Russian army under equipped?

[Ivanov]

Because their report seems to view the only way to deter a Russian invasion is having 7 brigades stationed in the Baltics.  A move, which was pointed out above, is perhaps sufficient enough to precipitate a war because Russia would be forced to deal with this massive buildup of forces in some way and the only meaningful way it has at its disposal is military.

 

Let's not forget this was a wargame of a limited scope, that was focusing on a very narrow military scenario. As such, the study is I think interesting from the point of view of the military buffs and the internet armchair generals. It wasn't dealing with the political and economical considerations. Due to that RAND came up with a purely military solution - namely the 7 brigades, that would need to be stationed in the Baltics. It was a pure arithmetic: if we think that Russians could attack with X number of battalions, we would need Y number of battalions to counter them. I think that the wargame quite reasonably demonstrates that as it stands now, in purely military terms, NATO would be unable to defend the Baltics against the blitzkrieg type of aggression. However it absolutely doesn't mean that such a scenario is probable in any foreseeable future. In my opinion it's very unlikely due to  other than military factors. 

In purely military terms in order to create a credible deterrence, NATO should seriously think of reforming it's Response Force and the Warsaw summit is going to focus on it. The mythical 40000 strong Response Force doesn't exist even in form of any permanent headquarters. It's also worth remembering, that it was formed during the times when a serious conventional confrontation with Russia was considered unlikely.  Since the deployment of substantial number of ground units to the Baltics is not an option from the political reasons and due to risk of escalation, the Response Force should be reformed. It should poses more ready units subordinated to it and it should be able to deploy substantial force much quicker than it is right now.

Edited February 1, 2016 by Ivanov

[Krater]

Speaking of "Russian army under equipped" - "Russian armed forces are currently equipped with modern equipment and vehicles at 47%.  This coefficient is equal to 52% in the air force, 39% navy, 35% land forces and 41% airborne.  Nuclear forces are updated at 55%."

http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/2612717

 

МОСКВА, 26 января. /ТАСС/. Вооруженные силы РФ на данный момент оснащены современным вооружением и военной техникой на 47%. При этом данный показатель в ВКС составляет 52%, в ВМФ - 39%, в Сухопутных войсках - 35%, а в ВДВ - до 41%. В то же время "ядерная триада" оснащена современным оружием на 55%. Об этом сообщил 11 декабря 2015 года министр обороны Сергей Шойгу

Edited February 1, 2016 by Krater

[Battlefront.com]

It is sort of the business of wargames in the military sense to make it so the following on planning is as bulletproof as possible.  In terms of making a realistic outcome, they're doubtful.  Frankly anyone who's survived a major Brigade+ level exercise, or an NTC rotation will tell you horror stories about how badly they're defeated.  But in that regard the intention is to build a capability so far beyond what the enemy can overcome, that it either prevents a conflict entirely (as we've now reactivated 2 AD and it's comprised of 3 ABCTs and an SBCT stationed outside Warsaw, and the Polish military has reoriented nearly entirely to the East or something)  or ensures that when the war goes off and we hit some major friction, that we are prepared to survive and overcome it (the attack comes during the 4th of July so most of 2 AD is still sobering up and moving slow from being stuffed with BBQ) without even getting close to a margin of error.

Yup, and as I mentioned earlier that is a GOOD thing to do within the military sphere.  When creating CMSF I did quite a bit of reading about NTC and talking with guys who went through there once or more than once.  It was pretty clear the intention was to challenge units to rise to greatness and humiliate those which thought too highly of themselves.  Oh sorry, "humble"   When used in that context I have no objection.

The problem with a wargame like this is it's intended to influence national level policy.  IMHO that's a bit above the pay grade of this sort of exercise.  Useful, indeed, but incomplete.  I don't expect the Pentagon to think outside of their armored box, but Rand?  At the very least I think they should have put in more caveats about the usefulness of this study absent other information.

It makes for bad wargames though, and I for one, used CMSF with my subordinates on a few occasions as it is a better rendition of what small (platoon through battalion) units can accomplish on the battlefield.

You know that makes me smile, right? :)

Let's not forget this was a wargame of a limited scope, that was focusing on a very narrow military scenario. As such, the study is I think interesting from the point of view of the military buffs and the internet armchair generals. It wasn't dealing with the political and economical considerations. Due to that RAND came up with a purely military solution - namely the 7 brigades, that would need to be stationed in the Baltics. It was a pure arithmetic: if we think that Russians could attack with X number of battalions, we would need Y number of battalions to counter them. I think that the wargame quite reasonably demonstrates that as it stands now, in purely military terms, NATO would be unable to defend the Baltics against the blitzkrieg type of aggression. However it absolutely doesn't mean that such a scenario is probable in any foreseeable future. In my opinion it's very unlikely due to  other than military factors. 

Yup, but the report did touch on the areas of deterrence and remedies post conflict.  Therefore, it is appropriate for it to be criticized for selective information.  All Rand had to say was something like:

"This report presumes worst case for Blue, best case for Red in a purely military scenario where all forms of non-military and military deterrence have failed.  There are a range of factors which could dramatically alter the outcome of this study, all the way from effective deterrence through better than expected outcomes for NATO forces.  Even if the presumption of defeat for NATO in the Baltics is more-or-less sound, there are a range of options which exist to remedy the situation after the fact."

This is the sort of thing I found lacking in the report.

In purely military terms in order to create a credible deterrence, NATO should seriously think of reforming it's Response Force and the Warsaw summit is going to focus on it. The mythical 40000 strong Response Force doesn't exist even in form of any permanent headquarters. It's also worth remembering, that it was formed during the times when a serious conventional confrontation with Russia was considered unlikely.  Since the deployment of substantial number of ground units to the Baltics is not an option from the political reasons and due to risk of escalation, the Response Force should be reformed. It should poses more ready units subordinated to it and it should be able to deploy substantial force much quicker than it is right now.

