We had a long seminar on the Ukraine crisis at my Uni today, if they post a video I'll upload it. (not sure, there were tech problems) Mostly it was everything a lot of you guys already know, and to a room of undergraduates. The crowd skewed older, 20-22, but much of the discussion varied from basic questions about historical context to ideologically driven questions about how to 'make the world a better place.' Most of the students had their hearts in the right place and brought some interesting questions.
Some interesting points that came up: Our resident expert on political economy had a lot to say about sanctions and Russia's future. He suggested that in the short term the Russian economy was heavily insulated from economic shocks. Its war chest was large and sanctions, while bold in concept, were not as extensive as the west makes them out to be. My previous predictions of doom (I believe I compared the Russian economy to Chernobyl) may have been a bit..... enthusiastic. He suggested that between access to Chinese markets, German reluctance to pull the plug on gas, and the watering down of SWIFT sanctions, the situation today isn't as bad as first appears. On SWIFT specifically the prof said that banking sanctions are all or nothing, if even one bank is excluded it will become the breathing tube for the rest of the economy. So long as banks in Russia are willing to play ball, and the west doesn't plug the tube, a single bank can float much of the rest of the system. More troubling in the long run, he suggested that this sanctions regime has probably destroyed the Russian economy for a generation, and a bad generation it will be. He pointed out, correctly, that Russian manufacturing lags behind the rest of Europe. This is because the ruble is artificially overvalued thanks to oil. More people buy oil, more people want rubles, more people want rubles, ruble price goes up. But Russian industry isn't up to the value of the ruble and that blocks foreign investment. What little foreign investment there has just died. China was building a new Jetliner with Russian companies. That will almost certainly die thanks to western sanctions. So will most east-west trade deals with Russian businesses. Companies will still want to make one of deals with Russia (we'll buy x mil bbls of oil at y price) but nobody will make long term deals with a country that is so economically self destructive all the time. The situation that Russia is facing is the same as Venezuela in a way. Tons of economic potential but nobody is willing to make a deal or help them out because of poor policy. The only exception is in Oil (Russia has more mineral wealth of course, but its biggest and most valuable is oil). Several problems with Russian oil. First sanctions will crash the price of Russian oil. Bad but not catastrophic. Second and more catastrophic, Russian oil is extremely expensive per bbl to pump. It and Canadian oil sands (said the professor) are the most expensive to pump in the world. Much of this is down to geography. Russian oil is remote, its really far from its customers, and its in some pretty bad terrain above the Arctic circle. Saudi Oil, on the other hand, is the cheapest /bbl. Third Russia will never pump more oil than it does today, in a broad sense. That is, the world is moving away from petroleum energy just like it did with coal and wood and dung. The single greatest 'sanction' the EU could impose is a law banning gas heating in new construction. And theyd be glad to do it, because its green. Between green energy and green cars and green cities, the world is going to use less and less oil. Russia will be the first to suffer.
Both the military historian and the Russian historian were pretty set that Ukraine would not last much longer without a fundamental revision in the conflict. The Russian historian was pretty convinced that Putin would not lose power to a popular movement in the short term, though he did note that the last two times regime change came to Russia it was after a failed war. He felt though that this conflict, while embarrassing, was not so bloody or onerous as World War One. More of a risk was the oligarch and military classes. They have less tolerance for failure and economic chaos. Putin, the thought, is more likely to drink polonium tea than he is to be gunned down in a dacha basement. Both also agreed that if the fundamental situation did not change, the Russian bear would eventually squeeze the life out of Ukraine. Though one student did ask a question that went mostly unanswered about parallels to Iraq. Hard to convey exactly what was said, I think that many of you would agree with most of the facts they laid out but some would definitely challenge the tone. Shame @The_Capt wasn't there to ask a more stark question about the possibility of an insurgency.
RE social media the group also pointed out something everyone should remember, lot of bad videos out there, lot of partial information. Everything we see here in this thread, on Reddit, on Twitter is very biased. Even if the person who filmed it didn't think so, there are strong perspective biases that were getting here. We maybe see 1% of whats really going on. 1% of 1%. Just because I havn't seen T-90s doesn't mean they arnt out there (plsplspls post every T-90 or BMP-3 vid you see, and if you see a wrecked T-14, put that pic in a mail and send it to me!) Just because we see a pattern evolving doesn't mean our analysis is based on good info. I dont mean to poo-poo everything were doing here or what were posting, I just want to throw in a little cold water and put things into perspective. It was a point, to be honest, that hit me close to home.
We also had a few Ukrainian students come and say a little bit. A former Yugoslavian professor also reminded the room that its all abstract theory and ideology when youre in a classroom in rural Ohio. Its a lot different when its your home, your family, your life on the line. That was a bit of cold water I think. I bring it up just so that we can all take a second to think about the real people, Russian and Ukrainian, who are dying over things were writing pet theories about. For us its info-tainment. For them its life and limb. Respect to those risking life and limb to bring us news and updates.
If I think of anything else worth mentioning I will, if they post the video link (again, there were tech problems they may not) I will. Mostly though the questions were pretty basic, but from the sense of the student's questions more generally it seemed like most were genuinely curious about the context of the conflict rather than the type whose already decided ahead of time. We also have a good bunch here though. I also have a vague feeling that Zoomers, for better and worse, are very open to new ideas. I dont want this to devolve in to a generational schlacht so Ill stop, I think Elvis barely survived this mornings slap fights.
Wow, what a crazy weekend!
So I figure I might be able to add to the discussion on the whole state of things, people normally have to pay for this but I like you guys so much you can have it gratis.
