Air superiority in the Cold War

[Stardekk]

In the case of WW3 happenning in the Cold War Era, which side do you guys think will get Air superiority for the longest time in each year and why (NATO\Warsaw Pact) ? And will there be a side with a capable air force 2 weeks in to the war even ?

1)1973

2)1982
3)1989

4)1968

Edited November 27, 2021 by Stardekk

[Redwolf]

Ugh. Complex question.

I'd say that F-16 and F-15 showing up in numbers, along with decent air defense for the airfields, would be a turning point. So 1981-1982. But that is US only, I think the Germans in particular are not even competing for air superiority in the cold war.

[Halmbarte]

Runways.

 

NATO is more dependent on large fixed runways the WP is. Too many NATO aircraft rely on big airbases that are relatively easy to degrade with non-nuclear ballistic missiles and air raids. 

 

It doesn't matter how many neat, shiny airplanes you have when the fuel storage at the airfield is burning and the runways are cratered or littered with bomblets/mines. 

 

NATO can attack the WP airfields in the same way, and probably would. However, a lot of WP aircraft were designed with operating from rough fields in mind and have bigger tires that won't sink into soft ground and provisions to prevent debris ingestion into air intakes. 

 

I've played scenarios in CMO* where you're fighting a non-NBC war in the north German theater. As the WP player taking down the airfields with non-nuke ballistic missiles is step one in blunting NATOs air advantages, along with destroying the warning radars. There are alternate airbases NATO can use but they don't have the capacity the the large airbases have, plus the farther from the front you make NATO base their aircraft means water transit time, wasted sorties of tanker aircraft, and a general reduction of NATO air power. 

 

Don't shoot the arrows (airplanes) when you can shoot the archer (the air bases). 

 

H

 

*https://www.matrixgames.com/game/command-modern-operations

Edited November 27, 2021 by Halmbarte

[Sgt.Squarehead]

2 hours ago, Redwolf said:

I'd say that F-16 and F-15 showing up in numbers, along with decent air defense for the airfields, would be a turning point. So 1981-1982. But that is US only, I think the Germans in particular are not even competing for air superiority in the cold war.

By that point the MiG.31 Foxhound is entering service, its stand off kill capabilities combined with the sheer brute power of its radar would make it a real handful for NATO aircraft in the German theatre.....It represented a major threat to AWACS aircraft.

10 minutes ago, Halmbarte said:

Don't shoot the arrows (airplanes) when you can shoot the archer (the air bases).

Exactly.....Even better, shoot him in the eyes! 

 

[Halmbarte]

7 minutes ago, Sgt.Squarehead said:

By that point the MiG.31 Foxhound is entering service, its stand off kill capabilities combined with the sheer brute power of its radar would make it a real handful for NATO aircraft in the German theatre.....It represented a major threat to AWACS aircraft.

Exactly.....Even better, shoot him in the eyes! 

 

Right. everyone focuses on the fighters because they are Kool Kid stuff, bombers are boring, and the support aircraft like AWACS and tankers aren't even a glimmer. But you kill those support aircraft and you horribly degrade the combat effectiveness the combat aircraft. 

 

How many airbases in the UK or Iceland (or any airbase near a coast) do you think one of these could trash? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oscar-class_submarine

 

H

Edited November 27, 2021 by Halmbarte

[Sgt.Squarehead]

Don't forget the radars.....The UK countryside would have got quite an extensive remodelling.

Then there's the issue of maintaining logistics, Soviet subs and their Backfire fleet would have made mincemeat out of transatlantic convoys.....The US would need to assign a carrier battle group to each one for them to have a reasonable chance of getting through.

[MikeyD]

The big unknown is electronic countermeasures and SEAD (suppression of air defenses). The US had had  practice in jamming radars and missile homing signals over Vietnam. F4-G Wild Weasel Phantom started squadron service in 1978. On the Russian side they had their YAK28PP jammer aircraft to accompany strike groups and later the impressive MiG-25BM jammer/radar suppression aircraft. Russian ground ECM was powerful and its capabilities unknown. Whats an F-15 with its radar return signals and communications being scrambled?

[Halmbarte]

43 minutes ago, Sgt.Squarehead said:

Don't forget the radars.....The UK countryside would have got quite an extensive remodelling.

Then there's the issue of maintaining logistics, Soviet subs and their Backfire fleet would have made mincemeat out of transatlantic convoys.....The US would need to assign a carrier battle group to each one for them to have a reasonable chance of getting through.

In the Atlantic theater the first strikes using the cruise missile subs (The Sov had a lot more types than just Oscar) and Backfires + older cruise missile capable aircraft are against the fixed installations of the GIUK gap. Targeting a air base or fixed radars is pretty easy. That degrades the NATO ability to interdict future attacks on the convoys. 

 

In the Pacific it's rinse, lather, repeat against the the air bases in Japan, the Philippines, and Guam. And let's not forget to give good old Diego Garcia a little SS-N-19 attention. 

 

H

[Sgt.Squarehead]

But at some point, somebody will assume one of those missiles is a nuke and then it all goes properly pear-shaped. 

Lucky missiles were so slow back then, eh? 

Edited November 27, 2021 by Sgt.Squarehead

[Halmbarte]

A lot of the Sov cruise missiles flew at >Mach 1 and a lot of the latter types were low altitude. And to make things more confusing most of the Sov cruise missiles had nuke and conventional versions in the same airframe. You find out which version you get when it pops. 

 

Park Oscars off New York and Naval Station Norfolk and the opening salvo looks a lot like Pearl Harbor. 

 

H

[womble]

1 hour ago, Halmbarte said:

Park Oscars off New York and Naval Station Norfolk and the opening salvo looks a lot like Pearl Harbor. 

Would that not just lead to a lot of sunk Oscars? I thought the US submarine fleet and its hydrophone network was sufficiently superior at that stage that they could pretty much pinpoint all the Sov-subs most of the time. Or is that a Clancyist exaggeration?

[MikeyD]

F-14 was as agile as a dump truck with a flat tire but it had the advantage of Phoenix AA missiles with a 190km range. The AIM-54 missile is credited with an impressive 62 (another source says 78) air-to-air kills in the hands of Iranian pilots during the Iran Iraq war (including downing two planes with one missile). The US fired Phoenix in combat situations on a couple occasions but never managed to hit anything.

Edited November 27, 2021 by MikeyD

[Halmbarte]

37 minutes ago, womble said:

Would that not just lead to a lot of sunk Oscars? I thought the US submarine fleet and its hydrophone network was sufficiently superior at that stage that they could pretty much pinpoint all the Sov-subs most of the time. Or is that a Clancyist exaggeration?

The range of the SS-N-19 is 300nm if I remember right. That's a lot of square miles to look for a sub in, especially when those subs can be prepositioned off the coast and sitting on the bottom. And if your 1st notice that you're in a war is 18 SS-N-19s coming onshore there isn't a lot of time for sinking subs. 


Plus the Sov did have other cruise missile capable subs besides the Oscar. 


When running the WP side in CMO the hardest part of attacking USN assets is finding them. It's a big ocean and a CV battle group that's silent is kinda hard to find unless you get lucky with a RORSAT. Norfolk and Reykjavík (or Kadena or Andersen) aren't going anywhere. And AA vs terrain hugging cruise missiles in the '80s is a joke. 


 

I'm not saying that the Sovs get away scot free in this scenario, but it would offer a lot of reward compared to the risk of the assets involved. This is in the context of a general NATO/WP war. Blowing up the ports of Los Angeles, Seattle, New York, New Orleans, and attacking the Panama canal would be an escalation, but it's a reasonable tactic in a general war against a naval power. 


H 
 

[womble]

31 minutes ago, Halmbarte said:

The range of the SS-N-19 is 300nm if I remember right. That's a lot of square miles to look for a sub in, especially when those subs can be prepositioned off the coast and sitting on the bottom. And if your 1st notice that you're in a war is 18 SS-N-19s coming onshore there isn't a lot of time for sinking subs.
 

So I'm coming at this from a complete tyro's POV, unless you count reading Tom Clancy. I get the impression that the hydrophone arrays and attack subs deployed to defend the US coastline would be able to track that Russkie sub (Oscar or otherwise) pretty much right to where it settles on the bottom, and would notice as soon as they started maneuvering to launch depth. I don't know what sort of RoE the American sub drivers would be working from in the hours before the Doomsday Clock hit midnight, but I would have thought that if several cruise-missile subs changed from "lying doggo" to "ascending to launch depth", there would be some sort of escalation to "sink 'em when they flood tubes; we can't afford to let them launch". And if the USN had the capacity I'm assuming (from, certainly, very slender knowledge) to locate such aggressor vessels, they'd be monitored pretty closely by the people meant to defend against their aggression, so there would be assets in place to interdict such launches, or at least attempt to.