The force is in the process of being expanded, for sure.  But the NRF has been around in its smaller 15,000 form for many years.  What NATO needs to do is figure it has to be positioned in Poland as there's no incentive of having it positioned anywhere else.  It's a good time to move things east as the primary reason for not doing so before was concerns over Russia getting upset.  That is certainly less of a concern today than it was 2 years ago.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Speaking of "Russian army under equipped" - "Russian armed forces are currently equipped with modern equipment and vehicles at 47%.  This coefficient is equal to 52% in the air force, 39% navy, 35% land forces and 41% airborne.  Nuclear forces are updated at 55%."

http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/2612717

 

МОСКВА, 26 января. /ТАСС/. Вооруженные силы РФ на данный момент оснащены современным вооружением и военной техникой на 47%. При этом данный показатель в ВКС составляет 52%, в ВМФ - 39%, в Сухопутных войсках - 35%, а в ВДВ - до 41%. В то же время "ядерная триада" оснащена современным оружием на 55%. Об этом сообщил 11 декабря 2015 года министр обороны Сергей Шойгу

Any statement from any military about their capabilities must be taken with a pinch of salt.  But even if we take the Russian government numbers at face value, their land forces are still a long ways away from the sort of operational readiness necessary to engage in an open war with NATO and hope to survive it. 

Also, I think the Russian definition of "modern equipment" would be interesting to see in detail.  I think by Western standards quite a bit of it would considered "outdated".  Just not nearly as outdated as what the rest of the military has for equipment.

Steve

Edited February 1, 2016 by Battlefront.com

[BTR]

Back in 2011, ex deputy defense minister Popovkin claimed that NATO has an equivalent modern equipment ratio at 30-50% which would indicate that stored equipment in any and all conditions are also taken into account. I've never seen a detailed definition of what "modern is" though. 

[Vanir Ausf B]

Here's where I start to get suspicious of the study's objectivity.  They did not take these forces into consideration (directly) along with others, then when they are presented as fact they are dismissed as irrelevant militarily and politically. 

They actually did, although I missed it in my first reading. As Krater noted in his post, they gamed NATO forces at varying levels of preparedness, and in at least one of these scenarios NATO had an entire ABCT, which would (I believe) represent all US prepositioned equipment in Europe.

3.  Green Men are now officially material for an Article 5 declaration.  Which means that not only is it possible that Russia's weeks and months of efforts to create a Green Man scenario are uncertain to produce a desired level of utility, the mere insertion of Green Men could trigger Article 5 and a theoretical war with NATO before the first Russian soldier openly crossed the border.  Again, Rand does not take this into consideration at all.

I don't see how this is true. Rand assumed 1 week warning. That could have represented when the Green Men are sent in. Aside form that we should remember just because Russia used Green Men in Crimea does not obligate them to do so anywhere else or withing any particular time frame.

RE: Economics. I really don't care That was clearly outside the scope of the exercise and I have no problem with that.

[Krater]

As many as two heavy brigades.

"The lack of air defenses in U.S. maneuver forces showed up in another game, in which two arriving NATO heavy brigades were organized into a counterattack aimed at the flank of a Russian thrust toward Riga. Because the Russian Air Force is sufficiently powerful to resist NATO’s quest for air superiority for multiple days, the Red team was able to create “bubbles” in space and time to launch massed waves of air attacks against this NATO force. The absence of short-range air defenses in the
U.S. units, and the minimal defenses in the other NATO units, meant that many of these attacks encountered resistance only from NATO combat air patrols, which were overwhelmed by sheer numbers. The result was heavy losses to several Blue battalions and the disruption of the counterattack.

17 This again was a scenario in which NATO’s posture was assumed to be improved beyond its current state."

[Battlefront.com]

They actually did, although I missed it in my first reading. As Krater noted in his post, they gamed NATO forces at varying levels of preparedness, and in at least one of these scenarios NATO had an entire ABCT, which would (I believe) represent all US prepositioned equipment in Europe.

My criticism still stands that they did not include the propositioned units as their primary test, they did not include *any* non US/UK forces moved into theater, and they didn't look ahead to guess at what future forces might be available within the near term.  As I have been saying all along, they presumed the absolute worst conditions for Blue and apparently (as far as I can tell) best conditions for Russia.

I don't see how this is true. Rand assumed 1 week warning. That could have represented when the Green Men are sent in.

For sure Green Men could appear on Day 1 and that gives NATO +6 days to respond.  However, that's not the way I think it would go.  Russia rushed the Green Man scenario in Crimea because circumstances dictated they had to.  They took a lot longer to introduce Green Men into Donbas because they first primed the pump with rent-a-cowds to engage in demonstrations and to beat up pro-unity groups.  That's more in keeping with their usual script and I'd expect the same to apply to the Baltics.  The detection would, therefore, be significantly greater than 1 week in total.

Aside form that we should remember just because Russia used Green Men in Crimea does not obligate them to do so anywhere else or withing any particular time frame.

Sure it's possible, but Russia has yet to conduct any military action against a neighbor without artificial pretenses being cultivated ahead of time.

RE: Economics. I really don't care That was clearly outside the scope of the exercise and I have no problem with that.

Then they should NOT have strayed into that territory, especially with their conclusions.  For example:

It is unclear whether denial of the prospect for a rapid vic-

tory would suffice to deter Russia from gambling on an attack

on the “Baltic three,” were it inclined to contemplate one. What

seems certain is that NATO’s current posture, which appears to

offer Moscow the opportunity for a quick and relatively cheap

win, does not.

