How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I get all the numbers comparison hazards, but there is no getting around the fact that the RA had (note past tense) the clear advantage in mass.  They also had their choice of where to put that mass at the beginning of this.  So by all traditional conventional metrics, this thing should be over by now...and that did not happen.  Quite the opposite. 

Maybe the opening phase was just a wild winger, and the UA got lucky; however, we have seen the same thing in the Donbas Offensive phase; Russian mass is not working...and it is supposed to if all the textbooks still have any value.

The root of all Russia's ills in this war is that they needed to take over too much land, with too many people, with and with too few troops.  No plan would have worked IMHO.  However, Putin put a massive constraint onto this already doomed invasion... for geopolitical and economic reasons he required it be done within days (optimally) or a few weeks (worst case).  Whatever chance might have existed for Russia's military to shape a victory were demolished by the requirement of a quick victory.

I doubt any military in the world could have achieved Putin's goals against an opposing force that had 8 years to prepare for just such a thing happening.

Now, could a NATO force have done this better than the Russians?  Absolutely.  Maybe even to the point of superficially achieving most of the strategic goals within a few weeks.  But then it would all fall apart with partisan activities.

Mind you, if NATO had moved a force of that size into Ukraine there would have been one big difference.  Unlike what happened to Russia, there really would be no resistance because Ukraine would really have welcomed them with flowers, bread, and salt instead of sunflower seeds

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

My honest guess is that the Russian suck, but not as badly as we think - at least not initially during the opening offensive.  And something the UA was doing basically negated that mass.  I suspect it was a combo of ISR superiority - a lot of western strat stuff at play - UAVs everywhere, hybrid self-synchronizing tactics, all link back to integrated fires.  My working hypothesis is that Ukrainian defence has, and continues to be able to create friction along the entire Russian operational system.  This friction, along with Russia's own, has made all that mass nearly useless as it is dislocated and disrupted constantly.  To the point that up north it may have fallen under its own weight.

I know I've said this a bunch of times in this thread, but I'll state it again... the old Soviet system of warfare worked because doctrine, training, equipment, and strategic resources were all carefully calibrated together so that each took into consideration the limitations and strengths of the other.

What Russia did wrong was to start transforming into a Western type flexible and capable force and then stopping when it got to the difficult bits.  The result was a bunch of half (or less) implemented components with no strategic recalibration to make them all work together seamlessly.

Then, on top of all that, Putin required this jumbled mess to fight a complex war that was way beyond its capabilities even if fully resourced, which it wasn't.  Disaster is the only possible outcome.  Massing of fire and effort could mitigate the disaster, maybe to the point of blundering into some degree of short term success, but that's it.  This war was doomed to fail before the first Russian soldier crossed the line even if the planning had been vastly better.

This is why I've been saying since the first couple of days of the war that Russia has lost and there's no possibility of it changing that fact.  The only reason I waited even a few days to come to that conclusion was to make sure all my pre-war assumptions of both Russian and Ukrainian forces had been correct.  Thankfully, they were.

Steve

[sburke]

More on the most recent Oligarch death

Russian oligarch Alexander Subbotin died under mysterious circumstances at the house of a shaman over the weekend, according to Russian media.

Subbotin, the former top manager of Russian energy company Lukoil, is the latest of several Russian oligarchs to die in a suspicious manner amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

He was found dead in the basement of the home of a shaman in Mytishchi, a city just northeast of the capital city Moscow, on Sunday after suffering an apparent heart attack, Russian media outlet TASS reported. A criminal case into his death has been opened.

The billionaire allegedly went to the shaman's home "in a state of severe alcoholic and drug intoxication the day before" his death, a source told TASS. His body was discovered in a room of the basement reportedly used for "Jamaican voodoo rituals."

Local news outlets reported that Subbotin went to the shaman in search of a hangover cure, which allegedly involved toad poison. However, these claims have not been confirmed by law enforcement, and other details of what happened to cause his death remained unknown as of Monday afternoon.

Russian Oligarch Found Dead Under Mysterious Circumstances (msn.com)

[Battlefront.com]

Another thing this war has taught us... bridging rivers is going to need a serious rethink.

