Odin

One thing that war movies taught me is if you're faced with a German machinegunner behind a sandbag wall eventually he will stand up, clutch his chest and fall forward, the sandbags collapsing beneath him. My source: SPR, The Dirty Dozen, and innumerable episodes of ''Combat' and 'Rat Patrol'. Wouldn't it be funny if the most 'factually accurate' war film turned out the be 'Catch-22'?
'Reenactor' type movies tend to be deadly dull. The war (whichever war) is meant to be the backdrop to a proper human story, not the story itself. Technical accuracy, whether in U-boats, tanks, aircraft, or swordplay is the added spice that flavors the dish.
 
 

The 317th Platoon is a masterpiece. Really hard to find online now, but I remember taking out a physical DVD (along with Bondarchuk's War and Peace) from Robarts library's media archive during my first degree. You could tell just by watching that the extras knew what they were doing; only found out after I watched the film that they were all members of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces. 
Big fan of Beevor; have his Crete and Stalingrad on my shelf at home and have read both a few times. He's ultimately a pop historian but one of the good ones. Obviously he's right about most of the films but the article is tongue-in-cheek, its not like you should feel ashamed if you enjoyed any of them. Movies are movies. 

Many blue moons ago when the whole Upgrade system was announced I mentioned that long term it was going to turn into a bit of a logistical nightmare trying to balance multiple number of game 'families'. At the time there was only two families (I think), now we're heading for six.
Has this experience changed BF's thinking around release strategy? For instance bolting on on more modules to CMRT to push that front back to say Kursk, rather than releasing a whole new family for July 1943 - May 1944 eastern front? I'm no programmer so no idea if it would make a difference man hour wise but logistically/project management wise wouldn't there be some gains?

Personally, I agree with some of what Carl has to say, but his delivery and demeanor suck. The good points he might make get buried by his attitude and combative nature. He's rude and obnoxious when there is no need to be and this thread is a perfect example. There's a fairly defined demilitarized zone between rabid fanboy and bitter troll and an objective thoughtful person can usually navigate it without setting off the landmines. Unfortunately, Carl tends to break dance his way through...in clown shoes...on a pogo stick.
 
Mord.

Steve, any word as to when 4.1 is due? Apologies if it's posted somewhere else and I've missed it

It can be considered "expensive". But, if you keep on playing it for years like I do, then it is certainly value for money.

Hi! Long-time fan of the series, first time poster on this forum, and very excited to hear that a new Combat Mission is on the way! I love the game, and think that on the tactical level it is better than any I have ever played, so the below is not just whinging. HOWEVER there are a number of things I would love to be improved about the underlying game engine. Maybe a developer will see this, maybe not, but I’d love to discuss it anyway.
 
Full disclosure –I have tried to be realistic, but I am no programmer, and accept that much of the below may simply be impossible. Also, I much prefer playing infantry (CM:Burma would be my dream), so nothing below on tanks!
 
1.       Retreating when sensible. Say I have a team behind a hedge coming under heavy fire. It’s time to fall back through the gap in the second hedge behind them, just one square away, where they will be out of site and safe. As is, very often the team will cower behind the first hedge, even though if they retreated they would be safe! Units should be much more willing to move AWAY from threats.
 
2.       NOT retreating when NOT sensible. How many times has this happened to you? Your infantry dashes from one building to another. A few metres from the door, a machine gun in another building opens up and kills half the squad. The remainder stall, hug the ground, and start crawling back across the killing zone, and soon your whole squad is gone. I am no soldier, but I would think that even a terrified rookie would know that he has a much better chance if he carries on forward. So I would hope that the AI could be improved to assess whether changing orders is appropriate when soldiers break.
 
3.       Dynamic reactions. The mission that sums up my frustrations is ‘Kiwi Soldiers’ from CM:FI. Although you were aware of where the enemy was, there was no way to get your soldiers to approach them in a sensible manner. The enemy occupied a building with another building adjoining it: the commander would probably want his soldiers to hug its wall until the doorway, keeping out of the line of fire, before entering with weapons trained on the door to the enemy building. As it is, the soldiers move in the open outside the building, and then move towards the buildings centre, and usually get massacred. I’d love units to be able to mark an ‘area of interest’, which they would treat as occupied and act accordingly.
 
4.       Formations. Infantry has a tendency to clump close together and move in long, vulnerable lines. I’d love some sort of formation system, so you could, for example, cross a field in a spread out line, just as a platoon would in real life. Maybe a ‘space out’ button would encourage soldiers to maintain distance between themselves and their comrades?
 
5.       Grenades. Minor point – I’d love to be able to order soldiers to throw grenades at a nearby spot regardless of line of sight e.g. over walls or into buildings. This would make urban combat more manageable, especially in conjunction with the previous point.
 
6.       Blasting. Minor point – please could engineers not automatically rush through the gaps they blast? Mine tend to get machine-gunned, so I’d love the option to stay in cover!
 
7.       Direct linear fire. Minor point – I’d love HMGs and mortars, for example, to be able to do linear direct fire missions e.g. spreading their fire along a trench line or hedgerow. This would especially allow HMGs to be better at their real-life job of area suppression.
 
So what do you think? What improvements to the tactical engine would you like to see?

Battlepack 1: The Great Swan
Northern France and Belgium
September 1944
 
In just two months, between 6th June and mid August, the Allied armies in Normandy destroyed the cream of the 1944 German Army. Following this resounding defeat the Allies bounded across France in just a few days. It is during this period of stunning advance that Battlepack 1: The Great Swan is set, following the advance of the British 2nd Army from the Seine River, through Belgium, and all the way to the high water mark of the advance along the Meuse and lower Rhine.
 
The first phase of the Great Swan occurred when the 43rd Wessex Division seized a crossing over the Seine at Vernon in an opposed assault crossing. The battle here lasted several days, and the first 24 hours in particular were considered to be very dangerous for the British troops. However the bridgehead was stabilised and then gradually expanded to make room for follow-on forces. Prelude, the first battle of the Campaign Amiens Tonight, is a semi-historical examination of the difficulties of pressing back the determined German resistance which was able to make good use of the thick forests along the Seine river banks.
 
Shortly afterwards the British forces exploded out of the bridgehead and began racing across Northern France and into Belgium. From the first German resistance to the breakout was weak and disorganised - they were too busy fleeing back towards France to form a cohesive front. Engagements during this period tended to be small scale, and highly confusing. The Copse is a tiny scenario that takes a hypothetical look at one of these minor engagements. Overnight the advancing Allies generally rested, and prepared for the next day’s advance, while the Germans continued their relentless withdrawal. Celer et Audax and Nulli Secudus look at what happens when small British force disposed in hasty defence finds itself in the path of some withdrawing Germans in the middle of a rainy night or on a misty morning.
 
During the advance to Amiens the 11th Armoured Division was ordered to advance through the night without rest, culminating in an astonishing advance of 48 miles in just 24 hours. Tallyho follows the vanguard of this drive as they approach the location of a temporary halt at dusk. The next day found 11th Armoured at Amiens, embroiled in bitter city fighting (The Somme), and then pushing out of the city into the open ground across the river (To the green fields beyond). This was not the end of the war, and the Division soon found itself heading east once more (And the beat goes on).
 
Within days the lead elements of XXX Corps, made up as always by the armoured cars, found themselves in the region known as ‘the Crossroads of Europe’, a place where famous battles to decide the fate of nations have been fought since time immemorial (A crossroads near Brussels).
 
Soon after reaching Antwerp and the Belgian boder the advance petered out, stopped more by the logistical strain of leaping forward 200 miles in a few days than by increasing German resistance. Field Marshal Montgomery famously tried to kick-start the stalled advance with Operation Market-Garden. Those battles have been dealt with elsewhere in Combat Mission. However, in the weeks prior to the launch of Market Garden there were about a dozen planned airborne operations, all opf which were cancelled when they were overtaken by events. But what if the advance had been halted in the vicinity of Brussels?
 
One of the planned and cancelled airborne operations was LINNET II, which was to seize bridges over the Meuse west of Aachen, and open a route into Germany. A group of “what if?” fictional scenarios looks at how this never-fought battle might have played out. The flat ground between the Meuse River and Albert Canal would have provided excellent landing grounds (Drop Zone CHARLIE), while securing the river crossings was dependant on holding the high ground just east of the Meuse against counter attacks (LINNET II). As this operation was never launched, the exact details of Operation Linnet II are vague, and this vagueness has been exploited to look at the effect of differences in the detailed organisation of British and American ground and airborne forces when given the same ground and objectives, fighting against the same enemy.
 
Following the failure of Market Garden the British made a concerted effort to close up to the Rhine along its lower reaches before the onset of winter. This phase of the campaign saw a partial reversion to positional warfare, and the re-emergence of deliberate attacks against strong defences (Swansong). Often these attacks were supported by the specialist armour of the 79th Armoured Division (Hobart’s Funnies). With the onset of bad weather at the end of September the frontlines became static, and the heady days of The Great Swan became an increasingly distant memory.
 
In total Battlepack 1: The Great Swan contains over 25km2 of brand new, highly detailed handcrafted mapping.

Hello BF forum members,   I recently produced an AAR 'film' of a PBEM game I played out with Rico from The Few Good Men, as part of Rico's Cross of Iron multiplayer campaign.   I particularly enjoyed the final episode I played, called Blunting the Spear, and decided to make a film out of it. Rather than go for a standard PBEM game, Rico role played the Soviet side which made for a great experience for the German commanders. My encounter turned into a huge tank KO fest which I thought would make for a good AAR subject. So as a homage to Rico's campaign I've put together a film of the battle.   I've adopted a different style on this occasion to my usual commentary AARs, and tried to produce something which tells more of a story to reflect the fantastic storyline Rico developed for Cross of Iron.   On a separate note, I also hope the BF crew recognise my love for the game they've created. I'm a little annoyed that my work IP address has been banned from accessing BF's sites. I presume they've marked me down as a 'bad egg' for questioning the content of the upcoming CM Bulge release on the FGM forum (it's my understanding that BF staff have read the thread there). Please note this BF, when I've been critical of CM, it's always been out of a love for the game and a desire to see it become the best game it can, rather than a want to undermine it. I would appreciate it if you could take my work IP address off your ban list, I've tried emailing you about the subject but had no response.    Even if only in  a small way, I hope the few CM videos I've made over the years have helped to market your game and increase its audience. At the very least I hope the hundreds of hours I've put into making them demonstrate that I'm not some destructive CM troll.   All the best (and hoping you don't ban my home IP address)   Odin  

Apocal - the mechanized corps fought like the tank corps, it just had a tank regiment with each of 3 motorized rifle brigades, plus a 4th brigade that was pure tank.  
They still fought like the tank corps fought.  They had as many tanks as a tank corps, with 10 infantry battalions in the formation rather than 6, and a marginally more infantry heavy mix, as a result.
 
This did not change their basic tactics.  It just meant where one of the sub formations was barreling ahead, it would sometimes have a thinner cutting edge of tanks and a longer trailing "shield" column of trucked infantry.  Though the tank corps portion would often be "on point" with exactly the same techniques as in the tank corps.  In practice, the extra infantry gave the formation greater staying power after taking losses in extended action, and a superior ability to hold the ground it took.    

I like the jail next to the nunnery.