You see what is being said here?  That military posture is the most important, if not the only important, think from keeping Russia from invading.  And then they build their recommendations from this premise.  A premise that is demonstrably inaccurate, or at the very least incomplete.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

As many as two heavy brigades.

"The lack of air defenses in U.S. maneuver forces showed up in another game, in which two arriving NATO heavy brigades were organized into a counterattack aimed at the flank of a Russian thrust toward Riga. Because the Russian Air Force is sufficiently powerful to resist NATO’s quest for air superiority for multiple days, the Red team was able to create “bubbles” in space and time to launch massed waves of air attacks against this NATO force. The absence of short-range air defenses in the
U.S. units, and the minimal defenses in the other NATO units, meant that many of these attacks encountered resistance only from NATO combat air patrols, which were overwhelmed by sheer numbers. The result was heavy losses to several Blue battalions and the disruption of the counterattack.

17 This again was a scenario in which NATO’s posture was assumed to be improved beyond its current state."

Again, this sort of thing was relegated to almost a footnote except to emphasize a weakness of NATO's current force projection and even to some extent structure.  The ground portion was not detailed (what was the ultimate impact of the counter attack?) and generally not taken into much consideration when coming to various conclusions.  Put another way, they used the worst case (no counter attack) to grab the headlines and then mention this sort of more realistic scenario at the end after the reader has already been directed towards a particular way of thinking.

As for the air component, did they game things out where the Russian airforce's ability to effectively interdict ground forces turns out to be underwhelming?  Some experts think that's exactly what the case would be based on various studies and observations in Syria.  Which begs the question... what would happen to the Russian invasion if two brigades crashed into it in good combat condition?

Again... I have no problem with this Rand study as a "worst case" scenario, even if it is a bit unrealistically weighted in that direction, to highlight and learn from perceived shortcomings.  I do have a problem with a "worst case" scenario being used as a stand-in for "most likely case".

Steve

Edited February 1, 2016 by Battlefront.com

[Vanir Ausf B]

  I do have a problem with a "worst case" scenario being used as a stand-in for "most likely case".

Three points. 1) Worst case isn't the same as unrealistic. 2) It really is not a worst case for Blue/best case for Red scenario. Worse case for Blue is Russian invasion with no warning. Russia was assumed to have kept the forces they have in and near Ukraine in place, and in fact the Russian invasion force was much smaller than your own maximum size estimation.   3) To some degree upper limits must be placed on how much time NATO has to prepare in order for the scenario to have any relevance, i.e. if NATO has months to prepare the most likely scenario is that there is no invasion.

Edited February 1, 2016 by Vanir Ausf B

[Vanir Ausf B]

 

My criticism still stands that they did not include the propositioned units as their primary test, they did not include *any* non US/UK forces moved into theater, and they didn't look ahead to guess at what future forces might be available within the near term.  As I have been saying all along, they presumed the absolute worst conditions for Blue and apparently (as far as I can tell) best conditions for Russia.

As far as I can tell there was no "primary test" per se.

It's not clear exactly what other forces should have been included. I have not found a detailed description of the Very High Readiness brigade, only that it numbers about 5000. Given it's tasking I suspect it is a light brigade and that along with its size would have not affected the outcome to a significant degree.

You see what is being said here?  That military posture is the most important, if not the only important, think from keeping Russia from invading.  And then they build their recommendations from this premise.  A premise that is demonstrably inaccurate, or at the very least incomplete.

It has been understood from the beginning of this discussion that a Russian invasion of the Baltics is very unlikely for a multitude of reasons. From that perspective it is valid to question the necessity of their policy recommendations.

Edited February 1, 2016 by Vanir Ausf B

[Lethaface]

As far as I can tell there was no "primary test" per se.

It's not clear exactly what other forces should have been included. I have not found a detailed description of the Very High Readiness brigade, only that it numbers about 5000. Given it's tasking I suspect it is a light brigade and that along with its size would have not affected the outcome to a significant degree.

It has been understood from the beginning of this discussion that a Russian invasion of the Baltics is very unlikely for a multitude of reasons. From that perspective it is valid to question the necessity of their policy recommendations.

 

The Very High Readiness Joint TAsk Force (VJTF) concept is currently being developed. Last year it was 'interim-ed' by Germany, Netherlands and Norway and this year Spain is 'the framework' nation. The concept:

"The VJTF comprises a multinational brigade (approximately 5,000 troops), with up to five manoeuvre battalions, supported by air, maritime and special forces.  Once fully operational, the VJTF will be supplemented by two additional brigades, as a rapid-reinforcement capability, in case of a major crisis.  If activated, the force will be available to move immediately, following the first warnings and indicators of potential threats, before a crisis begins, to act as a potential deterrent to further escalation.  The rapid arrival of this small but capable military unit would send a very clear message to any potential aggressor: “any attempt to violate the sovereignty of one NATO nation will result in a decisive military engagement with all 28 allied nations”".

Link:

http://1gnc.org/the-nato-response-force/

Afaik Germany, Netherlands and Norway did actually have forces on high readiness, if only because I saw a report of a test rapid deployment on the news in which interviewed troops mentioned their being on high alert (deployment in 72hours) and how it affected their daily lives. Not sure how much of the 'concept' is currently practice.

Edited February 1, 2016 by Lethaface

[Krater]

As far as I can tell there was no "primary test" per se.

It's not clear exactly what other forces should have been included. I have not found a detailed description of the Very High Readiness brigade, only that it numbers about 5000. Given it's tasking I suspect it is a light brigade and that along with its size would have not affected the outcome to a significant degree.

It has been understood from the beginning of this discussion that a Russian invasion of the Baltics is very unlikely for a multitude of reasons. From that perspective it is valid to question the necessity of their policy recommendations.

Most will probably be light units, but some appear to "heavier".   "Noble Jump" was supposed to be a rehearsal of VJTF's functionality.

"MONS, Belgium – NATO’s new high readiness ‘spearhead’ force is being deployed for the first time, as Exercise NOBLE JUMP gets underway in Zagan, Poland. Units assigned to the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) were given orders to deploy on Tuesday afternoon (9 June 2015), and will exercise until 19 June. Over 2,100 troops from nine NATO nations are participating in the exercise, which continues the process of testing and refining the force.

 

Among the units rapidly deploying to the manoeuvres in Western Poland are Czech and Dutch air mobile troops, German and Norwegian mechanized infantry, Polish and Lithuanian special forces, Belgian artillery, U.S. helicopters and a Hungarian civil military cooperation unit."

Specific units I saw listed were:
11th infantry bn (air assault) / 11th Air Mobile Brigade - Netherlands

43rd airborne battalion / 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade - Czech Republic

371st Mechanized Infantry Brigade / 13th Panzergrenadier Division  - Germany

Telemark Battalion - Norway

 

 

 

[Ivanov]

I have not found a detailed description of the Very High Readiness brigade, only that it numbers about 5000. Given it's tasking I suspect it is a light brigade and that along with its size would have not affected the outcome to a significant degree.

Currently it's three battalions: German and Norwegian mechanized and a Polish tank battalion plus light elements from other countries like Netherlands, Czech Republic and Lithuania plus a component of special forces. For the moment this is so called temporary VJTF. The German 371 battalion rides on Marders, the Telemark battalion on CV-90's and the Polish battalion on Leopards 2. The "spearhead" already deployed to Poland last year for the exercises Noble Jump. Below some great photos from the exercise:

https://www.flickr.com/photos/shapenato/albums/72157651783164536/page2

Admittedly creation of VJTF is a progress but it's still too little and it would not be sufficient to protect the Baltics.

 

 

 

 

Edited February 2, 2016 by Ivanov

[Vanir Ausf B]

RE: VJTF. Thanks, guys. That helps. I wonder how fast the heavy elements could deploy? That may be hard to determine if the unit is still in the formative stage. 

As for the air component, did they game things out where the Russian airforce's ability to effectively interdict ground forces turns out to be underwhelming?  Some experts think that's exactly what the case would be based on various studies and observations in Syria.  Which begs the question... what would happen to the Russian invasion if two brigades crashed into it in good combat condition?

It's worth noting that in their comments on the reasons for the observed results there no mention of interdiction of ground forces by the Russian air force. That's not to suggest it never happened, only that it appears to not have been a major factor. The implied role of the Russian air force was to distract the NATO air forces from interdicting Russian ground units.

[Lethaface]

Currently it's three battalions: German and Norwegian mechanized and a Polish tank battalion plus light elements from other countries like Netherlands, Czech Republic and Lithuania plus a component of special forces. For the moment this is so called temporary VJTF. The German 371 battalion rides on Marders, the Telemark battalion on CV-90's and the Polish battalion on Leopards 2. The "spearhead" already deployed to Poland last year for the exercises Noble Jump. Below some great photos from the exercise:

https://www.flickr.com/photos/shapenato/albums/72157651783164536/page2

Admittedly creation of VJTF is a progress but it's still too little and it would not be sufficient to protect the Baltics.

Is the Polish tank battalion actually part of the VJTF or did it join the exercise because it was in Poland? From a video posted by the dutch mod I understood the latter. The VJTF in 2015 was formed by Germany, Norway and Netherlands and Spain will mainly take it over in 2016. At least that's what is said on the website of the '1GNC' 1 German/Netherlands Corps. 

[Krater]

My impression was that Spain's contribution was mainly organization, in that VJTF will be using NATO Rapid Deployable Corps HQ- Spain (NRDC-SP) in 2016.  But I could be wrong.

[Lethaface]

I'm not into the specifics but thought the info on the 1GNC website is interesting:

"[....]Assets Assigned to NRF 2016
Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFC Brunssum) is the lead headquarters for the NRF during 2016; it will be supported by the following command and control elements:

• Land – Spanish NATO Rapid Deployable Corps (NRDC);
• Maritime – United Kingdom Maritime Force (UKMARFOR);
• Air –  Italian Joint Force Air Component Command (JFAC);
• Special Operations – United States Special Operations Command Europe;
• Logistics – Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG) from JFC Brunssum;
• Multinational Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) Battalion led by Poland.

Combat Forces. Air, land, maritime, special forces, and logistics troops from across the Alliance have been placed on a high level of readiness and are available to support NRF 2016 if required.  For reasons of operational security, details of the exact composition, locations and readiness of these forces are not publicly releasable. Twenty-five Allies will contribute military forces to NRF 2016.

The VJTF framework nation for 2016 is Spain.

Current development of the VJTF concept: Exercises 2015-2016
Work on developing and testing the VJTF concept commenced in 2015, with the Land Component of the ‘traditional’ NRF 2015 acting as an Interim VJTF; this is the basis for VJTF concept development.

The Interim VJTF in 2015 was led by Germany, the Netherlands and Norway, supported by other participating Allies, and was tested through a series of exercises, trials, and evaluations aimed at developing, refining and implementing the concept[....]"

[Wicky]

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50088.htm

UK's 16 Air Assault Brigade I'm sure is involved.

And Turkey wants to play a part > http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/08/nato-ready-to-deploy-forces-to-defend-turkey-against-any-threats

[Ivanov]

Is the Polish tank battalion actually part of the VJTF or did it join the exercise because it was in Poland? From a video posted by the dutch mod I understood the latter. The VJTF in 2015 was formed by Germany, Norway and Netherlands and Spain will mainly take it over in 2016. At least that's what is said on the website of the '1GNC' 1 German/Netherlands Corps. 

