How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[sburke]

21 minutes ago, Splinty said:

@Elvis. I  think this guy needs some attention.

reported.  It is Sunday so hopefully he's finished lunch before having to deal with this.

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Harmon Rabb said:

I strongly suspect that soon YouWillOwnNothing won't even own a Battlefront forum account if he keeps behaving this way.

Yeah, he's gone now.  Warned him several times and (not unexpectedly) he didn't listen.

Steve

[sburke]

Putin 'calls up obese 20st retired general to lead forces in Ukraine' (msn.com)

@The_Captis this what you were referring to regarding mass?

Edited June 26, 2022 by sburke

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, kraze said:

It did happen, they were going to Kyiv with russians, but when the first shots started flying - Belarusian army turned tail and ran away. They didn't expect a shooting war, just a safe ride to Kyiv (like wha-?). Apparently Lukashenko himself didn't expect it will be so serious, as he himself stated at one point that the war will last hours. They did treat us as just being there for the taking.

But very small amounts of belarusian soldiers did remain and took part in committing war crimes near Kyiv.

Got some sources for that?  I was following the war extremely closely and saw no evidence of this at the time.

Anyway, my point was about the border stretching west of Kyiv.  If Belarus moved over the border there, where Russian forces weren't, it would have been a significant distraction for Ukrainian defenses at a time when Russia needed a distraction.  Yet it didn't happen and the reason for it not happening isn't because Lukashenko has a spine + principles, nor is it because Putin respects Belarus' in any way shape or form.  Therefore, the invasion of Western Ukraine by Belarus didn't happen because even Putin was convinced it wasn't going to be good for his short term plans.  And the only reason I can think of for that is because Putin was convinced that Belarus would collapse into chaos.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Heard this interesting bit on the radio today by a total fluke.  Go to the 40:18 mark and you'll hear a guy named Tetlock describing exactly what went wrong with the bulk of the experts who called this war so horribly wrong even though I'm pretty sure this was recorded before the war:

https://freakonomics.com/podcast/season-11-episode-43/

It's really interesting stuff.  There's more from Tetlock on Freakonomics from the past about how bad forecasting is and why the people making wrong calls don't face "punishment" for being bad at their jobs.

Steve

[akd]

20 hours ago, FancyCat said:

More Tochkas? Suicide drone? Also, damn, Ukraine is hitting really deep. In the tweet below, they are not saying HIMARS, but the name of the plant. random replies say it can't be HIMARS since the noise is too slow but I know nothing about that. 

https://liveuamap.com/en/2022/25-june-explosions-near-snizhne

 

 

 

 

Was Tochka-U:

 

[FancyCat]

28 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Got some sources for that?  I was following the war extremely closely and saw no evidence of this at the time.

Anyway, my point was about the border stretching west of Kyiv.  If Belarus moved over the border there, where Russian forces weren't, it would have been a significant distraction for Ukrainian defenses at a time when Russia needed a distraction.  Yet it didn't happen and the reason for it not happening isn't because Lukashenko has a spine + principles, nor is it because Putin respects Belarus' in any way shape or form.  Therefore, the invasion of Western Ukraine by Belarus didn't happen because even Putin was convinced it wasn't going to be good for his short term plans.  And the only reason I can think of for that is because Putin was convinced that Belarus would collapse into chaos.

Steve

You're not wrong at all, but I think emphasizing Putin's decision making in Belarus is understating what Grigb said, that Belarus would likely revolt at being ordered against Ukraine. While yes, Russia does have Belarus littered with personnel to stop a coup, keep them in line, I'm not sure that would be enough to stop Belarus from revolting against Russian orders or personnel, even during the lowest point of the war for Ukraine. 

[Harmon Rabb]

46 minutes ago, sburke said:

Putin 'calls up obese 20st retired general to lead forces in Ukraine' (msn.com)

@The_Captis this what you were referring to regarding mass?

I think this guy needs to spend some time riding @danfrodo's NordicTrack steed.