The basic German defense doctrine was the one they developed during WW I to avoid being defeated by local concentration and artillery suppression, and it remains the basic system the Germans used in the east.  That tactical system has been called the denuded front, in comparison with practice near the start of WW I of lining continuous front line trenches with solid lines of riflemen.  Instead it was based around a few fortified machinegun positions, concealed, and cross fired to cover each other rather than their own front, in an interlocking fashion.  The idea being to make it hard to take out just a piece of the scheme.  Most forces were kept out of the front line to let enemy artillery "hit air".  Wide areas were covered by barrage fire and obstacles (in WW I generally just wire, in WW II plenty of mines as well).  Barrages and obstacles have the feature that they multiple in their effectiveness the more then enemy sends; his local odds does not help him, it hinders him or raises his losses instead.  The MG and outpost network is meant to defeat penetration by smaller enemy numbers, while barrages crucify their masses if they overload those.
 
Then the main body of the defending infantry defends from considerably farther back, and executes local counterattacks into portions of the defensive system reached by the attackers.  The idea is to spend as much prep barrage time as possible deep in underground shelters, and only come up and forward to mix it up with enemy infantry after they are mixed in with your own positions and hard for the enemy to distinguish and coordinate fires on them etc.  This also was meant to exploit the confusion that even successful attackers were generally in, after crossing the outpost and barrage zone described above.
 
That is an effective enough system, but it isn't foolproof.  The thinner front and separated strongpoint positions it uses are vulnerable to stealthy penetration, night infiltration e.g., rather than frontal attack on a large scale.  The local counterattack part of the doctrine can be taken to extremes and get rather expensive for the defenders, resulting in mere brawling inside the defender's works, and just exchange off with the more numerous attackers.  What it really relies on is the enemy being defeated by the artillery fire scheme and ranged MG fire over most of the frontage, so that the counterattack and brawl stuff only happens in a few exceptional spots, where the defenders have a safer route to the front, better information about where the enemy is, what routes are left clear of obstacles, and the like.
 
The main line of resistance, once hit, generally tried to solve the fire discipline dilemma by firing quite late, when the attackers were close enough to really destroy them, not just drive them to ground.  Harassing mortar fire and a few "wait a minute" MGs were all that fired at longer ranges, to delay the enemy and prevent them being able to maneuver easily, mass in front of the defenders safely, and the like.
 
At a higher level, the division's artillery regiment commander, divisional commander, or regional "Arkos" tried to manage the larger battle by choosing where to intervene in the outcoming attack with the weight of divisional fires.  They didn't distributed those evenly, or according to need.  Instead they would have a plan of their own, to stop the Russians cold in sector B, and just make do in sectors A and C.  They divide the attack that way.  Then shift fires to one of the break ins, and counterattack the other one with the divisional reserve.  The basic idea is just to break up the larger scale coordination of the offensive by imposing failure where the defenders choose, by massing of fires.  They can't do this everywhere, but it can be combined with choices of what to give up, who pulls back, what the next good position is, and the like, as a coordinated scheme.  The function is "permission" - you only get forward where I let you get forward, not where you want it.  If the enemy tries to get forward in the place the defenders "veto" in this way, they just mass their infantry under the heaviest artillery and multiple their own losses.
 
I should add, though, that those doctrinal perfect approaches sometimes could not be used in the conditions prevalent in parts of Russia.  In the north, large blocks of forest and marsh are so favorable for infiltration tactics that separate strongpoints with only obstacles in between just invite penetration every night and loss of the position.  The Germans often had to abandon their doctrine in those areas, in favor of a continuous linear trench line.  And then, they often didn't have sufficient forces to give that line any real depth, but instead had to defend on line, manning that whole front as best they could.  In the more fluid fighting in the south, on the other hand, the Germans could and did use strongpoint schemes.  The Russians got significantly better at night infiltration as a means to get into or through those, as the war went on.
 
Against Russian armor the German infantry formations also had a harder time of it.  In exceptional cases they could prepare gun lines with enough heavy ATGs well enough protected and sited to give an armor attack a bloody nose, but normally they were not rich or prepared enough for that.  Keep in mind that the Russians were quite good at tank infantry cooperation in their mech arm - by midwar that is, early they hadn't been - but lagged in the development of tank artillery cooperation.  Which is what tanks need to deal with gun based defenses efficiently.  The German infantry formations themselves tried to just strip tanks of their infantry escorts and let the tanks continue.  The Russians would sometimes make that mistake, and send the tanks deeper on their own.  That put them in the middle of a deep German defense that would know more about where they were and what they were doing than vice versa.  But that is really an "own goal" thing - if the Russian tanks just stayed with their riders and shot the crap out of the German infantry defenses, the Russian doctrine worked fine.
 
On a deeper level, the Germans relied on their own armor to stop Russian armor.  Brawling frontally with reserves, often enough, sometimes aided by superior AFVs.  Sometimes by counterattacks that sought to cut off the leading Russian spearheads, and prevent their resupply (with fuel above all).  That worked less and less well as the war went on, however, because the Russians got better at keeping multiple threats growing on the map, gauging defender strength correctly and waiting for all arms to consolidate gains, and the like.  There was also just less of the fire brigade German armor later in the war, and it had less of an edge in tactical know-how.
 
There are also some weaknesses of the Russian doctrine that the Germans tried to exploit.  It can be quite predictable.  You can let them succeed at things to draw them in, in a pretty predictable way.  The Russian mech way of attacking was at its best against infantry defenses, or vs armor against heavily outnumbered defenders.  If they pushed too hard at a strong block of armor, they could get a brigade killed in a matter of hours.  If you have such an asset, you can try to string the two together - let them hit a weak spot precisely where you want them to come on hard into your planned kill sack.  They aren't doing a lot of battlefield recon to spot such things, they are mostly relying on speed to create surprise.  If you let them think they just made a brilliant and formula perfect break in, they are apt to drive hard trying to push it home, and not to suspect that its is a trap.  But a lot of things get easier if you have a Tiger or Panther battalion lying around, don't they?

Aured - Did the Russians use the same fire and maneuver tactics with typical triangle tasking used by the US in WW II?  No they did not.
 
Did they understand the basic principles of fire and maneuver, sure.  But the whole army was organized differently, tasked differently, placed less reliance on close coordination with artillery fires, wasn't based on small probes by limited infantry elements to discover the enemy and subject him to more of those fires, etc.  Basically there are a whole host of army-specific optimizations in US tactics that just don't apply.
 
The Russian force is divided into its mechanized arm and the rifle arm (called "combined arms" at the army level, but still distinct from mech).  Each had its own specific mix of standard tactics.  There are some common elements between them, but you should basically think of them as two distinct doctrines, each tailored to the force types and operational roles that type had.  Conceptually, the mech arm is the arm of maneuver and decision and exploitation, while the rifle arm is the arm of holding ground, creating breakthroughs / assault, and general pressure.  The mech arm is numerically only about a tenth of the force, but is far better armed and equipped, and controls more like 2/3rds of the armor.
 
The Front is the first element of the force structure that does not respect this distinction and is entirely above it, and Fronts are not uniform in composition, but always contain forces of both types (just sometimes only limited amounts of the mech type).  From the army level down to the brigade level, the distinction applies at one level or another.  Below that level it still applies but cross attachments may blur somewhat, but normally at all lower levels one has clearly either the mech or the rifle force type and uses the tactics appropriate to that type.
 
The army level is the principle control level for supporting elements and attachments - much higher than in other armies (e.g. for the Germans it was almost always the division level, with little above that level in the way of actual maneuver elements). The army commander is expected to "task" his pool of support arms formations to this or that division-scale formation within his command for a specific operation, depending on the role he has assigned to that formation.  This can easily double the organic weapons of such formations, and in the combined arms armies, is the sole way the rifle divisions get armor allocated to them.  What are we talking about here?  Independent tank brigades and regiments, SU regiments, heavy mortar regiments, rocket brigades and battalions, antitank brigades and regiments, motorcycle recon regiments and battalions, extra pioneer battalions, heavy artillery formations from regiment up to divisions in size, etc.  Basically, half of the guns and all of the armor is in the army commander's "kit bag" to dole out to his divisions depending on their role.  A rifle division tasked to lead an attack may have a full tank brigade attached, plus a 120mm mortar formation to double its firepower at the point of the intended breakthrough.  Another rifle division expected to defend on relatively open ground, suited to enemy tanks, may have an antitank artillery brigade attached, tripling its number of 76mm guns, and a pioneer battalion besides, tasked with mining all likely routes and creating anti tank ditches and other obstacles, etc.
 
Every division is given enough of the supporting arms to just barely fulfill its minimal standard role, and everything needed to do it better is pooled up in the army commander's kit bag, and doled out by him to shape the battle.  Similarly, the army commander will retain major control of artillery fires and fire plans.  Those are not a matter of a 2nd Lt with a radio calling in his target of opportunity, but of a staff of half a dozen highly trained technicians drafting a coordinated plan for days, all submitted to and approved - or torn up - by the army commander.  This highly centralized system was meant to maximize the impact of very scarce combined arms intelligence and tactical skill, which could not be expected of every green 2nd Lt.  
 
Within the rifle divisions, each level of the org chart has its own organic fire support, so that it does not need to rely on the highest muckety-muck and his determination that your sector is the critical one today.  When he does decide that, he is going to intervene in your little corner of the world with a weight of fire like a falling house; when he doesn't, you are going to make do with your assigned peashooters.
 
The divisional commander is assigning his much smaller divisional fires on the same principles, with the understanding that those smaller fires become not so small if the army commander lends him an extra 36 120mm mortars for this one.  The regimental commander may get his share of the divisional fires or he may get nothing outside what his own organic firepower arms can supply - but he gets a few 76mm infantry guns and some 120mm mortars and a few 45mm ATGs so that he can make such assignments even if he gets no help.  Frankly though the regiment adds little - it mostly assigns its battalions missions, and the regimental commander's main way of influencing the fight is the formation he assigns to those component battalions.  Formation in the very simplest sense - he has 3 on line to cover a wide front, or he has 3 in column on the same frontage to provide weight behind an attack, or the 2-1 or 1-2 versions of either of those.  It is not the case that he always uses 2-1 on all roles.  The most common defense is 2-1 and the most common offensive formation is column, all 3 one behind the other on the same frontage.  Notice, this isn't about packing the riflemen in - those will go off in waves at proper intervals front to back.  But it puts all 27 of the regiment's 82mm mortars (9 per battalion) in support behind 1 or 2 kilometers of front line.
 
The fire support principle at the battalion level is not implemented by having one of the component battalions support the others by fire from a stationary spot, with all arms.  Instead it is a combined arms thing inside each battalion.  They each have their 9 82mm mortars and their 9 Maxim heavy machineguns organized into platoons, and the "fire support plan" is based on those infantry heavy weapons.  Battalion AT ability is minimal - 2 45mm ATGs and a flock of ATRs, barely enough to hold off enemy halftracks and hopeless against whole battalions of tanks.  But that is because the higher muckety-mucks are expected to know where the enemy tanks are going to come and to have put all the army level ATG formations and their own supporting armor formations and the pioneers with their minefields and obstacles, in those spots.
 
Down inside the battalion, the same formation choices arise for the component rifle companies as appeared at battalion, and the usual formations are again 2-1 on defense and all in column on the attack.  And yes that means you sometimes get really deep columns of attack, with a division first stepping off with just a few lead companies with others behind them, and so on.  This doesn't mean packed shoulder to shoulder formations, it means normal open intervals 9 times in a row, one behind another, only one at a time stepping off into enemy fire zones.  These "depth tactics" were meant to *outlast* the enemy on the same frontage, in an attrition battle, *not* to "run him off his feet in one go", nor to outmaneuver him.  The later parts could be sidestepped to a sector that was doing better and push through from there.  The last to "pancake" to the front if the other had all failed, would not attack, but instead go over to the defensive on the original frontage and hold.  One gets reports of huge loss totals and those "justifying" the attack attempt when this happens - the commander can show that he sent 8/9ths of his formation forward but they could not break through.  It is then the fault of the muckety muck who didn't gauge the level of support he needed correctly or given him enough supporting fires etc.  If on the other hand the local commander came back with losses of only his first company or two and a remark that "it doesn't look good, we should try something else", he will be invited to try being a private as that something else, etc.
 
What is expected of the lower level commander in these tactics is that he "lay his ship alongside of the enemy", as Nelson put it before Trafalgar.  In other words, close with the enemy and fight like hell, hurt him as much as your organic forces can manage to hurt him.  Bravery, drive, ruthlessness - these are the watchwords, not cleverness or finesse or artistry.  
 
What is happening in the combined arms tactics within that rifle column attack?  The leading infantry companies are presenting the enemy a fire discipline dilemma - how close to let the advancing Russian infantry get before revealing their own positions by cutting loose.  The longer they take to do so, the close the Russian infantry gets before being driven to the ground.  Enemy fire is fully expected to drive the leading infantry waves to the ground, or even to break them or destroy them outright - at first.  But every revealed firing point in that cutting loose is then subjected to another round of prep fire by all of the organic and added fire support elements supporting the attack.  The battalion 82mm mortars, any attached tanks, and the muckety-mucks special falling skies firepower, smashes up whatever showed itself crucifying the leading wave.
 
Then the next wave goes in, just like the first, on the same frontage.  No great finesse about it, but some of the defenders already dead in the meantime.  Same dilemma for his survivors.  When they decide to hold their fire to avoid giving the mortars and Russian artillery and such, juicy new things to shoot at, the advancing infantry wave gets in among them instead.  And goes to work with grenade and tommy gun, flushing out every hole.  The grenadier is the beater and the tommy gun is the shotgun, and Germans are the quail.  Notice, the firepower of the infantry that matters in this is the short range stuff, because at longer range the killing is done by supporting artillery arms.  The rifles of the most of the infantry supplement of course, but really the LMGs and rifles are primarily there as the defensive firepower of the rifle formation, at range.
 
It is slow and it is bloody and it is inefficient - but it is relentless.  The thing being maximized is fight and predictability - that the higher muckety mucks can count on an outcome on this part of the frontage proportional to what they put into it.  Where they need to win, they put in enough and they do win - hang the cost.  It isn't pure suicide up front - the infantry go to ground when fired at and they fire back,and their supporting fires try to save them, and the next wave storms forward to help and pick up the survivors and carry them forward (and carry the wounded back).  In the meantime the men that went to ground are defending themselves as best they can and sniping what they can see;  they are not expected to stand up again and go get killed.  That is the next wave's job.  The first did its part when it presented its breast to the enemy's bullets for that first advance.  The whole rolls forward like a ratchet, the waves driven to ground holding tenaciously whatever they reached.
 
That is the rifle, combined arms army, way of fighting.
 
The mech way of fighting is quite different.  There are some common elements but again it is better to think of it like a whole different army with its own techniques.  Where the rifle arm emphasizes depth and relentlessly, the mech way emphasizes rapid decision and decisive maneuver, which is kept dead simple and formulaic, but just adaptive enough to be dangerous.
 
First understand that the standard formation carrying out the mech way of fighting is the tank corps, which consists of 3 tank and 1 rifle brigade, plus minimal attachments of motorized guns, recon, and pioneers.  The rifle brigade is 3 battalions and is normally trailing the tank brigades and holds what they take.  Sometimes it doubles their infantry weight and sometimes it has to lead for a specific mission (force a river crossing, say, or a night infiltration attack that needs stealth - things only infantry can do), but in the normal offensive case it is just driving up behind something a tank brigade took, dismounting, and manning the position to let the tank brigade go on to its next mission.  It has trucks to keep up, and the usual infantry heavy weapons of 82mm mortars and heavy MGs, but it uses them to defend ground taken.  Notionally, the rifle brigade is the tank corps' "shield" and it maneuvers it separately as such.
 
The business end of the tank corps is thus its tank brigades, which are its weapons.  Each has a rifle battalion organic that is normally physically riding on the tanks themselves, and armed mostly with tommy guns.  The armor component of each brigade is equivalent in size to a western tank battalion - 50-60 tanks at full TOE - despite the formation name.
 
I will get to the larger scale tactics of the use of the tank brigades in just a second, but first the lowest level, tactical way the tanks with riders fight must be explained.  It is a version of the fire discipline dilemma discussed earlier, but now with the critical difference that the tanks have huge firepower against enemy infantry and other dismounts, making any challenge to them by less than a full panzer battalion pretty suicidal.  What the tanks can't do is force those enemy dismounts to open fire or show themselves.  Nor can the tanks alone dig them out of their holes if they don't open fire.  That is what the riders are there to do - kill the enemy in his holes under the overwatch of the massed tanks if and only if the enemy stays low and keeps quiet and tries to just hide from the tanks.  That threat is meant to force the enemy to open fire.  When they do, the riders drop off and take cover and don't need to do anything - the tanks murder the enemy.  Riders pick their way forward carefully after that, and repeat as necessary if there are enemy left alive.  This is all meant to be delivered very rapidly as an attack - drive right at them, take fire, stop and blast for 5 or 10 minutes tops, and move forward again, repeating only a few times before being right on or over the enemy.
 
So that covers the small tactics of the mech arm on the attack.  Up a bit, though, they are maneuvering, looking for enemy weak spots, especially the weak spots in his anti tank defenses.  And that follows a standard formula of the echelon attack.  
 
Meaning, the standard formation is a kind of staggered column with the second element just right or left of the leading one, and the third off to the same side as far again.  The individual tank brigade will use this approach with its component tank companies or pairs of companies, and the whole corps will use it again with its brigades.
 
The first element of such an echelon attack heads for whatever looks like the weakest part of the enemy position - in antitank terms - and hits it as hard as it can, rapidly, no pausing for field recon.  The next in is reacting to whatever that first one experiences, but expects to wrap around one flank of whatever holds up the prior element and hit hard, again, from a slightly changing direction.  This combined hit, in rapid succession, is expected to destroy that blockage or shove it aside.  The third element following is expected to hit air, a hole made by the previous, and push straight into the interior of the enemy position and keep going.  If the others are checked, it is expected to drive clear around the enemy of the harder enemy position - it does not run onto the same enemy hit by the previous elements.  If the enemy line is long enough and strong enough to be neither flanked nor broken through by this process, well tough then.  Some other formation higher in the chain or two grids over is expected to have had better luck in the meantime.
 
There are of course minor adaptations possible in this formula.  If the lead element breaks clean through, the others shift slightly into its wake and just exploit - they don't hit any new portion of the enemy's line.  If the first hit a position that is clearly strong as well as reasonably wide, the other two elements may pivot outward looking for an open flank instead of the second hitting right where the first did, just from a different angle.  The leading element can pull up short and just screen the frontage if they encounter strong enemy armor.  Then the second still tries to find an open flank, but the third might slide into reserve between and behind the first and second.
 
The point of the whole approach is to have some adaptability and flexibility, to be designed around reinforcing success and hitting weaker flanks not just frontal slogging - all of which exploit the speed and maneuver power of the tanks within the enemy's defensive zone.  But they are also dead simple, formulas that can be learned by rote and applied mechanically.  They are fast because there is no waiting for recon pull to bring back info on where to hit.  The substance that needs to be grasped by the leader of a 2nd or 3rd element is very limited, and either he can see it himself or the previous element manages to convey it to him, or gets it up to the commander of all three and he issues the appropriate order downward.  They are all mechanically applying the same doctrine and thinking on the same page, even if out of contact at times or having different amounts of information.  The whole idea is get the power of maneuver adaptation without the delays or the confusion that can set in when you try to ask 3 or more bullheaded linemen to solve advanced calculus problems.  There is just one "play" - "you hit him head on and stand him up, then I'll hit him low and shove him aside, and Joe can run through the hole".
 
There are some additional principles on defense, the rifle formation forces specially,  where they use 2 up 1 back and all around zones and rely on stealth and field fortifications for their protection, while their heavy weapons reach out far enough to cover the ground between each "blob", and their LMGs and rifles reach out far enough to protect each blob frontally from enemy infantry.  That plus deeper artillery fires provides a "soft defense" that is expected to strip enemy infantry from any tanks, or to stop infantry only attacks on its own.  Or, at least, to make it expensive to trade through each blob in layer after layer, in the same "laying his ship alongside of the enemy", exchange-attrition sense.  Then a heavier AT "network" has to cover the same frontage but starting a bit farther back, overlapped with the second and later infantry "blobs".  The heavy AT network is based on cross fire by 45mm and 76mm ATGs, plus obstacles (watrer, ditches, mines, etc) to channel enemy tanks to the locations where those are dense.  Any available armor stays off the line in reserve and slides in front of enemy penetration attempts, hitting strength not weakness in this case, just seeking to seal off penetrations and neutralize any "differential" in odds or armor concentration along the frontage.  On defense, the mech arm operates on its own principles only at tank corps and higher scale, and does so by counterpunching with its offensive tactics, already described above.
 
That's it, in a nutshell.  I hope this helps.  

Yes, having to deal with the consequences of your actions/successes/failures in one battle continue to the next battle(s) is what makes CM such a great game.
 
That's one of the reasons that it is vital for BF to put more focus on Campaigns that use/exploit all the features that their game engine allows - branching, penalizing excessive friendly casualties, destruction of "valuable" buildings, core units, as well as using up too much ammo etc etc. 
 
After CMSF was patched to its current (excellent) iteration, the campaigns that were created for CMSF by volunteer players became increasingly sophisticated, and many were quite brilliant.  As new CM2 titles were released it seems like the campaigns have unfortunately become increasingly cookie cutter, simplistic and rather boring.
 
It's understandable that campaigns have been neglected since the work involved is tremendous - several man-months to create a good campaign.  That's not sustainable by volunteers.  I am very happy to hear that BF is planning Campaign modules to sell.  That may be more important than continually creating new CM2 products.

I know full well of the "other side of the coin" with the Russian crimes they commited and the suffering. I also remember Uncle Joe was in charge and was the author of the Katyn Forest massacre of the Polish Officer Corps. Not to forget the countless other atrocities he initiated such as the "Blocking Units" used to shoot their own soldiers who fled the battlefield. And as the inhumanity of both sides progressed the SOP became "paybacks are a bitch".
 
Also look at the U.S. and our inhumanity to our own countrymen during WW2. We dispossessed hundreds of Japanese citizens from their homes and businesses then put them in internment camps. However we let the German decendents run free all over the East and Midwest of the country.
 
Plus look at modern times. Just because a person is of Middle Eastern ethnicity or practices the Muslim religion puts them under scrutiny.
 
The first casualties of any war is innocence and humanity.

Hello Gentlemen
 
I bring you exciting news of the new Scenario Depot III which has been funded by The Few Good Men.  As we all know The Scenario Depot II was the go to place for Scenario downloads with its most successful period being from the mid-90's to the early 00's for the CMX1 series of games.  Unfortunately it was never updated to encompass the CMX2 series of games but all that is about to change.  I introduce to you The Scenario Depot III.
 

 
The new site is a community wide project and despite being hosted on The Few Good Men servers membership of The FGM is not required.  We have reached a stage where the site is pretty much finished and all that remains to be tested now is its load bearing capabilities.  
 
The Scenario Depot III is the place to upload your completed play tested scenarios for the enjoyment of the CMx2 community and I'm asking if you scenario designers out there would do me the honour of starting to upload your scenarios to the database as a stress test exercise.  If all goes well The Scenario Depot III will be up and running henceforth.
 
The site is available HERE
 
Please read 'The About The Scenario Depot III' section and then go to 'Upload A File' to go through the simple process of getting your scenario into our database awaiting front page post upload. 
 
I would like to thank Gary Krockover the original designer of The Scenario Depot II and The Proving Grounds for his permission to launch the next era of the sites catering for the new games released by Battlefront in the CMX2 series.
 
The site covers all CMX2 games [Afghanistan, Shock Force, Battles for Normandy, Fortress Italy, Red Thunder , Black Sea] and has areas waiting to be opened for the Bulge games forthcoming release.
 
As well as scenarios and campaigns the site also offers the capability of uploading user designed maps for players to download.
 
At present we have just the one map uploaded so please pop over and start adding your content and if you wish to donate towards the endeavour there is a link at the bottom of the right hand column for you generous folk out there.  Donations will go towards the programmes required to get The Proving Grounds up and running which is phase 2 of the project.  I look forward to seeing your work being submitted.
 
Thanks for reading.
 
Bootie

This document has been bouncing around on the internet for a while now. I've just rediscovered it and it makes for some interesting reading - allowing for the usual panzer hyperbole vs untermenche rubbish - as it contains many tactical tips that are applicable to the CMRt battlefield. I think it's an early Ost front document - perhaps 1942, maybe early 43.
 
This is the full text which I've taken from the FieldGrau website (worth visiting in it's own right). The link is HERE 
 
If you'd like the text in the original German I found this LINK.
 
I've highlighted the lessons I've found really useful on the CMRT battlefield.
 
AUTHOR's PREFACE
  The Panzer Regiment is, by reason of its firepower, protection and mobility the main fighting power of the Division. Its strength lies in unexpected, concentrated and determined attack; aggressive leadership and daring operations.   FORWARD   Combat in Russia has shown once again that for us, in action against the Communists, it is not so much the kind or number of our tanks but the spirit and skill on the tank soldiers that count. Only by these factors are German tanks always, even in Russia, victorious.   This exemplary combat spirit can however count for little as the weapons speed, armor or number of tanks in achieving success, if they are not led and employed by fully competent officers.   Superior tactical leadership in battle is a prerequisite when one desires few, or better still, no casualties.   The purpose of this volume is to collect the experiences of the veteran front-line combat leaders of our Regiments in action, and pass it on in simple and understandable form to our junior officers.   1. Before any attack acquaint yourself with the ground. Use the information provided by other units or by the map. Share this information with your subordinate commanders. Exact information and correct estimation of the terrain will be the decisive difference between victory and defeat.   2. No armored attack is so fast, even under the most pressing situation, that you do not have time to put subordinate leaders into the picture about the tactical situation, mission, and anything else which may impact on the coming action. Losses due to over-hasty action are your responsibility and place the success of the mission in jeopardy.   3. Only careful combat reconnaissance can protect you from surprise. Protect to your flanks as well as the front. Observation to all sides is the duty of every commander. ALWAYS KEEP YOUR EYE OUT FOR THE ENEMY!    4. Your entire ability in combat must be used to make a constant appreciation of the situation. Only in this manner can you make the correct decision during the decisive seconds and issue short, clear orders without delay. This is the kind of leadership for which you are responsible.    5. Iron radio discipline is a prerequisite of good leadership, particularly when your only method of command is radio. In the point company for instance, the trail platoons should not use the radio at all except in emergency, leaving the net clear for the point platoon leader.    6. You must lead with strength. At least two tanks must be forward, and the trail platoons must be held far enough forward to support the lead platoon. The more guns that fire in the first minute, the quicker the enemy will be defeated and the fewer losses you will suffer.    7. When breaking cover, do it quickly and together. The more targets the enemy is shown simultaneously, the harder his fire control and distribution will be, and the more guns you will have in effect on the enemy.    8. In the attack drive as fast as you can. At slow speed you can see and shoot only a little better than at high, and are much more likely to be hit. For a tank there should be only two speeds: the half (for firing!) and all out forward. This is the basic principal of tank combat!    9. When antitank weapons are encountered at long or medium ranges, you must first return fire and then maneuver against them. First make a firing halt in order to bring effective fire to bear - then commit the bulk of the company to maneuver on the enemy with the continued support of one platoon.    10. When antitank weapons are encountered at close range, stopping is suicide. Only immediate attack at the highest speed with every weapon firing will have success and reduce losses.    11. In combat against the antitank guns you may never - even under the protection of strong fire support - allow a single platoon to attack alone. Antitank weapons are not employed singly. Remember - lone tanks in Russia are lost!    12. You must continually keep a broad interval between vehicles. This splits the enemy's defensive fire and complicates his fire control. Narrow intervals must be avoided at all costs, especially in critical situations, or it will cost you losses.    13. When an impassable obstacle, for instance a minefield or antitank ditch, is encountered you must immediately and without hesitation give the order to withdraw into the nearest cover. Standing still, in open sight, trying to carry on the attack, has in such circumstances no sense and will only cost you losses. Your consideration on how to make a new start will be best made in the safety of cover.    14. When your attack must pass potential enemy tank positions, for instance a woodline, you should either pass by them so closely that you are inside their minimum range, or remain so far away that you are outside their maximum effective range.    15. Enemy tanks should not be attacked directly, because then they see you and know your strength before you can kill them. More often, you should avoid them until you can move into favorable firing positions, and surprise them from the flank or rear. Repelled enemy tank assaults must be aggressively pursued.    16. A strongpoint, for instance a small village or artillery battery position, whenever possible should be attacked from different directions simultaneously in order to split enemy defensive fire and deceive him about the true location and direction of the attack. In this manner your breakthrough will be easier and your losses fewer.    17. Always prepare dug in positions and camouflage against the possibility of air or artillery attack. Being sorry afterwards is no excuse for losses taken by these causes.    18. Ammunition should not always be conserved; in the decisive moment, if you want to save casualties, you may expend ammunition at exceptionally high rates (for instance, an emergency attack.)    19. Never split your combat power; that is to say, do not employ parts of the company in such a manner that they cannot support each other. When your attack has two objectives you should attack first one and then the other with all weapons. In this way you will more certainly end up with both objectives in hand and fewer casualties.    20. Support from artillery fire or dive bombers must be used immediately, that is to say, while the fire is still hitting the objective. Afterward, when the fire has stopped it is too late. You must know that mostly such fires only produce a suppressing effect, not a destroying one. It is better to risk a friendly shell or bomb than to charge into an active antitank defense.   21. Other weapons and arms, cross-attached to you, should not be misused. Do not use them for purposes for which they were not intended, for example, do not use tank destroyers as assault guns, or armored infantry as tanks, or recon or engineer troops as infantry.    22. Unarmored or lightly armored units attached to you must be protected from any unnecessary losses until they are needed for their own operational tasks, for which reason they were attached to you.    23. Cross-attached units placed under your command are not your servants, but your guests. You are answerable to supply them and share everything they need. Don't just use them on guard duty! In this way they will work better and more loyally for you when you need them. And that will be often!    24. In combined operations with infantry or armored infantry, you must make certain that the arms stick close together; only so can they help each other and achieve success. Which of the two is leading is a secondary matter; what must be known is that it is the intention of the enemy to separate them and that you must prevent this in all circumstances. Your battlecry must be "Protect the Infantry!" and the infantry's battlecry is "Protect the Tanks!"    25. You and your soldiers must always concentrate on your combat mission, i.e. "the bridge," and you may not turn aside, for example, to an enemy on your flank, unless he is actually dangerous to the accomplishment of your mission. Then you must attack and destroy him.    26. After a victorious battle; i.e. the seizure of a bridge or the occupation of a village, keep your helmets on. That is to say, prepare for a counterattack which will certainly come, perhaps in a different place than you expect. Later you can collect the spoils of victory.    27. In a defense or security mission place your tanks so that not only their firepower, but also their shock action can be brought into play. Also, leave only a few tanks in stationary firing positions. Keep most as mobile reserves under cover. Tanks defend aggressively!    28. Against strong enemy resistance, there is no point in continuing to attack. Every failed attack only costs more casualties. Your effort must always be to hold the enemy with only weak forces, in order to use mass of your strength at another, weaker place, breakthrough, and destroy the enemy by surprise attack in the rear or flank.    29. Never forget that your soldiers do not belong to you, but to Germany. Personal glory hunting and senseless dare-deviltry lead only to exceptional cases to success, but always cost blood. In battle against the Soviet- Russians you must temper your courage with your judgement, your cunning, your instincts and your tactical ability. Only then will you have the prerequisites to be victorious in battle and only then will your soldiers look on you with loyalty and respect and always stand by you in untiring combat readiness.    30. The panzer division in modern warfare today holds the former place of cavalry as the decisive arm of combat. Tank officers must carry on in the tradition of the cavalry, take up its aggressive spirit on behalf of the Panzer arm. Therefore take note, as a basic combat principle, of Marshall Blucher's motto, "FORWARD AND THROUGH!" (but with intelligence).

It does matter, seeing how arrogant you are coming across towards anyone who dares disagree with you. I speak a small bit of German as well, but I'm not gonna be one to puff up my chest and tell others how wrong they are and how right I am. 

womble, do you even speak German? 

Zat would be "Monsieur Le (P)resident Troll ®" to you, Meester Mumble.
 
Ah trust yore Eengleesh  ees better zan yore French.

Maneuver is still the basis of Teutonic war. While a Russian guide in this vein would emphasize smashing an enemy with direct fire and an American guide would emphasize surgical precision strikes from air support and artillery prior to attack, the advice strikes me as quintessentially German.

Hello BF forum members,   I recently produced an AAR 'film' of a PBEM game I played out with Rico from The Few Good Men, as part of Rico's Cross of Iron multiplayer campaign.   I particularly enjoyed the final episode I played, called Blunting the Spear, and decided to make a film out of it. Rather than go for a standard PBEM game, Rico role played the Soviet side which made for a great experience for the German commanders. My encounter turned into a huge tank KO fest which I thought would make for a good AAR subject. So as a homage to Rico's campaign I've put together a film of the battle.   I've adopted a different style on this occasion to my usual commentary AARs, and tried to produce something which tells more of a story to reflect the fantastic storyline Rico developed for Cross of Iron.   On a separate note, I also hope the BF crew recognise my love for the game they've created. I'm a little annoyed that my work IP address has been banned from accessing BF's sites. I presume they've marked me down as a 'bad egg' for questioning the content of the upcoming CM Bulge release on the FGM forum (it's my understanding that BF staff have read the thread there). Please note this BF, when I've been critical of CM, it's always been out of a love for the game and a desire to see it become the best game it can, rather than a want to undermine it. I would appreciate it if you could take my work IP address off your ban list, I've tried emailing you about the subject but had no response.    Even if only in  a small way, I hope the few CM videos I've made over the years have helped to market your game and increase its audience. At the very least I hope the hundreds of hours I've put into making them demonstrate that I'm not some destructive CM troll.   All the best (and hoping you don't ban my home IP address)   Odin  

An oldie now and made using an early Beta.
 

new video
 

I need some popcorn !
 
P