I read an early info that the battalion would form a part of VJTF but possibly they later changed the idea. Polish Leopards took part in Noble Jump but maybe they were acting as the Red Force. I'm not sure about that.

[Battlefront.com]

Three points. 1) Worst case isn't the same as unrealistic. 2) It really is not a worst case for Blue/best case for Red scenario. Worse case for Blue is Russian invasion with no warning. Russia was assumed to have kept the forces they have in and near Ukraine in place, and in fact the Russian invasion force was much smaller than your own maximum size estimation.   3) To some degree upper limits must be placed on how much time NATO has to prepare in order for the scenario to have any relevance, i.e. if NATO has months to prepare the most likely scenario is that there is no invasion.

You're taking my term "worst case" out of context.  "Worst case" in my usage is that the least favorable, but somewhat plausible, scenario.  I think NATO not having a week's notice is about as plausible as all the NATO trigger forces leaving the Baltics and saying "you're on your own, best of luck to you" when the first shot is fired.  So let's not get distracted by splitting hairs and focus on the criticism within context.  Which is...

 

 As far as I can tell there was no "primary test" per se.

Sure they did.  They set up a scenario where there are x conditions specified for Blue (aka "worst case") and y conditions set for Red.  They then gamed out those conditions and the results were horrible for Blue.  So they then relaxed some of the Blue's conditions (aka "better case") and apparently did not change Red's.  They gamed that out and the results were still bad for Blue.  It appears they gamed out at least one more scenario where they added even more forces for Blue (aka "best case") and again did not change anything for Red as best I can tell.  Why is it the "best I can tell"?  Because they spent all their time describing the "worst case" scenario and giving the alternate scenarios almost no space in the report.

It's pretty obvious that they wrote the report largely referencing only the "worst case" conditions and outcomes with very little added about how "better case" and "best case" changed the equation.  And the "worst case" is deficient in many ways as I have detailed several times now.  Even "best case" seems to have significant shortcomings.  Certainly the conclusions are not based on a range of possible conditions for Red, which is the same as them saying "we know pretty much with certainty what they would have and how it would fight".  Which isn't a very defensible position to take.

 

It's not clear exactly what other forces should have been included. I have not found a detailed description of the Very High Readiness brigade, only that it numbers about 5000. Given it's tasking I suspect it is a light brigade and that along with its size would have not affected the outcome to a significant degree.

 The problem is they have omitted or under accounted for several factors.  Each one might not be huge, but when added together they might be able to screw things up for the Russians enough to allow something else to come into play that is more decisive.  The NRF VJTF, Javelins a plenty, and prepositioned forces are just the most obvious ones.  I bet if I knew a lot more about NATO capabilities I could come up with more.

It has been understood from the beginning of this discussion that a Russian invasion of the Baltics is very unlikely for a multitude of reasons. From that perspective it is valid to question the necessity of their policy recommendations.

A test can be valid and the conclusions invalid or at least on shakey ground.  That's what I've been arguing since the start.  If Rand wants to use this as some sort of baseline "worst case" scenario, fine.  But don't then conclude that the only way to avoid catastrophe is to have 7 brigades predeployed or be ready to get into a nuke pissing contest because there's nothing else that can be done to save the day.  That's overreach.

RE: VJTF. Thanks, guys. That helps. I wonder how fast the heavy elements could deploy? That may be hard to determine if the unit is still in the formative stage. 

The NATO link that I provided above has some of the information you are looking for.  VJTF is a sub portion of the existing NRF.  The concept is that if they decide to go hot the VJTF goes in within 72 hours to get things set up for the arrival of the heavy stuff, which will follow within a month.  Various sub components would no doubt be fed in earlier, so that 30 day window is for total deployment.  I do not know how long the first heavy element could get going or when artillery could show up.

With this information on hand, in Rand's scenario the VJTF would be there for sure because it is within the 6 day alert window.  SOME of the other NRF forces would be put into play as well, but no idea which ones or how much.  Therefore, these forces should have been included in Rand's "worst case" scenario or at the very least one of their alternate scenarios.

It's worth noting that in their comments on the reasons for the observed results there no mention of interdiction of ground forces by the Russian air force. That's not to suggest it never happened, only that it appears to not have been a major factor. The implied role of the Russian air force was to distract the NATO air forces from interdicting Russian ground units.

Actually, this is exactly what Rand meant when they talked about "bubbles".  Specifically, "create “bubbles” in space and time to launch massed waves of air attacks against this NATO force".  It then says the NATO ground forces would have trouble defending against these attacks because they lack significant ground to air defense systems.  To remind you of why I mentioned this part is that the Rand scenario presumed that Russia's airforce would:

1.  have a relatively free hand attacking the NATO forces, both from ground and air counter measures

2.  the attacks would be significantly effective enough as to disrupt the advancing forces

I do not think these are very good assumptions to make.  At best these are "worst case" and so there should have been an exploration of "better cases".

Rand also did not include any hints about what happens to the NATO force except that it would be neutered.  Therefore, they apparently presume that either the Russian airforce could make two heavy brigades combat ineffective or that they would be reduced to a combat readiness level that the Russian forces could easily handle them.  More "worst case" thinking that I'm tempted to say is more-or-less fantasy.  At the very least I think they owe it to the policy analysts to explain themselves better.

Steve

Edited February 2, 2016 by Battlefront.com

[Vanir Ausf B]

 

It's pretty obvious that they wrote the report largely referencing only the "worst case" conditions and outcomes with very little added about how "better case" and "best case" changed the equation. 

That isn't obvious at all.

"Russian forces eliminated or bypassed all resistance and were at the gates of or actually entering Riga, Tallinn, or both, between 36 and 60 hours after the start of hostilities."

"Across multiple games using a wide range of expert participants playing both sides, the longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the outskirts of Tallinn and Rigais is 60 hours."

"The games’ findings are unambiguous: As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members."

The results do not appear to reference any particular scenario and there is no implication that any scenario produced a result that was strategically much different than the rest. I would love to have a detailed breakdown of results by scenario but this is all we have to go on.

The problem is they have omitted or under accounted for several factors.  Each one might not be huge, but when added together they might be able to screw things up for the Russians enough to allow something else to come into play that is more decisive.  The NRF VJTF, Javelins a plenty, and prepositioned forces are just the most obvious ones.  I bet if I knew a lot more about NATO capabilities I could come up with more.

With this information on hand, in Rand's scenario the VJTF would be there for sure because it is within the 6 day alert window.  SOME of the other NRF forces would be put into play as well, but no idea which ones or how much.  Therefore, these forces should have been included in Rand's "worst case" scenario or at the very least one of their alternate scenarios.

I give them a pass on the NJTF since the unit did not exist at the time. In addition, the exact composition and locations of this force are apparently classified which would be problematic.

They did not omit the prepositioned forces, and in fact in at least one scenario NATO was given two "heavy brigades", one of which could have served as a stand-in for the NJTF were it a heavy brigade.

A test can be valid and the conclusions invalid or at least on shakey ground.  That's what I've been arguing since the start.  If Rand wants to use this as some sort of baseline "worst case" scenario, fine.  But don't then conclude that the only way to avoid catastrophe is to have 7 brigades predeployed or be ready to get into a nuke pissing contest because there's nothing else that can be done to save the day.  That's overreach.

A fair point, but this discussion has centered around the military aspects of a hypothetical war.

Actually, this is exactly what Rand meant when they talked about "bubbles".  Specifically, "create “bubbles” in space and time to launch massed waves of air attacks against this NATO force".  It then says the NATO ground forces would have trouble defending against these attacks because they lack significant ground to air defense systems.

Yes, and I admit I had forgotten about the bubbles However, my point stands that Russian air-to-ground was not listed as one of the four factors that "contribute most substantially" to RAND's results.

To remind you of why I mentioned this part is that the Rand scenario presumed that Russia's airforce would:

1.  have a relatively free hand attacking the NATO forces, both from ground and air counter measures

2.  the attacks would be significantly effective enough as to disrupt the advancing forces

I do not think these are very good assumptions to make.  At best these are "worst case" and so there should have been an exploration of "better cases".

Keep in mind this was in reference to a specific event in one scenario. I think you may be in danger of overstating it's significance.

Rand also did not include any hints about what happens to the NATO force except that it would be neutered.  Therefore, they apparently presume that either the Russian airforce could make two heavy brigades combat ineffective or that they would be reduced to a combat readiness level that the Russian forces could easily handle them.  More "worst case" thinking that I'm tempted to say is more-or-less fantasy.  At the very least I think they owe it to the policy analysts to explain themselves better.

What the report actually says: "The result was heavy losses to several Blue battalions and the disruption of the counterattack." There is no mention of combat ineffectiveness nor of their fate afterwards. Aside from that I would like to know why you think this particular result is "fantasy". It looks reasonable to me, or at least not impossible. But I do agree (once again) that it would be nice to have more details.

 

Edited February 2, 2016 by Vanir Ausf B

[John Kettler]

Here are, I think, very important considerations in assessing the above RAND wargames. Who is the customer and how deep the customer's pockets? What is a desirable set of results, as seen from the customer's perspective? Deriving from that is who and what are that customer's constituency and rice bowls? 

As a child, my father taught me about something called a "directed study." When I innocently inquired, I was told: "Son, that's a study in which the general or admiral has decided ahead of time what the answers will be." Is this set of RAND wargames one such? There are lots of ways to game the game, so to speak, just as intel, for example, was gamed to make the B-1B more survivable against Russian fighters, both in terms of speed and LD/SD radar capabilities--making it much easier to sell the B-1B program at all levels.

Who benefits for an apparent operational requirement for seven brigades in theater, and who loses, in absolute and relative terms? From what I can tell in the matter we're discussing, the Air Force, no matter what it does, seems not to be the big dog, and as expressed in terms of the games, neither is the Navy, which through a variety of means, is capable of having significant impact in a Baltic invasion scenario. Air Force tankers now can refuel Navy aircraft, too, after having been fitted with drogue systems in addition to the familiar flying boom. This creates the ability to bring immense Navy air power in from simply tremendous distances as the carrier or carrier strike groups move into position for high intensity combat ops. The US carrier forces have lots of experience operating as far north as the Kola Peninsula and can certainly hurt a Baltic invasion force. Nor does the study consider the damage hundreds of Tomahawks, fired from surface warships and submarines, could inflict, both directly on the attacking forces and indirectly on key facilities. 

But with neither the Air Force nor the Navy being depicted in the games as being significant factors in terms of the outcome, it ineluctably follows that the driver must be ground combat forces: too few, too weak, not heavy enough, not available timely and, oh yes, weak in ground fire support. Consequently, I feel pretty safe in asserting the potential benefactors here are the Army and the Marines, with the former by far the dominant actor. Are we talking about simply repositioning forces from CONUS, modifying forces or even adding to them? Does whatever action is taken fatten or reduce the budgets of one or more services? Even if these issues are not directly evident in the games themselves, it would be foolish, I believe, to presume they at the very least do not provide a subtext and inform the proceedings. 

Regards,

John Kettler

[Krater]

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon plans to sharply increase the number of troops, tanks and artillery positioned in Europe under a budget proposal that calls for a $2.6 billion spending increase aimed at strengthening the military’s posture across eastern Europe.

The $3.4 billion request for the European Reassurance Initiative is about four times the amount of the department’s $780 million request in 2016. It would add an additional brigade’s worth of troops to the U.S. footprint in Europe — between 3,000 and 5,000 rotational soldiers. A brigade-size fleet of heavy vehicles and weaponry would also be delivered to storage sites throughout the Continent, defense officials told Stars and Stripes on Monday.

The proposals are part of the Pentagon’s 2017 budget request, which aims to take on a series of vexing security challenges confronting the military as it faces “Great Power competition” from Russia and China, traditional terrorism threats and the instability brought on by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Defense Secretary Ash Carter, during a speech Tuesday, is expected to unveil some details about the new budget.

He is expected to announce a large increase to the counterterrorism budget request to fund an expanding fight against the Islamic State. Reuters, citing senior defense officials, reported that Carter would request more than $7 billion to fund operations against the extremist group.

Senior defense officials told Stars and Stripes that the fund would be used to meet other needs, such as replenishing thousands of bombs U.S. warplanes have dropped on Islamic State targets in Iraq and Syria since the start of Operation Inherent Resolve in August 2014.

The Pentagon’s planned moves would amount to a surge in military presence and spending on a Continent that until two years ago was a steady target for troop cuts. But Russia’s annexation nearly two years ago of Ukraine’s Crimea Peninsula and its support of pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine has led the United States and NATO to dramatically step up their presence in eastern Europe.

The budget serves as an acknowledgement that the post Cold War order in Europe, where NATO leaders spent two decades attempting a strategic partnership with Russia, is over.

The additional troops and tanks called for in the new spending plan will augment the tanks and artillery the Defense Department has moved to Europe during the past year. Already, a brigade’s worth of heavy equipment is positioned at strategic locations in Germany and the Baltics.

“The security challenges have really given us a new focus,” a senior defense official said.

The new troops, which are expected to rotate in from the U.S., would provide relief to the Vicenza, Italy-based 173rd Airborne Brigade and Vilseck, Germany-based 2nd Cavalry Regiment, two units that have been deployed in Europe’s east repeatedly over the past two years.

“They’ve been constantly deployed,” a senior defense official told Stars and Stripes. “We are going to try to source that from units” based in the U.S.

The officials said that the funding increase is a show of force meant to signal U.S. commitment to its NATO partners.

While the Pentagon has yet to detail all aspects of how the increased funding in Europe will be doled out, it will likely support a wide range of military missions in Europe.

Since the European Reassurance Initiative was launched in late 2014, the funds have supported more frequent Air Force and Navy rotations into eastern Europe along with numerous infrastructure projects to sustain an increased presence, such as refurbished military runways, firing ranges, barracks and training grounds where allies conduct war games.

 

By beefing up its presence, the Pentagon aims to reassure wary allies in close proximity to Russia and send a deterrent signal to Moscow, which has expanded its own military presence around NATO’s periphery.

Russia did not immediately respond to the Pentagon plan to further bolster its force in Europe, but past announcements have been met with threats of countermeasures from Moscow.

If the Pentagon budget is approved, it will provide a boost for U.S. Army Europe, which has faced sharp reductions in force structure in recent years.

Those cutbacks have left the Army with only two brigades permanently forward stationed in Europe after two others were inactivated two years ago, forcing the military to rely on rotational units to carry the increased load.

At U.S. European Command headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, military leaders have warned that Russia’s more aggressive posture represents an enduring security challenge.

In recent years, the U.S. military has steadily drawn down its forces in Europe, which now stand at about 65,000 in total. The downsizing has left the military in Europe undermanned for the current security environment, EUCOM warned in a new strategy document issued last week.

http://www.stripes.com/dod-requesting-3-000-5-000-more-troops-for-europe-in-fy17-budget-1.391680

 

Soo...some thoughts. First, that means that there will be two heavy brigades in Central/Eastern Europe - one prepositioned equipment set, and one fully manned.  That's in addition to the 2nd Cavalry Stryker brigade and 173rd Airborne.  I'm curious in which states the new brigade will be stationed.  I'm also curious - where does the 3.4 billion dollar price tag come from?  The RAND study cited $13 billion for procuring equipment for 3 ABCT, which is pretty much spot on for Pentagon request...but as they said, the new brigades don't necessarily mean Lima Arsenal cranking out new M1A2s. It's can't be personnel costs, either, as this new brigade will be a rotational unit.

[Battlefront.com]

That isn't obvious at all.

"Russian forces eliminated or bypassed all resistance and were at the gates of or actually entering Riga, Tallinn, or both, between 36 and 60 hours after the start of hostilities."

"Across multiple games using a wide range of expert participants playing both sides, the longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the outskirts of Tallinn and Rigais is 60 hours."

"The games’ findings are unambiguous: As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members."

The results do not appear to reference any particular scenario and there is no implication that any scenario produced a result that was strategically much different than the rest. I would love to have a detailed breakdown of results by scenario but this is all we have to go on.

 That's the problem with this whole report   Details matter and they are not available to us.  You're looking at the results one way, I'm looking at them a different way.  I am probably being more skeptical/critical because I see parallels with a lot of discussions that happen with Combat Mission results.  "My tanks always get blown up", "no matter what I do I can't win this battle", "LOS is totally broken!", etc.  When the initial positions, and sometimes even tests, don't make sense to my understanding of how the game works I dig deeper.  More often than not it doesn't take much digging to find significant, if not fatal, flaws in the original position.  Which means a thread that starts out with the title "Tigers are undermodeled" winds up with an affirmation that the opposite is true. 