Edited June 26, 2022 by Harmon Rabb

[dan/california]

 

15 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Heard this interesting bit on the radio today by a total fluke.  Go to the 40:18 mark and you'll hear a guy named Tetlock describing exactly what went wrong with the bulk of the experts who called this war so horribly wrong even though I'm pretty sure this was recorded before the war:

https://freakonomics.com/podcast/season-11-episode-43/

It's really interesting stuff.  There's more from Tetlock on Freakonomics from the past about how bad forecasting is and why the people making wrong calls don't face "punishment" for being bad at their jobs.

Steve

Speaking of assessing the Ukrainian and Russian forces, is there any public info about how the poles and the Baltics intelligence services thought about the two sides? I still firmly believe the U.S. problem was reading the Russian General Staffs email system and believing what the Russians were telling themselves.. 

[FancyCat]

It is interesting Zelensky addressed Belarus. Editor of Kiyv Independent so I'm assuming his memory is good. The only thing I can think of is even at the lowest point of the war for Ukraine earlier in the months before, Russia assumed the fight was done, and that Belarus wouldn't be needed. Maybe then, the idea of Belarus as a transit point for Russia to avoid economic sanctions might have been in play, and now less likely due to combo of sanctions being issued against both. Maybe the manpower shortage is such that Belarus's poorly able units are such that Russia is desperate for anything at all. 

On one hand, Putin must know Belarus isn't that useful, on the other hand, Putin may be betting Ukraine is about to break, and if Russia is at a breaking point as well, Belarus's intervention may tip the breaking point enough for Russia to outlast Ukraine, even if both are about to tip over in Donbas. 

Maybe its just Zelensky being cautious, but desperation does drive. Even as Russia was rolled back months ago, they were not desperate. Perhaps now it is sinking in and Putin is willing to put the gun to Lukashenko.

Edited June 26, 2022 by FancyCat

[Huba]

33 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

It is interesting Zelensky addressed Belarus. Editor of Kiyv Independent so I'm assuming his memory is good. The only thing I can think of is even at the lowest point of the war for Ukraine earlier in the months before, Russia assumed the fight was done, and that Belarus wouldn't be needed. Maybe then, the idea of Belarus as a transit point for Russia to avoid economic sanctions might have been in play, and now less likely due to combo of sanctions being issued against both. Maybe the manpower shortage is such that Belarus's poorly able units are such that Russia is desperate for anything at all. 

On one hand, Putin must know Belarus isn't that useful, on the other hand, Putin may be betting Ukraine is about to break, and if Russia is at a breaking point as well, Belarus's intervention may tip the breaking point enough for Russia to outlast Ukraine, even if both are about to tip over in Donbas. 

Maybe its just Zelensky being cautious, but desperation does drive. Even as Russia was rolled back months ago, they were not desperate. Perhaps now it is sinking in and Putin is willing to put the gun to Lukashenko.

I honestly don't believe Lukashenka will go for it, unless the gun to his head is literal. But let's assume for a moment that they will - what can they reasonably achieve?

UA- BA border is one huge swampy forest with some rivers. BA has 4 mechanized brigades of doubtful quality, plus some air assault/ spetznaz units, and some artillery. There's no way in hell they would be able to do more then put local pressure on UA, who would have to maybe move 1 or 2 regular army brigades to support the TD units. Main UA GLOCs from Poland are around 200 km from BA border, it's quite safe to assume that threatening them is not in reach of Luka's army. Not much would change regarding air war, as Russians use BA airspace freely anyway.

What is interesting is what would NATO (and especially Poland as the directly affected party) do when shells started exploding just across the border fence? I'm not sure if Putin would like to take that risk, it could easily slip out of control.

 

In other news, I ran across this bit of RUMINT - it coincides with Spain deploying a NASAMS unit in the Baltics. Not necessarily it is the one to be purchased, but at least it would make training much easier to arrange.

