How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[sburke]

30 minutes ago, Huba said:

A little "case study" of RU army corruption and contacts with criminal world. I remember Poland in the '90s a bit, but it didn't even come close, the story is truly shocking:

 

I think it was Steve that did a similar analysis of what kinds of opportunities for corruption exist at different levels of rank in the Russian Army.  This pretty much aligns with that with the addition of a few good personal examples.

[billbindc]

 

 

[JonS]

Re: KIA/WIA ratios: US Army ratio in WWI was 1/3.83. In WWII it was 1/3.44. In Korea 1/2.80, Vietnam 1/3.14.

Dupuyinstitute.org/blog/2016/10/27/wounded-to-killed-ratios/

Unless you think modern Russia casualty care is significantly worse than the US' from 60 to 100 years ago, 1/3.5 is plausible, especially since it is corroborated by a directly relevant sample from /this/ war. If you want to push for a significantly different ratio, you should consider that you probably need some significant evidence.

And, as noted already, kia/wia leaves out a lot of irrecoverable losses (Mia, pow, etc)

Edited June 23, 2022 by JonS

[Vet 0369]

On 6/16/2022 at 3:48 PM, sburke said:

training center dude...  guess the new recruits just get handed a weapon and pointed west.  Well maybe handed a weapon.

A friend of mine, and best friend of one of my wife’s cousins, was born in and immigrated from Poland prior to the Soviet collapse, told me that he grew up about 19Km from the Ukraine border. His Grandfather was conscripted out of his house as the Soviets passed through during WWII. He said they gave him a bullet ridden overcoat and put him at the head of their column to make sure he couldn’t run away. He asked about a rifle, and was told he would just pick one up off the ground at the front. That night, his Grandfather and a few others ran off into the woods and escaped. Unfortunately, atrocities by Ukrainians and Poles along that border caused much vengeance by both sides, and there is still little love lost there. My friend will proudly say that he’s half Ukrainian, but more proudly say that he’s Polish. Such is the history of the region.

[paxromana]

2 hours ago, Fenris said:

This is the first I've seen on the topic of Syrians since the call to arms back in what was it?  March?

 

So, if captured these guys can be treated as Mercenaries as per 'Russian Rules?'

[Suleyman]

This conflict gives me a huge headache. Both sides claim the complete opposite and they’re not wrong even if it’s a lie because it’s a valid war tactic. Then they provide evidence and then the other does what’s the real situation lol.. still tho I’m sure Ukrainians are putting up stiff resistance

[Battlefront.com]

10 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Wanted to come back to this one as well.  I think we are muddling some issues here:

- Cost.  A strategic issue that many countries are wrestling with but a UAV with a Stinger was what I was talking about to deny manned aircraft and here the cost is upside down for the traditional manned aircraft.  Counter-drone, or drone-v-drone warfare needs a new set of cheaper weapons, which they will be because they don't need the same HE payloads to bring down...finding and hitting them is the primary issue.

A B2 Bomber costs about $2,000,000,000 just for the airframe.  Then there's the specialized everything else that runs into the many of billions a year in routine costs to keep that fleet going.  Imagine how many TB2 type drones one can buy with that.  Wait, we don't have to imagine because we know

A TB2 costs $5m per unit.  This means a nation can produce 400 TB2s for the cost of one B2.  The US has about 20 of these now, so if they bought the equivalent in TB2s the USAF would have a total of 8,000 TB2.

For every $1b in support costs for the B2s, including fuel, inspections, training, maintenance, dedicated facilities, dedicated equipment, etc., there would be huge amounts of money saved moving to TB2 type drones.  Those savings could be reinvested into all kinds of other things.  Like more TB2s

I'm not saying there isn't still a roll for something like the B2, nor am I suggesting that the TB2 type drone is a replacement.  Nope, I'm just chucking out some comparisons to get a handle around the magnitude of cost differential between the two.

10 hours ago, The_Capt said:

- Unmanned warfare.  We are coming up to 120 days of this war and drones are not going anywhere.  ... So rapid production and deployment of unmanned systems (of all types), integrated across the depth of the battlefield is going to be a primary driver.

