How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Vanir Ausf B]

French hand grenades are dainty.

 

Edited May 15, 2022 by Vanir Ausf B

[Battlefront.com]

Another example of LPR soldiers desert en mas and trying to get out of Ukraine through Russia:

 

[TheVulture]

Ukrainian troops apparently at the Russian border north of Karkhiv:

 

 

[FancyCat]

40 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Difficult to say why, though.  The north was where Ukraine concentrated it's major defenses and the terrain was horrible from an attacker standpoint.  Rough, swampy, densely urban, and plenty of places for getting ambushed.

The south, by contrast, was almost completely open for the taking.  Apparently Ukraine's defense plan hinged on holding up Russian advances at the neck of Crimea.  That utterly failed and there were many serious consequences that came from that.

It's interesting to think how much better the south might have gone for Russia if it had concentrated it's best units down there instead of up around Kyiv.  Not that Russia had the logistics capacity to have so many forces based out of Crimea, so it's a theoretical question only.

Steve

There were reports of Ukrainian politicians and military officers fleeing their posts at the beginning of the war, and Zelensky called out two of them for being traitors and stripping them of their rank. Most likely they sabotaged and handed information over to Russia to facilitate the advance in the South. One of them was head of the SBU in Kherson. Not sure how important the other one was, but I'm assuming the head of SBU in Kherson is a nice asset to turn. 

I'm amazed they didn't have more traitors, or that Zelensky didn't get killed in Kiev at the beginning of the war. 

Quote

Naumov Andriy Olehovych, the former chief of the main department of internal security of the Security Service of Ukraine, and Kryvoruchko Serhiy Oleksandrovych, the former head of the Office of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Kherson region

https://www.npr.org/2022/04/01/1090253301/zelenskyy-generals-traitors-ukraine

[Battlefront.com]

I'm posting the latest Girkin rant because he just confirmed something I was saying about the Debaltseve battle while it was happening.  Which was the battle did not go smoothly from the Russian's standpoint because the Ukrainians fought way better than they were prepared for.  In fact, the Russians did some of the exact same stupid stuff then as they do now, namely not doing recon and marching in column into unknown territory. 

Back then I got a lot of pushback from people saying, basically, "Ukraine lost Debaltseve, we don't need to know anything more than that".  I looked at the battle and had a very different opinion, thinking that Russia won the battle mostly because they had more bodies to through at it than Ukraine had to defend.

 

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Another example of where drones are headed.  Up until now the homemade "bombers" have 1-4 grenades to drop.  Very useful for a wide array of tactical missions, but still limited.  Well, a Dutch company has figured out a way to make relatively inexpensive drones into a far more potent platform.  A couple of these used in together could be as effective as a battery of artillery firing dozens of rounds (this article is in Romanian):

https://evz.ro/jucaria-mortala-care-ingrozeste-trupele-rusesti-conceputa-sa-livreze-bere-la-petreceri-lanseaza-grenade-peste-inamici-video.html

Make sure you look at the video of the carousel in action. 

Looks like it has a capacity of 8 bombs and can be lifted by an octocopter.  This specific example might not be entirely practical (I don't know either way), but it shows where this is headed.

Steve

If you don't have an answer for the next version of this thing, the one that is not someones senior class project, and happens to drop some sort of nifty guided round, don't show up for the next war.

[Battlefront.com]

The reason I've been paying so much attention to the fiasco of the Bilohorivka bridgehead is that it has the feeling of being something a lot bigger than a tactical defeat.  At the very least it encapsulates many of the common themes we've seen in this war so far, all in one untidy little section of the front.  There is also the possibility of this having an outsized impact on the Russian war effort.  Here's one hint that might in fact be true.  This is from a NYT article (paywall) that just came out:

Quote

As the news of the losses at the river crossing in Bilohorivka started to spread, some Russian bloggers did not appear to hold back in their criticism of what they said was incompetent leadership.

“I’ve been keeping quiet for a long time,” Yuri Podolyaka, a war blogger with 2.1 million followers on Telegram, said in a video posted on Friday, saying that he had avoided criticizing the Russian military until now.

 

“The last straw that overwhelmed my patience was the events around Bilohorivka, where due to stupidity — I emphasize, because of the stupidity of the Russian command — at least one battalion tactical group was burned, possibly two.”

