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Russian army under equipped?


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Hours. Not days.

Dang, typo!

Yes I chose a single flawed report to make a point, in response to which you made a multitude of flawed counter-arguments :P

Flawed?  Oh, I think not :)  Besides making a goof on the hours vs. days thing, which I corrected once pointed out, I think my view of this report is quite sound.  The report is poorly written and the conclusions are demonstrably flawed.  You challenged several other of my points and either dismissed them as irrelevant (which since you didn't game out isn't really possible to do) or stated a counter opinion (i.e. not something you can prove any more than I could).

I will try to explain this a clearly as I can.

NATO is a military alliance, so any recommendation to NATO on how to solve a problem or perceived problem is inevitability going to focus on military solutions because that's what NATO does. The report basically has two components: a premise and a recommendation based on that premise The premise is that given a 1 week of "THIS IS REALLY HAPPENING" notice and the assets available at the time, NATO could not prevent a Russian invasion from occupying the Baltic states. Note there was no attempt to ascertain the likelihood of an invasion, only to measure the military balance of power. Based on that premise the recommendation was made to place 6 or 7 brigades in the Baltic states to ensure a Russian invasion would fail to occupy the Baltics. A military solution to a military problem.

If that were what this report did, I'd have no problem with it.  It states quite clearly that there are no good options except to create a massive military force.  That's a total overreach.

You can question the proposed solution all you want. I have questioned the need for it myself and am not wedded to it in any way. The same is not true for the premise. I think the results of RAND's wargames accurately reflect the reality of NATO's ability to prevent an initial Russian military takeover of the Baltics in the event of war. You seem to have moved away from questioning that in your last few posts to focus on attacking aspects of the report that do not represent my position.

Not really.  I spent quite a bit of time showing that the report has a lot of flaws in it and there are likely more, but have to speculate because they have withheld even some of the most basic information needed to assess their conclusions.

As I said from the start, there are conditions that could trip up a Russian offensive enough to stall it and create conditions radically different than those gamed out in the report.  I do think it is likely that with the forces presumed in their basic scenario that would not be as likely as Russia taking over the Baltics within a couple of days.  Though those force assumptions (on the Blue side) are already outdated and not accounted for in their study as I have proved.

Steve

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Out of curiosity, which conclusions? All of them?

well the fundamental point is deterrence right?  Making sure Russia understands it shouldn't even consider invading.  That is all NATO wants, not a force that could be considered in an offensive orientation.  So how about this, instead NATO take a clear hard line position on sanctions in the Ukraine and continue to escalate them every month until Ukraine re-establishes full border control.  Would that not show the kind of resolve that is fundamentally the core of deference?  That would cost far less and provide less provocation than trying to establish a serious military force on Russia's doorstep.  Yes that is more work and can not be done unilaterally by placing US brigades overseas, but it is a far more civil approach.  A NATO that has more unity and shown greater resolve in action is going to be a far better deterrent all around and not just in the Baltics.  It also focuses on something more sustainable than simply expecting the US to become the sole guarantor of peace in Europe.  Fundamentally this is a European problem that this study provides only a US solution for.

As I said earlier I went to a problem solving workshop last year.  One of the aspects they pushed is in developing a proposal you need to list all possible options - all inclusive and mutually excluding so you end up with a full picture of your available options then you start vetting to see what works and what doesn't.  This report started from one place- the only way to deter aggression was to have the military force in place to win.  Why is that the only option?  What other options did they consider beside military?  Doesn't this sound frankly very much like the US lead up to Iraq?  We have enormous economic resources, why do we not consider those first?  Call me cynical, skeptical, whatever you want, but what I see missing from this report tells me that from the start it has only one agenda.  A military option for Baltic security.  That is fine as long as they say that is what it is.

