How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

Jomni's latest just posted.

[Huba]

I wonder to what degree it's true. If Russians somehow manage to get additional 20 000 light infantry on the battlefield, it could help them substantially, for example in storming Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. I don't see it being a Wuderwaffe game changer though, Ukrainians will adjust. What do you gents make of that?

 

[Kinophile]

That's a useful number, on paper, but really they'd be best used as road surfacing.

Mercenaries don't have the best initiative, ME guys have truly ****ty combat ability and tend to buckle and flee under any serious resistance. Those dimwits will just be machine gun fodder or inflicted on the civilians. 

Their godawful discipline will be an even bigger ISR bonanza for Ukraine, they can be have no clue of real entrenching and will flee at the first real arty barrage, opening a nice hole in RUS lines.

Think of the Italians and Romanians manning German flanks at Stalingrad. Turned out great - for the Soviets.

[Battlefront.com]

24 minutes ago, billbindc said:

We are talking about very well informed and sharp folks and you see them out there from time to time. Their bias is that they have perforce spent years working the Kremlin, the oligarchs, the FSB. Clearly in this instance all three of those verticals were themselves completely wrong about what was happening with the Russian Army and very few really knew clearly what was happening around Putin.

This is an excellent point.  I doubt the folks with FSB contacts got text messages after the war started saying "ha-ha, fooled you!  We really suck!".  Those contacts were most likely as surprised and confused as the experts were.  In fact, there's quite a bit to suggest that even Putin was unaware of how bad his military was.

The thing that I just don't get about this is all the weaknesses we're seeing in the Russian performance are simply carry overs from the days of the Tzars.  This isn't new stuff.  The issues were known.  The past track records were known.  The failures to improve specific aspects were known.  So why did people, smart and generally well plugged in people, think that long standing shortcomings that had not been overcome would produce a different result?

24 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Yet those groups were often the best sources last year and the year before. It's going to take time for habits of reporting to adjust.

They could start by realizing that change is hard and even harder in a dictatorship.  So they shouldn't be so quick to think that minor improvements in mindset or capabilities doesn't automatically equate to fundamental change.

Seems experts were too easily swayed by smoke and mirror reforms.

Steve

[BlackMoria]

 

"A European official says that Russia has deployed between 10,000 to 20,000 mercenaries from Syria, Libya and the Wagner Group to eastern Ukraine These mercenaries are being used as infantry with no heavy equipment or vehicles"

In other words.... high priced cannon fodder.

[c3k]

1 hour ago, panzermartin said:

I guess night fights are not so dark as I thought. Edit: Flares would be a nice addition to CM

 

On a second thought this doesn't look like Donbas. Looks like footage from Iraq war or something else 

What? Did someone just mention "flares"?

 

[dan/california]

6 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

That's a useful number, on paper, but really they'd be best used as road surfacing.

Mercenaries don't have the best initiative, ME guys have truly ****ty combat ability and tend to buckle and flee under any serious resistance. Those dimwits will just be machine gun fodder or inflicted on the civilians. 

Their godawful discipline will be an even bigger ISR bonanza for Ukraine, they can be have no clue of real entrenching and will flee at the first real arty barrage, opening a nice hole in RUS lines.

Think of the Italians and Romanians manning German flanks at Stalingrad. Turned out great - for the Soviets.

And they will freeze to death, even this late in the year.

[Hapless]

One potential (and emphasis on the 'potential') for that "10-20k" force could be that the Russians are looking for a screening force to supplement the DPR etc.

This would hark back to 2014-15 where you have the militias out in front doing the grunt work and Russian regulars staying back and executing limited heavily planned actions to destroy Ukrainian forces or seize ground, which they immediately hand over to their screen before bugging back to safety.

Or, to mirror another war, kind of like the Iraqi Republican Guard in the Iran-Iraq War. The regular army holds the front, the Republican Guard with all the toys works out and rehearses the script for the upcoming battle, executes it until the wheels start to inevitably fall off the operation, then pulls out. Rinse and repeat like it's WW1 and, if you're Russian, worry about why people are now comparing you to the Iraqis.

Pretty sure you'd need more than 20k men (of questionable quality!) to hold a useful length of front and I'm pretty sure the Ukrainians wouldn't take it sitting down, but on the other hand the idea of minimising Russian casualties while inflicting a Zelenophillia every now and again is appealing to someone.

Or... it could be an admission that the lines are going to solidify soon and someone- preferably not someone Russian- needs to hang around at the front exposed to angry Ukrainians for Russia to hold onto it's ill-gottten gains.