As I read and reread the Rand report my alarm bells are going off here and there, which makes me question lots of things to see if I can figure out where there is either a flaw in the reporting or a flaw in my understanding of the subject matter.  The first time the alarm bells rang was when there was no Rand report to review at all.  Now that we have a summary report I am more convinced than before that something is significantly "off".  They promised more information about the games themselves, so that might give us more to go on.  However, until then I will retain my skepticism as I do when a customer tells me "Shermans are overmodeled" and hasn't yet backed it up with vetted testing.

 

 I give them a pass on the NJTF since the unit did not exist at the time. In addition, the exact composition and locations of this force are apparently classified which would be problematic.

Yup, just like I give them a pass about the prepositioned stuff that wasn't there when they ran their tests.  At least when evaluating "worst case".  See end for more on that.

They did not omit the prepositioned forces, and in fact in at least one scenario NATO was given two "heavy brigades", one of which could have served as a stand-in for the NJTF were it a heavy brigade.

No, that's not correct.  Those two heavy brigades were specifically coming in from Poland *after* the attack started, the NJTF would have been deployed directly into the Balkans *before* the attack started.

A fair point, but this discussion has centered around the military aspects of a hypothetical war.

They are making policy change recommendations.  If those recommendations are based on flawed study or at the very least not qualified appropriately then the report is potentially misleading.  Look at how this report was portrayed in the media before we even saw it.  The media's portray boiled down to NATO being unable to defend the Baltics.  That is a premise that is no substantiated by this report as far as I can tell.  It MIGHT be, but there's so many unknowns and questions that need answering before one can determine the applicability of the Rand study to the real world.  Media, people with axes to grind, etc. don't bother with that sort of thing.

I keep coming back to the 1980s screams of "Tank Gap!!!!!" There was a major push to work up people into a frenzy about how the Soviet Union was going to figure they could take over the rest of Europe because they had more tanks than NATO.  The solutions being called for were more tanks, more troops, more spending.  In reality there was no "tank gap" in any meaningful way.  In fact, post fall of the wall it was discovered that most of the Warsaw Pact countries probably would have mutinied against the Soviet Union if they perpetuated a war against NATO and perhaps even mutinied if NATO attacked first.

While it is not fair to accuse Rand of intentionally stoking the fires for unnecessary and excessive spending commitments, in its present form I do think it is being used for that purpose.

Yes, and I admit I had forgotten about the bubbles However, my point stands that Russian air-to-ground was not listed as one of the four factors that "contribute most substantially" to RAND's results.

Keep in mind this was in reference to a specific event in one scenario. I think you may be in danger of overstating it's significance.

Context is everything.  Rand used the two heavy brigades to test the "best result" NATO could hope for and then they totally neutered the additional forces by presuming that the Russian airforce decimated it.  Then they conclude that those two heavy brigades didn't have a significant impact.  Which is...

What the report actually says: "The result was heavy losses to several Blue battalions and the disruption of the counterattack." There is no mention of combat ineffectiveness nor of their fate afterwards. Aside from that I would like to know why you think this particular result is "fantasy". It looks reasonable to me, or at least not impossible. But I do agree (once again) that it would be nice to have more details.

I'm a little surprised you don't see the pattern. Anything that has the potential for countering their premise that NATO is doomed is conveniently nerfed by conditions that seem to be tailor made to neutralize the challenge.

"Let's see what happens if two heavy brigades are put into action.  But let's also assume they get laid waste from the air even though Russian ground support capabilities are generally rated quite low by aviation experts.  And let's presume any force not wiped out is so combat ineffective we don't have to bother taking it into account".

Why didn't they do this instead?

"Let's see what happens if two heavy brigades are put into action.  Let's also assume that Russian ground support capabilities are only modestly effective at disruption and let's follow the results through to 60 days post invasion".

You really don't see how they've weighted the odds decidedly against NATO by the choices they've made?

I'll return to what Rand should have done if they wanted to case out the MILITARY aspects of a hypothetical Russian invasion of the Baltics.  They should have set up three very specific scenarios (Worst, Best, Middle) for each side.  They then should have played out each of these against each other:

1.  Best Blue vs. Best Red

2.  Best Blue vs. Middle Red

3.  Best Blue vs. Worst Red

4.  Middle Blue vs. Best Red

5.  Middle Blue vs. Middle Red

6.  Middle Blue vs. Worst Red

7.  Worst Blue vs. Best Red

8.  Worst Blue vs. Middle Red

9.  Worst Blue vs. Worst Red

If they could not afford the time/money to do all nine tests, then they could go with just Best and Worst for both sides and shorten it to 4 tests.

Each of these tests would have specific conclusions written out based on the specific test conditions.  No mixing and matching of elements, just a statement of fact as to what happened.  After that there would be a statistical summary of the various tests in chart form, along with some sort of mean results.  Then, and only then, there would be an analysis that looks at the testing on the whole and sees what sorts of trends and lessons can be learned from the various results.  You'd might get things like:

"The scenarios where Russian airpower was more modestly simulated the results for Blue were noticeably better.  In the case of Best Blue vs. Worst Red, where Red's airpower was presumed to be at harassment level, Blue was able to adequately stabilize and even reverse the invasion force's progress.  But in situations where Blue's ground forces were meager and air superiority given to Red, it was game over within 3 days".

THAT is the sort of thing we should be seeing.  No political or economic stuff mixed in at this level at all.  Just pure casing out defensible scenario presumptions and conclusions drawn from them.  Military recommendations could be made based on the conclusions.

To really be useful, though, the report would then take the military study and mix political and economic circumstances in and see how the military conclusions fit into full spectrum policy.

That's how I would approach it.

Steve