All one side needs to do is fly a drone along a river and it will have no problem spotting bridging activities.  Once identified there are a number of options available to take it out or otherwise render it useless.  Precision strikes are preferable, but traditional artillery or air attacks could work just as well.  If there's any friendly presence on the river, and it's deep enough, there's even the possibility of unguided suicide boats (some RUMINT says Ukraine is getting some from the US).

The ability to maintain an improvised bridgehead requires a lot of different things coming together.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, sburke said:

More on the most recent Oligarch death

Russian oligarch Alexander Subbotin died under mysterious circumstances at the house of a shaman over the weekend, according to Russian media.

Subbotin, the former top manager of Russian energy company Lukoil, is the latest of several Russian oligarchs to die in a suspicious manner amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

He was found dead in the basement of the home of a shaman in Mytishchi, a city just northeast of the capital city Moscow, on Sunday after suffering an apparent heart attack, Russian media outlet TASS reported. A criminal case into his death has been opened.

The billionaire allegedly went to the shaman's home "in a state of severe alcoholic and drug intoxication the day before" his death, a source told TASS. His body was discovered in a room of the basement reportedly used for "Jamaican voodoo rituals."

Local news outlets reported that Subbotin went to the shaman in search of a hangover cure, which allegedly involved toad poison. However, these claims have not been confirmed by law enforcement, and other details of what happened to cause his death remained unknown as of Monday afternoon.

Russian Oligarch Found Dead Under Mysterious Circumstances (msn.com)

This is typical KGB/FSB cruelty of killing someone and humiliating them at the same time.  Having a heart attack while doing S&M with a whore type of thing.

Steve

[Calamine Waffles]

18 hours ago, SeinfeldRules said:

Armored vehicles seem to be more vulnerable to artillery then commonly believed in the US/NATO. Lots of footage of (what seems to be) destroyed vehicles due to rocket and cannon fire.

Well, according to Chobitok et al. in their 2016 book on the T-64 tank, 70% of Ukraine's armoured vehicle casualties photographically documented during the 2014/15 stage of the Donbas War were from tube/rocket artillery. The remaining 30% were abandoned or non-combat losses.

 

Scenes like this, the aftermath of a Grad barrage on a field camp, were not uncommon.

I would hope the Ukrainians have learned their painful lessons and put them to use in this war.

Quote

Russian and Ukrainian artillery forces seldom use effective cover and are often lined up in neat rows in the open, instead of utilizing dispersion and tree lines. I think this is mainly a function of the manual nature of most of their artillery, which requires howitzers to be somewhat closer and more orderly for a variety of technical reasons I won't get in to (unless you would like me to).

As far as I can tell, at least some of them do try to do that? Like in the video you posted.

On the other hand, some don't. No idea why, but the truck being nearby suggest they are prepared to move if needed?

 

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, billbindc said:

The issue isn't really the legality of using the conscripts since the law in Russia merely exists to serve the immediate interests of the state and which average Russians know quite well. The issue is going to be that those conscripts...whose families expected to be gone roughing it for just a year...are going to be coming home in boxes or disappearing entirely into the maw of Ukraine and the Russian bureaucracy trying to hide what's happening to soldiers in it. Clearly, Putin sees this issue as one of the few really dangerous threats to his regime so declaration or not, I doubt now that we'll be seeing any large influx of fresh meat into the grinder.

Yes.  As I keep saying, the only reason conscripts aren't in combat right now is because he fears the fallout from it.  However, a key element of this is having the zinc boxes marked "died in Ukraine".  If they instead say "died in Russia" things get much easier.  The difference is the former is clearly putting soldiers into a warzone, the latter is no different than if they died in Siberia or Moscow.  Yes, yes, yes... of course reality is very different, but it's the sort of subtly Russians seem traditionally conditioned to overlook.

Note that I'm not saying that annexing Ukrainian territory gives Putin a blank cheque to use conscripts however he wants, I'm just saying it gives him some cover to use them.  If deployed wisely they could help with the manpower shortage.