 

 

Edited June 26, 2022 by Huba

[Artkin]

AAMRAM is due to be phased out anyway. They could potentially get long range versions

[akd]

@sburke @Kinophile

Mikhail “Troll” Yeresko, commander 3rd Battalion, 107th Rifle Regiment, 1st AK, DNR:

 

[Machor]

Interesting claim being made - by an account we've hitherto trusted - that the initial assault on Kyiv had an airborne component which was cancelled at the last minute; would call for a reassessment of the reasons for Russia's failure if true:

 

[Machor]

Rare video of what appears to be a Ukrainian tank company making a stop while moving in column towards Bakhmut [The direction stated in the tweet is contested.]:

Now that the defenders of Severodonetsk are out, we have more footage of the urban fighting there - note the Dushka:

 

[Artkin]

Operator Starsky (Ukrainian soldier) at Hostomel:

An-225 has another aircraft's stabilizer lodged in its wing

Ka-52 rotor blades are made of layers of fabric (Higher tensile than metal?)

Russian military PCB (Presumed from helicopters) made in China

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=aEug0yY2mBE

Edited June 26, 2022 by Artkin

[dan/california]

FINALLY!

 

[Machor]

The Russian KT: Turret-cam view of T-90M in action (with authentic sound):

Technicals will no longer be associated with the third world after this war:

And yet another supplier of Ukraine - Azerbaijan:

 

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, sburke said:

Putin 'calls up obese 20st retired general to lead forces in Ukraine' (msn.com)

@The_Captis this what you were referring to regarding mass?

Where is the throwing up emoji on this thing…?  Found it.

[paxromana]

7 hours ago, FancyCat said:

Enforcement of the NPT via a UN framework would fail due to Russia being on the UN Security Council. Not to mention Russia's control of grain, oil and gas gives powerful incentives for many states not to take harsher positions sanctions wise. In effect, if Russia really does decide to give nuclear weapons to Belarus (tho it's probably more like station under lock and key of Russian control), I don't think there's much to threaten Russia with.

What's sauce for the Goose is sauce for the Gander.

By thge above metric the US could place nukes in Poland ... though, of course, Poland would have to actually agree, rather than simply be told as Lukashenko presumably has been!

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

I honestly don't believe Lukashenka will go for it, unless the gun to his head is literal. But let's assume for a moment that they will - what can they reasonably achieve?

UA- BA border is one huge swampy forest with some rivers. BA has 4 mechanized brigades of doubtful quality, plus some air assault/ spetznaz units, and some artillery. There's no way in hell they would be able to do more then put local pressure on UA, who would have to maybe move 1 or 2 regular army brigades to support the TD units. Main UA GLOCs from Poland are around 200 km from BA border, it's quite safe to assume that threatening them is not in reach of Luka's army. Not much would change regarding air war, as Russians use BA airspace freely anyway.

What is interesting is what would NATO (and especially Poland as the directly affected party) do when shells started exploding just across the border fence? I'm not sure if Putin would like to take that risk, it could easily slip out of control.

Belarussians would make great target practice for newly forming Ukrainian units...In case of incursion they would probably be stopped by local Territorial Defence.

Let's be serious, maximum they can do is some incidents across the border and just being there putting some pressure.

Russians are building triumphal arc next to famous MOD cathedral...

 

As to importance of this phase of the war, Ivan Matveev thread is perfect read. You can autotranslate; it's long, but much clearer than most western analysis.

 

[LongLeftFlank]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

The Russian army took Severodonetsk. Why are the Russian units moving forward again? Ukraine lost? I will try to analyze the new tactics of Putin's army, which helps it achieve local victories. My thoughts are in a new thread.....