Mr. Podolyaka ridiculed the Kremlin line that the war is going “according to plan.” He told his viewers in a five-minute video that, in fact, the Russian Army was short of functional unmanned drones, night-vision equipment and other kit “that is catastrophically lacking on the front.”

“Yes, I understand that it’s impossible for there to be no problems in war,” he said. “But when the same problems go on for three months, and nothing seems to be changing, then I personally and in fact millions of citizens of the Russian Federation start to have questions for these leaders of the military operation.”

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/15/world/europe/pro-russian-war-bloggers-kremlin.html

The above came from a pro-invasion propagandist in Russia with 2.1 million followers on media that Russians have access to.  He just spoke some unpleasant truths to his audience.  On its own this won't do much, but every chip in Russia's false narrative of the war pushes Russians closer to deciding something needs to be done.

Steve

[fireship4]

40 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

My general rule of thumb is if the person is sitting behind a desk or standing in front of a media wall, ignore 'em.  If the person is in a helmet and vest reporting in Ukraine, then it's at least worth watching/reading/listening.

I disagree.  People on the ground have their role, as eyes and ears and to communicate the facts and feeling on the ground.  They also capture small bits and pieces of info that are useful to people like us who are interested in the nuts and bolts.  And you might want them writing the copy, not being very familiar with the field I don't really know the pro's and con's of that.

But journalism (not entertainment news) is about explaining what is going on.  And for that you need a guy behind a desk, and a big map.  And a bit of time.  With digital TV it should be easier than ever to get in-depth context via a second channel for those that want it. 

What we have however, for the most part, is singed teddy-bear hunting, and the latest emotional event done to death.  'War reporter voice', and in general 'reporter on the scene voice' is something I can't stand for the last number of years (honourable mention goes to 'pre-offended police officer voice').  24hr news may be good for something (over-worked people getting updated whenever they have the time to turn on the TV as opposed to 'The News at 10' for example), but I wouldn't be surprised if has contributed to emotional desensitisation to the subject from over-reporting, and of things that happened, instead of 'why'.

I think we have it about right here.  This is journalism of sort, we have sources, we have experts, we have discussion, interviews, talks etc. all filtered by the fact we are trying to understand what is going on.  A distilled version of that is what I'd like to see mainstream news move back towards, but I wonder if the incentives in the other direction are too much.  Leaving the war aside for a moment, and I understand there is some call for news to stand as a record of events, but why do I need to hear about shooting after shooting when I switch on the TV or radio.  Just tell me how many there are in a year and tell me what people are doing or not doing to change that.

Back on the war I have been following it since day one... every day, and I wonder if I am too hooked into it.  It does affect us (we are in interesting times indeed), but it's like we are all a little bit at war with the stress that goes along with that.  The old Bill Hicks line about crickets outside the window comes to mind.  A bit of self-discipline is perhaps what is needed, but it's addictive, as the spectre of nuclear war tends to be.  Of course the people directly involved need the support of the world around them, I just wonder where the line is in this age of being in touch with the whole world.

Anyway I recommend the series 'Newswipe' for a look at modern news, this rambling post brought it to mind.

 

[Battlefront.com]

5 minutes ago, fireship4 said:

But journalism (not entertainment news) is about explaining what is going on.  And for that you need a guy behind a desk, and a big map.  And a bit of time.  With digital TV it should be easier than ever to get in-depth context via a second channel for those that want it. 

Yes, I agree that's what is needed.  But for the most part what we're getting isn't that.  What I've seen is information that is outdated by days, "expert" opinions that aren't worth a damned, focusing on stuff that doesn't matter, or otherwise totally fumbling their jobs of getting good quality information over to their viewers in a timely fashion.

Not saying that the folks behind the desk are always doing a bad job and the ones in the field looking for burnt teddybears are always doing an excellent job.  What I'm saying is if I have 10 minutes of my day to learn something about a war I'm more likely going to get better information from someone on the ground than someone behind the desk.  At least that's the case with this war.

Oh, but one caveat.  At the beginning of the war there was a noticeable lack of journalists at the front.  I suspect it's because they didn't believe they'd live long enough to file a report.  The last month or two, by contrast, I've seen a lot of really good reporting.