We are currently in a human social singularity and have been since the beginning of the pandemic. Historians may very well point out that 1991 to 2022 was one big singularity. By that I mean the coin is literally in the air and there is no real way to tell how it will land. So here we are all spinning in a massive uncertainty and trying to cling onto certainty, very human. The best we can honestly do right now is enhance our strategic agility and collective resilience because no one really knows how this thing will unfold (trust me). Predictive assessment and projections are about as accurate as throwing dice in these situations so I really encourage everyone to avoid getting to attached to any one version of reality.
So that all said, here is what we can say:
War, all war, is a human social activity that is defined by a collision of certainties. It is a theory with primary components of: a version of reality, communication, negotiation and sacrifice, all laid overtop a foundation of culture/identity and power. Right now this is a three way war (at least): Russia, Ukraine and the West (for want of a better word). I include the West not only for the material and volunteer fighters but the incredible amount of information warfare being waged all pretty much in the direction of Russia. Further the West also has a vision of reality and certainty stake in all this.
So what? Well the versions of reality by all parties is pretty clear by now, Russia's is a still a little vague but it is hard not to see an overall aim here. Communication is literally happening live on YouTube and Twitter in all its forms. Negotiation is ongoing in so many dimensions it would be impossible to see them all. Sacrifice, which is more than the obvious tragedy of loss of life it is what each side is willing to lose in order to win, is largely unknown outside of some really big rocks (e.g. The west is not willing to sacrifice New York for Kyiv). This war is definitely existential for Ukraine, maybe for Russian and very impactful for the western based view of the world order. In summary this system is still in collision and it is almost impossible to tell where it will land; if you want to know how a war ends, you have to fight it first.
So what can we tell so far? Well for that I take a look at the deeper power frameworks:
If we take Power as Will, Strength, Relationships and Opportunity (there are other models but this one works):
- Opportunity. The options spaces for a short sharp war, which probably served Russian ends, is pretty much closed. And here I mean for all sides. Ukraine has dug in and I am not sure they would listen at a local level if the Ukrainian government begged them to put down arms. Russian military operations have not gone according to plan. There is too much evidence of stalls, logistical screw ups and frankly disturbing losses (mins/dis information caveats accepted - some of this equipment being towed by Ukrainian tractors are Div level assets). The Russian quick definitive war options spaces have likely collapsed unless they are willing to escalate to the WMD level. The West has swung the other way, dramatically. Soft support and kinda weak signals have been galvanized in a manner I find shocking to be honest. This, and the fourth party in this fight, the people of the global community, is also something I am not sure anyone was ready for. So what? Opportunity-wise Russia is facing one of two spheres of options: negotiate a "just enough win" or dig in for a long hard grind. Ukraine is looking to "just lose enough" or pretty much "hey Russia go f#ck yourself" and wage a hybrid war for the history books (we are talking Iberian Peninsula "war to the knife" type stuff). There have been zero signs of regional Ukrainian splits beyond the Donbas (and even there), so while Balkanization is likely on the table there is a lot of space between initial bargaining positions.
- Relationships. This could not have gone better for Ukraine if they actually sat down and workshopped it as a movie script. Russia is isolated and villainized to a point I am not sure even the most optimistic western planner could hope for. China and India are basically staying out of this as far as I can see, while Russia's allies are Belarus and...? I mean if its true, the freakin Chechens (modern day Cossacks) said "no thank you". Only the most delusional Russophile could describe this as anything but a total relationship disaster for Russia and enormous victory for Ukraine, at least so far.
- Strength. Well this is a deep rabbit hole but I am pretty sure most experts will (and are) saying that Russia still has an enormous military advantage (even subtracting the nuclear equation). Their economy is crashing a lot faster than many thought so unless those "military contractors" on the Russian side are being paid in USD, it is going to hurt eventually. But Russia is a big machine that will take a long time to choke out economically - at least that is the theory, I am beginning to wonder. So if this turns into a long grinding war we will likely see urban sieges (wow that takes me back) and a brutal insurgency that is really not good for anyone. Russians will bleed, heavily and Ukraine will take decades to recover. In the end, neither side is showing an inability to muster and project military power, at least for now.
- Will, the church of warfare, and it definitely applies here. Whose will break first? Not the West, our stakes are much lower and we are pretty much all in for the little guy, plus we are not hurting. Putin really has only one option space wrt to western Will and that is nuclear war; however, he will likely suffer a 9mm headache if he tries to go that far. Ukrainian Will, well one can only go on online video and open source here but it seems pretty clear that Ukrainian will to fight has escalated in the last 5 days, not diminished. Compare the Ukraine to the Afghan National Army vs Taliban last Aug if one wants a stark contrast of the concept of Will.
Russia, hoo buddy, lets sit down and have a conversation. So things have definitely not gone according to any sane plan. The Ukrainians are really pissed off and are digging in hard, they own the ground and are being supplied by the best the west can give them and that cheque is pretty close to blank. So, how bad do you really want the Ukraine? I mean really want it? This is making that little misadventure to Afghanistan back in 79 look pretty benign. You can probably "win" this militarily but it may very well break your nation trying to do it. Russian Will is right now the center of gravity for this whole thing and time is not on its side. I am not sure the Russian people have the stomach for a months long siege of Kyiv (In 16-17, it took 115k Iraqis with western support and all the airspace 9 months to take Mosul from about 12k ISIL fighters), so what does next Christmas look like for Russians, cause I suspect Ukrainians are already planning for it.
