How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Combatintman]

11 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

All vice versa. Many experienced veterans of 2014-2016 have retired from serviсe after 2017 and now most of them were mobilized again. Of course, they need some retrain, but most of people, who now in regular army are so called "operative reserve 1" (who participated in th war) and "operative reserve 2" (who served in army in previous years, but didn't participate in ATO) 

One of my temporarily ex-colleagues caught a flight from Afghanistan at the start of this 'Special Military Operation' to get his family out of Dinipro.  He managed to get them into Poland and then went back.  He's an ex-Ukrainian paratrooper and got assigned to a territorial unit.   Not sure what he's up to at the moment but as of a week ago he and his unit hadn't been doing much.  So the point is that there are some very experienced and quality guys to call on.

[Der Zeitgeist]

26 minutes ago, Taranis said:

@Huba
Unfortunately, what he indicated is quite vague. We don't really know if they have already been delivered or not.

He'll probably speak more clearly from Sunday evening on.

[Lethaface]

7 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

So, merely cuz lying orcs/RTtrolls, feeding the same 5 loons (Ritter, Helmer, MoonofAB, Saker, etc.) in turn cited endlessly by Western CT addicts at both ends of the political horseshoe.

...it necessarily follows that Ukraine cannot possibly be encountering critical shortages of: 

1. vehicles

2. fuels

3. ammo

4. skilled manpower?

....Hmm, talk about sticking one's head in the sand. And you're about the last person on here I expected to hear this from.

I am not asking anyone to prove a negative here. I am just trying to pierce the protective fog the UA has brilliantly wrapped around itself.

I think it's always good to entertain thoughts contrary to the line of thoughts/beliefs one is following. Although I think it's also good to hold their arguments to the same level of scrutiny as one would do regarding arguments that support one's own line of thought.

Anyway others here are probably in a much better position to counter some of the arguments, while arguments like 'multiple Javelins are needed to destroy MBTs' or Stugna-P misses 80% of it's shots are imo not really worth going into. Even if those were true it doesn't change the number of losses documented by groups like Oryx.

Although I agree we don't know much about the current situation of vehicles/fuels/ammo/manpower on the Ukrainian side. We do know that much of that is being shipped by the 100 ton on a daily basis and that Ukraine has actually mobilized a while back (and has quite some reservist with combat experience), while Russia didn't mobilize yet.
 

7 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Because I am deeply worried that letting the Russians get their breath back and dig in in place rather than continuing to keep them running around fighting fires over the next 60 days is *extremely* risky.  That's at a Sun Tzu level.  

UNLESS the ability of UA to sustain offensive operations is in fact a lot less than we believe.

Personally I'm not that worried about Russia being able turn tables into their favor, even if they are allowed to catch their breath. For one because apparently they didn't properly read Sun Tzu's chapter 'Fire Attack' (or any of it for that matter, seem like they're stuck in the middle of 'Il Principe'.

But moreover because imo the main reason for the funky odor surrounding this war and their military performance is mainly caused by their political / strategic culture and the corruption and nepotism that has been allowed to fester under the same clique for two decades. These things can't be easily fixed from inside the military, change would have to come top-down unless the regime falls. Such changes take years or probably decades, even if the regime would want such a change.

I'm throwing in this old article because I think it's a good analogy for Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine (probably got it from these forums a decade ago, could even be you who posted it lol)

https://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars

Now there are obvious differences between Russia and the Arabic countries talked about in this study.

But, there are also many similarities. Lack of leadership, training, corruption/kleptocracy, nepotism, lack of trust among the common soldiers, a history of 'befehlstaktik', the 'boss' is always right, etc. Imo those are the main reasons why the Russian army 'sucks', not because Russians are a different breed of humans; they aren't. 

My impression is that somehow Putin and his clique tried to change the army into a more modern, western alike, army and probably believed it succeeded. The initial invasion plan looked like a bit of an 'auftragstaktik' like 'plan'. 

Reorganizing the same elements in whatever nomenclature (regiments/divisions) won't do jack sh1t to improve their combat power in the short term. Not all of Russia's military units suck obviously, but do they have enough 'non-sucking' units to make a change? I don't think so, otherwise a change wouldn't have been needed in the first place.

Sticking their best remaining units in trenches under continued Ukrainian shelling / drone strikes doesn't seem extremely risky for Ukraine, but rather for Russia's remaining combat power.