Given the low unit and support costs of drones vs. traditional aerial platforms, yeah it's going to happen at some point.  In a long war, it's probably better to have 8000 of something small and manageable that can be reasonably replaced in short order vs. 20 of something that takes years to produce just one replacement.

10 hours ago, The_Capt said:

- Good 'ol CAS.  It brings payload and range, I will give it that. 

Speed too.  This is why we might wind up with an unmanned analog for manned aircraft before we see an abandonment of that sized airframe.  Having something that can go Mach 1.6 with a payload of several large drones is going to be tried, at the very least.

10 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I keep getting the sense that the big powerful predators of the battlefield are in trouble.  And it is integrated small cheap nasty bite-y little things that are hurting them.

I do as well.  For a while they are going to stick around, but they are going to need augmentation if they are to survive.

Steve

[dan/california]

5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I do as well.  For a while they are going to stick around, but they are going to need augmentation if they are to survive.

And when might we get to test various kinds of augmentations in a certain 3D digital environment per chance?

[dan/california]

8 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

A B2 Bomber costs about $2,000,000,000 just for the airframe.  Then there's the specialized everything else that runs into the many of billions a year in routine costs to keep that fleet going.  Imagine how many TB2 type drones one can buy with that.  Wait, we don't have to imagine because we know

A TB2 costs $5m per unit.  This means a nation can produce 400 TB2s for the cost of one B2.  The US has about 20 of these now, so if they bought the equivalent in TB2s the USAF would have a total of 8,000 TB2.

Now imagine Orlan 10s, or at least very lightly upgraded ones. There needs to be a highly automated factory turning them out by the tens of thousands. You have to think of them as ammunition more than a longterm asset going forward. You send them out in groups and hope one of them lives long enough to figure out what killed them. You kill THAT, and repeat the process. If you have enough drones to erode their anti drone capacity your artillery eventually gets to pound them into scrap almost unbothered.

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

Russia didn't mobilize anyone before the war. They went in on Feb 24th at peacetime strength.

Right, but they've put in reinforcements (whole units and individuals) from all over the place since the war started.  Those have to be accounted for.

6 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

Here, this has been posted before IIRC, but this is Kofman's analyses. It may not be correct but I would bet it's a lot closer to correct than Karl from Estonia's

I respect Kofman (still), but he's shown himself to be... ehm... fallible, to say the least.

6 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

Note these are from a month ago so are outdated, but I think the methodology is sound.

Here I agree, which is why I still think what Kofman has to say is worth listening to.

I used a similar methodology as Kofman a bunch of pages ago and came up with a conservative number for Russia's total casualties, including proxy fighters, of 52,000 total casualties (13,500 KIA and 38,500 WIA).  That's about 15.7% losses for all Russian and proxy forces and close to the 15% guess I made back on Page 899.

Here's how I arrived at these numbers (note I made a math error with the % casualties in my final line of this post):

After I crunched my numbers we had two Russian sourced numbers that put the "KIA" at ~40,000.  However, discussion seems to indicate that this number includes KIA, MIA, POW, and WIA that can't return to the fight.  This would put the total casualties more like 120,000 in total, which is just about 36% force wide since the start of the war.  This number seems high to me, but still possible as it means Russia still has a force in Ukraine that is roughly the same size it started with on Feb 24.

Steve

[dan/california]

I realize this is a questionable source, but A) this is checkable. and B ) it would make an outstanding little Campaign for the game title about this war. And my heartfelt congratulations to Lieutenant for living to receive his medal, Although I assume he is a major now. He certainly should be between that outstanding performance and the fact there is a war on. 

[Battlefront.com]

ISW's report for June 20th reinforced their statement the day before about the nature of Ukraine's Zaporizhia front switching from defensive to offensive to exploit thinner Russian defenses:

Quote

Ukraine’s Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration stated that Russian forces are continuing to move equipment northwards towards the Vasylivka district (approximately 40 kilometers south of Zaporizhia City) in order to fortify and defend occupied positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast.  Commander of the Azov Regiment Rodion Kudryshov notably claimed that Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia have moved from defensive to offensive positions, which is consistent with reporting that Russian troops are concentrating forces and equipment in Zaporizhia Oblast to prepare for potential Ukrainian counteroffensives.

