How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[womble]

"There were no train delays"

Plenty of cancellations, but no actual delays. But yeah, that second view looks much more like rain-induced landslip than explosive deconstruction of the embankment.

[Elmar Bijlsma]

24 minutes ago, womble said:

"There were no train delays"

Plenty of cancellations, but no actual delays. But yeah, that second view looks much more like rain-induced landslip than explosive deconstruction of the embankment.

UGH! OT but this is exactly how the Dutch national railway operator keeps itself from being fined for lateness of trains. Trains running  late get straight up cancelled to bring up their average On Time performance.

Edited April 25, 2022 by Elmar Bijlsma

[womble]

1 minute ago, Elmar Bijlsma said:

UGH! OT but this is exactly how the Dutch national railway operator keeps itself from being fined for lateness of trains.

Same with many operators, I believe. There were some gift-wrapped contracts around a while back.

[Der Zeitgeist]

 

[Der Zeitgeist]

Heh, looks like it really was a drone attack. They're looking for a mini-van now.  @Huba

 

[Huba]

It looks like it was a German van, did Scholz say anything yet ?

Edited April 25, 2022 by Huba

[Haiduk]

Briansk oil facilities, belonging to "Transneft" is not only storage, but the hub of oil distribution to Europe. On this map Брянск=Bryansk. Looks like this is Ukrainisn contribution to oil embargo %) 

[Haiduk]

UKR 2S1 SP-howitzer crew at work

 

[CHEqTRO]

First T90AM spotted out in the wild it seems.

 No idea what those wood planks are for, thought.

Edit: Video for context:

 

Edited April 25, 2022 by CHEqTRO

[Haiduk]

25 minutes ago, Der Zeitgeist said:

Heh, looks like it really was a drone attack. They're looking for a mini-van now. 

In Russian this calls "simulation of tempestous activity". To recognize their AD overslapt old Tochka-U or something else? Never. They will tell this is CIA/Mi-6/Ukronazi sabateurs on minivan with kamikadze drone.

Edited April 25, 2022 by Haiduk

[Der Zeitgeist]

20 minutes ago, Huba said:

It looks like it was a German van, did Scholz say anything yet ?

Anything that can be driven with a standard class B driver's license is not a heavy weapon. 

[Haiduk]

Balakliya area, Kharkiv oblast, Russian jet shot down, probably Su-34

 

[Huba]

Just now, Der Zeitgeist said:

Anything that can be driven with a standard class B driver's license is not a heavy weapon. 

Just pulling your leg  It is funny though that the  (one of) greatest attack on RU infrastructure to date was done by 4 guys in a van. Of all nations, I'd guess that Israeli security services must be the most terrified right now.

[DesertFox]

8 minutes ago, CHEqTRO said:

No idea what those wood planks are for, thought.

They think it works as camo against recce from above. Seen that in many drone vids. It ain´t work though.

[cyrano01]

16 hours ago, The_Capt said:

- Ability to negotiate with their own political level.  A weird one as most militaries do not find themselves in this position but...Russia.  The Russian military has likely been negotiating with Putin throughout this thing and will continue to, the only way they can do that is if they remain in control of the Russian military. Speed of Success is key here as faster is better because time is not on their hands.

 

This is a really good point. Mind you, the more I think about it the more  I wonder about ' most militaries do not find themselves in this position.'

The British commanders in the Western desert subject to Churchillian pressure to mount premature offensives might say different. Similarly the relationship between Lincoln and the various Union commanders during the earlier years of the US Civil War resembles a continuous negotiation.

The German and Soviet comanders subject to no-retreat directives from their respective dictators were suffering from an inability to negotiate as you describe.

I recently read a damning analysis of the British army's role in the Iraq occupation where the military manifestly failed to negotiate with the government, although such problems are always going to be more prevalent in counter-insurgencies.

Perhaps this negotiated tension is more prevalent than we normally allow.

I guess the obvious difference is that those political leaders who ended up on the winning side managed to find themselves a general they were happy with before too much damage was done, whether that be a Monty, Grant or Zhukov.

 

[The_Capt]

21 minutes ago, cyrano01 said:

This is a really good point. Mind you, the more I think about it the more  I wonder about ' most militaries do not find themselves in this position.'

The British commanders in the Western desert subject to Churchillian pressure to mount premature offensives might say different. Similarly the relationship between Lincoln and the various Union commanders during the earlier years of the US Civil War resembles a continuous negotiation.

The German and Soviet comanders subject to no-retreat directives from their respective dictators were suffering from an inability to negotiate as you describe.

I recently read a damning analysis of the British army's role in the Iraq occupation where the military manifestly failed to negotiate with the government, although such problems are always going to be more prevalent in counter-insurgencies.

Perhaps this negotiated tension is more prevalent than we normally allow.

I guess the obvious difference is that those political leaders who ended up on the winning side managed to find themselves a general they were happy with before too much damage was done, whether that be a Monty, Grant or Zhukov.

 

I probably should have been more clear, my bad.   All militaries have to negotiate with their political level to a greater or lesser extent.  We shine it up and call it “military advice to policy” but it is really negotiating their political needs with military strategic ones.

What is weird in the Russian dynamic is the risk to that “ability to negotiate”.  Especially to the point that is becomes a CoG consideration.  Most militaries have it built into a national legal framework but in autocracies the reality of a political amateur essentially “taking over” and making the military negotiation position null and void is somewhat unique -and even then it is not often done, see Stalin.  

In this case the Russian military is being forced to fight-for-success or that bargaining position may simply be take away.  And if Putin as CinC means that, then it has already happened.

[Armorgunner]

Just wonders when the Nazirussians realize, that they can not win?

I mean, if the free world send like 20-30% of it´s stocks of advanced equipment. Nazirussia, should understand, that it can not win!

Edited April 25, 2022 by Armorgunner

[sross112]

6 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Sure sounded like a rocket attack.

Steve

If you do frame by frame around 16 seconds you can see the strike come in. Definitely a missile of some sort.

[DesertFox]

 

 

[hcrof]

Hi all, another long time dormant member here re-emerging to say thanks for such a great thread. This really is the best analysis of the war I know of, due to the mix of on the ground people (Haiduk, kraze) and knowledgeable experts from lots of different backgrounds. 

I keep thinking about what a Russian or Ukrainian armoured offensive would actually look like in practice. They would require some kind of staging area, but surely these would be visible to ubiquitous drones and then nailed with a arty/air/SRBM strike before they leave the starting line? How long would it take for a brigade or more to assemble like that, or do modern armies stay dispersed even just before a big push?

Maybe that is why the Russians have not concentrated for their big offensive? They would be too vulnerable before the order to move out? But if that is the case, how does the UA solve that problem?

 

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Elmar Bijlsma said:

UGH! OT but this is exactly how the Dutch national railway operator keeps itself from being fined for lateness of trains. Trains running  late get straight up cancelled to bring up their average On Time performance.

Years ago this is how airlines kept their flights from being marked as "delayed".  The standard was once they pulled away from the terminal they were considered "in flight".  Didn't matter if the plane stayed on the tarmac for 5 hours.  The plane might still have been hit for "late arrival", but not "delayed departure".

Back to the real topic...

The railroad problem is another example of why we should not jump to conclusions.  Russia is MASSIVE, its infrastructure in bad shape, and its attention to safety poor.  I bet there is some significant infrastructure problem every week that has absolutely nothing to do with deliberate causes.  Beware of confirmation bias!

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

In Russian this calls "simulation of tempestous activity". To recognize their AD overslapt old Tochka-U or something else? Never. They will tell this is CIA/Mi-6/Ukronazi sabateurs on minivan with kamikadze drone.

Exactly this.  Ukraine doesn't have super sonic drones   The security camera footage had a microphone, so those really looking for answers have a nice piece of evidence that it wasn't a drone.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

7 minutes ago, hcrof said:

Hi all, another long time dormant member here re-emerging to say thanks for such a great thread. This really is the best analysis of the war I know of, due to the mix of on the ground people (Haiduk, kraze) and knowledgeable experts from lots of different backgrounds. 

I keep thinking about what a Russian or Ukrainian armoured offensive would actually look like in practice. They would require some kind of staging area, but surely these would be visible to ubiquitous drones and then nailed with a arty/air/SRBM strike before they leave the starting line? How long would it take for a brigade or more to assemble like that, or do modern armies stay dispersed even just before a big push?

Maybe that is why the Russians have not concentrated for their big offensive? They would be too vulnerable before the order to move out? But if that is the case, how does the UA solve that problem?

 

Look what the cat dragged in!!!  Good kitty

Yes, staging areas have been a real problem for both sides.  Drones tend to be rather good at spotting them.  The old days of having to lay physical eyeballs on something are gone, and with that all the extreme expense and difficulty.

It would seem that Russia has all its forces in place for attack, but that they aren't committing them all at once.  Most importantly, it seems that there is no southern pincer in this attack.  Slow grinding offensive instead of bold breakthroughs.

As I said around Wednesday last week, I don't think there's a big "classic" type Russian attack on the menu.  I'm guessing some sane heads up the food chain figured out it wouldn't achieve anything positive.  For Russia, I mean.

Steve

[womble]

2 minutes ago, Armorgunner said:

Just wonders when the Nazirussians realize, that they can not win?

Which ones? There's a wide range of "win" conditions across different factions, and a wide range of levels of "loss" that might prompt significant reactions.

Putin likely recognises now that he can't achieve his initial "win" of taking over the whole of Ukraine and installing a puppet government, and that he's got to grab some sort of success he can claim as a win with "maximum credibility". For him, at this point, it's a matter of surviving long enough to try again later.

The army likely recognise that they can't hope to hang on to what they've got forever, and their "win" is "not getting shot for failure by Putin".

The security services have already lost. It's even possible they don't have the influence left to matter. They're probably "all in" behind Putin now.

The "oligarchs"... again, they just don't want to get axed/strangled/shot/poisoned/sent to the Gulag. I think if they were going to oust Putin and change Russia's official position they'd've done it by now. They are, I think, largely "men of the world" and comprehend what the actions taken in Ukraine are going to do to their personal fortunes; they'll want to get started on the long, long road to normality ASAP. But they lack the levers to get rid of Vlad.

The people? I don't think they matter in this calculation. The ones that aren't totally brainwashed (by cultural predelictions massaged mercilessly by a monolithic state media) to follow Putin's party line are too few and too afraid (rightfully) of the security forces (who aren't going to be switching sides en masse) and the zombies. Things would have to get a lot worse before we'll see any return to popular protest on the streets that might lead to uprising. Any recognition of inability to win less than that is irrelevant.

So, the only recognition of "inability to win" that matters is probably Putin's and his "win conditions" will be moderated as circumstances develop, since he's pragmatic. And even his recognition that he "can't win" against UKR doesn't mean that he can't, personally, win by making others carry on losing against UKR/NATO/the rest of the world.

 

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

UKR 2S1 SP-howitzer crew at work

 

All that smoke. Nothing like that in footage of NATO SPGs.  Inhaling that crap all day,Jesus.