Russia won't have another 'shot' on the same level as this one anytime soon. This was all they had, it failed and is now working on 'loss aversion' (imo in vein).
The incompetent leadership, from political to strategic to operational level would need to change and be improved for another shot to have better effect. The army would have to be rebuild.

Unless their political / strategic culture changes and they manage to get rid of a lot of the corruption and nepotism, the leadership won't improve. Given the current sanctions I guess it will be hard to rebuild their army, let alone improve it.

Ukraine on the other hand is improving their army and will not sit still for Russia to start round 2. That is if there won't be NATO / security guarantees turning round 2 in a world war from the get go.

Concluding I'm mostly worried about more loss of life for as long as the current conflict goes on. But I agree that if Ukraine is able, they should kick the house of cards  down and force Russia at least back to the pre-February borders  before they call it quits / agree to a ceasefire.

Edited April 22, 2022 by Lethaface

[Haiduk]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

What I'm trying to figure out is how this fits in with the BTR-82.  Seems this was the first action, then the BTR went forward, hit another mine, then a second T-72 collected the BTR?

You can see this all happened in the same space as there's a distinctive damaged tree in all these videos.

Steve

Yes, BTR of naval infantry blew on AT-mine. While the tank came to pull it out, BTR got two RPG hits. Tank towed BTR and returned to supress UKR positin in building, but, as wrote our sources, it was blown on IED, disguished in a tire. Alas, IED was activated too early.  

[Huba]

More SPGs for Ukraine apparently. This is on top of undisclosed number that Poland sent - and we (used to) have 13 battalions of 2S1  with modernized fire control systems, plus a lot more stored.

Edit: apparently Ukrainians are also happy about Romania's help, but Romanians are not willing to disclose what exactly they are sending. Artillery ammo and maybe MLRSs would be my guess, plus some smaller stuff.

 

Edited April 22, 2022 by Huba

[Haiduk]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Could be this:

 

Trudoliubivka is north of Kherson oblast, so this is Kryvyi Rih direction, not Mykolaiv. I think, he could tell about Oleksandrivka, where intensive clashes more than week.

[akd]

Quote

"Apparently, we are now at war with the whole world, as it was in the Great Patriotic War, all of Europe, the whole world was against us. And now the same thing, they never liked Russia"

lol, whut?

[Huba]

Here's a 26 page report by esteemed UK think-tank, analyzing prospect of the long war. Sounds like very interesting read.

Edit: I read the whole thing and I really recommend you do it too. The highlights include breakdown of Western produced electronics used in Russian weapon systems (authors claim to personally inspecting Iskander cruise missiles! ) and an analysis of situation in Moldova.  @Battlefront.com @The_Capt I'm sure you'll find it interesting. 

Here's a direct link:

https://static.rusi.org/special-report-202204-operation-z-web.pdf

 

Edited April 22, 2022 by Huba

[Taranis]

46 minutes ago, Der Zeitgeist said:

He'll probably speak more clearly from Sunday evening on.

. This is exactly what I think. And I also think that this revelation, just before the weekend, is not insignificant.

For those who don't know, the second (and last) round of the French presidential elections takes place this weekend (Sunday) between Emmanuelle MACRON and Marine LE PEN.

Going back to the weapon donations, I think that we can clearly see the effect of the various anti-aircraft weapons. There are increasing reports of downed Russian planes and helicopters. This is also a good thing and a prerequisite before sending more ground-to-ground artillery type equipment. A proof that everything is carefully thought out and well organized.

[Taranis]

@Huba
Ukrainian troops (40 soldiers) begin training in France with Caesar 155mm 52-caliber self-propelled howitzers donated by France, said Macron in @OuestFrance

http://lignesdedefense.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2022/04/22/40-artilleurs-ukrainiens-en-france-a-parti-de-ce-week-end-po-23000.html

Quote

The delivery of Caesar to the Ukrainians is "in progress" and the capacity will be operational "at the beginning of May", according to the Élysée, which did not want to specify how many pieces (6 + 6?) and how many thousands of shells will be delivered .

On the other hand, details were provided on the training component. Tomorrow Saturday, around forty Ukrainian soldiers will arrive in France for training. They could join the Canjuers camp, the usual training site for French gunners.

