate special force detachment "Yermak" (Novosibirsk) of Rosgvardia, Syberian military district of Rosgvardia
Maj. Shamil Nasrulayev, Dagestan SOBR “Yastreb”:
Mayor Anatoliy Miagkov, last mention of his service - 12th separate special force detachment "Ural" of Rosgvardia, Ural district of Rosgvardia
Maj. Viktor Sluskin, commander 3rd Spetsnaz Group, 25th Separate Spetsnaz Detachment “Mercury,” Rosgvardiya
Maj. Leonid Makhonin, Rosgvardiya Special Purpose Center "Vityaz"
Maj. Alexei Ivanushkin Sakhalin OMON officer killed in the HIMARS strike on court house in Lysychansk
Maj. Dmitri Polyansky Sakhalin OMON officer killed in the HIMARS strike on court house in Lysychansk
Police Major Vladimir Shabalin, Republic of Tuva Rosgvardia SOBR “Ezim”

Police Captain Opatsky Alexei Mikhailovich, Commander, Zyryanin OMON Special Purpose Mobile Platoon, Rosgvardia Directorate, Komi Republic (killed)
Captain Ilya Tsuprik FSB Special Purpose Center Alfa officer 

Senior Lieutenant Sergei Zuykov Alekseevich, Rosgvardia (killed, given Order of Courage)
Senior Lieutenant Sergey Dorokhov, Rosgvardia SOBR team member (Vologda) (killed)

Naval-

Captain of 1st rank (=colonel) Andrei Paliy Deputy of Black Sea Fleet commander

Captain 2nd Rank (Lt. Col. equivalent) Alexander Bobrov, commander 170th Minesweeper Division, 184th Water Area Protection Brigade (Novorossiysk).

Captain of 3rd rank (=mayor) Alexandr Chirva, commander of large landing ship "Tsezar Kunnikov" of 197th landing ship brigade, Black Sea Fleet. Died from wounds 16-17th of April. He was wounded during Uлrainan strike on Russians landing ships in Berdiansk on 24th of March
Captain of 3rd rank (mayor equivalent) Roman Pasynkov, chief of troops service department of Black Sea HQ 810th Naval Infantry Brigade
Captain 3rd Rank Svyatoslav Nizhegorodov
Captain 3rd-rank Alexander Trusov
Captain 3rd Rank Yuri Kukushkin HQ of the 242nd Landing Craft Division, 106th Brigade of the Caspian Flotilla

Aviation -

Major General (*ret.) Banamat Botashev Russian Air Force 

Colonel Ruslan Rudnev was a Su-25 attack aircraft pilot based in the Far East. He was killed in Ukraine and buried on March 1
Col. Anatoly Stasyukevich, (as of 2020) 1st Deputy Commander, 1st Guards Composite Aviation Division
Col. Vasily Kleshchenko, Ka-52 pilot, deputy commander of the 344th Center for Combat Use and Retraining of Army Aviation Flight Personnel (presumably he was with a combat unit at time of death)

Lieutenant Colonel Alexey Narzullaevich Khasanov, Deputy Commander, 31st Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (pilot, Su-30SM, killed Mar 5)
Lt.colonel Fyodor Solovyov, commander of 872nd SP-howitzer regiment of 127th motor-rifle division, 5th CAA Eastern Military District
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Pozynych, Deputy Commander for Military-Political Work, 14th Guards Fighter Regiment (Kursk) (Pilot, Su-30SM, killed)
Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Chervov, Deputy Commander, Aviation Regiment (Voronezh) (Pilot, Su-25, killed Mar 7)
Lt.colonel Sergey Gundorov, Mi-35M flight or squadron commander of 487th separate helicopter regiment
Lt.colonel Roman Igolnilkov. Until 2021 served in Rosgvardia mixed aviation regiment of Southern District in duty of regiment commader deputy of supply. Dismissed in August 2021, but on 7th Feb 2022 was mobilized in again to RuAF. Probably also was on duty of some aviation unit commander deputy. Got lost on 3rd of July after HIMARS strike on Melitopol airbase
Air Force Lt. Col. Roman Igolkin killed in Jul. 3rd strike on Melitopol 
Lt. Col. Vladimir Strelchenko, Ka-52 pilot / Deputy Commander for Flight Training), 487th Separate Helicoper Regiment
Lt.Col. Vladimir Petrushin
Lt. Col. Viktor Pakholsky, Deputy Commander for Military-Political Affairs (Zampolit), 39th Helicopter Regiment
Lt. Col. Maxim Potemin, pilot in unknown unit