Anyway, just keep watching but I do recommend that we take mental health breaks too because this is still got room to be one crazy ride. Oh and remember while you are at it that there are those, even on this forum, who cannot take mental health breaks, this is not theoretical for them so try and keep that in mind too.
It's correct that the Soviet-Russian soldiers managed to reach Berlin and other parts of Germany. But I watched a documentary about the war in which Soviet veterans, now old geezers, talked about how they despised the Soviet-Russian generals (and Soviet-Ukrainian generals too) for how they used the common soldier as their chess pieces so they could send a successful report to the Stavka.
In the Chechnya war in the '90s the Russian generals used the same tactics when they tried to storm Groznyi, the capital of Chechnya, with the result of many dead and wounded Russian soldiers. If I remember correctly they assaulted Groznyi twice or three times with great losses.
I don't know much about the Soviet tactics in the Afghan war, but it was probably the same kind of assaults used in that war. When I lived in Estonia in the late '90s early 21 century I talked to some veterans from that war and they were almost always talking badly about their officers.
So, yes, they got results but I don't think they have a good reason to be really proud about the tactics used.
So it doesn't surprise me if they use the same Soviet-type tactics today.
Sure, I've been playing around with it, in various combinations.
I haven't found an up-to-date orbat for the current Strike plans (and I don't know if they're even finalised), but he's a 2019 paper that is an attempt to optimise them (since it's an "optimisation", it presumably does *not* represent the default or the reality, but it's a really easy place to start.
https://static.rusi.org/201906_op_strike_web.pdf
From that paper, your Combat Team might look like this:
In CMSF terms, the IFV Boxers can be Warriors, and the HMG Boxers can be FV432 with minimal issue.
The British do not have 120mm mortars in CMSF, so you're either looking at using the FV432 81mm mortars or 155mm artillery. The "one mortar" above is really three - since the idea is that these are co-ordinating as a single unit, whilst being dispersed.
Individual two-man Javelin teams can be added, and DMRs can be two man sniper teams.
There are no air defence vehicles or manpads in CMSF. To translate the above, I'd give them an FV432 and a US manpad team.
The step above this:
Ajax is being used as a drop-in replacement for the Scimitar CVR(T), since they do the same job - in CMSF terms (and presumably real life, if they can't get the problems with Ajax sorted), Scimitar is the way to go for now.
For context, the above "platoon"-sized CT would have a fighting box of up to 4km x 4km, and would be expected to be able to defeat an enemy mechanised infantry company, which would not be easy.
In the paper, they argue against embedding Ajax at the CT level. This would be counter to British Cold War practice, since the British emphasised depth, counter attack and low-level embedded recce to a much greater extent than the rest of the NATO.
For that context (since it's still very much rooted in that kind of idea), your typical Cold War Combat Team might be:
2 x FV432 mech infantry platoons (4 APCs, 3 rifle + 1 HQ in each platoon, 8 total)
2 x Tank Troops (2 platoons of 3 Chieftains, 6 total)
2 x Scimitar recce vehicles
In infantry CT: 1 x Infantry CT HQ in FV432
In armour CT: 1 x Troop of 3 Chieftains
1 x Blowpipe manpad team in Spartan
Plus support assets (an ambulance, recovery vehicles) and any attached ATGM options (Milan, Swingfire, Striker)
So an Infantry CT would have 6 Chieftains, and the Armour CT would have 9, and Cold War BAOR doctrine was heavily based around Chieftain (much in the same way that US doctrine was really centred on TOW).
The Battlegroup (more or less a battalion) above that would be a combination of Infantry and Armour CTs, with the emphasis on depth and counter-attack - 1 forward, 2 back, 1 in reserve, in a formation which is deeper than it is wide. The forward CT takes the brunt, and the two back (north and south) then consolidate to slow down the Soviet advance. When this is stymied, the fourth element counter attacks in the flank (whichever flank is exposed). The fifth element of the Battlegroup is the artillery.
In terms of Strike - I'm still very much at the stage of trying to get a feel for things, and to understand the advantages and limitations. I'm not currently at the stage where I can form defensible opinions about it, although that seems pretty typical in discussions of it across the internet.
He's using the Steam version, so it has to go in the data folder. I'll repeat what I said to you on there.
For Steam you create a folder called "Z" (or "Z Mods" or whatever) in your data folder. Put your mods in that folder.
Will be found under Drive:/Steam/steamapps/common/Combat Mission Shock Force 2/data.
Original in Russian: https://lostarmour.info/articles/ostalnye-dni-vtoroy-voyny-karabah-2020-zamechaniya-i-rassuzhdeniya/. The last part with the author's conclusions - I neither agree nor question the author's opinion. Previous parts were mostly about reconstructing actual course of war from videos and photos and how it relates to propaganda from both sides. The pictures and video referenced can be seen at the original URL.
Armenia
1. Did the Armenians have a chance to win the war? If we talk about complete victory, the only possibility is to tie the navel with the strongest belts in 1994 and continue the war until Azerbaijan agrees to the independence of the NKR with the transfer of Lachin. The truce did not work for Armenia.
If by this we mean the relatively complete preservation of the existing front line, then the chances were negligible. I think that the Armenians in any case would have lost the Araks valley and the adjacent desert plateau - they would not have been able to supply troops there along unprotected roads.
But to retain the main territory of the former NKAO and, relying on the mountains and "greenery", and albeit with high losses, but wait for a favorable change in the international situation and / or depletion of Azerbaijan - they had chances. If it was not possible to defend the complete secession of Artsakh, then it would be possible to fight for more favorable conditions, to force one to reckon with oneself - everything would be better than his current completely undefined state, suspended in a fog and obedient fulfillment of Azerbaijani demands.