Then again, I'm not watching TV.  I'm looking at YouTube (mostly) for the MSM reporting and selecting the ones that look like they aren't looking for burnt teddybears.  And even then I'm using it to supplement a wide range of non-MSM news sources.

Steve

[Calamine Waffles]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is certainly what Putin wanted everybody to believe.  The relatively "clean" takeover of Crimea seemed to demonstrate this was fact, as the soldiers in that operation were well disciplined and did not go around looting/murdering/raping.  However, the whole operation was unopposed and therefore the Russian narrative to its soldiers ("we are liberating Russians for Russia!") was helped by the fact that a large % of Crimean Ukrainians really did welcome Russia as liberators, therefore Russian soldiers were not really put to the test.  Russian FSB, however, did the usual disappearances, arrests, and suppression that Russia is well known for.

Crimea was effectively unopposed. The Ukrainian forces there defected en masse to the Russians, including almost all of the Ukrainian Navy.

If you are surprised by the brutality of the Russian soldiers in this war, you probably have not been paying too much attention to what they did in Syria (where they would intentionally target hospitals to the point where MSF refused to share the coordinates of their hospitals) and Chechnya (where they have been reenacting Grozny in Mariupol).

Putin's words at the beginning of the war have made it very clear he wants nothing less than the complete destruction of the Ukrainian state and identity. And he is far from the only Russian who wants this. That's what "denazification" actually means.

 

1 hour ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

French hand grenades are dainty

These are OF-37 offensive hand grenades. By design they have a smaller kill radius because they rely on blast instead of fragmentation, unlike the M67, which is also 25% heavier and about 30 years more recent.

[sross112]

17 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The reason I've been paying so much attention to the fiasco of the Bilohorivka bridgehead is that it has the feeling of being something a lot bigger than a tactical defeat.  At the very least it encapsulates many of the common themes we've seen in this war so far, all in one untidy little section of the front.  There is also the possibility of this having an outsized impact on the Russian war effort.  Here's one hint that might in fact be true.  This is from a NYT article (paywall) that just came out:

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/15/world/europe/pro-russian-war-bloggers-kremlin.html

The above came from a pro-invasion propagandist in Russia with 2.1 million followers on media that Russians have access to.  He just spoke some unpleasant truths to his audience.  On its own this won't do much, but every chip in Russia's false narrative of the war pushes Russians closer to deciding something needs to be done.

Steve

These larger defeats are what will turn the view more than anything. The vast majority of what has been out there is a clip of a vehicle or two getting knocked out by ATGM/UAV/Arty and the Russian retort was that it was the same one shown from multiple different angles to look like different attacks. When you can show the 100 pieces of equipment in one area it is pretty hard for the Kremlin to spin that and it is really hard for the military or pro invasion pundits to explain away when there isn't a victory to attach it to. 

Hopefully the RA will give more opportunities like this or the UA will have an offensive opportunity to destroy a brigade or two. Each of those smaller wins will chip away at the national morale as well as the RA morale.

On a side note, I'm waiting for the UA 1st Tank Brigade to show up. They've been out of the picture since the Kyiv retreat and are supposed to be one of the best UA brigades. They've had about 6 weeks for reconstitution and I would think they would be ready for use. Seeing them leading an offensive should be a good indicator where the UA plans to decisively strike.

[Battlefront.com]

This is from the left leaning Daily Kos, so if you're someone who can't take looking at the linked subject matter you might want to skip it   However, if that sort of thing doesn't bother you then I give this a full two thumbs up summary of Russia's reasoning and reality of trying to take the Donbas.  NONE of this is news to you guys here, but if you have someone you now that needs a quick summary of where things are at right now, this is a good one to send their way:

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2022/5/13/2097783/-Ukraine-update-Russia-s-incredibly-shrinking-ambitions

Steve

[Cederic]

42 minutes ago, dan/california said:

If you don't have an answer for the next version of this thing, the one that is not someones senior class project, and happens to drop some sort of nifty guided round, don't show up for the next war.

Guided rounds are something you'd use instead of such a 'bomber' drone.

The guidance is the delivery platform, which takes the simple gravity bomb, uses its camera to aim and drops directly onto the target. Platform then returns home; switch batteries, add more bombs, back up and running.

