How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[cyrano01]

1 hour ago, kraze said:

I didn't know The Guardian is now ran by our DoD.

How about checking actual official source?

https://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2022/03/10/vtrati-rosijskih-okupantiv-stanovlyat-ponad-12-000-osib-znishheno-majzhe-2400-odinicz-vorozhogo-ozbroennya-i-vijskovoi-tehniki-–-generalnij-shtab-zs-ukraini/

Втрата translates to loss, not 'death'

Our DoD doesn't calculate dead or wounded because that's impossible. But press is uneducated in milspeak.

So again, check actual sources

 

Agreed. General media are usually pretty lacking in military matters (certainly in the UK) and I would expect the Guardian to be less good than the average, talking competence and depth of fact checking/analysis here rather than inherent bias. I'd be willing to bet the journalist only went to the english language Kiev Independent website rather than the primary source. Doubly so since they probably don't have a kraze or a Haiduk on hand to translate for them.

[c3k]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Quite right, this is the very definition of "hybrid warfare" (or at least western one).  I have no illusions that the UA conventional lacks the ability to create and project mass.  However, I will be very interested to see how that relationship was managed and who was doing what and where?  I also suspect that if the Ukrainian Army does not time its move back to mass very carefully it may be in for some nasty surprises.  However, the shattering effect of heavy is not out of the game yet, particularly if one has eroded an enemy system badly.

If the UKR light infantry are only conducting delay actions until the UA feels it can do a heavy decisive battle, I am left wondering if they still need to?  If one can attrit 20% of an opponents combat power through hybrid tactics then the only reason to create heavy mass would be at exactly the right place and time to very loudly demonstrate a collapse of the Russian military at an operational level.  I suspect this will evolve in the course of the fight but the UA does itself no favors by forming mass like it did back in 2014 and essentially play the "Russian game".  The UA has invented a new game, one they are very good at.  

The Russians came to play rugby, while the Ukrainians poured water over the field, froze it and brought skates.

I suspect this will definitely change in the urban environment as we will be really down to infantry mass; however, in this space the odds even up dramatically as mech becomes supporting.

Interesting questions.

To delve into the question about "light" infantry, dispersed, stopping mechanized forces, let's think about the requirements...

1. Widespread ATGMs

2. Long-range secure comms.

3. UAV/drones (whatever you want to call tactical, short-range (1-2km) remote controlled aerial vehicles. I like "drone") embedded within these teams.

4. Working in territory with freedom of movement/deployment. (Imagine the same battles taking place 30 miles from Moscow. How well would dispersed Ukrainian infantry fare while moving around Russian villages and towns?)

5. Permissive air support environment. (If Russia owned the airspace, these teams moving about would be easily found and engaged.)

 

There is no doubt that the Ukrainian forces (Active, Reserve, and Territorial as well as motivated civilians) have performed magnificently.

If another force tried to replicate the Ukrainian tactics, they could be countered. How?

A. Active defenses against ATGMs mounted on all armored vehicles, capable of destroying top-attack munitions.

B. Denying ATGM resupply.

C. Massive air defense against drone targets. Sensing and engaging... Lasers would come into their own. As would EMP/EW.

D. Only effective when the dispersed infantry are not spotted or supported by civilians.

E. Aerial surveillance, drone, UAV, manned, coupled with air-to-ground freedom to engage (or long-range arty). Every group of people moving around or found gets fired upon.

 

I do think the Ukrainians did a phenomenal job of studying 2014 and effectively determining what would happen next and how to counter it.

[akd]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

Mariupol. "Azov" shells Russian vehicles with mortars, using drone fire adjustment

 

1x Typhoon-K, 1x BTR destroyed (both burning); 1x BTR wrecked.  Missed what looks like some sort of command / comms BTR hiding behind smaller building with white roof, but suggests this was a CP.

[The_Capt]

45 minutes ago, billbindc said:

There's an argument out there that no negotiation with the Russian government should be taken seriously until well after the troops actually withdraw. I endorse it.

Ok, so that is a "no" this has not been brought up then.  Ok, the political process belongs to the Ukrainians on this front, not even going to try and make a judgement on what they should or should not do.  My point being the Russian position appears to be softening, which could be an indication that the military strategic reality is starting to sink in, or this is some sort of two-step but I am not sure what the point would be.

As I mentioned before a significant component of war is negotiation be it through violence or at a table, one way or another both sides in this conflict are negotiating.  The primary role of military power is to communicate through violence (and other ways) in order to shape that negotiation.  People were asking for indicators, this is one of them.

