How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Ts4EVER]

6 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Heh, clearly never taught in US or Canada.  Unpleasant, undisciplined and lawyered up.

I mean, it's not like I teach at fancy private schools for kids with rich and educated parents, but those Ukrainians are something else... We have started joking that they might be more useful at the front.

[FancyCat]

 

 

[Bil Hardenberger]

1 hour ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

For a change Ukrainians showing their incompetence.

some pointers:

• tracks are way too close to each other
• there should be a single track keeping the point so only it gets ambushed
• there should have been some recon element to notice this in advance  (fails to notice everything, I give that)
• seems like a split rout/defense. absolutely no control over these forces
• good example on the challenges of riding on top of the IFV. No cover from small arms fire and absolutely no maneuvering under small arms fire. Also command and control of the infantry squad(s) breaks up completely under fire.

In this situation point tanks should pop smoke, notify the company and dismount to closest available "cover" and engage in hasty defense. After this the whole point platoon does hasty defense and the company commander makes a fast decision on what to do. Common options: disengage or push though with the 2. and 3. platoons. And in either case the enemy position receives immediate fire from the battalion mortars.

at least this is how it would go in the Finnish military.

Looks like they need to break out CMBS, visit my Battle Drill blog and brush up on their basic movement and react to contact drills.   

Bil

[beardiebloke]

3 hours ago, chuckdyke said:

Sorry, no translation available. But German artillery seems to have played a role. By the way they call the recent operation a counter offensive.

 

Auto-translate is working now.  I think Youtube takes a while to do it's thing.  Works very well for this video probably because the guy's German is very formal.

On the subject of Youtube, thank you whoever here recommended this youtube channel Hromadske:
https://www.youtube.com/c/HromadskeTvUkraine
It has a just-let-people-talk kind of journalism that I really like but sadly auto-translate struggles at times.

[Haiduk]

2 hours ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

This is certainly right, I have only one quibble. Perhaps surprisingy, during the Commowealth today's Ukraine was mostly -if not entirely -  Polish Crown lands, not the Grand Duchy (Lithuanian) lands.

The Lithuanian Ruthenians would be today's Belarussians.

Crown lands hystorically were only on modern Halychyna and part of Podillia - this caused several wars between Poland and Lituania in 14th century for fromer Rus' legacy. Rest (Volyn', Kyiv, Chernihiv, Bratslav, Cherkasy) belonged to Great Duchy of Lithuania. Though, in western documents as Ruthenians were called all inhabitants of former Rus' of Orthodox faith. Even Orthodox inhabitants of Vojevodstvo Rus'ke, belonged to Crown also initially in 14-15th centuries considered as Ruthenians, not Poles. In that times "nationality" mostly determined by faith and mores.

Of course after Brest Union of 1569 Polish, when Polish magnats had been receiving lands in Ukraine, Lithuania influence gradually became to fade and name "litvins" became more use for modern Belarusians, though recently meant also inhabitants of novadays Ukrainain lands.

[kevinkin]

"U.S. expects months of intense fighting in Ukraine-Russia war"

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/15/us-ukraine-russia-war/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

No mention of an imminent Putin departure or collapse of Russian society. The deep state in the West is planning for and betting on a longer war than many would like:

"Those expectations undergird a U.S. strategy of attempting to hold together international support and gradually expanding American military aid without the immediate injection of heavier weaponry that might trigger a wider war."

Also:

""forces will encounter a period of intense fighting in the lead-up to winter as part of what they expect to be a “nonlinear” trajectory for the war.""

When you have no clue or just want to obfuscate, call something non-linear. At least you sound smart. 

[keas66]

3 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

"U.S. expects months of intense fighting in Ukraine-Russia war"

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/15/us-ukraine-russia-war/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

No mention of an imminent Putin departure or collapse of Russian society. The deep state in the West is planning for and betting on a longer war than many would like:

"Those expectations undergird a U.S. strategy of attempting to hold together international support and gradually expanding American military aid without the immediate injection of heavier weaponry that might trigger a wider war."

Also:

""forces will encounter a period of intense fighting in the lead-up to winter as part of what they expect to be a “nonlinear” trajectory for the war.""