Edited April 19, 2022 by Hapless

[Haiduk]

31 minutes ago, Huba said:

I wonder to what degree it's true. If Russians somehow manage to get additional 20 000 light infantry on the battlefield, it could help them substantially, for example in storming Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. I don't see it being a Wuderwaffe game changer though, Ukrainians will adjust. What do you gents make of that?

 

This is not true. Russians had some plans for arab fighters, but here is a question - how to coordinate their actions? Also these fighters are very unstable force - they can just drop a weapon and run away toward EU borders to get a status of refugee. 

Different Russian PMC groups of course present. Vagner is already "brand", but indeed Vagner PMC already doesn't exists. One of those, who fight in Ukraine call itself "Liga". Our troopers engaged with them around Izium and Popasna and in whole have opinion they are more trained, motivated and experienced than regular Russian units.

Edited April 19, 2022 by Haiduk

[sburke]

19 minutes ago, BlackMoria said:

 

"A European official says that Russia has deployed between 10,000 to 20,000 mercenaries from Syria, Libya and the Wagner Group to eastern Ukraine These mercenaries are being used as infantry with no heavy equipment or vehicles"

In other words.... high priced cannon fodder.

Not really, these guys won’t be around to collect their pay. 

[Huba]

1 minute ago, Haiduk said:

This is not true. Russians had some plans for arab fighters, but here is a question - how to coordinate their actions? Also these fighters are very unstable force - they can just drop a weapon and run away toward EU borders to get a status of refugee. 

Different Russian PMC groups of course present. Vagner is already "brand", but indeed Vegner PMC already doesn't exists. One of those, who fight in Ukraine call itself "Liga". Our troopers engaged with them around Izium and Popasna and in whole have opinion they are more trained, motivated and exparienced than regular Russian units.

Sounds debunked to me. Unless this was regular Syrian army, I don't see how Russians could organize this rag-tag band into anything useful, especially on the offensive.

[db_zero]

Lets look at what we do know:

1. The Russian military so far has demonstrated to be lacking in many if not most areas. We'll have to see if they have rectified their shortcoming in further operations.

2. The Ukrainian military has demonstrated remarkable capabilities and most units are now combat experienced. The overall effectiveness and efficiency of Ukraines military is arguably increasing.

3. The Ukrainian armored formations and Russian armored formations are roughly equally equipped, but in terms of performance and efficiency, the Ukrainians are better. So in effect I would rate them as more than a match compared to Russia.

Now we decide to give Ukraine more advanced tanks-M1's, Leopard 2. Even if its 6 months 12 months, what does that do? You've now transformed the Ukrainian armored formations into a significant over match compared to Russia, that is now capable of undertaking rapid and violent offensive actions into regions already occupied by Russia and if you take the worst case (something that planners for better or worse always do), Russia itself.

How do you react if your Russia? One possible reaction is to start basing nuclear weapons in the Crimea and Donbass. Your conventional forces that you know can't match Ukraine with its new found offensive weapons become just a trip wire. You justify basing nukes based on "NATO hostile offensive arming of a mortal threat"

These are the kinds of things I would bet are now being debated behinds the scenes.

How many M1s do we give to Ukraine? Do we insist on limits to how they might be employed? How would we enforce any violation of said restrictions? Do we allow them to be used in offensive operations to retake past lost territory and what are possible consequences.

We've seen what tanks like M1s are capable of doing. Russia does not have anti-armor systems like the Javelin.

Poland will be getting M1s, but there is a buffer between Poland and Russia and Ukraine is a different situation.

I'm not trying to be antagonistic to anyone. Just trying to see the possible good and bad of taking such actions.

To this point the West has been reacting to events in Ukraine. Many are now saying the West needs to define its future policies and actions.

I'm sure the subjects of M1s is just one of the few systems being hotly debated behind the scenes. MLRS being sent has been mentioned. Do we start sending more advanced IFVs that alongside M1s will transform Ukrainian armored formation into even more powerful offensive formations and what will the consequences of that move be?

Edited April 19, 2022 by db_zero

[The_Capt]

8 hours ago, Combatintman said:

Here:

Jomini of the West (@JominiW) | nitter

or here:

UAWarData: Tracking the Russian invasion

 

 

Are the BTGs strengths accurate on that second one?  I see 10 BTGs in that bulge west of Izyum, is that right?

