How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Zeleban]

14 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

Так есть ли где-нибудь лучший, более актуальный опрос или это все еще лучшее, что у нас есть?

when Donbass was controlled by Ukraine, no one did any research about its loyalty to Ukraine. Everything was so obvious

[The_Capt]

15 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

There are so many goodies in this topic in last 24 hours that it will take several days to think and reflect them.

Just a several quick notes.

True, but I think this goal is very ambitious. As of now, there are no useful short-term levers in Western toolbox to force RU into submission, except directly helping Ukraine of course. All good tools are either mid o long term, and even them are uncertain.

It will be trully Herculeian task to keep Western resolve in mid- and long- term. I wonder if current US administration has announced its plan to Western partners in details- or if it has any longer plan at all ( I sincerely hope so).

 

 

Absolutely.  That is why this is not about the Donbas, or sending a few more HIMARs this is about a multi-year massive effort to sustain unity of effort in that compression pressure and sanctions, while pushing hard wherever we can in the Russian backfield (I.e supporting internal resistance), without pushing Russia over the edge; this is likely our new normal.

My concern is that we are straining to get to the end of this war, and have completely missed the fact that this does not end there - we must not let it end there.  If in 2 years we are buying Russian gas and oil, sanctions are fractured and lifted, and Putin is still in power threatening everyone one and back to his A-game of subversive warfare, elections interference and assassinations, while rebuilding his military- we have definitively failed and have set the terminal decline of the Western global order in motion.

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Absolutely.  That is why this is not about the Donbas, or sending a few more HIMARs this is about a multi-year massive effort to sustain unity of effort in that compression pressure and sanctions, while pushing hard wherever we can in the Russian backfield (I.e supporting internal resistance), without pushing Russia over the edge; this is likely our new normal.

My concern is that we are straining to get to the end of this war, and have completely missed the fact that this does not end there - we must not let it end there.  If in 2 years we are buying Russian gas and oil, sanctions are fractured and lifted, and Putin is still in power threatening everyone one and back to his A-game of subversive warfare, elections interference and assassinations, while rebuilding his military- we have definitively failed and have set the terminal decline of the Western global order in motion.

Basics of such policy will in fact need its own name and form appropriate for our enlighted era, like Kennan telegram; I dont't know, maybe "12-point Sullivan twitter thread" or 'Fellas meme warfare rules video"?

But seriously, I think the most probable outcome in 2-4 years will be something between two endgames you described. There is NO turning back to poisonings, oligarchs yachts and open bribes; we will still see some forms of subversive warfare that can be done by the internet alone. But energetics and resources are different matter; even most hawkish of German politicians state they will need probably several years to decouple from Russian gas. And Putin can find a lot buyers around the world. This + food crisis + inflation may soon bend the will of some of our partners. Frankly, we cannot even be certain how long US itself will stay this course. Due to very nature of political system, next US administration, whoever it will be, may even try to seek for another "reset" with Russia.

That is why I think we have window of maybe 2-4 years to subdue Kremlin, till memories of Russian brutallity are fresh. Then Putin may again start to accumulate more points; he probably thinks this way and is already clearly bracing for longer game (he actually announced that several times).

 

Hell of ambitious task, running against short-sighted political currents- I hope we still have blood in our veins, not water and oil, to pull it off. If we in the West (forgive I already treat NATO/EU Central European states as part of it) will be able to stay on course and subdue Russia in several years time - this will be feet worth of teaching to our granchildren.

 

 

 

 

Edited June 28, 2022 by Beleg85

[Vanir Ausf B]

Provides perspective on General Sir Patrick Sanders' earlier comments about needing more mass.

Edited June 28, 2022 by Vanir Ausf B

[chuckdyke]

Wonderful news when I woke up.

 

[Offshoot]

5 hours ago, Jammason said:

So the hot war of independence for DPR & LPR that started in 2014 (and gained momentum with civilian protests) is all Russian puppeteering and the puppets actually don't want independence at all? I'm curious: If a honest referendum (impossible, I know, but humor me) was held in DPR and LPR today, what is your percentage estimate of voters who would favor rejoining Ukraine over independence?

Likely they would go with whichever side they thought would provide the most stability and investment in infrastructure. If Ukraine joined the EU it might boost the pro-Ukrainian vote, or, given the older population in the Donbass now, the thought of Russian pensions might prevail.

https://theconversation.com/the-hope-is-finished-life-in-the-ukrainian-separatist-regions-of-donetsk-and-luhansk-177685

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/02/17/russia-wants-recognize-independence-two-eastern-ukraine-republics-what-do-people-there-think/

[paxromana]

Just something to reflect on .... Keynes (yes, that Keynes) made clear in his Economic Consequences of the Peace that the financial sanctions and reparation placed against Germany in 1919 were not tough enough ... and it was that lack of toughness that would (as it did) inevitably lead to further problems down the track.

His base posiution seems to have been that if Germany had been more harshly treated, bankrupted and kept that way in  effect, then it simply would not have been able to cause further problems since it would be unable to build a credible military.

The West as a whole needs to impose sanctions that actually cripple Russia, not the death by 1000 cuts half measures they have applied to date, and they need to enforce them rigidly. They also need to make it plain to third parties who will use this as an opportunity to get sweetheart deals with Russia that that will not be tolerated.

With already crumbling infrastructure how long would Russia be able to be seen as a credible non-nuclear threat if sanctions were serious? And the sanctions should remain in place even after Putin is gone until something like a moderate and rational government is in place ... 25-50-75 years? Won't be short term, I guess.

Edited June 29, 2022 by paxromana

[chuckdyke]

22 minutes ago, paxromana said:

inevitably lead to further problems down the track.

Down the track is 2022 now they are asking for higher German defense spending. Your valued WW2 Russian alley is the trouble maker.

[danfrodo]

UKR is outgunned, locally in Donbas by RU artillery and air.  So they are going after the ammo for the guns and now the airbases.  I like it.  I like it a lot.  Hard to find all those dang guns.  but easy, it seems, to find the ammo storage.

And a lot of talk about Russia and its future on the thread today.  But what's missing is that Russia is in control of what happens.  Remove Putin, make peace, make it stick, reform gov't and in 5-10 years things will start getting better.

Keep on the path Russia is on and it will be severe, ongoing economic decline and probably dangerous political instability.  

No one is invading Russia, especially not going to moscow removing the Russian gov't.  That's absurd beyond belief.  And Russia attacking NATO in a way that hurts NATO 1% as much as it hurts Putin is only slightly less absurd.

[keas66]

54 minutes ago, paxromana said:

Just something to reflect on .... Keynes (yes, that Keynes) made clear in his Economic Consequences of the Peace that the financial sanctions and reparation placed against Germany in 1919 were not tough enough ... and it was that lack of toughness that would (as it did) inevitably lead to further problems down the track.

His base posiution seems to have been that if Germany had been more harshly treated, bankrupted and kept that way in  effect, then it simply would not have been able to cause further problems since it would be unable to build a credible military.

The West as a whole needs to impose sanctions that actually cripple Russia, not the death by 1000 cuts half measures they have applied to date, and they need to enforce them rigidly. They also need to make it plain to third parties who will use this as an opportunity to get sweetheart deals with Russia that that will not be tolerated.

With already crumbling infrastructure how long would Russia be able to be seen as a credible non-nuclear threat if sanctions were serious? And the sanctions should remain in place even after Putin is gone until something like a moderate and rational government is in place ... 25-50-75 years? Won't be short term, I guess.

Are you reading the same  "The Economic Consequences of the Peace"  that I am reading ???? Where Does Keynes ever suggest that  the Treaty he was arguing against was not tough enough ???

I think you have seriously misread Keynes work .

[paxromana]

18 minutes ago, keas66 said:

Are you reading the same  "The Economic Consequences of the Peace"  that I am reading ???? Where Does Keynes ever suggest that  the Treaty he was arguing against was not tough enough ???

I think you have seriously misread Keynes work .

Perhaps ... "Secondly, the German economy was being so damaged, and the reparations demands were so great, that there was no way Germany could meet the demands"  ... perhaps just extrapolating.

[chuckdyke]

3 minutes ago, paxromana said:

that there was no way Germany could meet the demands"

Except for one just to elect a leader who had no plans to repay it. Yes, he was elected. 

[Calamine Waffles]

20 hours ago, Taranis said:

↑ Interesting video on Ukrainian armored OOB and equipment used

It's a bit outdated. Some of the information about specific tanks is wrong too.

[FancyCat]

6 hours ago, The_Capt said:

"Distrust and hardens positions"...I think we are already there.  Let me be clear, this is a war between Russian and the West right now, as much as it is between Russia and Ukraine - and in a war, distrust and hardening are virtues.  We are already there - Russia is already paranoid; sh*t is blowing up in their own country, and tens of thousands of its sons are dead, and we provided the ISR and systems to make it happen - does anyone think there is a "normal" after that?  We win this by removing the paranoid actor and trying to find another one we can tolerate - because spontaneous democracy is not realistic - while containing (etc) Russia. 

I think this is the crux of the issue, and perhaps we can agree to disagree.  I am of the opinion that we are already past the point of rational negotiation of an end-state with the current Russian regime - we passed it when Russian invaded a neighbor and committed war crimes on a massive scale and the again when we directly supported, and continue to support, the killing of Russians...in large numbers.  Our unstated war goals are in line with what I wrote previously, if we are willing to admit it or not, or we even know it yet, or not.

 

Definitely not a lot I disagree with from you. Is this still referenced as a special military operation in Russia? Has it become a war? I wonder about that.

[Battlefront.com]

I've been out for a bit, but just got caught up on everything.  I have time for two quick posts.  First... the military situation.

It seems that Ukraine is continuing to fight a conventional war instead of some sort of emotional propaganda fight like Russia is.  Ukraine recognized it's positions in the Donbas were no longer tenable and so withdrew.  Good.  As I (and others) have been saying since the start of the war, or at least more recently, territory isn't how Ukraine wins this war.  It wins by killing Russians to the point that Russia is obligated to stop killing Ukrainians.  Losing thousands of experienced soldiers to hold something that ultimately isn't defendable is not smart at all.  Anybody thinking this was a defeat for Ukraine is using the wrong metric.

Hopefully the withdrawal goes well.  Retrograde ops are the hardest and riskiest to pull off.  I expect there's going to be some significant tactical defeats (prisoners included), but so far Russia hasn't shown itself able to capitalize on opportunities. 

If Girkin's assessment is correct the primary force in contact with Ukrainian forces is the LDPR cannon fodder.  For sure the bulk of Russia's contribution to the battles around Severodonetsk came from artillery units.  This means Ukraine can withdrawn faster than Russia can respond.  Picture Ukrainian regards facing off against cannon fodder without their own cannons.

We also have to keep in mind that all these recent logistics strikes by Ukraine are absolutely having an impact on Russia's ability to wage war on its terms.  How much of an impact?  No idea, but it's pretty safe to say that Russia didn't stockpile all that ammo close to the front just to keep some logistics guys employed.  It might have taken Russia MONTHS to move that much stuff into the theater, therefore it could take months to restock.  Assuming there's no supply problem.

Steve

[Grigb]

9 hours ago, Jammason said:

So the hot war of independence for DPR & LPR that started in 2014 (and gained momentum with civilian protests) is all Russian puppeteering and the puppets actually don't want independence at all?

Yes. The locals did not want to start shooting war. It was Girkin who did it.   

 

9 hours ago, Jammason said:

 I'm curious: If a honest referendum (impossible, I know, but humor me) was held in DPR and LPR today, what is your percentage estimate of voters who would favor rejoining Ukraine over independence?

Do you count LDNR locals who escaped? Then the answer is majority.

[Grigb]

9 hours ago, Jammason said:

by saying it is the LPR/DPR who rebelled, and their brave fighting from 2014-2022 gave us proof they could win, which is why we came in now.

Except it was RU Girkin who started the war. Their fighting was not brave - some of them run away from UKR army (group of Miner ran from Enakievo without order). At the end they actually lost and had to be bailed out by direct RU invasion. 

There was no civil war. There was a foreign incited insurgency that was defeated and saved only by de facto annexation by RU. 

 

9 hours ago, Jammason said:

But how Russia rationalizes their actions to the world isn't the main point I was trying to make anyway. It is instead the move to support forces fighting for their independence is militarily smarter, more achievable given RU assets and liabilities, and is a much better "look" for Russia. The thread might benefit from separating this phase of the war from the initial stupidity and ineptitude.

It is not smarter - for internal stability RU must be seen by citizens as powerful military force capable of dealing with NATO. Currently it showed it cannot deal even with UKR army. Hiding behind LDNR does not help to restore image.  Without restoration of image, we are talking about attempts at internal regime change and the following civil war.  

[Grigb]

9 hours ago, The_Capt said:

The Tsar was accepted by the people as legitimate for centuries, the crime boss might have a few decades (although there are counter-examples in Africa).

Nonono, it does not matter who you are Tsar or Mob boss (which is actually the same thing in RU). What matters is whether you can show to people that You can protect them. With fortress under siege mentality people need someone who might be brutal, corrupt and incompetent but if he shows he can deal with heinous foreigners, he is legitimate power.

Tsar in RU-Japan war showed he cannot deal with "Jap monkeys" - first Ru revolution. In WW1 Tsar showed it cannot deal with Germans. He was out shortly. Stalin despite brutally and incompetence showed he can deal with Germans, they still revere him. USSR showed it cannot deal with Afghan Mojaheds and It collapsed shortly thereafter (it was not a single cause but one of major ones).

 

9 hours ago, The_Capt said:

3rd pole as irrational:  Global power poles are a zero sum game.  So we have Russia at with a GDP less than that of Canada, and 4 times the population, and has been basically flat since 2014.

Thinking behind 3rd pole is simple - unlike citizens the RU government is well aware the RU state is much weaker than US or China. To get and protect lebensraum RU desire a sort of power agreement with US and China. Like Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. RU promises not to make troubles in US/China lebensraum, but US/China promise not to make troubles in RU lebensraum. This power agreement is what RU call 3rd pole or multipolar world - entire world is divided by three countries in to respective lebensraums, where each respective country can do whatever it wants. 

So, it is not about power. It is more about RU promises not to sh*t into US slippers when US is not looking. Grain blockade is an example of such sh*tting - you cause us problems in Ukraine? We gonna make famine in Africa! You want to stop it come to use for an agreement. 

[The_MonkeyKing]

8 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

The details viewed from Turkish side:

https://twitter.com/ragipsoylu/status/1541853998138986497

Theoretically it is quite a lot, the question is if Erdogan really got something extra under the table and what will be execution of those agreements. I hope Kurds are not sold out again.

 

The details are what matter. Here is what Finnish officials and the president commented:

• Sweden/Finland will lift its arms embargo 
There was never an arms embargo. Every deal is weighted case by case as before by authorities. Pretty direct quite from the president.
• Both will support Turkey on PKK, stop support to YPG 
Direct quite from the president: "There will be no changes to the relationship with the PKK/YPG"
• They will amend their laws on terrorism 
Finland's changes made in the resent years were judged to be sufficient already (EU "standard" laws). Sweden is going to do similar changes soon. Written this way in the agreement.
• They will extradite terror suspects
Everything will continue according to EU regulations and international law as before. "This is a legal matter and cannot in anyway be effected by political agreements" - Finnish president.
• They will share Intel with each other 
Could mean lots of things. Totally unknown to me
• Turkey, Finland and Sweden will establish a permanent joint mechanism to consult on justice, security and intelligence
Could mean lots of things. Totally unknown to me

[chuckdyke]

2 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Totally unknown to me

Politicians' university. You can promise your constituents anything because you are not going to honor it anyway.

[Battlefront.com]

The Russian Empire was destined to collapse.  It eventually did with a massive and horribly bloody civil war that mostly reassembled the old Empire's territories under "new management" of the Soviet Union.  It went after its lost territories as soon as it was able to, including the Baltics, Finland, Poland, and various bits and pieces here and there.  After it narrowly survived WW2 it sought to EXPAND its territory by militarily and economically dominating Eastern Europe.  For the entire Cold War it made attempts to go beyond that and have military and economic control over all sorts of places the old Russian Empire didn't.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990/1991 it didn't really end.  For the second time we got the Russian Empire under "new management".  This time calling itself the Russian Federation.  Unlike 1917 the breakup was mostly bloodless initially.  However, the Russian Federation set out to do exactly what the Soviet Union did before it which was to retake all the territory it previously had under its control.  That included Eastern Europe and "Communist" countries around the globe.

Initially Russia was distracted by the Caucuses.  There was so much going on there it couldn't deal with much else.  The struggle for the Caucuses was brutal and bloody.  For other former Russian Empire/Soviet Union regions it made economic deals that effectively gave Russia enough control that it was satisfied for the short term.  Former Soviet countries that didn't do this sort of thing got onto Russia's hit list.  It is no coincidence that as the Caucuses came under its control Russia's confrontational positions against NATO and Europe went up considerably.  Georgia was hit first because it was the most obvious one to target.  Ukraine and Belarus came next.  Baltics and Poland, maybe even Finland, would come after that.

Under Putin it's been eroding steadily due to inept leadership and criminal intentions.  Now the contract Putin made with the Russian people and power centers is in tatters.  Instability is back.  Economic hardship is back.  Isolation is back.  Inept central economic control is back. Russians are not unaware of it and are likely intuitively anticipating that chaos will be back very soon.  Thanks to its botching of the war in Ukraine its end is likely to be quite soon.

Since the Russian Federation is behaving just like the Soviet Union did after the collapse of the Russian Empire, so we should anticipate that whatever remains of the Russian Federation after it's inevitable collapse will behave the same way.  And collapse is going to happen.

We can only hope that the Russian Federation breaks apart peacefully AND it stays that way.  Unfortunately, I don't see that happening.  When Putin is gone there will be another Putin trying to recreate what the Tzars had.  The West would be wise to start planning for this now so that a second form of NATO can limit its ability to do so.  Because without NATO, the Baltics, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and probably Poland would all be under Russia's thumb again.

Steve

[Grigb]

Civilian Girkin referenced following article about RU oil revenues

Quote

Oil revenues of the Russian budget have collapsed to a minimum since the beginning of the war

June brought Russia a new wave of falling raw materials revenues. Russian oil exports through seaports fell by 20% in the week ended June 24, adding "pain" to the federal budget, which is already bursting at the seams due to the growth of the ruble.

Weekly collections of export duties on oil fell to $123 million, Bloomberg calculated based on data from the Ministry of Finance and tanker statistics.

Compared with the peak values of April, the flow of petrodollars has halved and has reached the minimum since the beginning of the war. The budget received even less in rubles: the dollar exchange rate has fallen by 7.5 rubles since the beginning of June, and on Tuesday it again reached the minimum for 7 years - 52.5750 rubles.

Alfa-Bank estimates that to make ends meet, the budget needs oil at $100 per barrel. But Urals buyers do not agree with such a price tag: in May, the Russian oil brand was sold for an average of $78.

 

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Civilian Girkin referenced following article about RU oil revenues

 

This is why I've largely ignored people harping about the amount of money that Europe is still spending on Russian energy sources.  Yes, there's a lot of money still flowing to Moscow in absolute monetary value, but percentage wise Russia is overall net negative with the energy market.  Couple this with the massive declines in the other Russian market sectors and the economy is going down fast.  At the same time it is fighting an expensive war that it's losing.

Not an indicator of good things to come for Russia.

Steve

[FancyCat]

10 hours ago, The_Capt said:

"Distrust and hardens positions"...I think we are already there.  Let me be clear, this is a war between Russian and the West right now, as much as it is between Russia and Ukraine - and in a war, distrust and hardening are virtues. 

Why I ask whether Russia and the Russian people consider it a war, why is Medvedev saying stuff like "if Ukraine invades Crimea, it will be war". Isn't Russia still hiding the KIAs and WIAs from public knowledge? I was under the impression this was to try and defer foreign involvement but "special military operation" serves a domestic purpose as well, no?  Russia still has not mobilized, and I'm beginning to think that it's not just simply due to the burden of explaining it's failure in Ukraine so far, it is also gonna have to explain why despite after mobilizing Russia is still gonna lose. (Which I think is a valid separation to consider) if one considers that military defeat brings about regime changes, certainly making a distinction between a "special operation" and a war might just be enough leeway to get Putin out of getting overthrown.

[MikeyD]

The benefit of money is your ability to buy stuff with it. If there's no stuff to buy money becomes useless as a commodity. Russia is currently under strict sanctions. No matter how much its incoming oil revenue, it can't get translated into 'stuff'. Can't buy cars with it, can't buy airplane parts with it, can't buy farm machinery or computers or medicines.