When you have no clue or just want to obfuscate, call something non-linear. At least you sound smart. 

What a odd take on that article - It seemed to present  some reasonable points  about the difficulties of  restarting negotiations by the Ukrainians - and I certainly didn't see any indications of a "Deep-State" attempt to keep extending the conflict out for  any purposes other than helping the Ukrainians  restore their borders .

[chuckdyke]

Glad the translator is working, I recommend that everyone here listens to it. International mass media at times is doing more harm than good. They could look at having journalists embedded in the Ukrainian army. It would give the shivers probably to Zelensky. 

[Haiduk]

1 hour ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

For a change Ukrainians showing their incompetence.

some pointers:

• tracks are way too close to each other
• there should be a single track keeping the point so only it gets ambushed
• there should have been some recon element to notice this in advance  (fails to notice everything, I give that)
• seems like a split rout/defense. absolutely no control over these forces
• good example on the challenges of riding on top of the IFV. No cover from small arms fire and absolutely no maneuvering under small arms fire. Also command and control of the infantry squad(s) breaks up completely under fire.

In this situation point tanks should pop smoke, notify the company and dismount to closest available "cover" and engage in hasty defense. After this the whole point platoon does hasty defense and the company commander makes a fast decision on what to do. Common options: disengage or push though with the 2. and 3. platoons. And in either case the enemy position receives immediate fire from the battalion mortars.

at least this is how it would go in the Finnish military.

Damn. This is not only because platoon commander had  Command Skill -2, but obvious because driver's panic. Poor guy, unless MP pick him up, his comrads just will tear him apart. At least two were crushed with tracks to the death or became invalids. 

Though such stupid situations, which caused to needless death and injuries too much from both sides.

[paxromana]

1 hour ago, chuckdyke said:

In Australia there is a chronic shortage of teachers for some reason lol

Speaking from almost 40 years experience teaching in NSW (Government) High Schools ... very little to do with students, more to do with a s**tload of completely meaningless record keeping increasingly imposed on Teachers and an increasingly incompetent leadership resulting from 'promotion by merit' (as a Union Rep I served on several Interview Panels and all you get are people who are good at spouting the party line and sucking up to Bureaucrats rather than being good, or even competent, leaders - don't get me wrong, the old Inspectorial System was flawed, but at least tended to promote a greater degree of competence).

Pay is was a lesser problem for my generation as we were in a Defined Benefits superannuation scheme which was ended in the 1980's and replaced with an accumulation only one ... the Union estimated that (then) those in the new scheme would have had to have had a pay increase of $8-12000 pa (about 10% of gross salary at the time) to even come close to what we were going to get. Needless to say, they got b****r all extra.

Edited September 16, 2022 by paxromana

[poesel]

1 hour ago, Ts4EVER said:

I mean, it's not like I teach at fancy private schools for kids with rich and educated parents, but those Ukrainians are something else... We have started joking that they might be more useful at the front.

My wife teaches at what can roughly be translated as trade school. They have just the opposite experience. The Ukrainians are the more organized and eager of the refugees.

[Taranis]

51 minutes ago, beardiebloke said:

Auto-translate is working now.  I think Youtube takes a while to do it's thing.  Works very well for this video probably because the guy's German is very formal.

On the subject of Youtube, thank you whoever here recommended this youtube channel Hromadske:
https://www.youtube.com/c/HromadskeTvUkraine
It has a just-let-people-talk kind of journalism that I really like but sadly auto-translate struggles at times.

Indeed, I have noticed that you have to wait some time after the release of videos to be able to access the automatic translation of the subtitles.

[Taranis]

19 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Damn. This is not only because platoon commander had  Command Skill -2, but obvious because driver's panic. Poor guy, unless MP pick him up, his comrads just will tear him apart. At least two were crushed with tracks to the death or became invalids. 

Though such stupid situations, which caused to needless death and injuries too much from both sides.

It saddened me deeply to see these guys get run over.
I feel like one of the first ones that falls to the right of the first BMP has already been hit (killed?) because it already doesn't move after falling and before the BMP rolls back.