[Haiduk]

Ukrainain volunteer fund of Serhiy Prytiula is preparing to buy armored Defenders for different units. Jeeps and pick-ups now in the top 5 of whishlists of our soldiers

[billbindc]

32 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is an excellent point.  I doubt the folks with FSB contacts got text messages after the war started saying "ha-ha, fooled you!  We really suck!".  Those contacts were most likely as surprised and confused as the experts were.  In fact, there's quite a bit to suggest that even Putin was unaware of how bad his military was.

The thing that I just don't get about this is all the weaknesses we're seeing in the Russian performance are simply carry overs from the days of the Tzars.  This isn't new stuff.  The issues were known.  The past track records were known.  The failures to improve specific aspects were known.  So why did people, smart and generally well plugged in people, think that long standing shortcomings that had not been overcome would produce a different result?

They could start by realizing that change is hard and even harder in a dictatorship.  So they shouldn't be so quick to think that minor improvements in mindset or capabilities doesn't automatically equate to fundamental change.

Seems experts were too easily swayed by smoke and mirror reforms.

Steve

I think here was a general perception that Russian successes* in the 'near abroad', in Syria, in interventions in Africa were proof of some larger level of excellence. It should also be noted that there are plenty of folks in the Defense establishment, on the Hill and elsewhere with lots of money riding on an overestimation of Russian capability. It creates groupthink and it's hard for many to completely resist. 

[dan/california]

3 minutes ago, billbindc said:

I think here was a general perception that Russian successes* in the 'near abroad', in Syria, in interventions in Africa were proof of some larger level of excellence. It should also be noted that there are plenty of folks in the Defense establishment, on the Hill and elsewhere with lots of money riding on an overestimation of Russian capability. It creates groupthink and it's hard for many to completely resist. 

they are going to have to get serious about talking up the Chinese....

[riptides]

12 minutes ago, db_zero said:

To this point the West has been reacting to events in Ukraine. Many are now saying the West needs to define its future policies and actions.

Darn right the West has been reacting. Look at where it has gotten a sovereign nation.

It is past time we react, and instead act. We are dealing with a dictatorship that has brought war to Europe on a grand scale.

[altipueri]

@Haiduk  I think you would be better offer just stealing some pick-up from the nearest Toyota dealership.

 

[Huba]

UK and Canada declare providing towed artillery. The 40 000 shells offered by the US makes more sense now, it seemed excessive for 18 guns.

 

Edited April 19, 2022 by Huba

[BeondTheGrave]

1 hour ago, Vet 0369 said:

The “red line” was created by “politically astute” advisors who were terrified that China would enter from the north. The were apparently oblivious to the fact that only about 100 years before, the Vietnamese had ejected the Chinese occupiers after 1,000 years of occupation from the first time they asked the Chinese to help. While it was a possibility, I seriously doubt that they would asked for their “help” again.

A lot of people forget this but there were about 100k Chinese troops in North Vietnam through the 1960s. These units operated in not only construction battalions, fixing damage after American attacks, but AAA battalions. During which they were subject to American Aerial attack. These units of course also brought along their own 'security' units, which would have been capable of tripping up an attack north of the DMZ. Here is a document discussing some of their activities. These units, IIRC, were mostly removed in 1968 and 69 as North Vietnam switched from generally pro-Beijing towards Moscow (though ending up in a more neutral position as a factor of geography.)

Fears that an escalation of the war against the north would bring in the Chinese were not without merit, as the Chinese heavily signaled their support for the north when these decisions (mid 1960s) were being made. 

[Haiduk]

13 minutes ago, altipueri said:

@Haiduk  I think you would be better offer just stealing some pick-up from the nearest Toyota dealership.

 

All sold out already ) Though, many car-dealers don't work yet. In first month there was a problem in Kyiv with car-services.

[akd]

There really are Wolverines running round Ukraine:

 

[Battlefront.com]

20 minutes ago, db_zero said:

Now we decide to give Ukraine more advanced tanks-M1's, Leopard 2. Even if its 6 months 12 months, what does that do? You've now transformed the Ukrainian armored formations into a significant over match compared to Russia, that is now capable of undertaking rapid and violent offensive actions into regions already occupied by Russia and if you take the worst case (something that planners for better or worse always do), Russia itself.

How do you react if your Russia?

Why not look at how Russia IS ACTING right now as its forces are getting slaughtered by Western weapons fielded by Ukrainians that were, in part, trained by NATO forces?  This is vastly more instructive than your personal opinion or mine.  No nukes yet, so why would some perceived down-the-road threat suddenly get them to drop a nuke?

