Russian army under equipped?

[HUSKER2142]

Poor Baltic countries, why should Russia seize them? Kaliningrad region for them like a cancer. It is enough to place there an army corps in the 20000-30000 people and the same army corps in the Pskov and Leningrad region. The Baltic countries will be even more angry. Also will be a factor of deterrence of potential adversary Baltic.

 

Бедные прибалтийские страны , зачем России их захватывать ? Калининградская область для них как раковая опухоль. Достаточно разместить там армейский корпус в 20000-30000 человек и такой же армейский корпус в Псковской и Ленинградской области. Страны Прибалтики будут ещё больше злится. А так же будет фактор сдерживания из Прибалтики потенциального противника .

 

Edited February 4, 2016 by HUSKER2142

[Wicky]

Poor Baltic countries, why should Russia seize them? 

Why would Russian jets carry out a simulated attack on Stockholm, Sweden?

http://www.thelocal.se/20130422/47474

[Vanir Ausf B]

DOH!  Yeah, got that wrong.  Late nights, too much work and what not.  However it doesn't change my point very much.  Especially because my criticism of RAND's study is far more extensive than this one issue.

The question I have now is what criteria did RAND use to declare game over?  This would answer my question about the two ABCT's impact on the war as well as others.

The point of this is warfare is not usually "first one to capture the flag wins".  RAND's study gives the impression that the end of 60 hours Russia effectively, but not totally, controls both Estonia and Latvia.

These things are mostly implied rather than stated in explicit detail (unfortunately), but there is no question that the exercise was mainly intended to answer a single question: could NATO prevent an initial take-over of the Baltics in the face of a Russian invasion given the present force structure and deployments. The "win" condition for Russia was effective control of at least most of the Baltic states territory and control of their borders, to the extent that NATO forces could no longer reinforce directly to the Baltics and would instead have to mount a counter-offensive from outside the Baltics. They appear to have said "good game" when that outcome was no longer in doubt.

Their study seems only interested in if NATO could win a battle, not if it could win a war.  As I've objected to over and over again, they should make that very clear.

They did.

Russia taking over the bulk of Estonia and Latvia would be very temporary.  Days, maybe weeks.  I don't think months is very likely and absolutely not years.  Why?  Because the Russian state as we know it would collapse very quickly.

They don't assume that NATO/The West has a win button they can press to destroy the Russian state at any time they feel the need, nor do they assume there would be sufficient political will to pursue a costly counter-offensive to retake the Baltic states, although they do allow that NATO has the physical resources to do that.

Having said that, the primary issue to ponder is RAND's cutoff time.  Because if I were in command of two ABCTs and I'm told that today there's a serious risk of air interdiction but tomorrow it will be blue skies, then I'd find a way to delay moving until the following day.  Unlike RAND's study, real life doesn't have arbitrary start and end points.

A couple of problems here. One is that Russian forces could overrun an entire Baltic state in one day, and that is precisely the situation NATO is trying to prevent. Also, you are assuming NATO suddenly gains air superiority the next day, but it is not apparent that would happen. RAND says Russia was able to prevent NATO air superiority for "a few days" but what is not stated is if that means NATO gained superiority after a few days or if the scenario ended after a few days. I'm guessing it was the latter and that we don't know how long it would take to gain air superiority. Given the time needed to deploy additional aircraft and support assets from around the globe it could take weeks.

On the latter front, RAND commented on insurgency and reminded everybody about how Russia responds to insurgencies by dredging up Chechnya.  But once again RAND didn't put that into proper context.  There is no way, no how, that Russia would have the time or resources to mount a counter insurgency operation in the Baltics.

How much time does it take to line up your artillery on a city and open fire? In any event, RAND points out that even a successful insurgency would damage NATO's credibility. But it would be cheaper than an counter-offensive.

Edited February 4, 2016 by Vanir Ausf B

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

Yup, NATO strong, Russia weak, we can all go home. 

It's a sort of Imperial Japan vs US correlation.  Russia is dangerous, and it could do a lot of damage on a world that is not prepared for it....but Russia is not able to conduct a long war.  

My concern is there is a government in Russia right now that is focusing on the following messages:

1. Russia is powerful
2. Russia is surrounded by enemies.

Given this message on a loop, along with the silly Russia irredenta concepts, all combines for a concern that ultranationalist sentiments might lead to a combination of objectives, perceived means and perceived justifications, which might just lead to a lot of dead people.  I like to leave some education out there, or at least a counter-narrative showing the frailty of the strength, and when possible the illusion of objective and justifications for military conflict against the west.

Simply put there's no reason why any of us should go to war, and Russian belligerence in Eastern Europe is selling the Russian people's futures in exchange for trinkets for its ruling elite.  This is not to say America is somehow better, but our folly is somewhat less likely to result in full scale conventional warfare in an otherwise fairly peaceful place.

[Battlefront.com]

 

These things are mostly implied rather than stated in explicit detail (unfortunately), but there is no question that the exercise was mainly intended to answer a single question: could NATO prevent an initial take-over of the Baltics in the face of a Russian invasion given the present force structure and deployments. The "win" condition for Russia was effective control of at least most of the Baltic states territory and control of their borders, to the extent that NATO forces could no longer reinforce directly to the Baltics and would instead have to mount a counter-offensive from outside the Baltics. They appear to have said "good game" when that outcome was no longer in doubt.

We shouldn't have to guess, IMHO.   We also shouldn't have to guess at what the relative casualties are for each side.  Notice there is NO mention of this?  Why?  It's a pretty obvious question and one that is rather important to have an answer to.  Especially when we talk about the air scenario that we just discussed (i.e. their airforce could interdict for a few days at the expense of ceasing to exist) or what NATO's options are after the 60 hour window.

They did.

I disagree.  Very strongly, in fact.  RAND has not clearly specified much of anything except what they think should be done about it (i.e. 7 brigades).  Here is what RAND stated on Page 1 as the scope of their study:

"In a series of wargames conducted between summer 2014 and spring 2015, the RAND Corporation examined the shape and probable outcome of a near-term Russian invasion of the Baltic states."

This is a pretty ambiguous statement.  What does "invasion" mean to you?  To me it means "war", not just the beginning piece of it, unless specifically stated to the contrary.  This strongly implies that they have gamed out the war's final outcome, not just the initial phase.  Their conclusions definitely seem to indicate they have a pretty good idea how this war will wind up.  In fact, making statements which are not backed up by clear information is the norm for this report.

You know, screw it.  Now I've changed my mind from being critical of this report's details/methodology to being downright skeptical of it.  I am going to start questioning their professional integrity because this report doesn't follow long established research norms.  Such as being specific about the scope of the study so people can properly assess its conclusions.  HOW HARD is it to write:

"In a series of wargames conducted between summer 2014 and spring 2015, the RAND Corporation examined the shape and probable outcome of a near-term Russian invasion of the Baltic states to determine if NATO is capable of defending the territory from occupation."

I mean, really... how hard would that be?

How difficult would it be to state this somewhere?

"Three primary scenarios were developed for the NATO force based on various assumptions of actions made directly before and after the initial invasion.  Russian capabilities were assumed to be close to their theoretical potential and were not varied in any of the scenarios to account for possible variations."

Even better, studies regularly point out what their study does NOT do so people can keep things in their proper context.  Don't you think it would have been a good idea for them to have made the next sentence:

"The study made no attempt to wargame out possible NATO counter responses after the initial phase of invasion, therefore speculation and conclusions based on the eventual end state of hostilities are beyond the scope of this study".

Now, writing that last bit isn't very hard either, however it undermines some of their conclusions and would require rephrasing of others.  From the breakout conclusions section:

• Such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of options, all bad.

I call BS on this one big time.  "All bad" is a judgement statement that they are in absolutely no position to conclude because they didn't game out this thing more than 60 hours.  The collapse of the Russian state and the forces in place withdrawing all on their own with Russia being unable to be aggressive for another 20 years is an extremely likely outcome IMHO.  I would not classify that as "bad". Suing for piece because NATO airforces grind the occupation forces into the ground while Ukraine goes on the offensive and Georgia postures for doing the same is not what I call "bad" either.

 

They don't assume that NATO/The West has a win button they can press to destroy the Russian state at any time they feel the need, nor do they assume there would be sufficient political will to pursue a costly counter-offensive to retake the Baltic states, although they do allow that NATO has the physical resources to do that.

This is outside of the scope of their testing, therefore they stay away from this territory.  Stick to what they tested for... the immediate results of the first phase of the Russian offensive.  Nothing more.

A couple of problems here. One is that Russian forces could overrun an entire Baltic state in one day, and that is precisely the situation NATO is trying to prevent. Also, you are assuming NATO suddenly gains air superiority the next day, but it is not apparent that would happen. RAND says Russia was able to prevent NATO air superiority for "a few days" but what is not stated is if that means NATO gained superiority after a few days or if the scenario ended after a few days. I'm guessing it was the latter and that we don't know how long it would take to gain air superiority. Given the time needed to deploy additional aircraft and support assets from around the globe it could take weeks.

RAND presumes the only threat to Russian aircraft are NATO aircraft.  Logically this presumes that either NATO's initial force fights Russia to mutual annihilation (i.e. no aircraft left for either side) or NATO comes out on top (i.e. NATO aircraft in effective control of the skies).  It seems pretty likely to me it will be the latter and not the former since phyrric victories are extremely rare.  Therefore, the only question is how much air power remains in theater immediately after neutralizing the Russian force and a second question about how effective Russia's air defenses are under stressful conditions.

How much time does it take to line up your artillery on a city and open fire? In any event, RAND points out that even a successful insurgency would damage NATO's credibility. But it would be cheaper than an counter-offensive.

And here we go again with RAND discussing a possible outcome without talking about how they got to that point.  This presumes that NATO isn't able/willing to counter attack, that the Russian state remains intact and has the will to fight an insurgency.  It also isn't a very impressive conclusion about counter-insurgency operations even if I grant them all that.  Counter insurgencies are not so easily settled in most cases.  And while Russia is fighting this counter insurgency, what is going on with Ukraine and Georgia?  How about the Caucuses?

Then there is the crux of their push for 7 brigades to be inserted into the Baltics.  On the one hand they say Putin only response to shows of force, then it says this:

"President Putin clearly appears to distrust NATO and harbor resentments toward it. His rhetoric suggests that he sees the Alliance’s presence on Russia’s borders as something approaching a clear and present danger to his nation’s security. "

Sooooo... the solution RAND proposes is to make the largest increase NATO's military posture since the 1950s right on Russia's border so that Putin and Russia no longer have any lingering doubts that NATO has an agenda to rob Russia of its greatness?  Anybody see that as being counter productive?  I sure as heck do, especially because there are plenty of "cheap" things that can be done with far less risk and more chance of success than sticking 7 brigades into the Baltics on the extremely low off chance that Putin might possibly be stupid enough to self destruct the Russian state for a bit of Baltic real estate.

The more and more I reread the RAND report and debate it here the more and more I suspect that this report has an agenda behind it.  That's worst case.  Best case is it's not a very well written report which lends itself to aiding the agenda of alarmists who favor expensive and potentially very risky large scale changes in military posture to defend against a highly unlikely scenario.  Either way, this report isn't very reliable to base policy on.

Steve

P.S.  and I still question that their game results are reliable even if the report were written better.

Edited February 4, 2016 by Battlefront.com

[Vanir Ausf B]

Hey Steve, what do you really think of the report?

I am not going to debate the wording of sentences or whatnot. The report has been picked-over and turned inside out enough that everyone has made of it what they will by now. I know I have.

[Vanir Ausf B]

The one week warning period is nowhere near worst case for Nato, IMO. I have an extremely low regard for the current crop of western politicians and their willingness to make hard decisions. (Hey, it's my opinion and it borders on politics: I'm only stating it so that you understand my perspective vis a vis the Rand study.) Letting Nato take action BEFORE an overt invasion is pretty nice for the blue team. Imagine the US moving an ABCT into Latvia the day after a "spontaneous" street demonstration about Russian ethnic rights occurred up in Tallinn? Ain't gonna happen...

I read something today that reminded me of this post. It's from the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, General Petr Pavel.

___

Czech General Petr Pavel, who is scheduled to become chairman in June, warned on May 27th that Moscow would be able to conquer the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania within two days despite the former Soviet republics' NATO membership, according to the Czech news site CTK.

This is largely due to the complexity of the NATO decision-making process, along with the small geographic area of the Baltics. Russia could take advantage of NATO's relatively slow-moving command structure to blitz across the three countries in a matter of hours.

"On the one hand, one of [NATO's] disadvantages is its complex process of decision making. It is because NATO has 28 members who have to reach consensus on all conclusions," Pavel told CTK. 

"From the technical point of view, if I consider how many forces Russia is able to deploy in the Baltics, the size of the Baltic countries, and the density of forces on their territories, the Baltics could really be occupied in a couple of days." 

According to Pavel, the key military and political processes of NATO are not synchronized to allow for a split-second response. Whereas NATO's rapid-reaction force could be mobilized and deployed within two days, the political consensus needed to make that decision could take substantially longer to reach.

And until there is a consensus that the Russian advance has triggered the NATO alliance's mutual defense obligations, NATO military forces would have to remain on the sidelines.

http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-can-occupy-baltics-in-2-days-2015-5

 

Edited February 4, 2016 by Vanir Ausf B

[Battlefront.com]

Hey Steve, what do you really think of the report?

I am not going to debate the wording of sentences or whatnot. The report has been picked-over and turned inside out enough that everyone has made of it what they will by now. I know I have.

The funny thing is I didn't have such big problems with the report itself at first, just my concerns about the simulation aspect.  But now that I've read it a half dozen times I'm thinking "cripes, didn't these guys ever have to write a thesis paper in college?!?".  This thing does not conform to standard conventions for sure.  Given that RAND does this stuff day in and out, has a review process, and is generally a well vetted research company... one does have to wonder why this report is in its current form.  For sure you can see that it's pretty thin on specifics and vague where it should be clearer, don't you?

I read something today that reminded me of this post. It's from the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, General Petr Pavel.

___

Czech General Petr Pavel, who is scheduled to become chairman in June, warned on May 27th that Moscow would be able to conquer the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania within two days despite the former Soviet republics' NATO membership, according to the Czech news site CTK.

This is largely due to the complexity of the NATO decision-making process, along with the small geographic area of the Baltics. Russia could take advantage of NATO's relatively slow-moving command structure to blitz across the three countries in a matter of hours.

"On the one hand, one of [NATO's] disadvantages is its complex process of decision making. It is because NATO has 28 members who have to reach consensus on all conclusions," Pavel told CTK. 

"From the technical point of view, if I consider how many forces Russia is able to deploy in the Baltics, the size of the Baltic countries, and the density of forces on their territories, the Baltics could really be occupied in a couple of days." 

According to Pavel, the key military and political processes of NATO are not synchronized to allow for a split-second response. Whereas NATO's rapid-reaction force could be mobilized and deployed within two days, the political consensus needed to make that decision could take substantially longer to reach.

And until there is a consensus that the Russian advance has triggered the NATO alliance's mutual defense obligations, NATO military forces would have to remain on the sidelines.

http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-can-occupy-baltics-in-2-days-2015-5

 

This is why it is soooooooooooo very important to have trigger forces in place.  NATO's major shortcomings are getting balls rolling in peacetime because people have time to squabble without seemingly having a negative impact.  Russia moving over the border into a NATO country with military force would probably fit in the same category if it were not for the trigger forces.  That gets NATO a military response within a few minutes because the forces being attacked do not have to get authorization to fire back in this sort of scenario.  And that, in turn, puts things on a very different track.

Let's also keep in mind that nobody, and I mean nobody, knows what would happen in this scenario because NATO has NEVER been attacked on its home soil by an organized military force.  Therefore, no precedent to go by.  Concerns?  You bet, but all we can do is speculate.

The bigger question was about Green Men and how they fall into the Article 5 definition.  That was, until clarified, a big unknown.  Now it is known and it is correctly approved of being grounds for an Article 5 invocation.

Steve

[Vanir Ausf B]

For sure you can see that it's pretty thin on specifics and vague where it should be clearer, don't you?

I have already stated my wishes with regards to details. As a  wargamer of course I want to see AARs with stats and maps. Clearly the report was written for policy makers, not wargamers. I have also questioned whether their ultimate recommendations are really necessary given the low likelihood of a Russian invasion, and I doubt they will be implemented to nearly the degree they want. The other issues you have raised are trivial, at least to me. I presented the report as a counter-point to the narrative seen early in this thread that a NATO-Russian war would be a cakewalk on par with the Gulf Wars. It has served it's purpose to that end and I have no desire to turn the thread into a discussion on proper report writing 

[Lethaface]

Imo Steve has argumented the fallacies of the RAND report very well. Given enough preparations are made NATO could very well thwart any invasion of the Baltics without seven brigades permanently there. I think that political influence on the actual text made public is pretty much a given in the present days of worldwide affairs. Living in Europe I have personally never lost sleep about a war with Russia (born in 82 ), this report changes nothing for that matter. Seven US/NATO brigades in The Baltics have more chance of disturbing my sleep than their current absence has. OTH I do wonder if your worst case is really worst case, as I have personally not absorbed conclusive evidence to deny Russia enough operational or even strategic surprise (even if NATO's decision making wouldn't be hampered like Pavel states) to overrun the Baltics the moment NATO starts realizing about it. Why can't Russia creep a small but very capable mobile force into place before any 'hybrid hints' are given? Unlikely indeed, but impossible?
In the end I expect that if Putin does somehow goes for and actually manages to occupy the Baltics in any way shape or form, the 'forces of Democracy' will wake up and deal with Russia. Worst case being a second cold war that would only last a couple of years before Russia collapses again. I would lose sleep over a serious collapse in Russia, if only because of their Nuclear arsenal. I'd rather have Putin on the button then some criminal selling them off to the highest bidder. The great thing is that Putin is, like the majority of mankind, mainly interested in himself. His apparatus is more than able to realize that he has capitalized about as much as he can from the Western political weakness. He has already overplayed his hand, imo. Putin can't appear weak so he won't back down easily, but I don't see him throwing fuel on the fire that is mainly burning himself.

Now for the important stuff: am I the only one that thinks a CMBS Baltics module/pack would be a great way to game out the various scenario's that have came up? Steve and Vanir could do the beta AAR :-)

[sburke]

 

Now for the important stuff: am I the only one that thinks a CMBS Baltics module/pack would be a great way to game out the various scenario's that have came up? Steve and Vanir could do the beta AAR :-)

excellent idea!!

On a side note for those who aren't believers in pure coincidence.  The day the Rand report was released was the same day Ash announced the increase in US commitment.

[Krater]

Is there another game that could be used to give us operational view?  The only one I can think of is TOAW, but it's pretty long in the tooth and the editor is pretty horrid.

[Battlefront.com]

I have already stated my wishes with regards to details. As a  wargamer of course I want to see AARs with stats and maps.

That isn't the sort of missing details I am critical of.  I'm talking about things that would not score this an D+ if it were handed in as a thesis.  It is simply too vague and ambigious to know what to make of it.  Except, of course, the recommendation for 7 brigades.  It's like a report detailing how cold it is outside and recommending extreme arctic clothing only to find out that the temperature is only 32deg F (0c).  Where I live that's almost T-shirt weather

When I re-read a report I usually find answers to questions I had because I missed a detail, nuance, or some other tidbit.  This report?  Each time I re-read it I find more things it doesn't provide answers to.

Clearly the report was written for policy makers, not wargamers.

Obviously.  That doesn't change the fact it is a highly flawed document that makes a very strong, and quite radical, proposal without providing enough context to judge if it is a sound conclusion.  It certainly isn't the only possible solution, which I have repeatedly pointed out.

I have also questioned whether their ultimate recommendations are really necessary given the low likelihood of a Russian invasion, and I doubt they will be implemented to nearly the degree they want.

Not relevant.  If it was important to fund and conduct the study it should be done right or not done at all.

The other issues you have raised are trivial, at least to me.

I think I laid out sufficient doubt that their 7 brigade conclusion, which is important since the report is intended to influence policy decision making.

I presented the report as a counter-point to the narrative seen early in this thread that a NATO-Russian war would be a cakewalk on par with the Gulf Wars. It has served it's purpose to that end and I have no desire to turn the thread into a discussion on proper report writing 

You chose a single, flawed report to make a point.  Fair game to dig into the relevance of what is in the report instead of accepting it as fact.

In any case, I don't think anybody has argued defeating Russia would be a cakewalk.  I've simply been arguing that the ultimate end result would be a NATO victory, free and independent Baltic states, and a collapsed Russia.  I see nothing in this report to give me reason to change my tune.

In the end, what I am most curious about with these games is what is left of the Russian force after 60 days even under their favorable Red conditions.  That would be something interesting to see and it SHOULD be in the report in some fashion.  Notice it is not.