Emmanuel Macron revealed during an interview with Ouest-France this delivery of artillery pieces to the Ukrainians who are demanding support to deal with attacks by Russian infantry and armored vehicles.

With 40 crew you can equipped 13 CAESAR (max) or 8 if you used is maximum transport capacity.

The more crew there is, the less tiring it is to man the gun. Personally I think it takes a minimum of 4 regarding how they are going to use it

 

Edited April 22, 2022 by Taranis

[Huba]

11 minutes ago, Taranis said:

@Huba
Ukrainian troops (40 soldiers) begin training in France with Caesar 155mm 52-caliber self-propelled howitzers donated by France, said Macron in @OuestFrance

http://lignesdedefense.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2022/04/22/40-artilleurs-ukrainiens-en-france-a-parti-de-ce-week-end-po-23000.html

With 40 crew you can equipped 13 CAESAR (max) or 8 if you used is maximum transport capacity.

The more crew there is, the less tiring it is to man the gun. Personally I think it takes a minimum of 4 regarding how they are going to use it

 

The ones now being trained can be complemented by more personel back in Ukraine. For simple tasks like carrying ammo even green recruits would be useful. Does it make sense? 

Edited April 22, 2022 by Huba

[DesertFox]

 

 

[Haiduk]

22 minutes ago, Taranis said:

With 40 crew you can equipped 13 CAESAR (max) or 8 if you used is maximum transport capacity.

No, like and with 50 soldiers in US training this will be not crews, but instructors, which will teach UKR crews

[chuckdyke]

11 minutes ago, Huba said:

The ones now being trained can be complemented by more personel back in Ukraine. For simple tasks like carrying ammo even green recruits would be useful. Does it make sense? 

Only 1:6 is in combat in some armies. I don't know the ratio in the Ukrainian army. Everybody will receive basic weapons training after lots of recruits can do a job, they are most suited for. 

[Taranis]

11 minutes ago, Huba said:

The ones now being trained can be complemented by more personel back in Ukraine. For simple tasks like carrying ammo even green recruits would be useful. Does it make sense? 

Yes. It really is a semi-automated and easy to use system. A crew training on this machine is really very fast. Frankly for people who already know artillery, it takes days to really be comfortable. Where it got long and quite complicated was on the commander's post because you have to know how to resolve anomalies, shooting incidents, vehicle settings (that's really where the difficulty lies) to operate the vehicle the best way possible. It is a weapon that is quite secure and very efficient, which is a good thing for the gunners but it requires knowing how the system reacts so as not to have a blockage. Personally, I knew the first versions that had software defects etc (which is normal for any new vehicle) and I quickly saw its reliability increase drastically (at least a decade ago). On top of that, we've had the time to perfect it and use it in real combat situations in Afghanistan or Iraq. Regarding the crew, it also depends on the type of ammunition used. It's easier to train a crew that uses simple fuzes than electronics ones which need to be configured electronically (it's still very simple, don't get me wrong, but it's still more complicated) 

[Taranis]

9 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

No, like and with 50 soldiers in US training this will be not crews, but instructors, which will teach UKR crews

Thanks for clarification.

[Lethaface]

17 minutes ago, Taranis said:

@Huba
Ukrainian troops (40 soldiers) begin training in France with Caesar 155mm 52-caliber self-propelled howitzers donated by France, said Macron in @OuestFrance

http://lignesdedefense.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2022/04/22/40-artilleurs-ukrainiens-en-france-a-parti-de-ce-week-end-po-23000.html

With 40 crew you can equipped 13 CAESAR (max) or 8 if you used is maximum transport capacity.

The more crew there is, the less tiring it is to man the gun. Personally I think it takes a minimum of 4 regarding how they are going to use it

 

I guess NL will send a similar number of PZH2000. I haven't read about any numbers, actually our government / press didn't even mention we'd send the PzH2000 (just that we were sending 'heavy' materiel). I read someone asking, but PzH2000 is indeed compatible with Excalibur munition (operational with NL since 2018), although I guess Germany will send their own smart munitions.

I wonder whether all the 155mm NATO artillery systems, both the SP and towed, will be of much use before the current 'hot' phase ends. Earlier this week (before I even read about the PzH2000s) there was a statement from our military commander, which entailed that much of the stuff that gets send now won't necessarily be used by Ukraine in the fight for Donbass, but rather bring the defense of other parts of Ukraine to a higher level.

Of course it would be nice to see the daily drone footage featuring multiple rounds simultaneous impact 155 in action, probably even more accurate than Ukraine is already showing with their current artillery systems.

[Taranis]

5 minutes ago, Lethaface said:

I guess NL will send a similar number of PZH2000. I haven't read about any numbers, actually our government / press didn't even mention we'd send the PzH2000 (just that we were sending 'heavy' materiel). I read someone asking, but PzH2000 is indeed compatible with Excalibur munition (operational with NL since 2018), although I guess Germany will send their own smart munitions.

I wonder whether all the 155mm NATO artillery systems, both the SP and towed, will be of much use before the current 'hot' phase ends. Earlier this week (before I even read about the PzH2000s) there was a statement from our military commander, which entailed that much of the stuff that gets send now won't necessarily be used by Ukraine in the fight for Donbass, but rather bring the defense of other parts of Ukraine to a higher level.

Of course it would be nice to see the daily drone footage featuring multiple rounds simultaneous impact 155 in action, probably even more accurate than Ukraine is already showing with their current artillery systems.

Haven't like left  . But for sure I can't wait to see them in action and what it can give. What I expect and we really need is a total air interdiction. Feedback will be really interesting for our Western weapons systems but conversely photos of losses would not be positive.

[The_Capt]

10 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

OK team. I am going to join @Erwinin the Devil's Advocate space here.  I have now spent some time browsing the 'pro-Russian' sites (and I feel like I need a shower) -- so you don't have to.

I shall pass over all their 'Alternative Facts' around the will and condition of Russia and the Russian forces and present only their view of what is happening to the Ukrainian forces on the ground.

Fact based refutations preferred, please. Spluttering invective about 'lying Orcs' is of no practical use here.

THESIS:  In spite of a Western media propaganda campaign and some notable Russian failures, Russia is methodically degrading Ukraine’s military capacity. 

1. Ukraine is running out of AFVs and other vehicles

This is both due to combat losses and logistical/fuel bite.

1.1  UA is now 95% a leg infantry army, including new militia formations. While Ukraine spins this as an innovation, such forces are capable of only shallow local attacks.

1.2 A huge portion of UA mechanised forces abandoned its AFVs and artillery under heavy RA attack in the first week of hostilities, becoming pure infantry formations. 

1.3 UA is largely using passenger vehicles for transport and supply. Priority for remaining army transport has gone to keeping its dwindling artillery arm in the field.

1.4 Russia has taken out most repair facilities in East Ukraine. Damaged vehicles must be shipped long distances, or abroad, to be repaired and refit. Russian videos show UA vehicles that have been cannibalized for parts and then abandoned.

2. Ukraine is running out of fuels and POL:

2.1  Only 1/3 of Ukraine's gas stations are still open. The civilian economy is in rapid decline and supply chains are breaking down, especially outside the large cities.

2.2 Ukraine no longer has any functioning refineries. Tank farms have also been hard hit.

2.3 Fuels must be trucked to the front in civilian tankers after being railed in from abroad at the expense of other cargo. Tankers cannot reach Odessa and the Rumanians have not been overly cooperative.

3. Ukraine is running short of weapons and ammo

3.1  UA is consuming weapons in a week that the US thought would last them a month. In general, its militia troops have very poor fire discipline in spite of their high enthusiasm.

3.2 Clever video editing makes Ukrainian missiles and artillery look far more accurate and deadly than they are. In fact, several Javelin hits are needed to take out a MBT. Stugna has only a 1 in 5 hit rate and its kill rate vs. MBTs is very poor.

3.3 Western heavy artillery, with unfamiliar calibres and loads, is proving very hard for even experienced UA gunners to deploy and use effectively.

3.4  Russia seems able to jam Switchblade drones and almost no Bayraktars remain; the UA reserves them only for strategic missions like the one against Moskva.

3.5  Russia has been making very effective use of its cruise missile assets, destroying key facilities and arms stocks. It has extremely good humint from sources inside Ukraine. An entire month's supply of newly arrived Western anti-tank weapons was recently destroyed in missile strikes on 3 sites in Lvov. UA attempts to disperse these assets has thrown its logistics situation even deeper into chaos.

3.6  Local authorities (warlords) have been diverting some of the best Western weapons to equip their own militias and private armies, and also selling them on the black market.

4. Ukraine is running out of capable soldiers.

4.1 About 10% of the UA standing army on day 1 have been lost (dead/ invalided/ captured). That is a 'decimation' of its most experienced and skilled cadre, and will take as much as a year to bring back to its Feb 2022 condition.

4.2 Widespread draft evasion has occurred, especially in the Russian speaking east and also among urban educated youth. Only a few thousand Ukrainian expatriates have returned to serve, and the ballyhooed wave of Western volunteers has not materialised in meaningful numbers.

4.3  UA replacements are being sent into action with very little training. Specialists and skilled technicians are in critically short supply and veteran cadre are on the front lines, not training newcomers.

4.4 After nearly 60 days, the UA irregular infantry forces' ability to live off the land (local people and their food) is running down rapidly.  Their amateur, improvised logistical chains are totally inadeqate.

4.5  In spite of UA having years to prepare stay behind forces, in the southern oblasts there have been very few incidents of partisan activity or sabotage. This indicates  general acquiescence by the local population, which in large part has not evacuated (excepting active combat zones).

****

Again, for avoidance of doubt I make no endorsement whatsoever of the above, so don't freekin' @ me.....

Do you guys sleep?  It must be a time zone thing.  First off the new Perun video dropped and it is also on the long war, haven't watched yet so FYI for now:

Second, I think it is a very good idea to look inside the adversaries head from time to time so well done to @LongLeftFlank for pulling all this.   First thing that struck me was how much of this are noted vulnerabilities of the Russians which tracks as a lot of propaganda plays on projection mechanisms. 

This whole assessment, on both sides, is really asking what is the calculus of attrition in this war.  The overarching theory in the mainstream is that "the war is costing the Russians a lot but they have much deeper pockets/UA is on the brink"  The theory being that in a long war, Ukraine will break and Russia will be able to achieve its original aims - some see this with fear, others with glee depending who you talk to.  The high-level idea is that if a nations power is drained faster than its opponent their ability to resist will crumble = "victory". 

The reality is that it is a lot more complicated than that....like macro-economics complicated.  So for arguments sake let's break out the Capt's national power model and do some comparison:

Strength:  Let's start here as it really is all most people tank about.  On paper, even if we accept Russian faults, failings and corruption, the Russian Federation is "stronger" than Ukraine.  It has much more manpower, its economic strength is still higher even given sanctions, its standing forces - even if we cut them in half - well outnumber the UA and Russia has a strategic weapons inventory to rival the US.  The hard power reality is that Russia could turn Ukraine to glass with a small fraction of its nuclear arsenal and could do a general mobilization that could threaten the entirety of Europe if it put it all in motion.  If this was a uni-dimensional model, we should all be asking why Russia "has not won yet?", and many are doing just that. But Strength is a slippery beast and not one that simply responds to the sound of its masters whistle....we will come back to that.

Relationships.  Oh my when you start to unpack this one the view on Russian superiority swings dramatically.  Ukraine has relationship superiority in just about any metric one wishes to measure.  Externally the disparity is obvious as we ship heavier weapons and billions in support to Ukraine, while Russia gets deeper into the desert of international isolation.  However, it is the internal relationships that are even more interesting.  Internally Ukraine is a lot stronger, again for obvious reasons; however, the moral and collective connections in Ukraine scream "unity", Ukrainians are willing to die for each other and are proving it everyday.  Russia is a bit more complicated.  The Russian domestic audience is clearly a factor here based on the lies its own government has had to tell them, which are getting progressively larger and stretched.  When it comes to narrative superiority, Russia is clearly struggling.  I am sure internal polls in Russia are showing 110% support to the war but the amount of crackdown effort and epic "alternative facts" building going on do not speak to a galvanized Russian population.  Lastly, this whole war crimes thing was literally the dumbest thing Russia could do (beyond being barbaric), as it has become a strategic turning point in the relationship space deeply in favor of Ukraine - hence the crazy lies of Ukrainian snipers coming from Russia...worst damage control scheme ever.  So score a solid win on Ukraine for this one.

Will.  No need to really get into this one too much because my assessment is that Ukrainian Will has increased over time while Russian Will has eroded, worse it is very fragile because it is largely coming from a single node - Putin.  Over time Will ebbs and flows, shaped by events/outcomes and factors such as Strength and Relationships - remember all war is negotiation with the future, so people use these factors to weigh their odds.  Ukrainian Will is incredibly high right now... I do not care if Russia get that big naked blue guy from the Watchmen to stride the battlefield zapping Ukrainians with his laser eyes; the second that happens Ukrainian defence will work on how to cut his toes off.  Ukraine is all in, like Taliban all in.  I see pictures of 12 year old with toys guns and that says to me that for Ukraine, killing Russians is becoming cultural, part of their identity - this is how global powers are born.  In 100 years when Ukraine is a major power in Europe and the globe our great grand-kids can point to this war as the start point.  So, again, a major win for Ukraine and this is really the one that matters.

Opportunity. I left this one for last because it links back into Russian Strength.  This is why Russian strength is not what it appears on paper.  Russia is lacking in a lot of the stuff it take to create the opportunity to bring its national power to bear.  Relationships, make its nuclear arsenal almost useless as any use immediately risks drawing in the western powers, who have much more Strength.  Nuclear weapons have enormous deterrence power but almost zero coercive power as once used whatever the aims were to justify their use become irrelevant.  Will is the other problem.  Russian will is not strong, or Putin could have ordered general mobilization by now and he has tried every trick but that.  Then even if he did the tyranny of the physics of this universe means it will take time to pull together that Strength to the point it is "Opportune", worse that time further erodes Russian Will and Strength as economic sanctions start to kick in.  Ukraine is the exact opposite the lights are almost all green on Opportunity.  It would really appreciate more and even for NATO to get directly involved but here we have Opportunity costs of our own to worry about...you can see how it gets complicated. 

So back to LLFs list.  Well the first three are all Strength-offset-by-Relationships.  Until the RA cuts off supply from the West or the will to support fails, there is nothing there that we cannot simply drive across the Polish border.  Russia completely failed Step 1 of Invading Another Country (it is a lecture package) - Isolate and as such there is nothing we cannot send to the Ukrainians on that list.  The last one "Capable Soldiers" is probably the one thing, aside from volunteers, we cannot provide but we can help Ukraine make them in Poland and send them back across the border with the equipment...and I will bet money that is happening right now.  

Finally, what is interesting about the Russian-list in the OP is what is missing.  What about Information?  The Russians are clearly not even thinking in terms of modern warfare because any list I would make up would have Ukraine is cut off and in the dark due to lack of information and then build some BS reasons/examples why.  But information superiority isn't even in their lexicon, let alone C4ISR.  The fact that Russia propaganda is all on Strength and mentions nothing about other dimensions of power that really matter tells me more about the Russian mindset than anything else...and it screams amateur hour. 
 

Edited April 22, 2022 by The_Capt

[kraze]

1 hour ago, akd said:

lol, whut?

Are you really that surprised? WW2 should've led to the creation of a mighty russian empire spanning whole Europe and Asia, it's why Stalin was going to use his bro Hitler as an excuse to "liberate" whole Europe, down to Portugal. But, as we know, that plan failed so badly that in USSR it was forbidden to "celebrate" their 9th of May in any way, shape or form for 20 years. All their veterans that suffered any noticeable injuries were forbidden to be within 100km of Moscow. They just wanted to forget their failure ever happened.

Only in 1965, when Brezhnev became the emperor, he just decided it's a holiday now - because he loved medals so much and proceeded to slap some onto his own belly.

They had to settle for Cold War stalemate and half of Germany. So to russians their "victory" in WW2 was never one. They only let go of that plan to get to English Channel in 5 days when they couldn't do that anymore in 1991 with the crash of their empire.

But they never forgot about it. So, of course, Europe is always the enemy because Europe is something they want to have. But can't. So they are mad about it. "5 days to English Channel" is even more laughable now than "taking Kyiv in 2 days".

Edited April 22, 2022 by kraze

[Haiduk]

K-2 UAV unit and mortar battery of 54th mech.brigade struck Russian tank convoy of T-72B3M and UR-77 mine clearing vehicle. Despite only several close hits, part of Russian convoy retreated and part of tanks and UR-77 were abandoned by crews. At the end of video, UKR soldiers take HMGs from these tanks to own pick-up. It is seen one tank has damage of gun barrel, and some other were immobilized because of torn tracks.

Background song is UKR parody "Fried "Tigrs" on very popular Russian song "Crimson LADA" in style of "90th dance-pop"

 

Edited April 22, 2022 by Haiduk

[The_Capt]

9 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Because I have heard this sort of BS before, I was able to calmly and politely draw her back to some of the apolitical facts I presented.  To which she stormed off.  Had I not heard this MAGA talking point before I might have stumbled and not had a ready, non-political response.

(PS, for the politically sensitive of you out there I'm simply repeating what happened to me a couple of hours ago in a public forum.  If a left wing nut job had said something about making love and not war I'd be mentioning that person here instead).

So this is called a Black Elephant and we have danced around it margins a lot on this forum for obvious reasons.  I am Canadian and try not to weigh in on any one nations politics - we have got enough silliness of our own and do not intend  open up this can of worms but maybe we can look at the can.

The road to this war extends across the aisle, the world does not "happen" in the 4-8 year US administration cycles. If US readers of this walk away with one thing, let it be that.  The US has enormous influence but in a highly complex system such as "war" the causes are rarely determined in a few short years of a presidential term.  More succinctly "it is not all about you", and this applies to my own country as the political noise is trying to play this one as well.  

Putin has been in power for over 20 years and the western failures leading to today are long and winding on both sides of the aisle.  No one US president is responsible, they all are - kinda comes with the job.  

As to the particular former administration, I will lean in slightly: listen to the advisors and spokes-people before this war and it gives a hint at what the actual policy might have been.  I point to Col Macgregor as one of my favorites, a former military advisor to the White House and someone I take particular issue with, not only because he has consistently been wrong but also because he has sold out on a core principle of objective military advice.  Look up and listen to his analysis and assessment on YouTube for those looking for a window at what advice would have been provided in this crisis...and I will leave it at that.  

[Taranis]

Image from the site of crashed An-26 in Zaporizhzhia region
https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/6835

 

 

Russian troops attempted a breakthrough near Virnopilla of Kharkiv region, but failed

https://t.me/hueviykharkov/56207

 

 

Ukrainian military shotdown Russian Orlan drone in Kharkiv region with MANPADS

 

[Maquisard manqué]

20 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So this is called a Black Elephant and we have danced around it margins a lot on this forum for obvious reasons.  I am Canadian and try not to weigh in on any one nations politics - we have got enough silliness of our own and do not intend  open up this can of worms but maybe we can look at the can.

The road to this war extends across the aisle, the world does not "happen" in the 4-8 year US administration cycles. If US readers of this walk away with one thing, let it be that.  The US has enormous influence but in a highly complex system such as "war" the causes are rarely determined in a few short years of a presidential term.  More succinctly "it is not all about you", and this applies to my own country as the political noise is trying to play this one as well.  

Putin has been in power for over 20 years and the western failures leading to today are long and winding on both sides of the aisle.  No one US president is responsible, they all are - kinda comes with the job.  

As to the particular former administration, I will lean in slightly: listen to the advisors and spokes-people before this war and it gives a hint at what the actual policy might have been.  I point to Col Macgregor as one of my favorites, a former military advisor to the White House and someone I take particular issue with, not only because he has consistently been wrong but also because he has sold out on a core principle of objective military advice.  Look up and listen to his analysis and assessment on YouTube for those looking for a window at what advice would have been provided in this crisis...and I will leave it at that.  

Hehe, that’s one way to say a lot without saying anything!

Out of likes…

Edited April 22, 2022 by Maquisard manqué

[sross112]

21 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

 

As to the particular former administration, I will lean in slightly: listen to the advisors and spokes-people before this war and it gives a hint at what the actual policy might have been.  I point to Col Macgregor as one of my favorites, a former military advisor to the White House and someone I take particular issue with, not only because he has consistently been wrong but also because he has sold out on a core principle of objective military advice.  Look up and listen to his analysis and assessment on YouTube for those looking for a window at what advice would have been provided in this crisis...and I will leave it at that.  

Well, personally I really don't think any of us could say definitively what the response would be. You can point to advisors and say what their advice would be, but then I would challenge you to find an advisor the previous administration listened to. Just saying, if the former administration was still in we could be anywhere from nothing at all to full blown nuclear devastation right now.

I do agree that these things span longer and different time periods than US presidential cycles. If I sit back and look at it there is blame both ways and mostly due to a very confusing foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. 

Edited April 22, 2022 by sross112