How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Harmon Rabb]

1 hour ago, BornGinger said:

That rhymed. Must be the beginning of a Combat Mission poem. Let us hear the rest, poet fellow.

Just an old English proverb. Felt it was appropriate given how close Putin's regime is getting to other authoritarian countries like North Korea, Iran and Syria.

Edited September 6, 2022 by Harmon Rabb

[Artkin]

2 hours ago, Huba said:

Ukraine suffered serious OPSEC breach, as map of planned Kharkiv counteroffensive was posted online:

This is exactly what I posted about a couple pages up in the thread. 38th Army (Though by this point close to defeated) held a line nearly from Kharkov to Izium. We are seeing a fraction of those fighting forces being used today.

Edited September 6, 2022 by Artkin

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, Huba said:

Ukraine suffered serious OPSEC breach, as map of planned Kharkiv counteroffensive was posted online:

And another news - this is for real, but sounds like a joke:

 

 

Hold the phone a minute...Russia is purchasing millions of indirect fire ammo from NK.  I thought Russia had a bottomless ocean of artillery ammunition stocks?  Why do they need to buy more?  "HIMARS were a minor irritant and the RA was just going to blast the UA off the battlefield inch by inch with a never ending supply of ammo."

Whoops. 

[Combatintman]

11 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Interesting that they chose Russia's mission and not someone else.  Any idea why they didn't choose someone else?

Steve

Not many to choose from is one of the big factors and many of those are in the middle of town and have a fair amount of security in and around them.  The Russian Embassy by comparison is accessible as it is outside the city centre.  The attack was clearly planned and IS-K had almost certainly gone there on days that the consular section was open to see what went on there.  That recce identified that there was a crowd to hide in and that Russian officials would come outside the embassy security perimeter to call people forward to get their visas which was the scenario in which the attack was made yesterday.  In security risk management terms a straight out case of an exploitable vulnerability.

The Pakistani Embassy, which used to be the British Embassy until 1994, is also pretty accessible for the same reason and that embassy also has lots of people outside it gathering for visas.  Of the two, and if I was in IS-K's shoes, I'd go for Russia because IS-K still relies on facilitation and recruitment via Pakistan.  This shouldn't be taken to mean that Pakistan is providing this - it is just where some recruitment happens and Pakistan's geography puts it adjacent to IS-K's stronghold in Kunar Province from which onward facilitation routes run.  It is of course no friend of the Pakistani government but far less hassle right now to target Russia because Russia isn't in a position to turn the screws on IS-K recruitment and facilitation. 

It is worth pointing out that IS-K is not the force it was in 2019 and now that it can't collaborate with the Haqqani Network in the way that it used to, it needs to pick and choose its targets carefully as well as implied above, ensure that its recruitment and logistics aren't disrupted.  Quite a few of the attacks this year have shown that IS-K is almost relearning its trade.  The August 31 attack on a Taliban military convoy in Kotal Khair Khana in Kabul's Police District 17 was a good example.  This was a VBIED and the intent was to target a bus full of Taliban military but the device was triggered too soon and a minibus with civilians aboard travelling in front of the military bus got the brunt of the blast.  That sort of botched execution was rare before August last year.

This attack was more about embarrassing the Taliban than attacking Russia although the suicide bomber made sure he got two of them.  The message was very much that the Taliban cannot keep foreign diplomats secure like they promised rather than Russia is a hated infidel country.

Other than that Steve ... I have no idea

[Combatintman]

5 hours ago, Grigb said:

Bit of update - I looked at UKR GS morning report for shelled villages. (I skipped some villages in UKR rear)

 

1. Looks like yesterday-today night significant shelling occurred at West and North-West where UKR push is seems to be under way
2. Bridgeheads and East are much quieter however at Bridgheads UKR are pushing south and we see possible significant UKR penetration at Novooleksandrivka

I have theory RU defense is buckling at East and UKR is putting pressure at West to prevent RU from transferring forces from West to East. 

Might also explain why lateral E-W bridges are being targeted - according to FIRMS there is a a fire  in the vicinity of a bridge just east of Kherson (annotated white box)

[dan/california]

40 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Hold the phone a minute...Russia is purchasing millions of indirect fire ammo from NK.  I thought Russia had a bottomless ocean of artillery ammunition stocks?  Why do they need to buy more?  "HIMARS were a minor irritant and the RA was just going to blast the UA off the battlefield inch by inch with a never ending supply of ammo."

Whoops. 

Be a great time for some issues with the trans Siberian railway. Is it clear if Russia is down to their war reserve stock levels? Or have they literally let so much ammo corrode and decay into uselessness that they are out out? Ukraine has used HIMARS brilliantly, but GMLRS won't hit the big Soviet depots out past the Urals.

[Combatintman]

20 hours ago, Cederic said:

 

As a smoker that guy is sure to get a posting to an ammunition depot.