Mayor Yevgeniy Osipov, 18th Guard assault aviation regiment "Normandia-Neman" (Su-25SM)
Mayor Artyom Ogoltsov, 332nd Guard helicopter regiment (airfields Pushkin, Pribilovo, Leningrad oblast) of 6th AF and AD Army, Western militrary district. This regiment is armed with Mi-28N, Mi-35 and Mi-8AMTSh. Google search shows, during maneuvers Zapad-2021 he was a pilot of Mi-28N.
PMC-mercenary mayor (probably retired) Andrey Fedorchukov Captured pilot of Russian Su-25, which was shot down yesterday by 72nd mech.brigade turned out 
Major Nikolai Bugay (or Buhai as @Haiduk writes below), Mi-35 pilot
Major Alexander Shevstov, helicopter unit
Maj. Alexander Saveliev, Mi-28N pilot, 487th Separate Helicopter Regiment
Maj. Nikolai Prozorov, Su-25 pilot
Maj. Nikolay Gorbunov
Maj. Stepan Perminov
Maj. Vladimir Krot
Major Ravil Gattarov, probably Su-34 pilot
Major Alexander Shevstov, helicopter (probably Mi-8) squadron commander
Major Nikolay Prozorov, 18th assault aviation regiment (Chernihivka airfireld, Far East) of 303rd mixed aviation division of 11th AF&AD Army, Eastern Military District  Got lost on 10th of March NW of Kyiv or in Zhytomyr oblast. His Su-25SM (#10, RF-91969) was shot down by 10th mountain-assault brigade. 
Maj. Askar Robortdinov, 319th separate helocopter regiment (Chernigovka airfield, Far East) of 11th AF/AD Army, Eastern Military District
Major Yury Belitchenko, Flight Commander in 55th Separate Helicopter Regiment, SMD 
Maj. Dmitri Runev, Su-34 pilot?

Mayor Aleksandr Savelyev, flight commander, pilot of Mi-28N of 487th separate helicopter regiment (Budyonovsk airfield, Stavropol region), 4th AF/AD Army, Southern military district
Mayor Roman Grovich, flight commander ( Mi-26 pilot, wing commander in 17th Guards Army Aviation Brigade), was shot down in Mi-35 on 24th Feb over Kyiv reservoir during approach to Hostomel. In his crew also were lost with him mayor Nikolay Buhai (already posted here) and - Captain Alexey Bel'kov

Captain Ivan Sergeevich Afanasyev (Pilot, Ka-52?, killed)
Captain Radzhabov Rabazan Gasainievich (Pilot, killed)
Captain Emelyanchik Sergei Stanislavovich (Pilot, Mi-28n?, killed Mar 4)
Captain Eugene Kislakov, 14th Guards Fighter Regiment (Kursk) (Pilot, Su-30SM, killed)

lieutenent Dmitriy Yevdokimov

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Separatist Forces -
separatist commander Mikhail Kyshchyk, better known as "Misha Chechen,"
Colonel (DPR-promoted? Or posthumously?) Statsenko Alexey, deputy commander of armament of 1st motor-rifle brigade of DPR. 
"Mayor" (LPR-promoted) Alexzndr Shepel, battalion commander of 2nd motor-rifle brigade LPR. Citizen of Ukraine. Considered as "best battalion comamnder of LPR". Killed 6th of March
"Captain" or even "mayor" (DPR-promoted) Agranovich Sergey, company commander of recon-assault battalion "Sparta" of DPR.
"Colonel" (DPR promoted) Vladimir Kovalenko, chief of "non-departamental security of Internal affairs ministry of DPR" (prisoners guarding service). Citizen of Ukraine. Former officer of Ukrainian 20th separate convoy service battalion of Internal troops (later National Guard), dislocated in Donetsk. After his unit was seized in 2014 by DPR he defected to separs side.
Reserve Lt. Col. Alexander Kalnitsky, presumably with a Cossack volunteer unit from Krasnodar Krai
LNR Police Lt. Col. Denis Babich
Vladimir Zhoga, warlord, Sparta Battalion (Lt Col equivalent?) (killed Mar 5)
Separatist Taras "Clooney" Gordienko, Commander, B-2 Anti-tank group (killed Mar 14)
Major Petr Luzanov, Deputy Battalion Commander of tank battalion, 5th Seperate MRB, 1st AK, DNR
Evgeny “Bullet” Andreev, battalion commander, 1st AK, DNR (as of 2017 he was a company commander in the 2nd Motor Rifle Battalion of the 11th Separate Motor Rifle Regiment, but don’t know if he rose to command same battalion)
Lt. Col. Alexander “Prapor” Pogrebnyak, 5th Separate Infantry Brigade “Oplot,” 1st AK, DNR
Capt. Alexander “North” Miroshnik, commander separate tank battalion (4th Separate Tank Battalion “August”?), 2nd AK, LPR
LNR police Lt. Col. Nikolai Vatsyk, head of Special Purpose Center of the Rapid Reaction Forces
"Colonel" Olha Kachura (callsign Korsa), commander of reactive artillery battalion of 3rd MRB "Berkut" of DPR (deploys in Horlivka). Got lost Aug 3. Because of 3rd MRB fights on Bakmut direction, likely this happened there.
Maj. Andrey Gusarov (Polovnikov), Since he became "major", probably he was regimental cheif of recon or some else. Got lost during assault of Popasna on 1st of March - This article suggests he died still serving as commander of the LPR 6th Cossack MRR’s Recon Company
"Colonel" Dmitry "Korean" Tschke, Chief of Air Defense, 1st AK
Dmitry "Cloud" Oblachkov, unknown rank and position in DNR 1st AK command staff
Col. Eduard Pelishenko Acting commander of DNR 1st Army Corps  seriously wounded
"Lt.colonel" (LPR-promoted) Roman Medvedev, artillery chief of 4th motor-rifle brigade of LPR.
Reserve Maj. Valery Farshatov, volunteer for LNR
Mayor (?) Pavel Yevgkevskyi. Commander of 4th battalion of 105th rifle regiment of DPR's 1st Army Corps
Retired (?) mayor (?) Ivan Kravchenko. Battalion commander. He has a chevron of GRU, but also has a sign of Donbas Volunteer Union, so currently he was not officer of Russian regular troops. Either DPR battalion commander (regular or conscripts), or Russian volunteers battalion commander. 