Though personally, I don't think this will make any difference.  They need hundreds of thousands of men at the front.  Conscripts in the rear or running supply duties "in the rear" won't free up enough men to make that possible.  Mobilization is the only thing that can and that seems to be a regime ending event in Putin's eyes.  So we're back to Putin not having any way to get himself a frozen conflict.

Steve

[The_Capt]

22 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The root of all Russia's ills in this war is that they needed to take over too much land, with too many people, with and with too few troops.  No plan would have worked IMHO.  However, Putin put a massive constraint onto this already doomed invasion... for geopolitical and economic reasons he required it be done within days (optimally) or a few weeks (worst case).  Whatever chance might have existed for Russia's military to shape a victory were demolished by the requirement of a quick victory.

I doubt any military in the world could have achieved Putin's goals against an opposing force that had 8 years to prepare for just such a thing happening.

Now, could a NATO force have done this better than the Russians?  Absolutely.  Maybe even to the point of superficially achieving most of the strategic goals within a few weeks.  But then it would all fall apart with partisan activities.

Mind you, if NATO had moved a force of that size into Ukraine there would have been one big difference.  Unlike what happened to Russia, there really would be no resistance because Ukraine would really have welcomed them with flowers, bread, and salt instead of sunflower seeds

I know I've said this a bunch of times in this thread, but I'll state it again... the old Soviet system of warfare worked because doctrine, training, equipment, and strategic resources were all carefully calibrated together so that each took into consideration the limitations and strengths of the other.

What Russia did wrong was to start transforming into a Western type flexible and capable force and then stopping when it got to the difficult bits.  The result was a bunch of half (or less) implemented components with no strategic recalibration to make them all work together seamlessly.

Then, on top of all that, Putin required this jumbled mess to fight a complex war that was way beyond its capabilities even if fully resourced, which it wasn't.  Disaster is the only possible outcome.  Massing of fire and effort could mitigate the disaster, maybe to the point of blundering into some degree of short term success, but that's it.  This war was doomed to fail before the first Russian soldier crossed the line even if the planning had been vastly better.

This is why I've been saying since the first couple of days of the war that Russia has lost and there's no possibility of it changing that fact.  The only reason I waited even a few days to come to that conclusion was to make sure all my pre-war assumptions of both Russian and Ukrainian forces had been correct.  Thankfully, they were.

Steve

Here is a counter-point consideration, what if the Russian force in this invasion met the UA of 2014?  I don’t disagree that this was a tall order and a bad plan but 200k troops well equipped and with obvious mass superiority would have likely had a very different outcome against the UA of 2014 (something they were likely counting to be honest).  

So something changed in 8 years, better training and organization, western ISR, next gen ATGMs…all those add up to what we are seeing today in this war.  So I am not convinced that this is all on the Russians and their bad plan.  I am convinced that something has happened, we saw glimpses of it in 2014, ironically from the Russians.  We saw it in the Azer-Armenian conflict, and I am more convinced we are seeing it in this conflict.

 Remember Ukraine had to defend an entire frontier spanning two countries, that was something like over 2000kms long, with a regular standing force of what, 100k, that is a tall order…but they pulled it off.  So despite the Russia failures, I do not agree this could only go one way.  The Russians could concentrate force wherever they wanted while Ukraine had to try to defend everywhere.  I am not sure how they stayed out in front of the Russians operationally, let alone beat them back along that kind of frontage -while having to plan for the Belarusians (who never showed up).

Well it will give us something to study for the next 20 years, so there is that.

[dan/california]

 

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

And I think that is the problem we are solving for because we are not looking for slow and grinding, we want fast and quick.  So how do we take these conditions and do that?  I am basically at, if we had to the fight the UA current methods, how would we do that?

THIS is the question of the day.

Smart militaries watch other wars and assimilate, project forwards and adjust accordingly.

How would NATO fight a UKR type opponent?

What will US pacific oriented forces take from the UKR way of war?

How would China fight a US pacific force informed by UKR experience?

This war is the Spanish Civil War of our time.

[dan/california]

3 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

THIS is the question of the day.

Smart militaries watch other wars and assimilate, project forwards and adjust accordingly.

How would NATO fight a UKR type opponent?

What will US pacific oriented forces take from the UKR way of war?

How would China fight a US pacific force informed by UKR experience?

This war is the Spanish Civil War of our time.

Perfectly stated, so Steve about that new version of the game.......

[TheVulture]

Interesting document from ISW listing all the Russian general level officers and above, along with who is in command of which positions, biographies, and notes on who had been killed, arrested,  removed etc. Aside from being an interesting read, might also be a good cross-check for  those keeping the officer casualty lists.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-general-officer-guide-may-11

 

[dan/california]

Is Lukashenko really that stupid and/or desperate? Maybe Putin flat out threatened to kill him? Or he is still just trying to stall until the problem goes away?

[Battlefront.com]

32 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Here is a counter-point consideration, what if the Russian force in this invasion met the UA of 2014?  I don’t disagree that this was a tall order and a bad plan but 200k troops well equipped and with obvious mass superiority would have likely had a very different outcome against the UA of 2014 (something they were likely counting to be honest).  

Yes, and this is why it is very much important that any discussion of "Russia Sucks" must be combined with "Ukraine Doesn't Suck".  The disaster that Russia has on its hands today is a combination of both, not just their own problems.

I do think Russia's forces would have run into many of the same problems in 2014 that they ran into in 2022, especially logistics, though Ukraine of 2014 not armed with Western boomsticks would have made it less bloody.

32 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So something changed in 8 years, better training and organization, western ISR, next gen ATGMs…all those add up to what we are seeing today in this war.  So I am not convinced that this is all on the Russians and their bad plan.  I am convinced that something has happened, we saw glimpses of it in 2014, ironically from the Russians.  We saw it in the Azer-Armenian conflict, and I am more convinced we are seeing it in this conflict.

Ah, I see I had something implied in my lead in statement that wasn't explicitly stated as it should have been:

"The root of all Russia's ills in this war is that they needed to take over too much land, with too many people, and with too few troops for the likely real battlefield conditions (Ukrainian capabilities, terrain, and weather).

So yes, the massive failure of Russia's invasion is not only the result of a bad plan that ignored its own limitations, but because it did not take into consideration what the Ukrainians were likely capable of doing.

32 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

 Remember Ukraine had to defend an entire frontier spanning two countries, that was something like over 2000kms long, with a regular standing force of what, 100k, that is a tall order…but they pulled it off.  So despite the Russia failures, I do not agree this could only go one way.  The Russians could concentrate force wherever they wanted while Ukraine had to try to defend everywhere.

And here is where we get into the unhealthy environment in which this war was planned.  Namely, Putin setting up strategic goals that almost certainly could not be achieved.  In a healthy planning environment his military would a) know this (and they might not have!), b) communicated it to Putin (I doubt they did), and c) Putin would have listened and adjusted accordingly (unlikely, but in theory possible).

If Putin had not insisted on speed AND taking Kyiv AND taking Odessa, then yes I think there could have been a plan that theoretically might have resulted in a short term military success for Russia.  Long term?  Nope.  Too many pissed off and armed Ukrainians being supplied by the West and supported by crippling Russia's economy for long term success.

However, Putin deemed it necessary to do the impossible and I do not think there is any plan that could have secured that.  Kyiv would never, ever go down without a fight and Russia could barely handle Mariupol.  Not to mention Mariupol on top of fighting in Kyiv.

Steve

[TheVulture]

2 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Is Lukashenko really that stupid and/or desperate? Maybe Putin flat out threatened to kill him? Or he is still just trying to stall until the problem goes away?

They've been moving troops around every now and then throughout ths war.  It probably isn't anything more significant than rotating which units are on border duty.

[Sojourner]

@sburke

ISW has your back... Russian General Officer Guide

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-general-officer-guide-may-11

[Vanir Ausf B]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

 The Russians could concentrate force wherever they wanted while Ukraine had to try to defend everywhere.  I am not sure how they stayed out in front of the Russians operationally, let alone beat them back along that kind of frontage -while having to plan for the Belarusians (who never showed up).