1. After a series of failures in the spring, having suffered significant losses, the Russian army has noticeably changed its tactics of warfare. By adapting it to your new goals, using your strengths and trying to level out your weaknesses. And also adjust to the actions of the Ukrainian army

2. In this thread, I will first outline the main conclusions and my thoughts about the actions of the Russian army, and then I will analyze each item and justify it. I will also add the necessary details. First a brief summary, then an in-depth analysis. Begin

3. How have the goals of growing the army changed?

It was: Change of power in Ukraine

Now: Force Zelensky to accept peace on Putin's terms

Was: Take control of the country

Now: Capture Luhansk and Donetsk regions

Was: Defeat the Ukrainian army

Now: Force the Ukrainian army to retreat

4. In accordance with the goals, tactics have also changed. Instead of wide maneuvers, we see local attacks. Instead of encircling enemy groupings, the tactics of "pushing out" the enemy from key areas. Instead of focusing on mobile units - widespread reliance on artillery as the key to success

 

5. The sequence of actions of Putin's army is as follows:

1. Create pressure on a key area

2. Ensure superiority of forces in the area

3. Start bypass movements on the flanks

4. Having created a half ring, conduct a massive assault

5. Having occupied the area, strengthen there

 

6. Offensive operations of the Russian troops became:

1. Slow and methodical

2. Cautious, with minimal risk

3. Local. The area of operations is close to the range of cannon artillery (15-20 km)

4. Thoroughly prepared

We did not see all this in February and March

7. The growing army bites off the territory in small pieces. This "eat the pie in pieces" tactic is ineffective in a protracted war. The key to success is the defeat of the enemy army over a large area. But in the short term, this approach brings results to those who have more resources.

8. Ros army solves political, not military tasks. The first is to give Putin a real victory. The capture of first Luhansk and then Donetsk regions of Ukraine was chosen as such a victory. The second is not to lose too much and not suffer embarrassing defeats. These tasks defined a new style of war

9. So they attacked Severodonetsk, surrounded on three sides. The Zolote area was also attacked in a similar way (I will analyze it in detail later). The main effort still remains a frontal assault. From the point of view of command, assault reduces risk and gives much more control over the local situation.

10. It is important to understand. Now the Russian army wants to seize the territory. Not to defeat the Ukrainians, but to drive them away - to squeeze them out of important areas. Because Putin is not interested in what is happening with military operations. He obviously demands the capture and occupation of Ukrainian land

11. As a result, we see a series of short-term local offensives followed by assaults on key points. And this will continue until the Ukrainian army stops them or the Russian units run out of strength.

12. And now about everything in more detail and in order. Let's go back to April, when the Russian army concentrated on the Eastern Front. It was at that moment that the goals that Putin set for the generals changed dramatically. This is the plan that appears to have been approved

13. The Russian command realized its main weakness - the insufficient number of troops. It was in April that the loudest talk was about a possible mobilization, because the shortage of troops was obvious. But instead of increasing the army, it was decided to reduce the goals

14. Then Putin's officials started talking about the fact that the main thing was the capture of Donbass, and after the transfer of troops, it became clear that this was the case. The main Russian groups left for Izyum and the territory of the occupied LDNR. At the same time, negotiations ended.

15. The subsequent offensive to the south from Izyum was the last attempt by the growing army to create a wide encirclement and encircle a large grouping of Ukrainian troops. But it proceeded sluggishly, and apparently soon the Russian generals abandoned this idea.

16. Moreover, the first plan was not the defeat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, not a military victory, but the “liberation”, as Putin’s propaganda says, of the remnants of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. That is, it became enough to force the Ukrainian troops to leave. How to do it? Using the main trump card

17. The Russian army gained experience and tried to level out its shortcomings - low numbers and unprofessionalism. And to conduct combat operations with an emphasis on strengths - air superiority and dominant superiority in artillery. This was the tactic

18. Personnel changes also point to this. Putin has changed commanders twice since the beginning of April. And both times the posts go to the "Syrian" generals. Those who have experience in restoring order, massive bombing of cities and squeezing out the enemy with the seizure of territory

19. From April to the end of June, I see the Russian offensive as a chain of local operations. I got the following list (part 1):

1 Offensive from Izyum

2 Advance towards Belogorovka

3 Assault on Rubizhne

4 Assault on Popasna

5 Forcing the Seversky Donets near Belogorovka

20. The second part of the list of operations:

6 Advance from Popasna

7 Assault Liman

8 Storming of Severodonetsk

9 Assault on Svyatogorsk

10 Attack on Svetlodarsk

11 Surrounding the Golden

 

21. All these operations took place in areas with a radius of 10-20 km, most often these were assaults on settlements from several directions. All these operations took place according to one scenario.