[Halmbarte]

8 minutes ago, womble said:

So I'm coming at this from a complete tyro's POV, unless you count reading Tom Clancy. I get the impression that the hydrophone arrays and attack subs deployed to defend the US coastline would be able to track that Russkie sub (Oscar or otherwise) pretty much right to where it settles on the bottom, and would notice as soon as they started maneuvering to launch depth. I don't know what sort of RoE the American sub drivers would be working from in the hours before the Doomsday Clock hit midnight, but I would have thought that if several cruise-missile subs changed from "lying doggo" to "ascending to launch depth", there would be some sort of escalation to "sink 'em when they flood tubes; we can't afford to let them launch". And if the USN had the capacity I'm assuming (from, certainly, very slender knowledge) to locate such aggressor vessels, they'd be monitored pretty closely by the people meant to defend against their aggression, so there would be assets in place to interdict such launches, or at least attempt to.

As the WP side, you flood the zone. get all the subs out to sea, the USN can't track them all and can't dedicate a SSN to each Sov sub worldwide. USN has to have priorities and tracking and tailing the SSBNs are probably going to have a higher priority than attack subs. 

 

The SOSUS net will tell you there are Sov subs out there and where they generally are, but precise attacks are still going to rely on a local asset. And there are big chunks of the ocean that are out of range for land based patrol aircraft sorties. 

 

The GIUK air bases are well within easy range of the Sov Naval Aviation arm carrying their full load out of fast cruise missiles. Use the subs for attacking targets that are out of range of the aviation assets, like the panama canal. Is trading 1/3 of the fleet of Oscars worth shutting down the US ports and the Panama canal? Maybe... 

 

H

[Amedeo]

Speaking of fighters, if we focus on the air war in Central Europe both the MiG-31 and the F-14 are out of the equation. The first was a PVO interceptor whose sole purpose was the defense of mainland USSR from strategic bombers/cruise missiles, the second would have been busy with fleet operations, everywhere in the world save for the IGB.

Thus, the only NATO air superiority assets, available at start, to fight over Central Europe would've been those of the TWOATAF and FOURATAF. And, even in the mid-late '80s, the only all-weather and BVR capable units were the Eagle equipped 32nd TFS and 35th TFW (USAF) the Hornet equipped Squadrons No. 409, 421 and 439 (RCAF) and the Phantom equipped 92th and 19th Squadrons (RAF). Period. All other NATO fighter units in theatre were equipped with "light" fighters (F-16, F-104, F-5, Mirage 5 etc.) with no BVR capability. Thus, even against the maligned MiG-23, these fighters, while capable dogfighters, would have to dodge volleys of SARH AAMs before the merge.

Moreover, NATO fighters had also the burden of escorting air strikes deep behind the frontline in a SAM-rich environment and against a redundant GCI radar net (no possibility of a stealth surprise airstrike against A-50 AWACS à la Clancy to clear the way, simply because... there were no A-50s in Central Europe, the few existing ones at the time were also a PVO only asset). If someone is thinking: why bother with deep strikes over enemy airspace, just defend over your own airspace... well, I presume that without some serious FOFA, NATO airplanes wouldn't have made the difference in WW3.

And Western air forces had to manage this after (literally) tons and tons of explosive hurled against NATO airports and SAM sites in the form of ballistic and cruise missiles (and, possibly, bombs).

Of course the Red Horde (TM) wouldn't have emerged unscathed from this ordeal, quite the contrary. But, probably, they had the numbers to better survive this attrition war, if the other Warsaw Pact assets were able to reduce/delay US reinforcement in the theatre.

[MikeyD]

One doesn't get a mental picture of one boxer emerging victorious in the ring, the picture that emerges is of two blood-stained boxers who beat each other to death. In Vietnam just a few year earlier the US had lost 3,744 fixed wing aircraft including 382 Phantom II's in combat. North Vietnam lost somewhere between 150-170 aircraft... but of course they had fewer aircraft to lose.