General of Justice Sergey Gorenko (though he was born in Ukraine and had Ukrainian citizenship, I give his name in Russian spelling), General Prosecutor of LPR. In 2014 he worked in UKR police and had a duty of chief of one of departments. Betrayed and defected to LPR. In 2019 became the chief of LPR Prosecutin Office. In February of 2022 personally on cameras shot with howitzer at UKR positions eliminated in Luhansk Prosecution Office

Colonel of justice Yekaterina Steglenko, deputy of General Prosecutor of DPR. Before 2014 worked in Luhansk oblast Prosecution Office. In 2014 defected to LPR. In 2016-2017 served in MGB of LPR (analog of KGB). Since 2017 appointed on the duty of General Prosecutor deputy   eliminated in Luhansk Prosecution Office

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

WIA
Major General Serhiy Nirkov was seriously wounded; Chief of Staff - Deputy Commander of the 35th Combined Arns Army
Major General Andriy Serytsky Chief of Staff - Deputy Commander of the 36th Combined Arms Army was seriously wounded;
First Rank Captain Anton Kuprin, 44, lead Russian warship was fatally hit by Ukrainian Neptune missiles
Col. Yan Sukhanov, acting commander 810th Guards Separate Naval Infantry Brigade - heavily wounded (commander Col. Aleksey Sharov was killed in Mariupol on Mar. 22nd)
Lt. Col. Aleksey Teremkov, commander 542nd Separate Air-Assault Battalion - heavily wounded
Maj. Leonid Smirnoff, acting commander 382nd Separate Naval Infantry Battalion - heavily wounded

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Captured Maj. Pavel Gruzev, 7th Military Base (maybe the interview contains more detail?

Captured, dead or ran away without papers (?) Lt. Col. Sergey Deev, battalion commander, 49th Machine-Gun Artillery Regiment, 18th Machine-Gun Artillery Division:

Lt. Col. Artem Khelemendik from the 18th motorized rifle division with the position of "head of the control/command post" of the military unit 90151

 

[poesel]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

As for Dan's thinking that it could be built in Poland, I very much doubt it.  These things require a massive amount of extremely specialized machining.  They'd have to relocate the entire plant.  Even on an accelerated schedule that would take months.  Under normal circumstances more than a year.

Unless you are talking about a highly integrated automation line, relocation doesn't take that long. If you really want it, and you can cut through any red tape, then the thing you have the longest to wait for is for the concrete to cure.

It makes a huge difference to relocate an already running machine against installing a new one. The former is much, much easier.

[Holien]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

And RU Nats are preparing to do what we discussed earlier they would do:

 

It might be good to overload them with applicants and bombard that address with "willing" time wasters?

[Grigb]

21 minutes ago, Holien said:

It might be good to overload them with applicants and bombard that address with "willing" time wasters?

Yes, it is one way to deal with it - UKR are already practicing it. But sorry, no further discussion on the matter - we are being read as well. 

[Audgisil]

35 minutes ago, Holien said:

It might be good to overload them with applicants and bombard that address with "willing" time wasters?

It would also be a good idea for western countries to set up numerous believalbe "recruiting" opportunities to allow these willing participants to conveniently report themselves to intelligence services. A lot of them could even be left in the field to continue their "useful" efforts. May as well use these witless idiots against themselves.

[FancyCat]

NAFO will probably handle it. CIA front or not.

33 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Yes, it is one way to deal with it - UKR are already practicing it. But sorry, no further discussion on the matter - we are being read as well. 

o.O

Maybe I'm misreading you, surely your not suggesting what I think your suggesting? Who would be reading this?