It's cheap, it's portable and it's highly effective. The only difficult thing involved is adjusting aim for wind, and if you're willing to use the first round as a sighter you don't even need to do that. As shown in the multiple videos from Ukraine.

Guidance on each munition would be additional unnecessary weight. Better to use that payload for extra munitions or additional sensors - IR, thermal, etc.

[Battlefront.com]

15 minutes ago, Calamine Waffles said:

Crimea was effectively unopposed. The Ukrainian forces there defected en masse to the Russians, including almost all of the Ukrainian Navy.

Actually, a large portion of the ground forces in Crimea did not surrender nor did they give into Russia's attempts to intimidate them into surrendering after the initial invasion was completed.  What they did was stayed in garrison and made it clear to the Russians outside their gates that there would be no fighting unless the Russian tried to storm their positions.  There were a lot of cameras around at the time and that made many of the Green Men nervous.

This was no accident or act of desperation.  Kiev's new government ordered their forces to hold their ground but not initiate hostilities because they didn't want another Georgia situation so Putin could justify a larger war.  PM Yatsenyuk and President Turchynov made this explicitly clear many times.  I said at the time, and since, that this was likely one of the smartest things I've seen in my lifetime.  It totally screwed up Putin's plans for Donbas.  On the negative side, Putin's Plan B was vastly more violent than Plan A.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

10 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is from the left leaning Daily Kos, so if you're someone who can't take looking at the linked subject matter you might want to skip it   However, if that sort of thing doesn't bother you then I give this a full two thumbs up summary of Russia's reasoning and reality of trying to take the Donbas.  NONE of this is news to you guys here, but if you have someone you now that needs a quick summary of where things are at right now, this is a good one to send their way:

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2022/5/13/2097783/-Ukraine-update-Russia-s-incredibly-shrinking-ambitions

Steve

Nothing especially 'left' there, Steve, largely stuff we've been observing here for 750 pages now. Good map, though dates compressed, as the author noted:

 

[akd]

4 hours ago, akd said:

Seldom-seen 2S23 Nona-SVKs getting schwacked:

 

Bit more on this. Didn’t realize it, but this footage is also apparently from the failed river crossing at Serebryanka.  2S23 is a pretty rare vehicle in use in just a handful of units.  The ones I know are the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade and the 55th Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade (and both have theirs painted solid green as seen here).  55th MRB is, of course, part of 41st CAA along with 35th and 74th MRBs. This, along with the knocked out VDV armor, suggests even more units involved in the crossing attempts, at least in small composite elements.

Edited May 15, 2022 by akd

[Kinophile]

54 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The reason I've been paying so much attention to the fiasco of the Bilohorivka bridgehead is that it has the feeling of being something a lot bigger than a tactical defeat.  At the very least it encapsulates many of the common themes we've seen in this war so far, all in one untidy little section of the front.  There is also the possibility of this having an outsized impact on the Russian war effort.  Here's one hint that might in fact be true.  This is from a NYT article (paywall) that just came out:

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/15/world/europe/pro-russian-war-bloggers-kremlin.html

The above came from a pro-invasion propagandist in Russia with 2.1 million followers on media that Russians have access to.  He just spoke some unpleasant truths to his audience.  On its own this won't do much, but every chip in Russia's false narrative of the war pushes Russians closer to deciding something needs to be done.

Steve

Perhaps we're approaching a Tet Offensive inflection point in the Russian public "discourse" of the war.

Imean the turning of pro-regime people against the regimes stated objectives (but not the regime, yet it would have a corrosive effect), and the overwhelming pressure of negative gossip/rumours vis a vis  the Regimes propaganda. 

[Kraft]

9 hours ago, Phantom Captain said:

Why has someone not yet made an intro/splash screen mod of that ubiquitous song for CMBS???   

I think this is far superior.

Also nice to see Russia filling its MP gaps with sailors, they are ahead of shedule! Nazi Germany only did that by 1944/5  

[Calamine Waffles]

23 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Actually, a large portion of the ground forces in Crimea did not surrender nor did they give into Russia's attempts to intimidate them into surrendering after the initial invasion was completed.  What they did was stayed in garrison and made it clear to the Russians outside their gates that there would be no fighting unless the Russian tried to storm their positions.  There were a lot of cameras around at the time and that made many of the Green Men nervous.