[Taranis]

"An abandoned Russian tank at a gas station on the outskirts of Izium, in the Kharkiv region (eastern Ukraine), September 16, 2022. JUAN BARRETO / AFP"

*2S19 Msta-S

[kevinkin]

11 minutes ago, keas66 said:

I certainly didn't see any indications of a "Deep-State" attempt to keep extending the conflict

 

22 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

and gradually expanding American military aid without the immediate injection of heavier weaponry that might trigger a wider war."

Gradually expanding aid and extending the conflict are sort of the same. The points are not unreasonable, just the same old group think that fears a wider war. The article recognizes that eventually negotiations will start. We are trying to understand what the map of Ukraine is going to look like when they do. So why not inject heavier weapons now if the West wants the talks to start with most if not all Ukraine re-taken sooner rather than later? What's the wait if the weapons are coming anyway?

[Taranis]

"Ukrainian soldiers, near Izioum, in the Kharkiv region (Ukraine), September 16, 2022. JUAN BARRETO / AFP"

*BMP-2

[Harmon Rabb]

3 hours ago, Grigb said:

 

Well, what RU mean by saying Macedonian style is actually RU urban myth invented by Bogomolov (misspelled as Bogomilov in the article) for his novel "In August 1944" but presented by him as authentic for PR purposes. So, in reality nobody knows what is the proper way to shot Macedonian style. 

Historian Ulanov claims that the second version probably closer to truth - old 19 century revolvers used by Macedonians were notoriously slow to reload. So, most probably they basically shot from revolvers in turn, one after another and that's it. RU imperial officers probably experimented with it but stopped after the appearance of modern automatic pistols. Looks like Bogomolov heard the name from old imperial sources and thought it was a cool trick with the cool name and reimagined it. Ulanov also says the way Rogozin shots (two pistols close together) is most likely modern invention from around 90s.

BTW, the book is very good. If you can find the translated version, I strongly recommend reading it if you are interested in Red Army military Counter-int ops (SMERSH ops). The movie version is awful though, a waste of time. 

Thanks for providing more historical context.

Yeah, shooting dual semi-automatic pistols looks pretty cool in the movies but in reality it is just not very practical.

If I tried shooting like that at my shooting range, I don't think the range officer would be very happy with my attempt to look like one of these dudes.

Edited September 16, 2022 by Harmon Rabb

[billbindc]

1 hour ago, kevinkin said:

"U.S. expects months of intense fighting in Ukraine-Russia war"

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/09/15/us-ukraine-russia-war/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

No mention of an imminent Putin departure or collapse of Russian society. The deep state in the West is planning for and betting on a longer war than many would like:

"Those expectations undergird a U.S. strategy of attempting to hold together international support and gradually expanding American military aid without the immediate injection of heavier weaponry that might trigger a wider war."

Also:

""forces will encounter a period of intense fighting in the lead-up to winter as part of what they expect to be a “nonlinear” trajectory for the war.""

When you have no clue or just want to obfuscate, call something non-linear. At least you sound smart. 

By "non-linear" they are saying that they expect repeats of the outcome of the Kharkiv offensive. I don't think that's obfuscating anything. 

[Maciej Zwolinski]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

Crown lands hystorically were only on modern Halychyna and part of Podillia - this caused several wars between Poland and Lituania in 14th century for fromer Rus' legacy. Rest (Volyn', Kyiv, Chernihiv, Bratslav, Cherkasy) belonged to Great Duchy of Lithuania. Though, in western documents as Ruthenians were called all inhabitants of former Rus' of Orthodox faith. Even Orthodox inhabitants of Vojevodstvo Rus'ke, belonged to Crown also initially in 14-15th centuries considered as Ruthenians, not Poles. In that times "nationality" mostly determined by faith and mores.

Of course after Brest Union of 1569 Polish, when Polish magnats had been receiving lands in Ukraine, Lithuania influence gradually became to fade and name "litvins" became more use for modern Belarusians, though recently meant also inhabitants of novadays Ukrainain lands.

Sure, I am only talking about the formal allocation of the land currently making up the Ukraine after the Union of Lublin 1568 mostly to the Polish part vs the Lithuanian part of the Commonwealth. Regardless of the administrative divisions, the original Orthodox population of those lands was described as gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus  and their Ruthenian identity was not in dispute. Although since XIV century there also had to be some ethnic Lithuanians who settled in Kiev or wherebouts, their numbers must have been small enough for them to Ruthenise quickly.

[Aragorn2002]

5 hours ago, chuckdyke said:

Sorry, no translation available. But German artillery seems to have played a role. By the way they call the recent operation a counter offensive.

 

Very informative. Very successful use of the PzH 2000 according to the Ukrainians, delivery of German Biber bridge layers, the complexity of training German units with a shortage of material and enough captured Russian material during the Ukrainian counteroffensive to equip an entire Ukrainian brigade. 

[dan/california]

3 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

For a change Ukrainians showing their incompetence.

some pointers:

• tracks are way too close to each other
• there should be a single track keeping the point so only it gets ambushed
• there should have been some recon element to notice this in advance  (fails to notice everything, I give that)
• seems like a split rout/defense. absolutely no control over these forces
• good example on the challenges of riding on top of the IFV. No cover from small arms fire and absolutely no maneuvering under small arms fire. Also command and control of the infantry squad(s) breaks up completely under fire.

In this situation point tanks should pop smoke, notify the company and dismount to closest available "cover" and engage in hasty defense. After this the whole point platoon does hasty defense and the company commander makes a fast decision on what to do. Common options: disengage or push though with the 2. and 3. platoons. And in either case the enemy position receives immediate fire from the battalion mortars.

at least this is how it would go in the Finnish military.

I HATE watching Ukrainians lose a round. The ride on top thing seems to be a combination of how awful Soviet/Russian IFVs are to ride inside, and the risk of land mines thought to be as high or higher than small arms fire. You are of course correct about everything else, and you can learn all of those things playing this game. Smoke use seems to be a small fraction of what doctrine calls for on both sides? Are they just out of smoke grenades? Where not enough smoke grenades built/bought in the first place? Do Russian/Soviet smoke grenades/shells deteriorate in storage faster than actual explosives? I assume Nato stores of Soviet/Russian smoke munitions are low to non existent. Just to reiterate the amount of smoke shells/grenades used in all the video out there seems like a small fraction of what it should be, thoughts?

Edit: I really do think a copy of combat mission professional, and all if Bil's excellent writings on how to play, should be issued to every new lieutenant and senior NCO. It is not without flaws and it won't teach the nuts and bolts of HOW to get a platoon do things right. But it is shockingly good at teaching you what NOT to do, and let you get a bunch bad mistakes worked out with pixel truppen instead of the kind where you have to write letters to their family. Harder to do in an emergency mobilization with a war on, but I stand by the concept. 

Edited September 16, 2022 by dan/california

[The_Capt]

34 minutes ago, billbindc said:

By "non-linear" they are saying that they expect repeats of the outcome of the Kharkiv offensive. I don't think that's obfuscating anything. 

I read this as a bit of a spin piece to be honest.  I think the fear is that if Ukraine has "won" than why do we need to keep supporting them?  "They have not won, this will be a long fight = long term support".  As opposed to a military operations assessment.

The weather break will be the muddy season, not winter.  Winter warfare is harder in some ways and easier in others - ground firms up, wetlands can become like pavement.  Water obstacles freeze over and disease goes down - frostbite goes up.

Ukraine is re-setting and reloading because they made enormous gains.  I do not expect the Fall 22 offensives are over yet, maybe in a month or so.  Next ops are going to be continuous pressure on Kherson, slow biting there has a good chance of become another RA collapse.  Then the UA has to be thinking about "the middle".

As to how long this last - who frickin knows?  All we can say is that the strategic initiative has shifted and Russia is on the defensive; this was a key moment we were looking for.  How fast the UA can make gains is anyone's bet.  No one predicted the speed it occurred around Kharkiv - Kherson makes more sense for this war...slow...then fast.  The UA might make a switch back to Deep Strike campaigns to further stress the RA operational system, and then pulse out again after the mud clears.