[BeondTheGrave]

This is an interesting question, and one that NATO doctrine generally hinged pretty heavily on. After all, Air is half of the Air/Land battle concept. And even before ALB, which is the era we are playing for CMCW, airpower both in the tactical CAS role and the operational interdiction role was incredibly important (its neither here nor there, but I would personally argue that ALB is simply an extension or a repackaging of Active Defense ideas, critically in regards to controlling and using airspace) This doctrine was pushed not just by the Army, but very heavily also by the Air Force who saw tactical, not strategic, bombing as their future. As a quick refresher, ALB calls not just for air support on the tactical, CM, level of battle (though that is also important) but in the operational realm as well. Active Defense was a doctrine designed to win the first initial clash of tanks along the Inter-German border. Many in NATO felt it did a great job in setting up the conditions to defeat the first echelon of Soviet forces. The problem is obvious: Sure you can beat the first echelon, but what about the second, third, etc? In steps ALB. Conceptually ALB is all about fusing airpower and ground power not just to defeat the first and actively engaged echelon, but to detect, interdict, and destroy follow on forces as they came up. This didn't have to be just about airpower, something like the MLRS and FASCAM systems could potentially do a number on deeper targets. But airpower would be the cornerstone of this concept. It should also be noted that, despite what some seem to suggest online, there is nothing about ALB or Active Defense that necessitates nuclear attacks. By 1982 were comfortably in the era of the PGM, and PGMs offer you all kinds of options that older conventional, or even nuclear, weapons do not. To put it another way, the 1980s were not the 1950s. Nukes were certainly considered, and may well have been used, but there were methods of accomplishing the plan without them and in my mind I think that NATO and the WP would at least have started the war conventionally (minus a few gas attacks, but whats a bit of Sarin between friends?) 

To the central question though: Would it have worked? I think thats hard to say. The US and the FRG in particular got very good at nap of the earth tactics. CAS wouldn't loiter like they might in the GWOT era, or swarm in and dive on targets like it was WWII. The Israelis had made that mistake in '73 and the US was not willing to repeat that meat grinder. Instead, strikes would happen very low and very fast. Ideally this would give AD radars a very short time to detect and engage assets before they released their payload and pulled back. PGMs also would give the US a very strong advantage with standoff attacks. The combination of Wild Weasel and standoff strikes would, in my opinion, be hell on the Soviet's AD network. But thats up front at the FEBA. Knocking out a division's AD net is one thing, punching all the way through to bomb bridges in Warsaw is quite another. Personally I havn't read much on USAF plans for deep penetration raids, but I would imagine this is a problem they worked pretty hard on as this kind of interdiction was key to ALB. Keep in mind though, the F-117 was designed to solve this exact problem and was (IIRC) operational by the mid-80s. 

As for the Red Army, thats a more interesting question. Personally I think they would have struggled much the same as NATO would, US air defenses were pretty good, though not as good IMO as in the Red Army. The biggest difference, IMO, would be training. Red Flag, the NTC, and other USAF programs tried to create hyper-realistic near-combat training experiences which drilled stuff like nap of the earth flying, bombing in simulated heavy AD environments, and of course very intense air-to-air combat. Its my understanding that, at the time, stuff like that was pretty unique to the US and later NATO. On the tactical level I think this training would give the US an advantage in those situations and would probably reduce overall attrition and keep US strikes more active and effective. The PVO, however, might struggle to break through. As others have pointed out, I dont think its a technology problem necessarily. Mostly Russian air tech was pretty good, and anyway until the Patriot came online US AD was a bit more primitive. Personally though I think the training gap would play an important determining role, eventually attritting the PVO away while NATO remains relatively capable. But importantly my understanding of Russian doctrine is that insofar as the consider interdiction attacks, they emphasize SSM strikes over deep penetration air raids. 

I once heard someone say in a documentary, I think maybe it was the Clance himself, who said that in a WW3 scenario both sides would run out of planes before the other ran out of missiles. He suggested that within two weeks the skies would be clear of aircraft. Who can say if thats true or not. Personally though I think if that were to have happened, NATO doctrine would have proved to be grossly unrealistic. If the goal is to attrit the second echelon, the war has to last long enough for the second, third, etc. echelons to move forward. If it does but the USAF is totally spent by then, mistakes have been made. And if the war ends or goes strategic before then, well then thats its own mistake. 