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Assuming for a moment all that is true, this is a massive scandal, reaching into the highest levels of government. Someone in this thread is going to be famous if he contacts the right people. :ph34r:

I don't see the big scandal, even if it all is true. Perhaps I'm missing something but the worst 'crime' committed is influencing a presumed autonomous ThinkTank to produce a report that fits a certain political agenda. Unfortunately, that's how politics work in my experience. In my field of work we have to work hard to make sure that 'correct' information is presented to policy makers. Sometimes they don't even really care about 'correct' information, for reasons as simple as the policy makers being busy protecting budget, power and or just looking good for the voter. Then there are the interdepartmental struggles, etc. 
Anyway, what's the worst thing that could happen in this case? Let's say a senator would find out about it and has proof in the form of leaked e-mails showing that RAND was influenced to produce a study with a certain outcome. How many careers would be over? I don't think any career would be finished, perhaps a couple of persons lose their jobs and after that it's just business as usual.

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Oh, you edited before I found time to respond :angry: The juicy target I was planing my attack upon is gone! The Lanchester Exchange Rates would have been in my favor, I tell you.

Flawed?  Oh, I think not :)  Besides making a goof on the hours vs. days thing, which I corrected once pointed out, I think my view of this report is quite sound.  The report is poorly written and the conclusions are demonstrably flawed.  You challenged several other of my points and either dismissed them as irrelevant (which since you didn't game out isn't really possible to do) or stated a counter opinion (i.e. not something you can prove any more than I could).

Interesting that you use the world "flawed" in the same way you use "worst": not literally :P

Your views on this report can be broadly grouped into two categories: 1) attacks on data within the report and 2) attacks on data not in the report. The former do not amount to much. There is remarkably little in the report that can be definitively pointed to as wrong. Nearly all of the challenges of this variety that have resisted knocking down are subjective, e.g. how incompetent are Russian pilots at striking ground targets. The attacks on data missing from the report are almost wholly speculative and therefore not provable or disprovable.

If that were what this report did, I'd have no problem with it.  It states quite clearly that there are no good options except to create a massive military force.  That's a total overreach.

What they did was posit that outcomes following occupation of the Baltics were all less joyful on the joy scale than ensuring the occupation could not happen in the first place. Overreach? Perhaps. But their reasoning, while debatable, is sound.

Though those force assumptions (on the Blue side) are already outdated and not accounted for in their study as I have proved.

A minor point here. Up until this week's announcement of a second ABCT in Europe, RAND's Blue force was pretty darn close to reality in terms of type and quantity of capabilities and combat power.

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Why is that the only option?  What other options did they consider beside military?

This is RAND we're talking about. Go to Dominos for dinner and what do you expect? If you don't want pizza why are you there? :P

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Oh, you edited before I found time to respond :angry: The juicy target I was planing my attack upon is gone! The Lanchester Exchange Rates would have been in my favor, I tell you.

LOL thanks, that was a pretty good chuckle.  I am just wondering what my coworkers will think of me when I toss that one out.  "Yes that is all true, but the Lanchester Exchange rate is in my favor!."  :P

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This is RAND we're talking about. Go to Dominos for dinner and what do you expect? If you don't want pizza why are you there? :P

well yeah good point.  I did google a bit and also found this.

According to the 2005 annual report, "about one-half of RAND's research involves national security issues". Many of the events in which RAND plays a part are based on assumptions which are hard to verify because of the lack of detail on RAND's highly classified work for defense and intelligence agencies. The RAND Corporation posts all of its unclassified reports in full on its website.

Still I do think a consideration of strengthening NATO resolve internally fits within the umbrella, but the original posit might not have allowed for that option

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Tonight us brits get an eyefull of World War Three: Inside the War Room

Footage of a major war game with a committee of senior military, political and diplomatic figures as they confront a hypothetical `hot war' in Eastern Europe, including nuclear confrontation. The programme faces a scenario that has haunted western strategists since civil war broke out in Ukraine: potential Russian military involvement in the Baltic States of Latvia and Estonia

BBC2 HD
9:00pm-10:00pm (1 hour ) Wed 3 Feb 
Read more at http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b06zw32h

Well it looks like Putin didn't approve.

http://www.newsweek.com/kremlin-slams-bbc-ww3-programme-simulating-nato-russia-conflict-423141

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Oh, you edited before I found time to respond :angry: The juicy target I was planing my attack upon is gone! The Lanchester Exchange Rates would have been in my favor, I tell you.

No doubt, because you could tweak the values to ensure an easy victory :)
 

Interesting that you use the world "flawed" in the same way you use "worst": not literally :P

Your views on this report can be broadly grouped into two categories: 1) attacks on data within the report and 2) attacks on data not in the report.

Not quite.  I'd say 1) attacks on data within the report, 2) attacks on data not in the report, 3) attacks on conclusions that aren't supported by the report's content, and 4) criticism that the report was either poorly written or deliberately designed to promote a specific recommendation.  As for the latter point, check out this advice for college students on how to write a thesis:

http://www.cws.illinois.edu/workshop/writers/tips/thesis/

You can either take my word for it or you can look for yourself at how much of the advice focuses on being specific and not vague.  This is for good reason because the reader should not have basic questions about what the report is intended to cover.

So, there is a vague hypothesis, poorly explained parameters, some hard data on ONE of the scenarios' start conditions, no hard data on the end states, no explanation of how the results were judged, and so on.  Yet the proposed remedy is extremely specific.

The conclusions that 7 brigades would be necessary to defend the Baltics MIGHT be defensible, but to conclude that this is the only and/or best thing NATO can do to deter Putin is utter and complete nonsense.  There is nothing in this report to support such a conclusion and, in fact, it's pretty easy to demonstrate it's utterly wrong.  It doesn't matter if the study's constraints are military scenarios because the recommendations of the report are not.

Then there are the problems with the modeling that are suspected.

The former do not amount to much. There is remarkably little in the report that can be definitively pointed to as wrong.

Other than the conclusion, and therefore the point of the report, I agree there's not much in there that can be definitively pointed to as wrong.  Which makes the careful selection and omission of meaningful information all the more relevant.

Nearly all of the challenges of this variety that have resisted knocking down are subjective, e.g. how incompetent are Russian pilots at striking ground targets. The attacks on data missing from the report are almost wholly speculative and therefore not provable or disprovable.

The onus is upon the authors to have something that is provable.  Readers should not be left having to speculate about the fundamentals.  Especially since the information is readily available and the questions asked fairly obvious.

What they did was posit that outcomes following occupation of the Baltics were all less joyful on the joy scale than ensuring the occupation could not happen in the first place. Overreach? Perhaps. But their reasoning, while debatable, is sound.

Unsound.  Why?  Because it presumes a massive and unprecedented military buildup right on Russia's border is the only way to ensure it won't invade the Baltics.  This is demonstrably false since for the past 24 years Russia has had its eye on the Baltics, there has never been 7 brigades deployed there, and yet Russia has not invaded.  Clearly there are other reasons that play into Russia's decision making process than a headcount of what's on the other side of the border.  The report's recommendation, therefore, is not sound.

Now, had the report more narrowly defined its scope and ensured its conclusions were inline within that scope, I'd have less objection to the report.  I might still disagree with the recommended course of action or questioned if the study is based on sound gaming, but at least I'd not see this as outright overreach.

A minor point here. Up until this week's announcement of a second ABCT in Europe, RAND's Blue force was pretty darn close to reality in terms of type and quantity of capabilities and combat power.

Not quite.  RAND's presumptions of Blue Force structure was still a limited subset of the total range of possibilities.  While it is not practical to game out every single last one, they could have gamed out something that had more favorable assumptions for Blue.  For example, that NATO would likely wind up creating a second ABCT or NATO members would insert more forces into the Baltics from the start (the existing NRF for example) or both.  The fact that before this report was even released NATO had increased its force presence in Eastern Europe shows that RAND should have gamed out something forward looking than what it did.

Steve

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As for the latter point, check out this advice for college students on how to write a thesis:

http://www.cws.illinois.edu/workshop/writers/tips/thesis/

You can either take my word for it or you can look for yourself at how much of the advice focuses on being specific and not vague.  This is for good reason because the reader should not have basic questions about what the report is intended to cover.

Debating proper thesis writing.  :DYou might as well criticize their choice of font while you're at it. I should just concede the point because I find it too trivial to waste time on.

Then there are the problems with the modeling that are suspected.

Emphasis added.

The conclusions that 7 brigades would be necessary to defend the Baltics MIGHT be defensible, but to conclude that this is the only and/or best thing NATO can do to deter Putin is utter and complete nonsense.  There is nothing in this report to support such a conclusion and, in fact, it's pretty easy to demonstrate it's utterly wrong.  It doesn't matter if the study's constraints are military scenarios because the recommendations of the report are not.

I don't recall any non-military recommendations. Regardless of that, I have already said about 5 times that I am not in favor of the brigades, so this is not a point of contention and never has been.

The onus is upon the authors to have something that is provable.  Readers should not be left having to speculate about the fundamentals.  Especially since the information is readily available and the questions asked fairly obvious.t.

What odds would you place on the report released to the public being identical to the report given to the Pentagon?

Unsound.  Why?  Because it presumes a massive and unprecedented military buildup right on Russia's border is the only way to ensure it won't invade the Baltics.

Oh? ;)

Pg 9 : "It is unclear whether denial of the prospect for a rapid victory would suffice to deter Russia from gambling on an attack
on the “Baltic three,” were it inclined to contemplate one. What seems certain is that NATO’s current posture, which appears to offer Moscow the opportunity for a quick and relatively cheap win, does not."

Pg 16: "Even in the absence of strong conventional resistance, attacking NATO nonetheless would represent a very risky course for Russia. Deterrence is a complex phenomenon that does not rest on any single element. Nevertheless, the lack of a credible conventional defense cannot strengthen it."

This is demonstrably false since for the past 24 years Russia has had its eye on the Baltics, there has never been 7 brigades deployed there, and yet Russia has not invaded.  Clearly there are other reasons that play into Russia's decision making process than a headcount of what's on the other side of the border.  The report's recommendation, therefore, is not sound.

As demonstrated above, you are misrepresenting what the report says.

Not quite.  RAND's presumptions of Blue Force structure was still a limited subset of the total range of possibilities.  While it is not practical to game out every single last one, they could have gamed out something that had more favorable assumptions for Blue.  For example, that NATO would likely wind up creating a second ABCT or NATO members would insert more forces into the Baltics from the start (the existing NRF for example) or both.

Actually, they did game out a second ABCT scenario, alongside 2-3 battalions of the 82nd Airborne (who probably DO have Javalins, BTW :P), a battalion from the UK's 16 Air Assault Brigade (who probably also have Javelins), and others. They also allowed NATO fighter squadrons to base in Sweden, a non-NATO country, which helped them avoid the air defense network in Kaliningrad.

The fact that before this report was even released NATO had increased its force presence in Eastern Europe shows that RAND should have gamed out something forward looking than what it did.

I rather suspect it was "released" to the DoD long before the official announcement last week, the irony being that the report's increasing obsolescence over time is probably due in no small part to the report itself.

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Debating proper thesis writing.  :DYou might as well criticize their choice of font while you're at it. I should just concede the point because I find it too trivial to waste time on.

Holy crow.  I don't really know how to respond to this.  So if they scribbled this in crayon using the vocabulary of a 10 year old who speaks English as a second language, that would be OK too?  Look, there are very good reasons why standards for report writing exist.  If you think an organization that produces extremely expensive and sensitive reports with taxpayer money should not be held to at least a high school level standard... wow.  And if you don't see why that is of critical importance to the report's ability to support it's own conclusions, another wow.

You should ask yourself a very important question... why is this report not up to that standard?  Since RAND does this for a living and produces lots of reports that are clear and correctly written (I even paid money for one they did on Stryker deployment times) I see two possibilities:

1.  It slipped through the normal review/correction standards (rushed, ran out of money, etc.)

2.  If you want to support a conclusion that you don't have the facts for, and don't want to lie, you go as vague as possible.

Emphasis added.

Yes, though I have some very good reasons to suspect flaws in their modeling.  Since they omitted even the information which should be expected for a report like this, and the onus is upon them to back up their claims, I think suspicion is warranted.  Especially if this report was deliberately made vague to support a conclusion.

I don't recall any non-military recommendations. Regardless of that, I have already said about 5 times that I am not in favor of the brigades, so this is not a point of contention and never has been.

It doesn't matter if you or I agree with the conclusion.  That's not really the point.  The point is that the report is not internally consistent.  There is a hypothesis that is vague and poorly defined, there's not much detail presented about the test conditions, and yet there is a very specific conclusion which omits caveats and counter points for consideration.  Which means they present this as a slam dunk, open and shut case even though they have failed to support such a position.

What odds would you place on the report released to the public being identical to the report given to the Pentagon?

Irrelevant.  If this were kept internal to the Pentagon that would be one thing.  However, it was put into the public spotlight and we have to judge it on what is in the spotlight not what is in the shadows.  The media is reporting on this and I know for sure that the military community has read it.  So far I haven't seen anybody questioning the recommendations themselves.  That is not good for the democratic process, especially if the report was deliberately produced to have such an effect on public opinion.

Oh? ;)

Pg 9 : "It is unclear whether denial of the prospect for a rapid victory would suffice to deter Russia from gambling on an attack
on the “Baltic three,” were it inclined to contemplate one. What seems certain is that NATO’s current posture, which appears to offer Moscow the opportunity for a quick and relatively cheap win, does not."

Pg 16: "Even in the absence of strong conventional resistance, attacking NATO nonetheless would represent a very risky course for Russia. Deterrence is a complex phenomenon that does not rest on any single element. Nevertheless, the lack of a credible conventional defense cannot strengthen it."

I stand by what I said.  Look at the part I bolded above.  The report states, in no uncertain terms, that the current military posture in the Baltics makes Russian leadership think that an invasion would be a "cheap win".  That's a load of crap.  First, they have absolutely no way to know what the Russian leadership is thinking, and if they did then shouldn't they speculate what the Russian leadership would think if there were 7 brigades right on their border within a couple hours' drive from St. Petersburg?  More indication of the one-sided agenda slanting of the conclusions.

As for the second bit, they have concluded that the current posture and threat of a war with NATO is insufficient to act as a component of deterrence.  That's another load of crap.  Again, they have no way of knowing what the Russian leadership has calculated.  Further, a flaw in this report is they only gamed things out for 60 hours and came to this unsupportable conclusion that it would be a "quick and relatively cheap win".  Have they considered that maybe the Russian leadership is not so stupid and actually gamed things out for 60 days and perhaps came to the conclusion that it would be national suicide for them to attack?  Nope, zero consideration for this.

As demonstrated above, you are misrepresenting what the report says.

Not at all.  I am actually looking at the meaning of what is written and putting it into context with what they are advocating and the strength of that argument.

Actually, they did game out a second ABCT scenario, alongside 2-3 battalions of the 82nd Airborne (who probably DO have Javalins, BTW :P), a battalion from the UK's 16 Air Assault Brigade (who probably also have Javelins), and others. They also allowed NATO fighter squadrons to base in Sweden, a non-NATO country, which helped them avoid the air defense network in Kaliningrad.

I've already gone over this in great detail.  Yes, they had a variation on theme for one side, but nothing more.  They also did not demonstrate what these variations did in terms of affecting outcome differently than their baseline test.  Which means we are unable to gauge how effective even these mild changes in starting conditions affected the bigger picture.  For example, in their baseline did NATO suffer 80% casualties and lose all ground within 24 hours while only causing the Russians 500 casualties, but with the addition of these forces change the picture to NATO suffering 40% casualties, losing ground in 60 hours, and causing the Russians 5000 casualties?  These things matter and they definitely have the data, yet they didn't even so much as HINT at what the differences might be.

I rather suspect it was "released" to the DoD long before the official announcement last week, the irony being that the report's increasing obsolescence over time is probably due in no small part to the report itself.

This is the point I keep coming back to.  I think there is merit in buried in this report.  However, it is similar to a health report that comes out and says "you can live longer if you eat healthy and exercise" without specifying anything more than that.  This falls into the category of "tell me something I didn't already know" reporting.  If the report is having some positive role in getting NATO to strengthen certain aspects of its posture in the Baltics, I think that's a good thing providing it's a well reasoned approach.  Sadly, this report gives almost no guidance for what is a well reasoned approach because it recommends a massive and totally unnecessary, if not counter productive, solution that might in fact make the things worse.

Steve

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So if they scribbled this in crayon using the vocabulary of a 10 year old who speaks English as a second language, that would be OK too?

The thesis statement with your suggested corrections (that I agree with, which isn't all of them):

In a series of wargames conducted between summer 2014 and spring 2015, the RAND Corporation examined the shape and probable outcome of a near-term Russian invasion of the Baltic states to determine if NATO is capable of defending the territory from occupation. As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members. Across multiple games using a wide range of expert participants in and out of uniform playing both sides, the longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the outskirts of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga, respectively, is 60 hours. Such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of options, all worse than defeating the invasion in it's infancy: a bloody counteroffensive, fraught with escalatory risk, to liberate the Baltics; to escalate itself, as it threatened to do to avert defeat during the Cold War; or to concede at least temporary defeat, with uncertain but predictably disastrous consequences for the Alliance and, not incidentally, the people of the Baltics.

This is a more precise statement in a couple of places, but to analogize the original to something scribbled in crayon "using the vocabulary of a 10 year old who speaks English as a second language" can most politely be described as massively hyperbolic.

 

You should ask yourself a very important question... why is this report not up to that standard?  Since RAND does this for a living and produces lots of reports that are clear and correctly written (I even paid money for one they did on Stryker deployment times) I see two possibilities:

1.  It slipped through the normal review/correction standards (rushed, ran out of money, etc.)

2.  If you want to support a conclusion that you don't have the facts for, and don't want to lie, you go as vague as possible.

How about

3. Writing thesis statements is a different skill set than running wargames.

4. Imprecise syntax is not evidence of deception.

5. Nothing is perfect. If perfection is the standard everything fails.

What you are doing is akin to using inaccuracies in the Combat Mission manuals to indict Combat Mission and it's creators.

Yes, though I have some very good reasons to suspect flaws in their modeling. 

I have very good reason to suspect flaws in Combat Mission's modeling. That doesn't make it a poor simulation.

The point is that the report is not internally consistent.  There is a hypothesis that is vague and poorly defined, there's not much detail presented about the test conditions, and yet there is a very specific conclusion which omits caveats and counter points for consideration.  Which means they present this as a slam dunk, open and shut case even though they have failed to support such a position.

The report is a data point intended to help inform the discussion, which was in some respects unhinged from reality prior to the report's introduction. While you have questioned the unambiguous certainly of their conclusion there appears to be universal agreement that their conclusion is the most probable one. Mission accomplished, as far as I am concerned.

The media is reporting on this and I know for sure that the military community has read it.  So far I haven't seen anybody questioning the recommendations themselves.  That is not good for the democratic process, especially if the report was deliberately produced to have such an effect on public opinion.

Agreed that this discussion appears to be a tempest in a teapot. It does make one consider what is unique about this teapot...

I stand by what I said.

What you said was: "Because it presumes a massive and unprecedented military buildup right on Russia's border is the only way to ensure it won't invade the Baltics."

This is incorrect because the report explicitly states it is not possible to ensure Russia never invades.

Look at the part I bolded above.  The report states, in no uncertain terms, that the current military posture in the Baltics makes Russian leadership think that an invasion would be a "cheap win".  That's a load of crap.

Ah, more kvetching about syntax. What else?

The report actually says "relatively cheap" but I grant you they don't define what it is relative to. Nevertheless, that does not negate the preceding sentence, which is more unambiguous: "It is unclear whether denial of the prospect for a rapid victory would suffice to deter Russia from gambling on an attack on the “Baltic three,” were it inclined to contemplate one."

First, they have absolutely no way to know what the Russian leadership is thinking

Which they admit.

 As for the second bit, they have concluded that the current posture and threat of a war with NATO is insufficient to act as a component of deterrence. That's another load of crap.

The phrasing is odd but they definitely have not concluded that threat of war with NATO is not itself a deterrent. They almost explicitly state otherwise: "Even in the absence of strong conventional resistance, attacking NATO nonetheless would represent a very risky course for Russia. Deterrence is a complex phenomenon that does not rest on any single element."

Have they considered that maybe the Russian leadership is not so stupid and actually gamed things out for 60 days and perhaps came to the conclusion that it would be national suicide for them to attack?

Apparently they have.

This is the point I keep coming back to.  I think there is merit in buried in this report.  However, it is similar to a health report that comes out and says "you can live longer if you eat healthy and exercise" without specifying anything more than that.  This falls into the category of "tell me something I didn't already know" reporting. 

I doubt you stepped back from your initial position on a whim. If not because of the report it must have been my persuasive arguments :lol:

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OK, I don't see much point in debating this any more.  You seem to be bending over backwards to give this thing a passing grade, I'm doing the opposite.  Since a report is supposed to be clear, precise, and defensible the mere fact we are having this debate indicates to me that the report has "issues".  Before the report was released I had serious questions about how they could come to the conclusions they came to.  After the report was released I began to see some of my gut instinct guesses were correct.  The more I read it the more I found other aspects that call into question the veracity and/or the soundness of the conclusions.  Since this report is advocating a specific course of action, to the exclusion of others, the onus is upon the report to make that justification clear and concise.  You may feel it has achieved that, obviously I think it has failed.  Now that I've read and reread it several times, as well as debating it, I'm now more of the opinion that the conclusions drove the report rather than the other way around.

As for the invasion scenario itself, I am still of the opinion that the combination of trigger forces, the obvious NATO reinforcement of its commitments to the Baltics, economic realities, and political necessity makes the risk of Russia's invasion of the Baltics very small.  If Russia does decide to invade I think the present government would not survive the aftermath, the Baltics would remain free of Russian possession, the Russian Federation would lose territory elsewhere (some permanently, some only regained after bloodshed), and generally speaking Russia would not be in a position to threaten its neighbors for many years to come (if ever). 

Raising and deploying 7 brigades to the Baltics is not the best use of resources because it is inherently unnecessary and carries with it unintended consequences.  Apparently you disagree (i.e. you support the report ergo you support the conclusion), so it is what it is.

Steve

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US Army under-equipped?

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/02/09/we-dont-have-the-gear-how-the-pentagon-is-struggling-with-electronic-warfare/

“We don’t have the gear,” Col. Jeffrey Church, the head of the Army’s electronic warfare division, said in a recent interview. “We’re working on getting it, [but] we’re talking years down the road, when our adversaries are doing this right now.”

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US Army under-equipped?

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/02/09/we-dont-have-the-gear-how-the-pentagon-is-struggling-with-electronic-warfare/

“We don’t have the gear,” Col. Jeffrey Church, the head of the Army’s electronic warfare division, said in a recent interview. “We’re working on getting it, [but] we’re talking years down the road, when our adversaries are doing this right now.”

Looks like a good topic for a new thread Ivanov, go ahead I won't steal your idea!

;)

 

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Looks like a good topic for a new thread Ivanov, go ahead I won't steal your idea!

;)

 

I'm not an expert in electronic warfare, so that's why I haven't created a new thread. But I think the article above may be instructive, if we think of balance of power in a hypothetical confrontation between NATO and Russia.

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Yes, cyber, electronic, and propaganda warfare are things which the West has not invested in as much as it probably should have.  However, Russia's cyber attack on Estonia, the recent successes of Russian electronic warfare units in Donbas, and the ongoing propaganda warfare against EU/NATO countries (Germany being the latest example) has shown that the West needs to "get with the program".  The RAND report mentions these deficiencies, though nobody can say for sure how effective they would be in full wartime conditions.  I don't think the West can afford to take a risk here, especially since the cost is much less than 7 brigades and has applications elsewhere (China, for example).

Steve

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Just gonna throw a log on the fire here to keep my curious mind warm a little longer.