All war is negotiation and sacrifice - the Russians seem to be the ones dealing with that space right now - less so Ukraine: they know all about sacrifice but are looking much less inclined to negotiate.  I will go back to a re-occurring theme: options. Russia now has the fewest military options it has had in this war - offensive appears off the table entirely, defensive is getting narrower as positions get tenuous and capability erodes (corrosive warfare - attrit the entire system, not just the front end).  The compression on those options lays out like a schematic basically all the way back to 24 Feb.  So Russia either needs to turn that around - and I am at a loss on how they can (nukes has been discussed and largely dismissed), or they start to explore other options in the diplomatic space.

Frankly short of a significant ally jumping in on the side of Russia - and now we are at how important relationships are - and no one is looking to do that, went way out on a branch on that one Vlad, Russia remains largely isolated and increasingly fragile. 

For the "what do we do next" problem space; establish some tangible objectives; confirm long term support to the end of the conflict, into post-conflict; get serious about national reconstruction and integration of Ukraine into the western sphere, and; start thinking about how we are going to manage the post-Ukraine War realities.  

Edited September 16, 2022 by The_Capt

[Vergeltungswaffe]

7 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Yup, there's a DC3 that still flies a regular route from Fort Lauderdale to Bimini and there's no mistaking the drumbeat of those radials.

Awesome.

[kevinkin]

10 minutes ago, billbindc said:

By "non-linear" they are saying

Then the writer should just say so. Dropping the term non-linear adds nothing other than asking the reader to guess what they mean. You see, I come away with the opposite - they don't expect repeats of Kharkiv into the winter which might lead to a step wise defeat of Russia in Ukraine in short order. If they expect a major winter slow down, just be clear about it.  

[billbindc]

7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I read this as a bit of a spin piece to be honest.  I think the fear is that if Ukraine has "won" than why do we need to keep supporting them?  "They have not won, this will be a long fight = long term support".  As opposed to a military operations assessment.

The weather break will be the muddy season, not winter.  Winter warfare is harder in some ways and easier in others - ground firms up, wetlands can become like pavement.  Water obstacles freeze over and disease goes down - frostbite goes up.

Ukraine is re-setting and reloading because they made enormous gains.  I do not expect the Fall 22 offensives are over yet, maybe in a month or so.  Next ops are going to be continuous pressure on Kherson, slow biting there has a good chance of become another RA collapse.  Then the UA has to be thinking about "the middle".

As to how long this last - who frickin knows?  All we can say is that the strategic initiative has shifted and Russia is on the defensive; this was a key moment we were looking for.  How fast the UA can make gains is anyone's bet.  No one predicted the speed it occurred around Kharkiv - Kherson makes more sense for this war...slow...then fast.  The UA make switch back to Deep Strike campaigns to further stress the RA operational system, and then pulse out again after the mud clears.

All war is negotiation and sacrifice - the Russians seem to be the ones dealing with that space right now - less so Ukraine: they know all about sacrifice but are looking much less inclined to negotiate.  I will go back to a re-occurring theme: options. Russia now has the fewest military options it has had in this war - offensive appears off the table entirely, defensive is getting narrower as positions get tenuous and capability erodes (corrosive warfare - attrit the entire system, not just the front end).  The compression on those options lays out like a schematic basically all the way back to 24 Feb.  So Russia either needs to turn that around - and I am at a loss on how they can (nukes has been discussed and largely dismissed), or they start to explore other options in the diplomatic space.

Frankly short of a significant ally jumping in on the side of Russia - and now we are at how important relationships are - and no one is looking to do that, went way out on a branch on that one Vlad, Russia remains largely isolated and increasingly fragile. 

For the "what do we do next" problem space; establish some tangible objectives; confirm long term support to the end of the conflict, into post-conflict; get serious about national reconstruction and integration of Ukraine into the western sphere, and; start thinking about how we are going to manage the post-Ukraine War realities.  

 

Yep, yep, yep. And one of the options that is narrowing is escalating the war beyond conventional means. Both Xi and Modi have made it publicly clear that they aren't happy and want Russia to negotiate an end. I'd suspect the private exchanges were more blunt still.