It cannot be overstated how important it was that the Russians were road-bound, making them predictable. In addition to all the strategic errors Steve listed, the Russians also committed the cardinal sin of attacking at the worst possible time of year. The Ukrainians placed ATGMs on the obvious routes, confident the Russians could not just go around. The ATGMs slowed the columns down, then artillery destroyed them.

[billbindc]

 

The east side of the river behind Kherson is getting plastered.  

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yes, and this is why it is very much important that any discussion of "Russia Sucks" must be combined with "Ukraine Doesn't Suck".  The disaster that Russia has on its hands today is a combination of both, not just their own problems.

I do think Russia's forces would have run into many of the same problems in 2014 that they ran into in 2022, especially logistics, though Ukraine of 2014 not armed with Western boomsticks would have made it less bloody.

Ah, I see I had something implied in my lead in statement that wasn't explicitly stated as it should have been:

"The root of all Russia's ills in this war is that they needed to take over too much land, with too many people, and with too few troops for the likely real battlefield conditions (Ukrainian capabilities, terrain, and weather).

So yes, the massive failure of Russia's invasion is not only the result of a bad plan that ignored its own limitations, but because it did not take into consideration what the Ukrainians were likely capable of doing.

And here is where we get into the unhealthy environment in which this war was planned.  Namely, Putin setting up strategic goals that almost certainly could not be achieved.  In a healthy planning environment his military would a) know this (and they might not have!), b) communicated it to Putin (I doubt they did), and c) Putin would have listened and adjusted accordingly (unlikely, but in theory possible).

If Putin had not insisted on speed AND taking Kyiv AND taking Odessa, then yes I think there could have been a plan that theoretically might have resulted in a short term military success for Russia.  Long term?  Nope.  Too many pissed off and armed Ukrainians being supplied by the West and supported by crippling Russia's economy for long term success.

However, Putin deemed it necessary to do the impossible and I do not think there is any plan that could have secured that.  Kyiv would never, ever go down without a fight and Russia could barely handle Mariupol.  Not to mention Mariupol on top of fighting in Kyiv.

Steve

Like I've said before, this is all ignoring the fact that Putin was not preparing for war at all.  He was preparing for a coup.  If he thought he was gonna have a fight he wouldn't have crossed the border. 

His goals could not be achieved militarily but he was so in love w his KGB-style internal subversion and assassination squads he wasn't worried about that. 

He's not the only blind planner in modern history, paraphrasing below:

Professor of modern middle eastern studies "what are you going to do when the shia and sunni start fighting each other?"

Dick Cheney lacky:  "We won't let that happen.  Why would they want to fight each other anyway?  It won't happen."

(not picking on Bush here, he was sold a bill of goods.  I don't think he's a bad guy, he just got conned.  he should've stayed as CEO of the Texas Rangers baseball team -- a great gig for sure.  I would way rather run a baseball team than be president)

Edited May 11, 2022 by danfrodo
typo

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

Is Lukashenko really that stupid and/or desperate? Maybe Putin flat out threatened to kill him? Or he is still just trying to stall until the problem goes away?

I guess the UKR reserves will get some good training if these knuckleheads actually invade.  UKR will know exactly where the Belarus troops are massing and it'll be a slaughter. 

[Kinophile]

Or partisan activity is connecting up with UA SOF. Those fires are pretty distant fir UA arty.

[MikeyD]

Quote

...it is very much important that any discussion of "Russia Sucks" must be combined with "Ukraine Doesn't Suck". 

I've noted there's been a sharp drop off in 'Russian tanks are garbage' comments now that we see Ukrainian forces in the same tanks. Here's hoping in their hands Russian tanks don't suck as bad has they do in Russian hands.

[Harmon Rabb]

On a lighter note.

[asurob]

2 hours ago, dan/california said:

Is Lukashenko really that stupid and/or desperate? 

Both.  But he isn't coming across the border.  Ukraine has kicked Russia's ass along their mutual border.  He wants no part of that...further I'm fairly certain his army rebelled back in march when they were about to go in...this is all for show.

[chuckdyke]

The will to loot and here is their reasons. Take it away and you win the war.

 

[Machor]

Azovstal: "... that our flag was still there"

100% certain this footage will be set to Ще не вмерла Україна.

The faces of the defenders: