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Krater

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Everything posted by Krater

  1. I know this is a necropost, but yesterday I had a chat with a friend of mine who served in Soviet divisional reconnaissance company in Poland in the mid-80s. According to him, it was fairly ship-shape unit - lots of life fire training, even including night vision devices on occasion. But one thing they never touched were the radars in their BRMs. Nobody knew how to use them - neither the enlisted nor the officers. He was briefly tasked with studying the manuals to conduct some sort of training, but the whole thing fizzled out and the radars remained in their pristine condition. The prevailing attitude was "What if somebody tries to use it and breaks something? We'll be responsible!"
  2. Standard Soviet AK pouches hold 3 or 4 magazines, so I'd say it's at least that much, or more likely 2x of that.
  3. I don't suppose there is anything in the works covering the ground conflict in the operational scale? I had some hopes for CommandOps, but their engine is really limited to WW2 stuff.
  4. If these videos are well-known, they should already be included in totals on LostArmour. If not, let's get them added to the database.
  5. Ukrainian brigades are significantly understrength. According to multiple reports, the current manning levels in combat brigades deployed in the ATO are running anywhere from 40% to 70% understrength. In part, this is related to demobilization of the 4th,5th and 6th wave and insufficient quantity of people signing contracts for service. Though all of the servicemen and officers who served in the last two years have automatically entered reserves and are available to be called up, obviously this makes the current deployment much more brittle. In case of sudden attack by separatists/Russian forces there may not be time to integrate reservists back into their units before the front line folds.
  6. I think that also brings up one key issue - while individuals in those units may have combat or security ATO experience, they probably don't train for combat operations as a unit. And that's pretty important.
  7. I know, but I decided to exclude those units on the grounds that they are really not combat units. But thank you for posting them.
  8. Vladimir, maybe you know - what methodology is LostArmour using to determine whether a given tank became a trophy or not? I read that they base it strictly on photos, however it's not clear to me how they tie Ukrainian Tank A in photo1 to Separatist Tank B in photo 2. Also - let's examine some statistics. According to LostArmour, there are documented losses of 178 Ukrainian tanks. Add some tanks whose losses are not documented, subtract some tanks which are beyond repair and I'm guessing it's still around 175 tanks maximum that separatists could've captured. From that we subtract 94 documented tank losses by separatists, and we arrive at 75 tanks that could've been captured by separatists and are still in service. Given that in 2015 tank strength of DNR/LNR was estimated to be around 500-700 tanks, it's pretty clear that most of the tanks that they received didn't come from Ukraine.
  9. First, in 2014 most fighters on both sides were "40 year old guys" - they were the ones who had either benefited from better quality training available in late Soviet/early-Ukrainian army or accumulated enough experience over the years to be reasonably competent. 20 year old conscripts were considered to be pretty useless. Take a look at some pictures from that time - you'll find that soldiers in their 20s are by far a minority. Secondly, the cases when Ukrainian army suffered significant losses (Ilovaysk, Savur-Mohyla, sector D) were precisely inflicted by Russian regular forces. Separatists by themselves (even with "vacationers") have been consistently unable to stop Ukrainian advances.
  10. #NATIONAL GUARD COMBAT FORMATIONS 1st operational brigade 2nd operational brigade 3rd operational brigade 4th operational brigade 1st rapid reaction (light infantry) brigade 8th special purpose regiment "Yaguar" 9th special purpose regiment "Gepard" 18th operational regiment -1st battalion -"Donbass" battalion -"Azov" battalion 50/4 operational battalion "Kruk" 1/27 operational battalion "Kulchitsky"
  11. I've been able to find only fragmentary information about structure and armaments for motorized infantry battalions. They seem to be of 3 company variety, armed with light infantry weapons and mounted on unarmored trucks. They will have some or all of the following attachments: -tank platoon -ZU-23 AAA platoon -anti-tank platoon (ATGM/SPG-9) -120mm mortar platoon -Recon platoon on BRDM/BTR
  12. Current Ukrainian land forces order of battle: Armored Forces: 1 tank brigade 17 tank brigade Air mobile: 25 airborne brigade 45 air assault brigade 49 air assault brigade 80 air assault brigade attached: 87 separate airmobile battalion 81 air assault brigade -90 air assault battalion -122 air assault battalion -148 self propelled artillery battalion 95 air assault brigade attached: 13 separate air assault battalion Mechanized infantry: 14 mechanized brigade attached: 1 motorized infantry battalion 24 mechanized brigade attached: 3 motorized infantry battalion 28 mechanized brigade attached: 18 motorized infantry battalion 30 mechanized brigade attached: 2 motorized infantry battalion 53 mechanized brigade attached: 43 motorized infantry battalion 72 mechanized brigade attached: 14 motorized infantry battalion 92 mechanized brigade attached: 22 motorized infantry battalion 93 mechanized brigade attached: 20 motorized infantry battalion Motorized Infantry: 56 motorized infantry brigade -21 motorized infantry battalion -23 motorized infantry battalion -37 motorized infantry battalion 57 motorized infantry brigade -17 motorized infantry battalion -34 motorized infantry battalion -42 motorized infantry battalion 58 motorized infantry brigade -13 motorized infantry battalion -15 motorized infantry battalion -16 motorized infantry battalion 59 motorized infantry brigade -9 motorized infantry battalion -10 motorized infantry battalion -11 motorized infantry battalion Mountain infantry: 128 mountain infantry brigade -4 motorized infantry battalion -15 mountain infantry battalion -534 engineer battalion 10 mountain assault brigade -8 mountain assault battalion -24 mountain assault battalion -46 mountain assault battalion Marine: 35 marine brigade -1 marine battalion -501 marine battalion -701 marine battalion 137 separate marine battalion Artillery: 15 rocket artillery regiment 107 rocket artillery regiment 19 rocket brigade attached: 12 motorized infantry battalion 27 rocket artillery brigade attached: 41 motorized infantry battalion 40 artillery brigade attached: 19 motorized infantry battalion 43 artillery brigade (large caliber) attached: 45 motorized infantry battalion 44 artillery brigade -142 artillery battalion -150 anti-tank artillery battalion -6 motorized infantry battalion 55 artillery brigade attached: 39 motorized infantry battalion Surface to Air 38 surface to air rocket regiment 39 surface to air rocket regiment 1039 surface to air rocket regiment 1129 surface to air rocket regiment Special Forces 54 reconnaissance battalion 74 reconnaissance battalion 130 reconnaissance battalion 131 reconnaissance battalion 3 special force regiment 8 special force regiment 73 naval special force center 140 special force center
  13. Yes, certainly a 2 million nation can raise a SF battalion, but there is still a question how the pipeline well be fed. As you understand, you need a certain number of SF qualifiable recruits, and I don't see how current force structure could provide that. Perhaps 18X equivalent...but honestly, I think there is something else it's going on...
  14. Steve, I read about that Latvian SF tripling, and I don't know what to make of it. You either have to assume that they currently have a SF platoon ( to become a company) or that SF (company -> battalion) will comprise a full third of Latvian active duty land forces. Alternatively, they could be planning a reserve SF component, but that's not really doable in a few years.
  15. I'm sorry to add to the off-topic drift, but this excerpt came across my Facebook feed today and I thought it would be valuable to include. It has nothing to do with Russian army, but at the same time - everything.
  16. Steve, To make apples to apples comparison, you really have to treat Russian lieutenants as US junior NCOs.
  17. Why not? I would think that analysis of Russian armed forces would be exactly of interest to the personal circles.
  18. There is no way to make a QB play as AI vs AI, is there?
  19. Here is a partial list of units that have gone through Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine course at Yavoriv: Fearless Guardian I: 2nd Battalion, National Guard ? Battalion, National Guard ? Battalion, National Guard Fearless Guardian II: 1st Battalion, 93rd Mechanized Brigade 1st Battalion 72nd Mechanized Brigade 1st Battalion, 24th Mechanized Brigade 2nd Battalion, 25th Airborne Brigade ? Special Forces Battalion ? Battalion
  20. Meanwhile, Lithuanians just ordered Boxers armed with both 30mm Rafael autocannon and Spike for about 3.5 million euro.