This was no accident or act of desperation.  Kiev's new government ordered their forces to hold their ground but not initiate hostilities because they didn't want another Georgia situation so Putin could justify a larger war.  PM Yatsenyuk and President Turchynov made this explicitly clear many times.  I said at the time, and since, that this was likely one of the smartest things I've seen in my lifetime.  It totally screwed up Putin's plans for Donbas.  On the negative side, Putin's Plan B was vastly more violent than Plan A.

Steve

There were relatively few Ukrainian ground forces in Crimea though:

 

Quote

More than a tenth of Ukraine’s military strength, some 22,000 military
personnel, were based in Crimea. Most, however, were naval personnel, and
none were kept at a particularly high state of readiness. Beyond naval and
coastal defense missile forces, as well as an Air Force brigade and three
antiaircraft missile regiments, there were only a single regular Army battalion
and several Naval Infantry (marine) units. While the latter were relatively
well trained, they were all suffering from the disruption and demoralization
caused by years of under‑funding.

From Osprey Elite 228: Armies of Russia's War in Ukraine

[Battlefront.com]

Just now, Calamine Waffles said:

There were relatively few Ukrainian ground forces in Crimea though:

Right, but I don't get your point.  My follow up to your post was simply to point out that it wasn't because they all defected, but were explicitly instructed to not shoot at the invaders.  The relative number isn't relevant.

Steve

[FancyCat]

satellite availability is such a boon for OSINT. 

 

[Calamine Waffles]

6 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Right, but I don't get your point.  My follow up to your post was simply to point out that it wasn't because they all defected, but were explicitly instructed to not shoot at the invaders.  The relative number isn't relevant.

Steve

Well, most of the people there were naval personnel, and they either fled or defected. The highest ranking Ukrainian officer there was Rear-Admiral Denis Berezovsky, and he defected to the Russians.
 

Quote

 

Ukrainian Armed Forces' Deputy Chief of the Main Command Center Major-General Oleksandr Rozmaznin briefed the Cabinet Ministers on the logistics of the withdrawal, including negotiations over whether the Ukrainian troops will be able to depart the now Russian-controlled region with their weapons.

The withdrawal "will happen very soon," Rozmaznin said. "Even if there are no weapons, the people are what matters. And the weapons will be taken from arms depots."

When asked how many Ukrainian troops had defected to the Russian Armed Forces, Rozmaznin responded: "About fifty percent."

 

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2014/03/24/Ukraine-negotiating-troop-withdrawal-from-Crimea/5181395677491/

Okay, so it wasn't most of them, but half is still a huge chunk.

Edited May 15, 2022 by Calamine Waffles

[Battlefront.com]

35 minutes ago, akd said:

Bit more on this. Didn’t realize it, but this footage is also apparently from the failed river crossing.  2S23 is a pretty rare vehicle in use in just a handful of units.  The ones I know are the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade and the 55th Mountain Motorized Rifle Brigade (and both have theirs painted solid green as seen here).  55th MRB is, of course, part of 41st CAA along with 35th and 74th MRBs. This, along with the knocked out VDV armor, suggests even more units involved in the crossing attempt, at least in small composite elements.

I'm still accumulating data on all this mess.  For sure many of the sources out there are confusing vastly different bridging operations (in order of appearance):

1.  Shypylivka (no images that I've found so far)

2.  Serebryanka (images with three power line poles)

3. Bilohorivka (the fustercluck with 3 separate bridges)

I'm using this map as a guide to figure this all out.  Note that it misidentified the Serebryanka location.  I geolocated it a bit further to the west than what the map shows.  I also suspect that they put the Shypylivka location a bit further north than it was.

Steve

 

[Huba]

USTRANSCOM is conducting ship readiness exercises - apparently no that unusual in itself, but the timing is interesting. 

 

[LongLeftFlank]

10 hours ago, Phantom Captain said:

Why has someone not yet made an intro/splash screen mod of that ubiquitous song for CMBS???   

Not being European, or a TV viewer, I will confess the whole Eurovision thing has passed me by, so this piece by Aris Roussinos filled a few gaps.

It also mentions that ubiquitous song....

https://unherd.com/thepost/as-in-war-ukraine-summons-its-folk-roots-for-eurovision-victory/