It is now clear that Aliyev was not disposed to go so radically, confidently and decisively to the end, as he demonstrated in his statements. At the same time, outwardly, as of November 9, everything spoke for the continuation of the war by Azerbaijan until complete victory. If the war continued in the same way as before November 9, then Azerbaijan would completely destroy or expel the Armenian armed forces (obviously, together with the population) from Karabakh until the end of 2020, in the worst case - until the end of winter. But Aliyev stopped the war without achieving the previously stated goals (restoration of territorial integrity and raising the Azerbaijani flag in all occupied lands). Karabakh is not quite Azerbaijan yet, and the phrases "Khankendi bizimdir, Agdere bizimdir, Khojavend bizimdir, Khojaly bizimdir" have not been uttered. This suggests that there were serious factors restraining Aliyev. Most likely, this is the threat of isolation, sanctions and an embargo on oil and gas from the Western countries for the expulsion of Armenians, possibly also limited financial and military resources (for example, ammunition). And if the Armenians were able to stop the offensive of Azerbaijan, the effect of these factors would only increase, persuading Aliyev to conclude a real, and not a fictitious demonstration (like October 9 and 26) truce. There was no guarantee that this would happen, of course, but there were chances.
However, these chances were completely destroyed by the current military-political leadership of Armenia, which decided not to send full-fledged regular units from Armenia to Karabakh (not counting rocket launchers, artillery and other special units, as well as the defense of Zangezur, i.e., the actual territory of Armenia) and not declare a general mobilization.
Now it has become a commonplace that the main problem in Armenia was Azerbaijani drones. But this is not the case. There were simply too few attack drones to inflict really serious losses in manpower; they could sensitively thin out equipment and deprive the Armenians of the ability to attack, but they were not able to seriously damage the infantry sitting in the mountains, properly sheltered, dispersed and mindful of the air. Even the use of heavy guided bombs from the Su-25 did not guarantee the collapse of the Armenian defense, as the successful defense of Martuni (Khojavend) in early November showed.
The main problem of the Armenian army, which left a clear imprint on all operations of this war, was the severe shortage of infantry. After the breakthrough of the front in Boyuk-Marjanli, the Azerbaijanis seemed to have sunk into emptiness. There were no significant Armenian reserves there - only separate cover groups, and the Azeri offensive was essentially restrained only by its own caution. These reserves did not appear until the very end of the war, the Armenians were unable to create anything that could be called a new front line. In the future, the Armenians acted only in small, scattered detachments, which were not enough even to control large settlements, and no one tried to defend small villages. The battles for Hadrut are especially indicative here. This city was of great moral and strategic importance and was located on the direction of the Azerbaijani offensive. Aliyev even prematurely announced his capture, clearly indicating his intentions. However, the Azerbaijanis were only found in the city center when they were hanging their flag. This means that there was no control not only over the approaches and possible routes of the enemy's approach, but the city itself was poorly controlled. The next day, Armenian reinforcements were shown to Hadrut - President Harutyunyan himself with his special forces, more reminiscent of a gang of mountain robbers. And when a few days later the Azerbaijanis seized the city without serious battles, it became clear that the Armenians had practically nothing but this special forces. And without reserves, without replenishment of losses, with many kilometers of uncontrolled terrain, no enemy drones are needed to be defeated. Azerbaijan would have won even without the "Harops", "Skystrikers" and "Bayraktar" - its assault infantry detachments could always find an unguarded gorge and bypass, surround and destroy, or force the small and scattered Armenian groups to withdraw (this is well shown in the film "Anna News "From near Karin-Taka in early November). It would take a little longer and cost a lot, but the result would be the same.
Meanwhile, theoretically, Armenia was able to saturate the front with infantry to sufficient densities. According to the experience of world wars, the country is able to mobilize up to 10% of the total population without serious stress. In the case of Armenia, this meant conscription of no less than 200-250 thousand people. This number made it possible to create and maintain a full-fledged solid front in Karabakh. In the event of a total war with an extreme strain of forces, up to 20% of the total population can be mobilized, as Germany did in both world wars and the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War, i.e. for Armenia - up to 500-600 thousand people. This did not guarantee victory (since Azerbaijan could mobilize a million or more), but it gave chances for a successful defense and wasting time. However, even an attempt at such mobilization was not made - according to an estimate "by eye", Armenia during the war had mobilized no more than 70 thousand people, and in any case - no more than 100 thousand.
The reason for this, as already mentioned, is in the decisions of the Armenian leadership. The simplest and most logical explanation for this behavior is that the Armenian leadership, for some reason, did not want to fight for Karabakh, in other words, Pashinyan, Tonoyan and others are traitors. Whether this is so and how much so, the Armenians themselves must find out. The Armenian leadership is indeed behaving strangely and surprisingly, which was clearly manifested in the post-war incident with Khtsaberd, Khin Taher and Dizapayt. It seems to me more interesting and useful to consider the possibility of the influence of other, more "traditional" factors - mistakes, stupidity, incompetence and so on.
So, in addition to betrayal, in my opinion, the only explanation for the refusal to send corps from Armenia is the fear of an attack by Azerbaijan on the territory of Armenia proper from Nakhichevan, Gazakh and Tovuz, as well as the fear of Turkey entering the war. However, such a case made it possible to use the CSTO mechanism and it is very doubtful that Aliyev and Erdogan had a great desire to test his strength, teasing and humiliating Putin. Turkey did not at all demonstrate a desire to actively intervene in this conflict and, I think, would start acting only in the event of a complete catastrophe of Azerbaijan with a retreat to the Kur. The opening of new fronts from Azerbaijan was more likely, however, I am sure that Aliyev would start thinking about it only after the failure of the offensive in Karabakh itself. But for this to happen, it was just necessary to send additional Armenian forces to Karabakh, therefore, without this action, the preservation of troops in Armenia would be meaningless. Yes, sending troops to Karabakh was risky - but the risk was justified. Pashinyan should have preferred the explicit and immediate threat of losing Karabakh to the implicit and perceived threat of an attack from other directions. Thus, the Armenian leadership can be accused, if not of betrayal, then at least of strategic timidity, myopia and inadequacy.
2. Отдельного замечания заслуживает армянская предвоенная дипломатия. Армения находилась в сложнейшем геостратегическом положении, будучи зажата между превосходящими в десятки раз врагами и не обладая надёжными коммуникациями с миром. Но и в такой ситуации слабое государство может противостоять противникам, если заручится поддержкой и защитой достаточно сильного и способного повлиять на ситуацию союзника. Армения должна была стать для такого союзника настолько ценным партнёром, чтобы он согласился ради неё пожертвовать своими отношениями с Турцией и Азербайджаном и способствовать нарушению территориальной целостности Азербайджана (что до сих пор считается одиозным деянием), а также предпринять силовые действия, достаточные для того, чтобы остановить Азербайджан.
Подходящих государств было всего два – США и Россия. Но для США ценность Армении никогда не превысит ценность Турции, пока последняя является членом НАТО и не выступает прямо против США. Кроме того, США очень ограничены в средствах непосредственного силового воздействия в регионе и не способны их достаточно быстро нарастить. Что касается России, то Армения считала себя достаточно сильной и независимой, чтобы вести вполне свободную политику и не связывать себя более тесными и крепкими обязательствами, чем в рамках ОДКБ. А ОДКБ никогда не имела ввиду решение Карабахского вопроса, и членство Армении в ней носило в первую очередь антитурецкий характер. Хуже того, в Армении рос скепсис относительно союза с Россией, к власти пришли соответствующим образом настроенные люди, а в России в ответ ширились взгляды на Армению как на чемодан без ручки. Результатом этого стало заявление Путина в начале войны о том, что Армения и Азербайджан одинаково важны для России. Таким образом, одна из самых важных битв этой войны – на дипломатическом фронте – была проиграна Арменией до первых выстрелов, и на настоящих фронтах ей пришлось сражаться в одиночку.
В то же время необходимо отметить, что даже в таких обстоятельствах членство Армении в ОДКБ оказало колоссальное, хотя и практически не заметное, влияние на картину войны. Оно резко ограничило свободу действий Алиева и заставило его очень сдержанно хулиганить на территории собственно Армении. Будь Армения действительно в одиночестве, наступления Азербайджана со стороны Нахичевани и Товуза были бы практически неизбежными – слишком большие стратегические выгоды они сулили. Весьма вероятными становились обстрелы и бомбардировки армянских городов. В этом случае положение Армении из тяжёлого стало бы совсем невозможным.
3. Нельзя не отметить и ответственность армянского общества в целом. Одержав в значительной мере за счёт высокого боевого боевого духа замечательную победу в 1994 г., армяне решили, что дух не только необходимое, но и вполне достаточное условие победы, преисполнившись гордыней и презрением к врагу. В результате, когда Азербайджан занимался деятельной подготовкой к реваншу, армяне, снисходительно на это взирая, вместо подготовки общества и поиска средств и способов победы занимались самолюбованием. Эта война стала ярким примером того, как уверенность в себе и своей победе могут стать для этой победы смертельными врагами.
Эта самоуверенность и самонадеянность проявилась практически во всех аспектах подготовки Армении к войне. Я лишь хотел бы обратить внимание на один аспект: воспитанные в уверенности в собственном превосходстве, солдаты и офицеры оказались не готовы к действиям в условиях превосходства противника. Это привело к неоптимальным и ошибочным решениям, повышенным потерям и во многих случаях – к моральному слому личного состава (при том, что вообще армяне себя трусами не проявили). Именно о полном моральном коллапсе свидетельствует множество брошенной в исправности военной техники, даже при наличии всех возможностей её уничтожить (особенно в этой связи вспоминается ангар с танками в Физули).
4. Информационную политику армянского руководства нельзя назвать иначе как позорной. Попытки удержать на пропагандистском фронте те населённые пункты, которые давно уже были потеряны на реальном, не имеют никакого военного смысла и свидетельствуют только о трусости перед лицом собственного народа и неверии в его боевой дух.
5. Некоторые действия армянского командования не поддаются никакому объяснению. Своё важнейшее оперативно-стратегическое оружие – тяжёлые РСЗО «Смерч» - армяне, судя по всему, всю войну продержали в одном месте – в долине реки Хачинчай, к западу от с. Алиагалы. Все атаки и уничтожения армянских «Смерчей» произошли всего в паре километров друг от друга.
The main problem of the Armenian army, which left a clear imprint on all operations of this war, was the severe shortage of infantry. After the breakthrough of the front in Boyuk-Marjanli, the Azerbaijanis seemed to have sunk into emptiness. There were no significant Armenian reserves there - only separate cover groups, and the Azeri offensive was essentially restrained only by its own caution. These reserves did not appear until the very end of the war, the Armenians were unable to create anything that could be called a new front line. In the future, the Armenians acted only in small, scattered detachments, which were not enough even to control large settlements, and no one tried to defend small villages. The battles for Hadrut are especially indicative here. This city was of great moral and strategic importance and was located on the direction of the Azerbaijani offensive. Aliyev even prematurely announced his capture, clearly indicating his intentions. However, the Azerbaijanis were only found in the city center when they were hanging their flag. This means that there was no control not only over the approaches and possible routes of the enemy's approach, but the city itself was poorly controlled. The next day, Armenian reinforcements were shown to Hadrut - President Harutyunyan himself with his special forces, more reminiscent of a gang of mountain robbers. And when a few days later the Azerbaijanis seized the city without serious battles, it became clear that the Armenians had practically nothing but this special forces. And without reserves, without replenishment of losses, with many kilometers of uncontrolled terrain, no enemy drones are needed to be defeated. Azerbaijan would have won even without the "Harops", "Skystrikers" and "Bayraktar" - its assault infantry detachments could always find an unguarded gorge and bypass, surround and destroy, or force the small and scattered Armenian groups to withdraw (this is well shown in the film "Anna News "From near Karin-Taka in early November). It would take a little longer and cost a lot, but the result would be the same.
Meanwhile, theoretically, Armenia was able to saturate the front with infantry to sufficient densities. According to the experience of world wars, the country is able to mobilize up to 10% of the total population without serious stress. In the case of Armenia, this meant conscription of no less than 200-250 thousand people. This number made it possible to create and maintain a full-fledged solid front in Karabakh. In the event of a total war with an extreme strain of forces, up to 20% of the total population can be mobilized, as Germany did in both world wars and the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War, i.e. for Armenia - up to 500-600 thousand people. This did not guarantee victory (since Azerbaijan could mobilize a million or more), but it gave chances for a successful defense and wasting time. However, even an attempt at such mobilization was not made - according to an estimate "by eye", Armenia during the war had mobilized no more than 70 thousand people, and in any case - no more than 100 thousand.
The reason for this, as already mentioned, is in the decisions of the Armenian leadership. The simplest and most logical explanation for this behavior is that the Armenian leadership, for some reason, did not want to fight for Karabakh, in other words, Pashinyan, Tonoyan and others are traitors. Whether this is so and how much so, the Armenians themselves must find out. The Armenian leadership is indeed behaving strangely and surprisingly, which was clearly manifested in the post-war incident with Khtsaberd, Khin Taher and Dizapayt. It seems to me more interesting and useful to consider the possibility of the influence of other, more "traditional" factors - mistakes, stupidity, incompetence and so on.
So, in addition to betrayal, in my opinion, the only explanation for the refusal to send corps from Armenia is the fear of an attack by Azerbaijan on the territory of Armenia proper from Nakhichevan, Gazakh and Tovuz, as well as the fear of Turkey entering the war. However, such a case made it possible to use the CSTO mechanism and it is very doubtful that Aliyev and Erdogan had a great desire to test his strength, teasing and humiliating Putin. Turkey did not at all demonstrate a desire to actively intervene in this conflict and, I think, would start acting only in the event of a complete catastrophe of Azerbaijan with a retreat to the Kur. The opening of new fronts from Azerbaijan was more likely, however, I am sure that Aliyev would start thinking about it only after the failure of the offensive in Karabakh itself. But for this to happen, it was just necessary to send additional Armenian forces to Karabakh, therefore, without this action, the preservation of troops in Armenia would be meaningless. Yes, sending troops to Karabakh was risky - but the risk was justified. Pashinyan should have preferred the explicit and immediate threat of losing Karabakh to the implicit and perceived threat of an attack from other directions. Thus, the Armenian leadership can be accused, if not of betrayal, then at least of strategic timidity, myopia and inadequacy.
On October 17, a video was posted of an attack by the Azerbaijani "Harop" on the Armenian "Smerch", trying to hide in the bed of the Khachinchay River (www.google.com/maps/place/40.037656,46.699284).
The result of this attack is still unknown, but even if the "Harop" missed, the Armenians are unlikely not to notice the explosion, which, at least, should have alerted them. But they continued to use the same area for launches.
As a result, on October 29, the Azerbaijanis, angry after the shelling of Barda, could easily (even before the start of the shooting) spot one launcher and destroy it with several drone strikes (id26419). This happened just 2.5 km from the site of the first attack (www.google.com/maps/place/40.035058,46.728555).
Moreover, it turned out that on October 13 the Sentinel-2 satellite captured the moment the Smerch fired from the same position somewhere to the northeast in the direction of Terter-Yevlakh.
And the Armenian video of "Smerch" shooting posted after the war was also filmed at the same place, the fire is being directed to the north.
https://vk.com/wall-164246427_103522
But the destruction of the "Smerch" did not affect the Armenians in any way - they did not change either the place of deployment, or the launch area, and did not even disperse the vehicles. The next day, without embarrassment, they went to shoot at a position just 2.2 km to the west (www.google.com/maps/place/40.039233,46.703739). Naturally, they were already expected there. This time, the Azerbaijanis acted smarter - they let them shoot, then followed the launcher to the place of shelter (www.google.com/maps/place/40.034257,46.685200) and destroyed 2 Smerch at once, recklessly placed next to each other (id26426 and 26427). Together with the "Tornadoes", a fire engine died, which drove up to extinguish the id26426 that was hit by the first.
On the other hand, this episode illustrates the good camouflaging properties of the greenery even against modern means of observation - even if the Azerbaijanis, who were extremely motivated after shelling their cities, could not find huge launchers in their shelter in a small grove without the help of Armenians.
6. I hope that the Armenian military has kept and will be able to upload the complete recordings from their surveillance cameras. On the one hand, there is no military secret there, all positions are lost, and on the other hand, until now the general public could not observe the large-scale battles of the two armies completely from beginning to end, and Armenia can be the first to provide the world with such an opportunity.
Azerbaijan
1. Azerbaijan waged this war for a solid four, showing not only quantitative, but also noticeable qualitative superiority over Armenia. And most of the credit for this belongs to the autocratic regime of President Aliyev. Aliyev was at the height of his position as Bashkomandan. And if it is still difficult to say anything about his purely military talents, then his abilities as a foreign and domestic politician had no less, if not greater influence on the victorious outcome. He was able to create a favorable international environment for Azerbaijan and to a significant extent isolate Armenia. As the leader of the country for 17 years, he was able to ensure the planned and systematic preparation of the army and society for war. Particularly noticeable were Azerbaijan's solid investments in the information front (up to the purchase of "experts" in Russia and the creation of many fake pseudo-Russian and pseudo-Armenian accounts on social networks). And if the centralization of state administration, the absence of opposition, the suppression of dissent, the restriction of information, the rabid propaganda of ethnic hatred, militarism and the like can have a negative impact on the peaceful development of Azerbaijan, then their influence on victory in the war was purely positive. I doubt that a parliamentary republic would have been able to achieve comparable efficiency in specific ethnogeographic conditions.
At the same time, there were clearly flaws and mistakes in the military organization, which led to the failure of the first offensive on September 27. In the future, their influence was smoothed out by the quantitative and qualitative weakness of the enemy, and if the Azerbaijani command is unable to soberly and honestly analyze its actions and draw conclusions from them, then these flaws can painfully backfire in the future.
2. Azerbaijan, despite its superiority in almost everything, at any given time could successfully advance only in one fairly narrow direction. At first it was the northern Talysh direction, then, after breaking through the front, the Azerbaijanis attacked Jebrail, Hadrut and further north until the 20th of October, forcing the Armenians to leave Fizuli. Somewhere on October 16-17, the Azerbaijanis discovered that there was practically no one in the Araks valley and on the plateau north of it, and launched an offensive there, quickly reaching Zangelan and the valley of the river. Akers. After October 20, when they did meet resistance there, within a week the focus of the fighting shifted to the west. Then, from the middle of the 20s, Azerbaijan begins a slow advance through the mountains to Shusha. A little later, a parallel attack on Martuni (Khojavend) is read. And here it is indicative that this offensive never reached its final goal, although on November 3-4 Azerbaijanis broke through directly to the city. They were thrown back and for the week remaining until the end of the war, when decisive battles for Shusha unfolded, they could not overcome the several kilometers separating them from Martuni.
At the same time, it cannot be said that an offensive in the other direction was unnecessary - it could paralyze the Armenians' ability to maneuver their forces and reserves. But attempts to advance from Matagis / Sugovushan to the south were almost unsuccessful.
This testifies to the presence of some kind of bottleneck in the Azerbaijani grouping, which did not allow successfully advancing in several directions at once. This may be a lack of artillery for a sufficiently dense artillery support, a lack of high-class strike infantry, a lack of logistics capacity, or a lack of drones that were not able to provide sufficient information and force support in several directions at once. One way or another, but this once again shows that Azerbaijan's success was based on a very limited basis.
3. It is surprising that Azerbaijan, in the front ranks in the direction of the main strikes, of unmodernized T-72A tanks without reactive armor. On the modern battlefield, their combat value is only slightly higher than that of the T-55, which in this war were completely correctly used as an SPG. It is also unclear why Azerbaijan, spending substantial money on defense, was unable to allocate not so large funds for their modernization. To do this, it was possible to reduce the obviously excessive and completely useless in the current realities of the cost of the fleet. This testifies to the lack of consistency in the Azerbaijani strategic planning.
4. The main failure of Azerbaijan in this war is civil defense. In the early days, the villages immediately adjacent to the front line were evacuated, but, as far as can be judged, there was no evacuation from the large cities and villages located a little further, even after the start of Armenian rocket attacks, they lived as if in peacetime. Also, the system of early detection and warning of a missile attack was not organized (in any case, its work is not visible on the video of the shelling of Ganja and Barda). The result was significantly greater losses of civilians behind the front line than the Armenian side (the only indicator by which Armenia “defeated” Azerbaijan). And a noticeable part of the responsibility for these victims lies with the leadership of Azerbaijan.
5. A large number of hits on the Armenian equipment filmed with the cameras of "Bayraktar" caused a furor and almost the cult of "Saint Bayraktar". The hundreds of tanks they destroyed were counted. However, the analysis of the results makes the applause damp down. First, it is far from always clear whether the target was destroyed by Bayraktar's own weapons, or whether he only watched its defeat by other systems. Secondly, "Bayraktars" performed well against trucks, artillery, light armored vehicles and inadvertently crowded infantry. But heavy armored vehicles demonstrated significantly better stability. Filmed on camera, the defeat of the tank did not always mean its death.
So, for example, this tank in Merdinli
and this tank in Fizuli
got 2 hits each and were able to leave from there - in those places later there was nothing.
Of the 7 tanks at Karaköllu, 6 received hits, but only one was destroyed (the far right, id26456), and that, most likely, not immediately.
The article previously considered several more cases when a hit from the Bayraktar did not lead to the death of the tank.