  21. Keep in mind that a) Georgia was 8 years ago. In the last 10 years, Russian pilots went from flying about 25-30 hours per year to 125-150 hours a year. c) Georgia actually had a reasonably good air defense system, for country of it's size. Ukraine has taken a key role in modernizing Georgian air defense network, providing best examples of it's then-current production - Buk-M1 SAM complex, 36D6-M radar, Kolchuga-M passive radar system and Mandat electronic warfare system, which were tied into single integrated network. Broadly speaking, it's quality was on par with current Ukrainian air defense, except for S-300 which Georgia did not have. Judging by Turchinov's public statement in 2015, Ukrainian air defense manufacturing sector is in very bad shape and would have to be rebuilt from scratch.
  22. It seems to me that the truth lies somewhere between the two major viewpoints articulated in this thread. Yes, Ukrainian army improved very significantly since 2014 and early 2015. Most of it's soldiers and officers have experienced combat conditions. The supply situation is considerably better. Many areas of major deficiency have been addressed. However, I would also agree with ikalugin and VladimirTarasov that Ukrainians have not faced the full spectrum of Russian capabilities, particularly in SSM, cyberwarfare and air. Ukrainian air force and air defenses have not been tested at all, and I do not believe they can stand up to full scale Russian attack. I would expect Russia would be able to establish air superiority over Eastern Ukraine within several days, air dominance within one to two weeks over same and air superiority over central Ukraine in the same period. That will significantly inhibit maneuver capabilities of Ukrainian ground forces, deny them ability to fall back westward and enable their destruction as combat capable formations. The key question is what happens afterward? I don't believe Russia is interested in seizing Kiev, but rather to force Ukraine to sue for terms. Barring commitment of either Western forces or truly humongous levels of military aid (think "lend-lease" in scope), Ukraine would be faced with being unable to exercise sovereignty over greater parts of Central, Southern and Eastern Ukraine. This doesn't mean Russian troops will be garrisoned in Kharkov, Dnipro etc. but rather that Ukrainian forces (military and National Guard) will be denied ability to operate there. The situation might resemble that of early 2014 in Donetsk/Lugansk, when Ukrainian administrative control coexisted with separatist military control. I believe that in those conditions, and barring Western military assistance sufficient to restore the situation, Ukrainians may well agree to give up some aspects of it's sovereignty to re-establish it's territorial integrity. Think Germany in the 1920s - restrictions of size/armament of armed forces, foreign forces deployed on some parts of it's territory, etc. That would be a significant feather in Putin's cap, and would enable him to claim victory in the conflict.
  23. Thanks, that makes sense, although I still think MTLB is a reasonable APC alternative under the circumstances. Also, I just read that the director of Kharkov Tank Factory was arrested for conspiring with Russia to sabotage production. Now, I don't know if I automatically believe that - but whatever the reason it's likely that the factory was facing some sort of difficulty, and that could be the factor why MTLBs (which Kharkov services) are not being better utilized. Regarding the MTLB-MRL - the only video I saw of it showed some unit live fire exercises, and the accuracy looked to be subpar. Perhaps they are still a work in progress. Also, I need correct myself - apparently these are not straight MT-LBs but in fact converted 9K35 Strela-10.
  24. I didn't know if that was the case - I remember Yuri Butusov being quite excited about a find of 20-30 BMP-2 barrels in late 2014 in some NII warehouse, so I assumed that gun systems on BTR-3/4 are using reconditioned BMP-2 components. By the way - hopefully this has been covered in the press, but what is the situation with the MTLBs? I've seen photos of the new "artillery" version, with unguided rocket pods as well as the KPVT armed version but they don't seem to be very widespread. Given that Ukraine is supposed to have more than a thousand of MTLBs in storage, they should be more visible as APCs or IFV conversions.
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