[Halmbarte]

The primary air defense asset of the US Army since WWII has been the Army Air Corps and then the USAF. The US Army has never* fought under conditions where the enemy had air superiority. The Soviet Army has and devoted a lot of resources to effective air defense and other counter air measures like camouflage designed to defeat air/satellite recon and attack.

 

I agree that after a couple of weeks of full intensity fighting air power is going to be greatly reduced. Between combat losses, planes down for heavy maintenance, and attacks on airfields I wouldn't expect there to be much left flying. I do think that in a degraded situation the Soviets have an edge because of the design of many of their aircraft allow for operations from damaged facilities or alternate locations like straight sections of highways or improvised airfields. The question for the Soviets is did they bring enough spare parts to keep their planes flying at a high sortie rate. My suspicion is that Sov logistics and maintenance wouldn't be up to the task since they didn't like to accumulate hours on air frames in training. 

 

H

[Thewood1]

A lot of these questions about the air/missile battle over cold war Europe can be answered in Command Modern Operations.  I think just reading some of the forum will get you some answers based on the CMO models.

[MikeyD]

I recall in the first Iraq war (or 1991 war or whatever its called), the British were greatly distressed by the loss of five Tornado aircraft during low-and-fast airfield denial missions. RAF losses-per-mission were running nine times higher than US losses-per mission. The RAF was using tactics straight from the war-with-Russia playbook. US at the time was relying on high altitude sorties accompanied by heavy air defense jamming.

[Sgt.Squarehead]

JP233 looked cool, but it was a bloody silly idea:

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/38745/how-british-tornados-used-a-special-weapon-to-ravage-saddams-airfields-in-daring-desert-storm-raids

Edited November 28, 2021 by Sgt.Squarehead

[Erwin]

39 minutes ago, MikeyD said:

first Iraq war (or 1991 war or whatever its called), the British were greatly distressed by the loss of five Tornado aircraft during low-and-fast airfield denial missions.

I vaguely recall that the explanation was that the tech was designed for ETO and the heat etc from the desert affected the low-flying radar ground avoidance systems and the poor buggers were flown into the ground by the AI.  Awful...

[Combatintman]

12 minutes ago, Erwin said:

I vaguely recall that the explanation was that the tech was designed for ETO and the heat etc from the desert affected the low-flying radar ground avoidance systems and the poor buggers were flown into the ground by the AI.  Awful...

Your recollection is incorrect.  The profile for JP233 requires a straight and low pass over the target.  Those targets were airfields which had a lot of ZU-23/2 or similar AAA plus point defence MANPADs or IR guided SAM systems.  It was those systems rather than any issues with the Tornado's terrain following radar that caused the losses.

[Erwin]

 

It's not clear-cut.  The official line:

"British officials have stopped short of blaming their downed aircraft on their vulnerability to enemy fire. Rather, they refer only to the hazards of low-altitude flying and leave open the possibility that their aircraft losses could have resulted simply from running into the ground or suffering mechanical failure with too little altitude to spare.

There have been no official causes released for Britain’s downed aircraft. However, all of them have been from among the Tornado GR-1 ground attack fleet, as opposed to the Tornado F-3s and Jaguar fighters.

https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-01-23-mn-762-story.html

Also, a lack of sufficient training may have contributed:

"As we made our run, we went through the switches and committed the “weapon.” Suddenly the explosive release lugs went bang and the whole 5.5 tons of the two pods came off! The autopilot threw us into a 3.5-G pullup as it thought something had gone wrong. We left the whole thing in the desert!  That was the end of the JP233 training round.”

"The first time we came face-to-face with a JP233 was on the evening of January 17 when we walked out to the jet and it had these two big wardrobes strapped underneath it!”

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/38745/how-british-tornados-used-a-special-weapon-to-ravage-saddams-airfields-in-daring-desert-storm-raids

“JP233 had to be delivered at around 160 feet, wings level, with no G or angle-of-bank. An added complication was that the TFR was calibrated for 200 feet, and it wasn’t capable of flying the aircraft at the 160-foot height that was optimum for employing the JP233."