At the same time, it is impossible to underestimate the danger of controlled weapons attacking from above for tanks. Even without destroying a tank, hits from drones inflict damage and can force you to withdraw from the battle or even throw the tank as a gift to the enemy. The role of tanks without an all-aspect KAZ on the battlefield with a modern enemy narrows down to indecency, in fact, they can only perform auxiliary functions. But the importance of BMPTs is sharply increasing: if their guns are provided with the ability of anti-aircraft firing with appropriate detection and control systems, no one else will have a question why they are needed.
The combat value of hand-operated small-caliber anti-aircraft systems dropped to zero. The ZU-23-2 in its current form against modern means of destruction looks like a ZUlus with an assembly against machine guns and magazine rifles.
6. The main advantage of Bayraktars and similar drones over air defense systems is the optical reconnaissance distance, which is much higher than the range of the short (Osa, Pantsir, Tor) and even medium (Buk) air defense systems, and is provided US-Canadian optoelectronic station CMX-15D. A good illustration of its capabilities is the AzMO video from September 30.
The distance between points on the earth's surface at the top and at the bottom of the frame is about 15 km. View from northeast to southwest. In the distance, the valley of the Chailag river, the old Azerbaijani village of Minbashyly and the new Armenian Arajamug; the lower left edge of the frame shows the village of Kuydzhak. The observed target is located near the village of Tulus. At the same time, the drone itself flies much farther - near the villages of Ashagy Kurdmakhmudlu and Gayidish, in the deep Azerbaijani rear. The distance to the front line is more than 20 km, i.e. the drone flew in complete safety. The distance to the observed target is about 53 km, to the upper edge of the frame is about 58 km.
At such a distance, the drone cannot independently destroy the target or give target designation with a laser, but it can observe tens of square kilometers of enemy rear and detect the work of artillery, missile launches of MLRS and air defense systems and transmit their coordinates for destruction by other weapon systems. In the case of an air defense system, he can follow it until a convenient situation arises (redeployment, exhaustion of air defense missile systems, etc.), direct "Spike-NLOS", "Harop" or artillery, and, if the opportunity arises, get close and attack independently.
In this case, "Bayraktar", apparently, did not participate in the destruction of targets, but only watched their defeat with other weapons. At the same time, from the targets to the front line at that time about 17 km. Approximately 90 seconds elapsed between the defeat of the two targets.
Exactly what targets were hit, it became clear from the AzMO video posted on October 1. These are 2 SAM "Osa" (id25896 and 25898).
25896 (www.google.com/maps/place/39.365434,47.070959):
25898 (www.google.com/maps/place/39.364449,47.071670):
Filming is being conducted from another Bayraktar, flying eastward in a southerly direction at a fairly large distance (since the camera is already losing color perception), but no more than 15 km, since the territory of Iran is already beginning further. It is also possible that the operation involved 2 Bayraktar, which both flew in approximately the same direction (one flew further, since the image quality was noticeably different), while each was keeping an eye on its target. It is difficult to say whether the Bayraktar hit targets with its weapons or only provided target designation to foreign missiles - the size of the shells, as far as we can judge, roughly corresponds to the standard for the Bayraktar MAM-L, but they fly up to the targets from the north, not the east. At the same time, the air defense system does not see the drone, or is jammed with interference, or is distracted by another target (possibly An-2). All this shows how systematically and consistently the Azerbaijanis approached the task of suppressing even outdated air defense.
I just try to get a squad close to the house I wish to enter and use the target command. If they're close enough and have hand grenades they will usually lob a 2 or 3 of them during a one minute action phase. Rush your boys in there next turn while they're stunned and they will finish the job. It's not a breaching charge but it will suppress/kill the enemy fairly well. Alternatively you can split the squad have one group suppress and the others charge. This worked wonders for me in the Aachen Campaign in final blitzkrieg. It's not safe work but as aforementioned urban battles are nasty stuff in war.
Yup, its been like that since day 1. Mortars and artillery both. There was an explanation given for smoke disappearing awhile ago that (I think) had more to do with game engine mechanics than real world artillery practices. All I recall is its a known thing and isn't on their short list of 'things to fix'.
Thanks for help everyone it works now and I can enjoy the game. I had to delete everything connected to the game including folder the installer was in and do a hard reinstall to get the missing files
Uninstall and delete the unpacked installer files you used to install the first time. Create a new empty folder and unzip the downloaded installer into that directory. Then run the installer from there and don't add any mods and see if that fixes it.
A string mod from a non matching version or different game can cause surprising strings to show up. If you run an installer from a location where other CM install files are located the install will be messed up and you will see crazy stuff like this.
I've seen this happen while modding. The strings are all messed up. The indexes for those table entries must be screwed up. That's why you got T-55mv as region, and T-62 in the army drop down. It is curious to see entries from other titles, I'm guessing BFC tried to standardize string tables for all Engine 4 games.
I'd recommend a reinstall.
I think the lack of communication is because they don't want to argue with customers but would rather leave gameplay trailers here or there to placate the more veteran players. What do I know, I just joined the forums a couple weeks ago.
I think the lack of communication is because they don't want to argue with customers but would rather leave gameplay trailers here or there to placate the more veteran players. What do I know, I just joined the forums a couple weeks ago.
Steve himself said why he rarely has time to provide updates. I forget where exactly but it was essentially that the forums are a gateway drug, and he finds it very hard to "just post an update" and avoid getting his whole day (or more) taken up by answering questions and getting into discussions. He's human like you and me, so while I too would appreciate less radio silence I can perfectly understand why he is quiet sometimes! And if Steve doesn't do it, there really isn't anyone else...
I'm excited, but I have plenty of other stuff to do so I don't mind the wait.
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