22. The Russian army gathered in one place the overwhelming number of artillery and brought up the best infantry forces for the attack. Then the area was shelled until the Ukrainians left it. Then the growing parts slowly moved in there. The offensive went on for 3-5 days, then the units stopped

23. According to various sources, the advantage of growing the army in artillery is in the range from 1:10 to 1:20. Pay attention to this material, it will talk about how wasteful artillery can be growing, shooting even at single soldiers

The spearhead of Putin's offensive operations was the PMC Wagner and the remaining paratroopers. Which are regularly transported from one zone to another. Where a lot of infantry is needed, the troops of the DPR and LPR are used. Recently, they are no longer enough, but more on that later.

24. Let's look at the encirclement of Zolote as an example of the new tactics of growing the army. In general, Zolote was attacked from the first days - it is located on the original line of demarcation. But rare attacks did not bring success.

25. By the beginning of April, the growing army advanced from the terrorist LPR to Nizhny and Toshkovka. And from the east - to Popasna. Gold gradually turned out to be in a semicircle. At that time, it covered the flank of the group defending Popasnaya

26. End of April. Taken Novotoshkovskoe. The army grew very gradually, moving the front and occupying one small settlement after another.

27. Seventh of May. Ukrainian troops leave Popasna, positions in which it became impossible to defend under massive shelling of growing artillery. Ros army occupies Popasnaya and the dominant height. Ukrainians are strengthening in Kamyshevakh. The rest of the positions remain

28. For a whole week the army was growing, preparing a new offensive from Popasnaya and attacking mainly Kamyshevakha. But all attacks are repulsed. By May 15, the Lower was taken, there are advances in the Zolote area. But the region as a whole remains with the Ukrainians

29. The offensive from Popasna begins on 18 May and reaches its peak by 24 May. By May 26, battles are going on for Kamyshevakha, it passes from hand to hand, attacks by Vrubovka begin. To the east of Zolotoy there is a small offensive towards Gorsky. And they still can't take Toshkovka. She is bypassed
30. June begins. The troops are taking Kamyshevakha, there are battles for Vrubovka, they are regularly attacking Toshkovka and Zolote, propaganda is growing that they have either already been taken or are about to be taken
31. If we rewind to June 15, we will see that nothing has changed. The answer is simple - all forces are involved in the assault on Severodonetsk, some are advancing on Bakhmut, others - from Izyum to Slavyansk
32. By June 18, Severodonetsk was taken almost completely, the Azot plant was blocked. The forces were again transferred to the Zolote area, and by June 20 a massive attack on Mirnaya Dolina followed. She was taken almost immediately, as was Toshkovka, who stood in the way. The final battle for the Golden is approaching

33. By June 22-23, everything was over. Ukrainian troops partially retreated, partially surrounded. The battle for this small area continued in its active phase from the beginning of April to the end of June, approximately 82-83 days.

34. Pay attention to how the offensives of the growing army developed. 1. They concentrated on taking settlements. 2. The attacks actively continued for 2-3 days, then less intense fighting and the accumulation of forces. 3. Attacks took place when forces were not needed in other sectors of the front.

35. Some will call such tactics effective. I see it as an attempt to mask the general weakness of the Russian army. Literally one detail. Everything that I stifled here in 11 tweets took place on a square of 20 km, the maximum advance of the growing troops also turned out to be about 20 km. For 83 days!

36. An interesting detail that will tell us about the weakness of the Russian army. Recall the offensive from Popasna. Then many wrote that the Severodonetsk grouping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was about to be surrounded. And I wrote in the thread that this is unlikely or will not happen soon

37. Why did the growing army refuse such a movement to immediately cut off most of the Ukrainian troops and leave them without supplies? And instead, she switched to a frontal assault on Severodonetsk and attacks on Vrubovka, Toshkovka and Zolote?

38. To do this, you need to figure out how the offensive goes and what forces are needed to create such a ring. You need to understand that you cannot just walk a certain distance and that's it - your territory. She needs to be controlled. Namely, to defend against possible enemy counterattacks.

39. For defense, you need to take positions, dig trenches, dig in equipment, equip communications and everything else. As long as the soldiers do this, they cannot advance anywhere. Therefore, there is such a section of the charter as “company / battalion / regiment in attack”, well, there is a similar one about defense, of course

40. Now in the army of the Russian Federation BTG are actively used - Battalion tactical groups. They are not exactly equal to the battalion, but are close in composition. This means that they can act in a similar way in defense. According to the Soviet-Russian system, the battalion in defense occupies a strip 5 km wide

41. This width depends on how far the battalion can shoot. Just 2-2.5 kilometers is effective tank shooting. Yes, armored personnel carriers are reinforced by artillery, but artillery cannot give the control that small arms give. Leaving large gaps between battalions is dangerous

42. And so, it turns out that for every 5 km of the front there should be one BTGr. Let's return to that very theoretical environment of Severodonetsk. Let's estimate how many armored personnel carriers would be needed to defend the closed ring. We take into account that we will have to defend from two sides

43. From one Belogorovka to another (do not ask) about 20 kilometers. So you need 20/5*2 = 8 BTGr. + 1 BTGr to attack and at least one in reserve, what if the front fails somewhere? That is, a minimum of 10 BTGr only to complete the ring, taking into account weak resistance

44. But there is still the rest of the front, defending armored personnel carriers are also needed there. I figured that around Popasnaya, even without further advance, another 7-8 armored personnel carriers should have defended. That is, only up to 17-20 BTG, subject to complete success. For defense only

45. And of course you will ask. So, stop, but there are not only BTGrs, there are also various LPR-DPR troops, PMCs and others. So it is. But when you are advancing quickly, you can only rely on your grouping. How to entrust heterogeneous forces to build a fast and reliable defense?

46. Another question is how to supply them all? In addition, according to experts, the Russian army is experiencing a serious shortage of personnel in its armored personnel carriers. They should be larger than a battalion (900 men), but in reality they can be barely larger than a company (200 men). More

47. For defense, personnel are extremely important. A tank will not dig a trench for itself. Arta will not drag a shell for herself. If no one covers the BMP from machine guns, such an BMP will not live for a long time. Therefore, the shortage of units primarily affects the defensive qualities of the growing army.
48. It seems illogical, according to military rules, personnel are more important for attack than for defense. But as I wrote above, the growing army corrected this through tactics. A lot of artillery shelling on stationary positions makes a massive assault unnecessary. Can attack in small groups
49. Defending in small groups will not work. At least because two eyes are not four. You look to the left, and on the right, the Ukrainian DRG has already passed on a buggy. Again, it is necessary to stand on guard, and cook food, and cut logs for positions. We need hands, but we don't have them.
50. The attack speed of the growing army greatly reduces losses in armored vehicles. As soon as something on tracks or wheels leaves for the front, a Ukrainian with a Javelin meets him. Either with the Stugna, or with the NLAW ... Huge losses of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles make the growing army use them more carefully

51. And also to bring more and more old equipment from warehouses. Including the very old T-62. According to my information, they were used not only on the Kherson and Zaporozhye fronts for defense. But also in the Vrubovka area - in the hottest place

52. If there are no armored vehicles, then the infantry cannot go forward for a long time. It is necessary to move artillery fire to the second and third lines of defense, as if during the First World War. And then the soldiers get completely tired, losses accumulate, ammunition runs out.

53. This is why the Russian army attacks slowly. To have enough time and energy to build a defense of the captured patches of land. To gradually build up supply without causing an overload of the weak logistics network. In order to have time to pull up artillery in the end.

54. I do not expect mobile warfare from the Russian army at this stage. It is unprofitable for them, on the contrary, the slow extrusion and assault of individual villages leads to success. Yes, the victories are small and limited, but there are no other results, and even they look significant in the end.

55. What is happening now? It is reported that the Ukrainian units left the industrial zone of Severodonetsk. Obviously, the next local offensive of Putin's army will be the assault on Lisichansk. In the same style - creating a half ring and artillery hell.

56. The goal of the growing army is to reach the borders of the Lugansk region, and most likely in the short term they can achieve this. And the Ukrainians will retreat to the new defensive line Bakhmut - Soledar - Seversk.

57. At the same time, Slavyansk became the second area for the local offensive of the growing army. Probably the growing army will build bridges across the Seversky Donets and try to attack from two sides.

58. But why could an army grow at all? I have already named one reason - the change of tactics to a more convenient one. The second reason is the weakening of the Ukrainian army. Ukrainians are also losing equipment, and Western weapons are arriving with delays.

59. April deliveries put everyone (including me) in an optimistic mood. But then May followed, when almost nothing of the heavy weapons was sent. And only now new howitzers and self-propelled guns began to arrive. Including MLRS HIMARS.

60. In the meantime, the Ukrainians used up almost all their shells for Soviet 152-mm guns and long-range Soviet MLRS Smerch / Uragan. And it's almost impossible to get new ones. What further weakened the Ukrainian artillery

61. The third reason is that the Russian army has established a flow of volunteers to the front, partially covering the losses. We see this, among other things, from open data on losses. The number of volunteers has sharply increased in them. While the figure is not critical, but it must be multiplied by at least 3.

62. Moreover, the BBC writes that the Russian authorities are preparing a law according to which it will be possible to sign a contract immediately after school. Now you can go to contract service after being drafted into the army. That is, they are literally going to send schoolchildren to war

63. Let's get to the fun part. How can Ukraine resist Putin's offensive? Are there any chances and what do I see them in? And also why I firmly stand by my opinion - Putin's Russia has already lost the war

64. The Ukrainian army can hit the strong side of the growing army - artillery. And try to reduce the Russian advantage here. For this, long-range howitzers Pzh 2000 and Cesar are needed. As well as the American HIMARS. To get the rose long-range guns

65. But it is a long and difficult task to fight against growing artillery, because there is stupidly a lot of it. And Western supplies are few. It will take several months to achieve parity. There is another way. You can hit in a weak spot - so that the army grows, it cannot use its advantage 100%

66. Namely, logistics. Taking out ammunition depots. What the Ukrainian artillery is already doing quite successfully. Recently, I have heard about 4 or 5 powerful explosions of Putin's army warehouses on the Zaporozhye front and in the Donbass

68. In many ways, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are now engaged in this, drawing the growing army into the struggle for Kherson. I already wrote that the offensive here is the most promising. Yes, the Ukrainians were not able to gather a lot of forces, so the offensive is local. But it is still useful, as it distracts the growing army from the Donbass.

69. Additional forces have to be transferred to Kherson, reducing reserves on the Eastern Front. But besides this, a purposeful struggle is also needed with Putin's infantry units. Such as the attack on the barracks of PMC Wagner in Kadievka

70. In addition, the Ukrainian army needs to break Russian tactics. Since Putin's units do not want a maneuver war, it must be imposed. All in the same place near Kherson or on the Zaporozhye front, which are clearly secondary for Putin's army

71. It is clear that all this is very difficult and even a little like a dream. However, the Ukrainian military is already advancing on Kherson, even with small forces, and they are succeeding. So why should we exclude the possibility of further success? Let's see

72. Putin definitely lost this war. Yes, as long as the offensive continues and my opinion about the turning point was premature. However, let's look at the overall map again. Movements of 10-20 km in months do not change the picture.

73. At the same time, Putin's army is losing personnel. Including experienced mercenaries. And they are replaced by inexperienced volunteers 40+ and, in the future, by schoolchildren. At some point, the inexperience of the personnel will become critical

74. Everyone agrees that the Ukrainian army is inferior to the Russian one in terms of technology. For artillery dozens of times. But if the Armed Forces of Ukraine are already fighting the growing army on an equal footing, then what will happen when they receive more modern heavy weapons? It seems that the triumphal arch will not be useful to Putin

There may be inaccuracies in the thread - I urge everyone to point them out) Just in case, let me remind you that everything written is my personal analytics without any claim to scientificity and absolute truth

Dang, the guy wrote a book in Tweet form. Well worth reading though, many thanks.

Edited June 27, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[dan/california]

58 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Belarussians would make great target practice for newly forming Ukrainian units...In case of incursion they would probably be stopped by local Territorial Defence.

Let's be serious, maximum they can do is some incidents across the border and just being there putting some pressure.

Russians are building triumphal arc next to famous MOD cathedral...

 

As to importance of this phase of the war, Ivan Matveev thread is perfect read. You can autotranslate; it's long, but much clearer than most western analysis.

 

That is a FANTASTIC thread. But could we please ask google to translate the whole thing, instead of hitting the button over and over again. And yes I realize I am complaining about UI issues on technological miracle...

 

Edit; bleep me no sooner do I finish reading than LLF supplies it in full. 

Edited June 27, 2022 by dan/california

[The_Capt]

21 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

 

This is a translation of that tweet thread?

Lot to unpack here and I am not sure I agree with all of it - for example we have no idea what the Russian losses around Severodonetsk have been, so “minimizing risk for gain” could be way off.

One thing I do not see on the Russian side is an actual strategy.  For example, if the strategic end is to “take the Donbas and declare victory”, what is the Russian plan for the very real possibility that Ukraine won’t let them hold it?  Russian strategy has been and continues to be in this war, entirely in isolation of reality and largely based on hope.

Do they hope Ukraine has had enough and taps out?  Do they somehow figure they can call the Donbas “mother Russia” and go nuclear?  The reality is that it is taking just about everything the Russian have to take very small chunks of ground right now.  I do not think they will be able to actually take the Donbas, Luhansk maybe, but not Donetsk; however, even if they do will they have broken the will of Ukraine to resist?  The West?

The West cannot not allow Russia to gain from this in anyway.  Russia at a min must be economically punished, back to 2014 lines or better and with new internal power structure, one we can actually negotiate with, in place. If we cannot do that the western global order has failed…and China is watching. 

Ukraine has all the hallmarks of a nation that has embraced a war to the point it is now part of their culture.  You do not defeat a nation in this state by taking a few hundred square kilometres of real estate, you would need to break their backs and shatter that unity or completely exhaust them.   So long as the West keeps supporting, Ukraine will keep fighting…and we have reason to keep supporting.  

So back to Russian long game…and we have been over this.  How do they defend what they have taken while Ukraine continues to mobilize and modernize, and they are heading in the opposite direction?  How does Russian defend an extremely long front without enough troops against a very motivated opponent with increasing capability?  Beyond that, how does Russia renormalize to remove sanctions, scare Sweden and Finland away from NATO, get NATO national to not spend trillions on defence and wipe humanities memory of their complete gong show so they can re-emerge as a great power?

Short answer is that they cannot.  At best, the Russian government may convince or cow enough domestic population in order to stay in power and basically get to sit at the same lunch table as North Korea for the next 25 years.  That or we fail and the global order and all it pays for is at risk - and for the record, this is what happens when you let things slide.  We failed in 2014 and here we are, we fail again and what does 2030 look like?

[LongLeftFlank]

2 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

 

Finished the copypaste now.