New RAND article on Baltics talking about other ways of deterrence:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE179.html?utm_source=facebook.com&utm_medium=rand_social

Heh!  Well it's supposed to be negative single digits (on the old fashioned, and stupid, Fahrenheit scale) so I guarantee you I've got more logs on the fire than this one right now ;)

Here's something else on topic from last week.  It's Zbigniew Brzezinski's perspective on the defense of the Baltics.  In it he advocates for 7 brigades to be... oh wait, that's the other thing!  He said "a company" of American forces along with some other nations should be enough to make Putin think twice.

http://www.c-span.org/video/?c4526875/zbigniew-brzezinski-putin-seizes-riga-tallinn

About the RAND report...

I read through it quickly (too much work to do tonight) and it seems sensible enough.  Certainly preparing for an unconventional war against Russia, simply put, should be a part of the Baltics' self defense strategy.  Plan A would have it be a component in the rear of the Russian lines during an attack scenario where NATO had sufficient forces to slow the Russian advance enough to have an impact during the initial invasion period.  Blowing up bridges, directing fire from artillery or air assets, taking out critical hardware (EW trucks, for example), disrupting supply, etc.  This is something I talked about much earlier in this discussion and it could have a major impact on Russia's ability to take ground swiftly and with little cost.

Plan B would involve a more long term strategy necessary if NATO is unable or unwilling to immediately liberate the Baltics AND Russia doesn't voluntarily withdraw.  I think this is an even less likely situation than Russia deciding to conduct an outright invasion, but it needs to be thought out and planned for.  No nation should have a national defense policy which lacks viable contingency plans.  The point about Baltic peoples not having as many firearms and munitions in their houses as the Swiss can be easily overcome though a series of arsenals which, in time of war, are parceled out and hidden ahead of an advancing force.  It takes almost not time to toss a crate of ammo and a few rifles into a car and drive away somewhere to stash it.  This sort of plan would mean the government retains control of weapons in time of peace, but has then readily available for the populace in time of war.

I found the poll of Estonians in support of an unconventional war to be rather telling.  80% were in favor of it.  That's a massive expression of Estonian desire to never again be under the heel of Russian authorities, however it's especially interesting because 24% of the population is ethnically Russian.

Steve

Edited by Battlefront.com
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Something for RAND to play with for an updated study :D Details were just released about the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), which is a $3.4 Billion program to enhance deterrence of Russian aggression in Europe.  The program is phased in over three years.

EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE OVERVIEW
This budget continues and expands projects under the President’s European Reass rance Initiative (ERI), which was originally proposed by the President in Warsaw on June 3, 2014.  The Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget request funds ERI efforts started in FY 2015 and  FY 2016 to reassure North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies and partners of the U.S. commitment to their security and territorial integrity.   Funds provide near-term flexibility and responsiveness to the evolving concerns of U.S. allies and  partners in Europe, particularly Central and Eastern Europe, and increase the capability and readiness of U.S. allies  and partners.  Additionally, the FY 2017 ERI funding strengthens deterrence through  measures that provide a quick joint response against any threats  made by aggressive actors in the region.  As such, the FY 2017 ERI request is broken down into two broad funding categories:  (1) continuance of ongoing assurance measures (referred to hereafter as “Assurance”);  and (2) the introduction of  deterrence measures to better set European posture in the wake of Russian aggression  (referred to hereafter as “Deterrence”).

http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_ERI_J-Book.pdf

Besides a significant increase in hardware and personnel on a permanent basis, there are major upgrades being funded to facilities to handle high tempo, round the clock operations.  In particular heavy air lift to Romania and Bulgaria for supporting operations in Poland and Ukraine without major risk of interdiction by Russian forces.  There's also specific provisions for upgrading a base in Germany to handle F-22 and F-35 fighters.  New/upgraded facilities to stock equipment of several more heavy brigades' worth of equipment and munitions, with the personnel to be moved in at least once a year for major exercises.  Then there's specific allocations for significant spending on special forces, information (propaganda), electronic/cyber capabilities, etc.

There is also a specific allocation of resources to increasing Ukrainian military readiness and capabilities.

On the ground forces side, the plans are to have a ABCT, Fires Brigade, Sustainment Brigade, Division HQ, and various support units available 24/7/365.  Supplies to sustain them in combat are also going to be stored in theater.  Total for this is about 30% of the entire budget (roughly $1.3 Billion)

Steve

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