More indications that Ukraine is able to hold the current lines and selectively mass enough forces to achieve a favorable offensive ratio.  At present we know of 3 primary areas of Ukrainian offensive activities:

• directly west of Izyum with the goal of putting pressure on supply lines through that city
• western side of the Zaporizhia front (nearer the Dnepr vs. nearer Donetsk City) with the goal of pushing southward
• Kherson Oblast to the north (Davydiv Brid) and south (just west of Kherson City) with the goal of destroying or retreating Russian forces on the western side of the Dnepr.

Interestingly, we see roughly 3 primary areas of active Russian offensive activities:

• Severodonetsk with the goal of taking that city completely
• northward into Toshkivka with the goal of taking Lysychansk
• westward from the Popasna salient towards Highway T13-02 cut the LOC to Lyschansk

There's some on-off attacks SE from the Izyum bridgehead towards Slovyansk and some small scale activity along the Russian border northeast of Kharkiv.  Other than that, ground attacks along the rest of the front seem to be largely absent.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, billbindc said:

 

 

Yup.  This is Scary Red Arrow syndrome in a different guise.  What Russia wants isn't as relevant as what Russia is capable of getting.

• Initially Russia wanted total collapse of Ukraine as a state and to occupy at least everything east of the Dnepr and the entire southern coastline.  This didn't happen.
• Russia then switched to a terror war to try and break the Ukrainian will into stopping the war and at least freezing Russia's gains.  This didn't happen.
• The next attempt was to crush all the Ukrainian forces in the Donbas in the process of securing the administrative borders of Luhansk and Donetsk.  This didn't happen.
• The latest strategy seems to be take all of Luhansk and sit tight as artillery kills enough Ukrainians that they'll at least agree to freeze the conflict in its current state.  This hasn't resolved itself, but it's not looking very good.

So yeah, obviously Russia is trying to drag this out into the Winter and to have any number of factors push Ukraine into freezing the conflict.  I don't see that happening.

Steve

[Suleyman]

Will the winter favor the Russians?

[dan/california]

Worth the time to read.

[Grigb]

1 minute ago, Suleyman said:

Will the winter favor the Russians?

Except Donbass area no. RU bad logistics barely capable of supporting RU forces in summer. In winter you can forget about guys holding the line outside of villages/towns. So, by the snow fall either RU pulls them out or everybody run in to villages/towns.

In Donbass area though LDNR forces are on the home turf and survival wise they are much more experienced and capable. It will be tough, but they will handle it. 

[dan/california]

3 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Except Donbass area no. RU bad logistics barely capable of supporting RU forces in summer. In winter you can forget about guys holding the line outside of villages/towns. So, by the snow fall either RU pulls them out or everybody run in to villages/towns.

In Donbass area though LDNR forces are on the home turf and survival wise they are much more experienced and capable. It will be tough, but they will handle it. 

The prewar LDNR forces are pretty much gone now, there won't be tithe of them left by October. I am sure even more of their training cadre has already been committed to the fight than the regular Russian forces. I totally agree with the rest of your analysis. What favors Putin in winter is the gas supply in Berlin and Munich. Which might get him a deal on whatever he still holds, but certainly isn't going to get him anything back that he loses in a big August offensive by Ukraine.

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Except Donbass area no. RU bad logistics barely capable of supporting RU forces in summer. In winter you can forget about guys holding the line outside of villages/towns. So, by the snow fall either RU pulls them out or everybody run in to villages/towns.

In Donbass area though LDNR forces are on the home turf and survival wise they are much more experienced and capable. It will be tough, but they will handle it. 

Add to that the ongoing problems with expiring contracts. 

The longer the war goes on the more soldiers will be seeking to leave the front.  Obviously if Russia can replace them as fast as they leave, then everything is OK.  However, it seems there's already difficulty replacing contract soldiers.  Now imagine how difficult it will be to convince someone new to sign a contract in January knowing that for sure it means spending the winter in a trench.