Steve

[Vanir Ausf B]

In the end, what I am most curious about with these games is what is left of the Russian force after 60 days even under their favorable Red conditions.  That would be something interesting to see and it SHOULD be in the report in some fashion.  Notice it is not.

Hours. Not days.

You chose a single, flawed report to make a point.  Fair game to dig into the relevance of what is in the report instead of accepting it as fact.

Yes I chose a single flawed report to make a point, in response to which you made a multitude of flawed counter-arguments  If perfection is where the bar is set we all fail.

I think I laid out sufficient doubt that their 7 brigade conclusion, which is important since the report is intended to influence policy decision making.

I will try to explain this a clearly as I can.

NATO is a military alliance, so any recommendation to NATO on how to solve a problem or perceived problem is inevitability going to focus on military solutions because that's what NATO does. The report basically has two components: a premise and a recommendation based on that premise The premise is that given a 1 week of "THIS IS REALLY HAPPENING" notice and the assets available at the time, NATO could not prevent a Russian invasion from occupying the Baltic states. Note there was no attempt to ascertain the likelihood of an invasion, only to measure the military balance of power. Based on that premise the recommendation was made to place 6 or 7 brigades in the Baltic states to ensure a Russian invasion would fail to occupy the Baltics. A military solution to a military problem.

You can question the proposed solution all you want. I have questioned the need for it myself and am not wedded to it in any way. The same is not true for the premise. I think the results of RAND's wargames accurately reflect the reality of NATO's ability to prevent an initial Russian military takeover of the Baltics in the event of war. You seem to have moved away from questioning that in your last few posts to focus on attacking aspects of the report that do not represent my position. I consider the initial Baltics takeover question settled and therefore feel my interest waning

Edited February 5, 2016 by Vanir Ausf B

[John Kettler]

Steve,

It seems to me that in critiquing, dissecting and apparently rejecting the RAND report under discussion you have uncovered some very important issues which have significant defense and geostrategic/geopolitical implications. May I therefore suggest you drop highly experienced defense journalist Tyler Rogoway of Foxtrot Alpha a note requesting he look into this matter? He has a very good head on his shoulders, evidently has good contacts, writes incisively and isn't afraid to buck the party line, as seen in what he's written in ringing defense of the A-10--flatly in opposition to the Air force brass. I believe what you've uncovered deserves airing in a forum with lots more eyes on it than our little corner here.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Vanir Ausf B]

On a side note for those who aren't believers in pure coincidence.  The day the Rand report was released was the same day Ash announced the increase in US commitment.

The conspiracy is vast.

[sburke]

The conspiracy is vast.

LOL the military industrial complex lives on!!

[Vanir Ausf B]

[Lethaface]

What is so shocking about a publicly made study being redacted for (political) motives? In 'my world' it happens all the time. Thinking that ThinkTanks like RAND are fully free of influence from those that fund them is imo, a little naive.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Character assassination via inuendo. That is what this thread has degenerationed to.

Edited February 5, 2016 by Vanir Ausf B

[Sublime]

Id be interested what the ramifications of a collapsed Russia would mean inside Russia and the rest of the world. Like wat do people see happening there?

[sburke]

Character assassination via inuendo. That is what this thread has degenerationed to.

nah, just a healthy bit of skepticism.  If a study seems to be pretty incomplete with major underpinnings not clarified and that study is promoting major policy changes that seem to go hand in hand with a simultaneous announcement from said gov't, you'd be silly NOT to question it.  I just went through a problem solving workshop last year (I work for a consulting company, but fortunately for my soul I work in IT).  That study would have been laughed out of just my workshop for how incomplete it was.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Assuming for a moment all that is true, this is a massive scandal, reaching into the highest levels of government. Someone in this thread is going to be famous if he contacts the right people. 

Edited February 5, 2016 by Vanir Ausf B

[sburke]

Assuming for a moment all that is true, this is a massive scandal, reaching into the highest levels of government. Someone in this thread is going to be famous if he contacts the right people. 

LOL after all the stuff our gov't has done, this is chump change silliness.  Hell we went to the UN with doctored info and left our Secretary of State hanging out to dry to back a policy that had just been discredited.  Call me cynical, but that this paper may have been part of an agenda wouldn't bother me at all.  I just read it, disagree with it's conclusions and move on.

[Vanir Ausf B]

I just read it, disagree with it's conclusions and move on.

Out of curiosity, which conclusions? All of them?