[akd]

30 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Rare thing. Destroyed Russian DT-30 articulated tracked carrier. Theese vehiciles use in hard terrain, so I thinh this is Zhytomyr of north of Kyiv oblast, where many forests, swamps, soft ground, creeks etc.

 

Same one maybe?

https://postlmg.cc/ctY6JNxR

[DesertFox]

 

 

[c3k]

3 minutes ago, DesertFox said:

 

 

Great video showing the remote (25m?) location of the launcher vs. the control unit.

[db_zero]

50 minutes ago, billbindc said:

There's an argument out there that no negotiation with the Russian government should be taken seriously until well after the troops actually withdraw. I endorse it.

Putin has indicated no intention of stopping he is determined to see this through. I don’t see him ever agreeing to give back the 2 regions he already declared as independent states.

The longer this drags on the more risk of slippage of support in West becomes. There is a massive refugee issue that is going to cost a boat load of money to address. 

There is also a very high probability of a recession in the US and Europe. Asking the public to foot the bill for a continued war and refugee problem may become a problem.

When war breaks out there is often a big initial level of support in the west that tends to taper out especially if it’s drags on for a long time.

[DesertFox]

Hmmm

 

 

[kraze]

4 minutes ago, db_zero said:

Putin has indicated no intention of stopping he is determined to see this through. I don’t see him ever agreeing to give back the 2 regions he already declared as independent states.

 

What putin wants and what he is able to achieve became two very different things after Feb24.

Also we are getting back Crimea too and some soldiers joke about getting back Cuban as well after Russia's collapse. But that's just a harmless joke.

[John Kettler]

Haiduk,

Since we're talking here on page 228 about when and how the UA heavies may come down on the Russians at full force,  would refer you to my remarks regasrding a pic of ammo recovered from a captured Russian tank, where it was conspicuously obvious (3 rounds of HE, no CLGM and maybe 1 or 2 heat rounds, all else HE-frag) that this wasn't even close to the typical Cold War Russian loadout of 20% KE. My conclusion from this is that  at least the ammo load didn't reflect a foe expecting a tank battle. Would suggest UA look at ammo loadouts on other captured Russian tanks, in terms of splits in ammo types,and round counts of actual tank killing munitions carried, including CLGM if any. As we all know, a sample size of 1 has zero statistical value, but I believe there may (note conditional) be enough captured Russian tanks, taken on multiple Russian operational axes, to see whether that pic that was posted was a one off or maybe reflects a larger pattern. If the latter, that might have significance in seeing how well the Russians, using forces already in the field and in combat, are prepared to fight UA tanks with their own tanks, something I'd further note their doctrine strongly disfavors generally. 

Regards,

John Kettler

Edited March 13, 2022 by John Kettler

[Haiduk]

17 minutes ago, akd said:

Same one maybe?

Maybe, though there is no a large tree aside on the screenshot

[db_zero]

2 minutes ago, kraze said:

What putin wants and what he is able to achieve became two very different things after Feb24.

Also we are getting back Crimea too and some soldiers joke about getting back Cuban as well after Russia's collapse. But that's just a harmless joke.

The cost to rebuild what the Russians destroyed is going to be immense. I doubt Russia will agree to it, but taking some of the assets frozen to rebuild what they destroyed would be in order.

[akd]

2 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Maybe, though there is no a large tree aside on the screenshot

Nevermind, trees on wrong side entirely I think.

[Haiduk]

9 minutes ago, John Kettler said:

Haiduk,

 that this wasn't even close to the typical Cold Wr Russian loadout of 20% KE. My conclusion from this is that  at least the ammo load didn't reflect a foe expecting a tank battle. 
 

Many Russian units, fighting here are from Syberia and Far East. Assholes, where units equipped mostly with old tanks (including T-72A) and probably this sort of ammunition was from one of such tanks. On the other photo from Russian T-80BVM there was 3BM27 Nadezhda APFSDS. That's better, but not even 3BM42 Mango, I'm not saying about Svinets-2 Did you see a video, where captured Russian BMP-2 has backless stool insted standard driver seat? After this do not need to expect adequate ammunition in the tanks of "asshole military districts". Xi can take Syberia with bare hands.  

Edited March 13, 2022 by Haiduk

[billbindc]

21 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Ok, so that is a "no" this has not been brought up then.  Ok, the political process belongs to the Ukrainians on this front, not even going to try and make a judgement on what they should or should not do.  My point being the Russian position appears to be softening, which could be an indication that the military strategic reality is starting to sink in, or this is some sort of two-step but I am not sure what the point would be.

As I mentioned before a significant component of war is negotiation be it through violence or at a table, one way or another both sides in this conflict are negotiating.  The primary role of military power is to communicate through violence (and other ways) in order to shape that negotiation.  People were asking for indicators, this is one of them.

Sorry if that came across as snark. Just commenting on the unfathomably profound suspicion in most quarters of any Russian initiative. I think the assumption is that Putin is still trying to 'win' on some level and negotiations will be not be had in good faith until he has no other choice. 

It's pretty clear that the Kremlin is still grasping for ways to change the equation:  https://www.ft.com/content/30850470-8c8c-4b53-aa39-01497064a7b7

I'd be very curious to hear how impactful Chinese aid could be.

 

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, c3k said:

There is no doubt that the Ukrainian forces (Active, Reserve, and Territorial as well as motivated civilians) have performed magnificently.

If another force tried to replicate the Ukrainian tactics, they could be countered. How?

A. Active defenses against ATGMs mounted on all armored vehicles, capable of destroying top-attack munitions.

B. Denying ATGM resupply.

C. Massive air defense against drone targets. Sensing and engaging... Lasers would come into their own. As would EMP/EW.

D. Only effective when the dispersed infantry are not spotted or supported by civilians.

E. Aerial surveillance, drone, UAV, manned, coupled with air-to-ground freedom to engage (or long-range arty). Every group of people moving around or found gets fired upon.

Ok so let's break this down then.

A. I know there are systems out there in development but hitting a small fast moving missile is incredibly hard and the next gen of smart AT systems will likely include stealth/spoofing, top-down EFP and PGM DPICM artillery.  This will likely continue to counter/counter-counter systems race that has in reality been going on for decades.  Problem is that explosive technology and miniaturization or on the side of the attacker and not the defender because the defender is attached to 70 tons of metal.  There also becomes a return on investment issue  as it will become so costly to keep a tank alive, one has to ask what the point of doing it becomes.  They basically become land ships that are impossible to hide and draw more fire than they are worth.

B.  Sure...obviously.  But again very hard to do as missile systems become cheaper and smaller.  We could not keep AT out of the hands of the Taliban, let alone the next crunch we get into where now China and Russia are supplying the next-gen ATGMs to our adversaries.

C.  Every western military has identified UAV as a major issue in the coming years.  The idea that we can sweep them from the skies is not realistic.  Particularly when we could be seeing hybrid UGV/UAV systems.  All military grade systems are going to be shielded from EMP/EW, or fully autonomous so the link between pilot and system need only be occasional (enter ethical issues but this will be a race to the bottom).  Wishing away UVs of all shapes and sizes with some sort of magic gun is right next to wishing away machine guns.  We will need to learn to live with them and exploit their strengths better than an opponent.

D.  Disagree.  What proof is there that connected light infantry need civilian populations to work?  That is how it is working in Ukraine but so what?  We have had light infantry operating all over the world without civilian support, we call them SOF. Western militaries are investing a lot into field networks so keeping small light groups linked in a hostile environment is already on the menu.  I think the questions are "how much and where?"

E.  Kinda runs counter to point C but I didn't think that one was accurate anyway.  This is not what we are seeing in Ukraine right now.  The basic reality is that light is still a thing because 1) it is fast to project, 2) it can go places mech cannot and 3) it is harder to find because it is not riding on thousands of tons of steel.  It main weakness was low payloads which restricted lethality and sustainment when separated, and survivability once it did get found (again offset by dispersion).   Lights ability to disperse and swarm could increase its survivability versus heavier forces in a totally illuminated battlefield whereas heavy is a relatively slow moving, very visible target.

The reality is that this is not going to happen over night but these are questions that need some serious re-think and we cannot box them up nicely in "well sure Ukraine but..."  Some of this has been a long time coming, we had the most powerful mechanized forces in the world and they largely proved less than decisive for the last 20 years in the unconventional fights we have been engaged in.  Now we are seeing a hybrid/conventional war and there are some weird things happening here too.  I have already heard army types going "ah ha, at last a real war, see we need tanks".  Then as I look at the list of Russian tank losses and the real lack of ground gained, I have to wonder if this is all "dumb Russians" or something else is not going on.  

Edited March 13, 2022 by The_Capt

[Haiduk]

Fail

[Vet 0369]

6 hours ago, Phantom Captain said:

On a smaller scale, John Wilder's Lightning Brigade in the ACW was very much doing the same thing.  Light infantry on horses, specifically NOT cavalry, armed with repeating Spencer rifles.  It was never implemented on a larger scale though in the way he wanted his "mounted light infantry" to be.  I think we are seeing the modern equivalent of the same on that larger scale.

They could move with impunity behind enemy lines and rapidly.  They had repeating rifles and would dismount and fight as infantry, the rifles being a force multiplier and could stand up to much larger enemy formations and beat them.  Then quickly mount again and move on.  Very similar.  

That wasn’t a new thing invented in the 19th century. The term for those soldiers in earlier conflicts, such as our own Revolution, were “Dragoons.” Although they looked like Cavalry, even had sabers, they were Mounted Infantry who dismounted to fight as Infantry.

[The_Capt]

6 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Sorry if that came across as snark. Just commenting on the unfathomably profound suspicion in most quarters of any Russian initiative. I think the assumption is that Putin is still trying to 'win' on some level and negotiations will be not be had in good faith until he has no other choice. 

It's pretty clear that the Kremlin is still grasping for ways to change the equation:  https://www.ft.com/content/30850470-8c8c-4b53-aa39-01497064a7b7

I'd be very curious to hear how impactful Chinese aid could be.

 

Ooo, that is an other good one.  Hey, I get it the Russians are lying every time their lips move. But I am on the lookout for that "no other choice bit".  So softening of strategic bargaining position + up to 20% of invasion forces lost and stacking + zero real gains on the ground + economic hellstorm + now coming hat in hand to China = signs that this thing may crumbling strategically faster than we thought (remember - "Russians will grind for months" narrative?).  Guess we will see, hopefully soon and does not include some desperate WMD nonsense.

[Erwin]

8 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Fail

 

Looks like US ins finally moving to sanction China if it gives any further help:

https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-china-watcher/2022/03/10/china-in-congressional-crosshairs-for-support-to-russia-00015961

 

"Zhao fired off a litany of falsehoods in a March 8 press conference, alleging that “the biological military activities of the U.S. in Ukraine are merely the tip of the iceberg.”

That echoes a Chinese government conspiracy theory that has tried to link Covid-19 origins to the Fort Detrick military base in Maryland"

Edited March 13, 2022 by Erwin

[John Kettler]

6 hours ago, Panserjeger said:

@John Kettler, you asked for resources for ID'ing Russian equipment. I found a good resource on tanks here:

https://tankrecognition.blogspot.com/2022/03/ukrainian-conflict-tank-recognition.html

This is the video that the website summarizes:

EDIT: A Twitter thread on how to ID AD assets:

Regards,

Pål 

Panserjeger,

Many thanks for these! Can ID much AD gear but not in detail, such as distinguishing the various types of Buks, the first generation of which we in the US and NATO called the SA-11/GADFLY, and oh, was it a huge improvement on all fronts over the highly lethal (just ask the IAF) SA-6/GAINFUL, which was limited to one target at a time.  Apparently, we've now developed another number and codename for the Buk M1 and 2. That's SA-17/GRIZZLY. Tor simply didn't exist in my threat documents through late June 1989, certainly not as a fielded system if we did have something on it, under another codename, say, SA-X-15, as a developmental item. Consequently, am therefore hopeless on distinguishing Tor versions. But hey, the 9K35 Osa  SA-8/GECKO is still around, but I don't know the GRAU designators for the various versions. All I know is the SA-8B was the first one having the missiles in canisters rather than exposed on launch rails. I never had to deal with GRAU designations generally, since we seldom had them and certainly didn't work in them. We had, and had to follow, the ASCC (Air Standards Coordinating Committee) designator system, which applied not just to the US, but NATO-wide, and perhaps, in other treaty groups, such as SEATO. Here is the ASCC list for SAMs, some of which didn't exist at all when I left military aerospace.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_NATO_reporting_names_for_surface-to-air_missiles

Regards,

John Kettler

P.S.

Right after posting here, I went to the Twitter discourse and rapidly determined it's exactly the kind of thing I was looking for in figuring out what I'm looking at other than the basic system.

 

 

 

Edited March 13, 2022 by John Kettler

[Panserjeger]

Interesting article on the best strategy for China (published on a Chinese NGO website):

https://uscnpm.org/2022/03/12/hu-wei-russia-ukraine-war-china-choice/

[sburke]

@Haiduk this was from AFP.  Is this the same engagement reported in this twitter video?

 

 

On Kyiv's eastern front, Ukrainians hold off Russian tanks (msn.com)

 

According to several Ukrainian soldiers, at least two Russian vehicles, one of them a tank, were destroyed -- which the video appears to support -- and a Russian tank commander was killed.

On the Ukrainian side, "we had five wounded, one of whom is in a critical condition", after the Russian side opened fire in response, says one soldier, Ilya Berezenko, 27.

Edited March 13, 2022 by sburke

[DesertFox]

I think people should be aware what kind of bull russian state TV is spreading. Lunatics!