Similar issue with soldiers whose contract is expiring.  They already have a lot of first hand experiences to not renew, but as winter comes up there will likely be even less.

Steve

[kraze]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

In Donbass area though LDNR forces are on the home turf and survival wise they are much more experienced and capable. It will be tough, but they will handle it. 

"LDNR forces" are predominantly russian soldiers from regions far away, there's no home turf for them.

Edited June 21, 2022 by kraze

[Rice]

Will the module release at 1000 pages?

[Grigb]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

The prewar LDNR forces are pretty much gone now, there won't be tithe of them left by October. I am sure even more of their training cadre has already been committed to the fight than the regular Russian forces. 

 You are talking about infantry cannon fodder. Yes, it is long gone. But officers and support staff is not that badly hit. In Kherson area Mobiks might run away back. But inside LDNR it is unlikely. 

 

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

I totally agree with the rest of your analysis. What favors Putin in winter is the gas supply in Berlin and Munich. Which might get him a deal on whatever he still holds, but certainly isn't going to get him anything back that he loses in a big August offensive by Ukraine.

Agreed.

[Grigb]

16 minutes ago, kraze said:

"LDNR forces" are predominantly russian soldiers from regions far away, there's no home turf for them.

That's not true. Currently there is secret directive to block fresh RU recruits from entering LDNR forces. RU more or less Hight HQs. Tactical commanders and support are LDNRs or "old" RU who fought here previously and have connections.

One of the reasons Donbass is a hard slog is that while LDNR are weaker equipped they are much more motivated, much more experienced and much more flexible. Apart from cannot fodder infantry they are much more dangerous than we think.      

[LongLeftFlank]

2 hours ago, dan/california said:

Worth the time to read.

I followed him for a bit on the strength of his artillery analysis but then started to gag on his advanced TDS, so I stopped.

Aside:  I am also going to be posting a lot less for the duration, cuz work. I'm sure some folks here will be just fine with that lol, but I do have a client base as well. Ah, my adoring public!

The Russians escaped while we weren't watching them (from Washington)

-- Jackson Browne

[Hister]

There are 35 Yugoslaviam made BVP M80A's on their way to Ukraine from Slovenia. These were Yugoslavian knockoffs from Soviet BMP -1's. In exchange US gave Slovenia founds to buy military material from them. Good bussiness for both countries (dependance on spare parts).

Up to 50 Yugoslavian made and upgraded T-84 tanks are in the pipeline to be sent too. Not sure how thise would compare to Oplots. 

Slovenia already sent lots of kalashnikovs, helmets, bullet proof vests and other military equipment to Ukraine but I am now really happy we upped the ante. 

I personally delivered lots of medical equipment to Ukrainian embassy here. Now I am at peace.

 

 

[kraze]

2 hours ago, Grigb said:

That's not true. Currently there is secret directive to block fresh RU recruits from entering LDNR forces. RU more or less Hight HQs. Tactical commanders and support are LDNRs or "old" RU who fought here previously and have connections.

One of the reasons Donbass is a hard slog is that while LDNR are weaker equipped they are much more motivated, much more experienced and much more flexible. Apart from cannot fodder infantry they are much more dangerous than we think.      

They were always russian troops with only a very small part of local collaborators, russians decided to "mobilize" locals only now. Easy proof of that is a russian "union of Donbass volunteers" which as far as 2018 already had 40000+ members, all of which are citizens of Russia. Whole Belarus army is about that same number for comparison.

The only home turf advantage of "LDNR troops" they have is that of russians living in houses they "liberated" from locals 8 years ago and now consider their own. But I'm not sure if some buryat or kalmyk stealing someone's apartment thousands of kms away can really be considered as gaining a 'home' mentally even by him. Judging by how Donetsk decayed over 8 years of occupation - they certainly don't really treat it as their home (...or maybe they do and that's why it is like that hurrr hurrr).

Edited June 21, 2022 by kraze