[Maquisard manqué]

13 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Be a great time for some issues with the trans Siberian railway. Is it clear if Russia is down to their war reserve stock levels? Or have they literally let so much ammo corrode and decay into uselessness that they are out out? Ukraine has used HIMARS brilliantly, but GMLRS won't hit the big Soviet depots out past the Urals.

The DPRK artillery stock is also a good one to start running down, it you think about the risk it poses to Seoul…

I wish for a way to do the same that didn’t require firing the ordinance at Ukrainians.

[The_Capt]

11 minutes ago, dan/california said:

but GMLRS won't hit the big Soviet depots out past the Urals

Nope, but sabotage ops can. 

Russian stocks and production are likely down if they are buying that many rounds.  A few possibilities: 1) the reports of their war stocks was way over blown, 2) the war stocks they have are crap due to poor storage, 3) they have fired so many rounds that they need to re-stock to sustain operations, 4) UA actions have added to losses more significantly than they admit, and 5) domestic production cannot keep up with expenditure.

The reality is likely a combination of all of these.  Regardless it is another indicator of the stress on the Russian military system - this time strategic.  The only other explanation is if this was a pre-war buy that just came through but I do not see any evidence of this.

[dan/california]

A sudden out break off Train fires in outermost Siberian nowhere has a great deal of appeal.

[BlackMoria]

9 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Nope, but sabotage ops can. 

Russian stocks and production are likely down if they are buying that many rounds.  A few possibilities: 1) the reports of their war stocks was way over blown, 2) the war stocks they have are crap due to poor storage, 3) they have fired so many rounds that they need to re-stock to sustain operations, 4) UA actions have added to losses more significantly than they admit, and 5) domestic production cannot keep up with expenditure.

The reality is likely a combination of all of these.  Regardless it is another indicator of the stress on the Russian military system - this time strategic.  The only other explanation is if this was a pre-war buy that just came through but I do not see any evidence of this.

I would say all of the above. 

1. Russian pronouncements tend to overblown when they talks quantities of something.

2.  Based on a video earlier of a russian ammuntion train taken by someone amongst the ammo, the artillery ammo was heavy corroded, especially the fuzes.

3.  Based on villages and cities leveled during far eastern offensive a few months ago and the many videos of landscapes that look like the surface of the moon, I would say there was zero consideration of ammunition expenditure concerns.  I think that is catching up with them now.

4.  Russian ammunition dumps have all sorts of 'accidents' as we observed over the last six weeks. Mountains of the ammo is going up in spectacular explosions.

5.  I am certain that all facets of russian military capabilities are being stressed by the sanctions and corruption.

[akd]

45 minutes ago, Combatintman said:

Might also explain why lateral E-W bridges are being targeted - according to FIRMS there is a a fire  in the vicinity of a bridge just east of Kherson (annotated white box)

Dariivsky bridge pontoon replacement and nearby warehouse were hit.

 

Edited September 6, 2022 by akd

[keas66]

There doesn't seem to be too many railroad bridges  across the Tumen River on the North Korean/Russian Border .

[womble]

32 minutes ago, Maquisard manqué said:

I wish for a way to do the same that didn’t require firing the ordinance at Ukrainians.

Letting it get to a forward Log base/railhead, and then HIMARSing it achieves the depletion without the friendly casualties...

[danfrodo]

12 minutes ago, womble said:

Letting it get to a forward Log base/railhead, and then HIMARSing it achieves the depletion without the friendly casualties...

Yeah, definitely can't hit the stuff until it's "in theater".  That would be huge escalation.  This does show desperation for those of us in the "Putin is desperate on multiple levels" camp.  The "Russia is mighty" camp gets smaller and smaller but still some holdouts there.

Looks like the 'corrosive offensive' strategy is working in Kherson.  And now we have reports of increased UKR activity in Kharkiv & Izyum directions.  Force RU to choose losing territory or trying to reinforce, spreading its forces all over the place, back & forth to each new hot spot.  UKR is dictating the action while RU is forced to react.  

Putler's Pocket is currently on trajectory to be one of the most mocked events in military history.  Completely predictable and completely self-inflicted disaster via dictator.  Like the original Kherson pocket, where Hitler wouldn't pull out of the obviously vulnerable salient because he wanted to keep the resources and also viewed it has jumping off point for later counter offensive.  Hitler did love those "jumping off points for later offensive"' which after July 1943 always led to disaster.  History rhyming, once again.  Putler wants to hold Kherson for prestige and for his fantasy of later attacking toward Odessa.  

[Grigb]

UKR unofficially confirmed Novovoznesensk is liberated.

[Grigb]

RU sober assessment from Balaklya

Quote

News from the front, a look from the spot. Balaklya

"Balakleya in the operational encirclement. At 4 o'clock in the morning, an assault from the AFU is expected. Our aviation works from afar.

The tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: they go on the offensive, columns break into [our] positions at speed, [infantry] dismounts. The enemy is on tanks."

 

[Grigb]

RU mini assessment of UKR forces

Quote

The fighting unfolded in the area of the locality of Balakleya, which is between Izyum and Kharkov. The enemy presumably has from 2 to 4 brigades (one airmobile). The grouping is similar in composition to the one that attacked in the Kherson direction. It is covered by means of military air defense (up to a regiment) and is supported by artillery (about 40-60 guns, including 155 mm).

 

[riptides]

Interesting...Balakleya.

 

[Grigb]

RU confirms they captured Kodema at Bakmut direction. So far no significant progress anywhere else.

 

[Grigb]

15 minutes ago, riptides said:

Interesting...Balakleya.

 

It is incorrect. I can personally attest a few of them questioned if Kherson offensive is main one due to the relatively low number of forces involved.  Almost all of them reported that AFU is preparing to strike at Kharkiv-Izum direction. Some of them even properly named the area (Balaklya).

They are actually upset that despite their reporting RU command seems to fell a slip. But it is debatable as Mashkovets claims RU command was fully aware of the issue. It tried to solve the issue in August but failed. And the only mistake it made is it failed to guess properly where UKR strike exactly (from Pryshib to Verbivka)  

[UPDATE] Anatoly Dremov she is referencing to is not RU military reporter but RU soldier that got famous due to his online activity.

Edited September 6, 2022 by Grigb

[Beleg85]

20 minutes ago, Grigb said:

They are actually upset that despite their reporting RU command seems to fell a slip. But it is debatable as Mashkovets claims RU command was fully aware of the issue. It tried to solve the issue in August but failed. And the only mistake it made is it failed to guess properly where UKR strike exactly (from Pryshib to Verbivka)   

1. Do we now how many reinforcements Russians could muster at this front?

 

2. Regarding discussions about state of Russian economy, I didn't see this article posted here before. Worth to check, as it supposedly shows leaked internal assessment of true effects of war:  https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-05/russia-risks-bigger-longer-sanctions-hit-internal-report-warns?leadSource=uverify wall

 

3. ED: A video of ground combat from (probably very old, judging by voice) Russian soldier perspective. In previous one it is shown his entire squad was wiped out by something, literally lying one on another.

Edited September 6, 2022 by Beleg85

[danfrodo]

30 minutes ago, riptides said:

Interesting...Balakleya.

 

Looks to be around 17km NE from Balakalia to cut the E40 main N-S road to Izyum at Volokhiv Yar.  Still a long way to go.  Or 25km to Vesele directly east to cut E40 and junction w a secondary supply road.  Mostly open fields, but these are enormous distances in this war.  Not sure what this means.

[acrashb]

51 minutes ago, Grigb said:

The tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: they go on the offensive, columns break into [our] positions at speed, [infantry] dismounts. The enemy is on tanks."

We need to bring back tank riders.  At least in CMBS as Americans, I can't place even an two-man FO team on a tank and charge them forward.

[Grigb]

4 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Do we now how many reinforcements Russians could muster at this front?

Still significant

Quote

Unlike most of our "experts", I do not quite share particularly optimistic expectations about the activation of AFU in a number of sectors of the front. And now I will explain why…

1. The enemy has not yet used the bulk of its operational reserves, not to mention the main forces of the 3rd AK. At the moment, the Russian command reacts to the development of the situation mainly at the tactical level, trying to "stop" the advance of the AFU in certain areas. So, the enemy managed, despite the "completely interrupted communication across the Dnieper", to transfer to the bridgehead another 2 additional BTGrs (one from the 35th CAA, its probable 69th obrP, the second from the "semi-restored" 126th obr of the Black Sea Fleet), which had already deployed to the north of the Stanislav–Kherson road [West part, Stanislav is directly West from Kherson], because the command of the enemy troops on the bridgehead is clearly "worried" about their flank "ends" there. And it will be very difficult to "cut off" them, unlike what some of us think…

2. The screams regarding some kind of "moral and psychological decomposition" of the enemy troops, which I constantly stumble upon on social networks, are actually also, to put it mildly, exaggerated. At least, the enemy, wherever the AFU is attacked, provides tough resistance ... sometimes even counterattacks. For example, yesterday the enemy stubbornly tried to advance in the area of Lyubomirovka [West part, North East from Posad-Pokrovse] by the forces of a reinforced company with tanks. It was only thanks to persistent and prolonged fire fighting that he was stopped and forced to withdraw to the start line.

On other hand we discussed earlier that combat capabilities of even 3 AK are rather low. So, it is not as pessimistic as Mashkovets describes - I believe he intentionally leans toward a more pessimistic assessment in order not to sound like Arestovich.