20 minutes ago, db_zero said:

One possible reaction is to start basing nuclear weapons in the Crimea and Donbass. Your conventional forces that you know can't match Ukraine with its new found offensive weapons become just a trip wire. You justify basing nukes based on "NATO hostile offensive arming of a mortal threat"

Strawman argument.  Crimea is already a nuclear base and putting nukes into Donbas doesn't do anything that it can't already do.

20 minutes ago, db_zero said:

These are the kinds of things I would bet are now being debated behinds the scenes.

For sure Russia is discussing when it might use nukes.  I very, very, very much doubt anybody at the table is saying "if the Americans offer Abrams we go to WW3".  That's not the way Russia thinks.  If it was, they would have dropped a nuke on Kiev when we threatened to send over Javelins or a nuke on Kiev after the war started and we flooded the Ukrainians with weapons AND put in motion the destruction of the Russian economy.  These are real things causing massive damage to Russia, yet you're saying the mere discussion of sending Abrams over to Ukraine is enough to start nuking things?

20 minutes ago, db_zero said:

How many M1s do we give to Ukraine? Do we insist on limits to how they might be employed? How would we enforce any violation of said restrictions? Do we allow them to be used in offensive operations to retake past lost territory and what are possible consequences.

Again, you are taking a hypothesis and not using recent and relevant precedence to test if your theory has validity.  Case in point, the same questions were asked about Javelins years ago, they were answered, and Javelins sent despite howls of protest from Moscow.  Yet no nukes.  The flow of even MORE weapons continues despite the howls from Moscow.  No nukes.  The West has stated clearly its intentions to send bigger stuff with new capabilities despite yet more howls from Moscow.  No nukes.  And all of this is helping Ukraine kill off thousands of Russians and burn up billions of Dollars of equipment.  Yet no nukes.

20 minutes ago, db_zero said:

I'm not trying to be antagonistic to anyone. Just trying to see the possible good and bad of taking such actions.

You have failed to support your central argument in each of our exchanges.  You believe that Abrams represents something unique, a new line, and if crossed it risks a nuke attack.  Each time I've challenged you to show how it is different than what is going on now and you've not done so.

The challenge is upon you to show why talk of Abrams changes the equation and you don't seem able to do that.  Since that's the crux of this exchange, I suggest we drop it as I don't think it's a productive use of our time. 

Steve

[The_Capt]

33 minutes ago, billbindc said:

I think here was a general perception that Russian successes* in the 'near abroad', in Syria, in interventions in Africa were proof of some larger level of excellence. It should also be noted that there are plenty of folks in the Defense establishment, on the Hill and elsewhere with lots of money riding on an overestimation of Russian capability. It creates groupthink and it's hard for many to completely resist. 

Heh, that definitely tracks.  It is important to see the Russian successes for what they were and were not:

- Russian demonstrated a lot of acumen in the "grey zone"/subversive/political warfare space.  Their use of information (including dis and mis), leveraging, targeting with respect to influence activities, the use of political and social divisions as an inductive mechanism and general all around sneakiness did create a lot of strategic wins.  The Russians were demonstrating a mastery of those null and negative decisions to effect, to the point that in west we were pretty much ready to tap out on the whole Crimea "unpleasantness" for cheap gas.

- Russian doctrine on subversive warfare/active measures/Gibridnaya Voyna/Gerasimov doctrine has a long history going back to the Czars.  They have employed as a strategic option space for centuries and have demonstrated a lot of successes with the contemporary form they were employing.  So they know what they are doing and should be taken seriously on these margins.

- Those successes, even hybrid warfare in Donbas in 2014 do not mean that it translates into "above the threshold" warfare on this scale. These are two very different games that require very different skillsets and capabilities.  

- One cannot "cherry pick" threats in this environment.  These are threat systems and one has to address the entire system not just one small part of it that conveniently aligns with a particular funding line.  We, in the west, learned this the hard way in all the COIN  we have been doing, and then promptly forgot it when facing a peer state threat.

   So we saw conflation and disassociation simultaneously in order to build these warped arguments to "fund X".  Unfortunately the Russians look like they got high on their own supply and also thought a conventional invasion on the scale of the Battle of France would be all easy-peazy...whoops.  I am not sure why they did not stick with their A-game; however, I suspect that there are limits to what one can do in subversive warfare especially when you have basically galvanized micro-social structures within the target population.  In short, I think they ran out of options in that arena and then talked themselves into a hard power option.  Now the egg is on their faces and anyone who hung an argument on the "Looming Russian Bear".

S'ok, I am sure they will be back in a decade and the whole China thing is just loaded with potential hilarity...and you want to talk about modern "systems warfare"....

Edited April 19, 2022 by The_Capt

[Anon052]

I hope this is true: