Combatintman

Exactly - the point I wanted to highlight, given my particular trade, is the use of IPB.  It is an effective tool, particularly when you can draw on the expertise of SMEs - in this case a combat engineer who knows the detail on the river and bank conditions.  From there, as an analyst, once you narrow down the likely crossing sites you can start refining your NAIs and TAIs.  He also discusses the likely enemy assets needed to cross that gap and that allows you to work out the echelon you're facing and where that equipment might come from and how it will get to where it needs to be.  This allows you to add more NAIs to locate them and TAIs to strike them.  By knowing the equipment that is likely to be used you can then give clearer direction to your ISR assets - in this instance look for boats.  If deemed a High Payoff Target (HPT) then you are looking to strike that/those asset(s).  There was also some good detail about timings as well as time estimates.
A lot of people outside the intelligence trade seem to think that good tactical intelligence is enabled by super secret technical whizzbangery.  In fact it isn't - it is essentially a speed-time-distance problem that you are solving based on a knowledge of the enemy's orbat/likely orbat and the area of operations.  This is almost a classic case study of how to do this and how, if done competently (as in this case), tactical intelligence provides the decision support to get inside the enemy's OODA loop and to defeat him.

Christ on a bike ... that is truly shocking.  If they'd bothered with cam nets they'd all fit under the same one.

I won't delve into the tank part of the question but the other two are pretty easy.  One of the main bits of kit in the flamethrower platoon is the RPO-A
RPO-A Shmel - Wikipedia
As to its composition - not sure, in regular ground forces these elements sometimes get bundled under the title of 'assault engineers' or similar and at higher echelons are where you find the TOS rocket launcher.
TOS-1 - Wikipedia
Traditionally in the orbat, this equipment/capability sat under the chemical protection element at each level for reasons which always escaped me.
The ZU-23/2 on top of the BMD discussion has been thrown around a few times with some claiming that it had left service but it has definitely been seen in Ukraine.  I can't recall the origins of the idea of nailing a ZU-23/2 on top of a BMD - it could possibly have been back in Afghanistan to add high angle firepower to zap Mujahids on mountains.  However, it makes sense to have an air defence capable weapon system which is mechanised if the rest of your force is mechanised.  They probably are part of an air defence element bundled with a few MANPADS at the BTG level - nothing too sinister or worthy of overthinking here.

Exactly - the point I wanted to highlight, given my particular trade, is the use of IPB.  It is an effective tool, particularly when you can draw on the expertise of SMEs - in this case a combat engineer who knows the detail on the river and bank conditions.  From there, as an analyst, once you narrow down the likely crossing sites you can start refining your NAIs and TAIs.  He also discusses the likely enemy assets needed to cross that gap and that allows you to work out the echelon you're facing and where that equipment might come from and how it will get to where it needs to be.  This allows you to add more NAIs to locate them and TAIs to strike them.  By knowing the equipment that is likely to be used you can then give clearer direction to your ISR assets - in this instance look for boats.  If deemed a High Payoff Target (HPT) then you are looking to strike that/those asset(s).  There was also some good detail about timings as well as time estimates.
A lot of people outside the intelligence trade seem to think that good tactical intelligence is enabled by super secret technical whizzbangery.  In fact it isn't - it is essentially a speed-time-distance problem that you are solving based on a knowledge of the enemy's orbat/likely orbat and the area of operations.  This is almost a classic case study of how to do this and how, if done competently (as in this case), tactical intelligence provides the decision support to get inside the enemy's OODA loop and to defeat him.

Not if they don't have the assets - a fair few bits of PMP bridging (a divisional and above asset) are already gone in three attempts to cross, according to Google Earth mensuration, a 60m gap which therefore = 180m worth of PMP.  An old school Soviet Division had enough PMP to cross a 191m gap at Class 20 rating (so forget about getting your tanks across).  Time to rustle up another divisional set of bridging.

Back to the bridging ... there was talk of current and drift so I figured it was worth finding this out ...

Back to the bridging ... there was talk of current and drift so I figured it was worth finding this out ...

Exactly - the point I wanted to highlight, given my particular trade, is the use of IPB.  It is an effective tool, particularly when you can draw on the expertise of SMEs - in this case a combat engineer who knows the detail on the river and bank conditions.  From there, as an analyst, once you narrow down the likely crossing sites you can start refining your NAIs and TAIs.  He also discusses the likely enemy assets needed to cross that gap and that allows you to work out the echelon you're facing and where that equipment might come from and how it will get to where it needs to be.  This allows you to add more NAIs to locate them and TAIs to strike them.  By knowing the equipment that is likely to be used you can then give clearer direction to your ISR assets - in this instance look for boats.  If deemed a High Payoff Target (HPT) then you are looking to strike that/those asset(s).  There was also some good detail about timings as well as time estimates.
A lot of people outside the intelligence trade seem to think that good tactical intelligence is enabled by super secret technical whizzbangery.  In fact it isn't - it is essentially a speed-time-distance problem that you are solving based on a knowledge of the enemy's orbat/likely orbat and the area of operations.  This is almost a classic case study of how to do this and how, if done competently (as in this case), tactical intelligence provides the decision support to get inside the enemy's OODA loop and to defeat him.

Back to the bridging ... there was talk of current and drift so I figured it was worth finding this out ...

Opposite to my visual impression, thank you sorting that.

Back to the bridging ... there was talk of current and drift so I figured it was worth finding this out ...

Exactly - the point I wanted to highlight, given my particular trade, is the use of IPB.  It is an effective tool, particularly when you can draw on the expertise of SMEs - in this case a combat engineer who knows the detail on the river and bank conditions.  From there, as an analyst, once you narrow down the likely crossing sites you can start refining your NAIs and TAIs.  He also discusses the likely enemy assets needed to cross that gap and that allows you to work out the echelon you're facing and where that equipment might come from and how it will get to where it needs to be.  This allows you to add more NAIs to locate them and TAIs to strike them.  By knowing the equipment that is likely to be used you can then give clearer direction to your ISR assets - in this instance look for boats.  If deemed a High Payoff Target (HPT) then you are looking to strike that/those asset(s).  There was also some good detail about timings as well as time estimates.
A lot of people outside the intelligence trade seem to think that good tactical intelligence is enabled by super secret technical whizzbangery.  In fact it isn't - it is essentially a speed-time-distance problem that you are solving based on a knowledge of the enemy's orbat/likely orbat and the area of operations.  This is almost a classic case study of how to do this and how, if done competently (as in this case), tactical intelligence provides the decision support to get inside the enemy's OODA loop and to defeat him.

Exactly - the point I wanted to highlight, given my particular trade, is the use of IPB.  It is an effective tool, particularly when you can draw on the expertise of SMEs - in this case a combat engineer who knows the detail on the river and bank conditions.  From there, as an analyst, once you narrow down the likely crossing sites you can start refining your NAIs and TAIs.  He also discusses the likely enemy assets needed to cross that gap and that allows you to work out the echelon you're facing and where that equipment might come from and how it will get to where it needs to be.  This allows you to add more NAIs to locate them and TAIs to strike them.  By knowing the equipment that is likely to be used you can then give clearer direction to your ISR assets - in this instance look for boats.  If deemed a High Payoff Target (HPT) then you are looking to strike that/those asset(s).  There was also some good detail about timings as well as time estimates.
A lot of people outside the intelligence trade seem to think that good tactical intelligence is enabled by super secret technical whizzbangery.  In fact it isn't - it is essentially a speed-time-distance problem that you are solving based on a knowledge of the enemy's orbat/likely orbat and the area of operations.  This is almost a classic case study of how to do this and how, if done competently (as in this case), tactical intelligence provides the decision support to get inside the enemy's OODA loop and to defeat him.

That a probable platoon-sized group of Russians still haven't grasped tactical dispersion is the first deduction 😉

Exactly - the point I wanted to highlight, given my particular trade, is the use of IPB.  It is an effective tool, particularly when you can draw on the expertise of SMEs - in this case a combat engineer who knows the detail on the river and bank conditions.  From there, as an analyst, once you narrow down the likely crossing sites you can start refining your NAIs and TAIs.  He also discusses the likely enemy assets needed to cross that gap and that allows you to work out the echelon you're facing and where that equipment might come from and how it will get to where it needs to be.  This allows you to add more NAIs to locate them and TAIs to strike them.  By knowing the equipment that is likely to be used you can then give clearer direction to your ISR assets - in this instance look for boats.  If deemed a High Payoff Target (HPT) then you are looking to strike that/those asset(s).  There was also some good detail about timings as well as time estimates.
A lot of people outside the intelligence trade seem to think that good tactical intelligence is enabled by super secret technical whizzbangery.  In fact it isn't - it is essentially a speed-time-distance problem that you are solving based on a knowledge of the enemy's orbat/likely orbat and the area of operations.  This is almost a classic case study of how to do this and how, if done competently (as in this case), tactical intelligence provides the decision support to get inside the enemy's OODA loop and to defeat him.

Exactly - the point I wanted to highlight, given my particular trade, is the use of IPB.  It is an effective tool, particularly when you can draw on the expertise of SMEs - in this case a combat engineer who knows the detail on the river and bank conditions.  From there, as an analyst, once you narrow down the likely crossing sites you can start refining your NAIs and TAIs.  He also discusses the likely enemy assets needed to cross that gap and that allows you to work out the echelon you're facing and where that equipment might come from and how it will get to where it needs to be.  This allows you to add more NAIs to locate them and TAIs to strike them.  By knowing the equipment that is likely to be used you can then give clearer direction to your ISR assets - in this instance look for boats.  If deemed a High Payoff Target (HPT) then you are looking to strike that/those asset(s).  There was also some good detail about timings as well as time estimates.
A lot of people outside the intelligence trade seem to think that good tactical intelligence is enabled by super secret technical whizzbangery.  In fact it isn't - it is essentially a speed-time-distance problem that you are solving based on a knowledge of the enemy's orbat/likely orbat and the area of operations.  This is almost a classic case study of how to do this and how, if done competently (as in this case), tactical intelligence provides the decision support to get inside the enemy's OODA loop and to defeat him.

Exactly - the point I wanted to highlight, given my particular trade, is the use of IPB.  It is an effective tool, particularly when you can draw on the expertise of SMEs - in this case a combat engineer who knows the detail on the river and bank conditions.  From there, as an analyst, once you narrow down the likely crossing sites you can start refining your NAIs and TAIs.  He also discusses the likely enemy assets needed to cross that gap and that allows you to work out the echelon you're facing and where that equipment might come from and how it will get to where it needs to be.  This allows you to add more NAIs to locate them and TAIs to strike them.  By knowing the equipment that is likely to be used you can then give clearer direction to your ISR assets - in this instance look for boats.  If deemed a High Payoff Target (HPT) then you are looking to strike that/those asset(s).  There was also some good detail about timings as well as time estimates.
A lot of people outside the intelligence trade seem to think that good tactical intelligence is enabled by super secret technical whizzbangery.  In fact it isn't - it is essentially a speed-time-distance problem that you are solving based on a knowledge of the enemy's orbat/likely orbat and the area of operations.  This is almost a classic case study of how to do this and how, if done competently (as in this case), tactical intelligence provides the decision support to get inside the enemy's OODA loop and to defeat him.

Exactly - the point I wanted to highlight, given my particular trade, is the use of IPB.  It is an effective tool, particularly when you can draw on the expertise of SMEs - in this case a combat engineer who knows the detail on the river and bank conditions.  From there, as an analyst, once you narrow down the likely crossing sites you can start refining your NAIs and TAIs.  He also discusses the likely enemy assets needed to cross that gap and that allows you to work out the echelon you're facing and where that equipment might come from and how it will get to where it needs to be.  This allows you to add more NAIs to locate them and TAIs to strike them.  By knowing the equipment that is likely to be used you can then give clearer direction to your ISR assets - in this instance look for boats.  If deemed a High Payoff Target (HPT) then you are looking to strike that/those asset(s).  There was also some good detail about timings as well as time estimates.
A lot of people outside the intelligence trade seem to think that good tactical intelligence is enabled by super secret technical whizzbangery.  In fact it isn't - it is essentially a speed-time-distance problem that you are solving based on a knowledge of the enemy's orbat/likely orbat and the area of operations.  This is almost a classic case study of how to do this and how, if done competently (as in this case), tactical intelligence provides the decision support to get inside the enemy's OODA loop and to defeat him.

Funnily enough what we professionals call drones did exactly that (minus being able to kill stuff) - I used to have to tell where such drones were needed and what needed to be looked at with the target being along the line of an upside down 'U' (in this case a slightly curved 'U').  The route out was on one side and the route back along the other side of said 'U'.  Wikipedia I know but I also know that this is reflective of my experience ...
Being a drone meant that it flew a programmed course and was not under any form of external control. In the CL-89 the programmed flight path was constrained by the very limited number of 'events' that could be programmed. These events including turns, changes in altitude, sensor activations/de-activations and landing. The programmed flightpath had to be corrected for meteorological conditions. Data for this was provided by a standard artillery Target Acquisition meteor message.
My bold ... and why professionals of a certain era do not call things that can be controlled in flight by someone on terra firma without the presence of people sat in the air frame, drones.
Wikipedia article in full ...
Canadair CL-89 - Wikipedia
This system left British Army service in 1991 - apparently the trucks were driven off the pier at the end of GW1.  If you search hard enough there is some BBC footage of one being launched during that conflict ... apparently, according to my gunner friends from 40 Field Regiment Royal Artillery with whom I had a close acquaintance during said war who'd heard the yarn, Kate Adie was most disappointed that she had not stumbled across a British truck-mounted cruise missile launcher ...
Kate Adie - Wikipedia
 
 

Some of the conversation over the few pages have referenced the former Yugoslavia.  Which brings back... well, not so good memories.
I was a Canadian peacekeeper in Bosnia in latter half of '93.   During the Croatian offensive in the Medak in Sept of '93, I was with the 2 PPCLI when we went into the sh*tstorm to try to stop the ethnic cleansing going on.  The Croatian army attacked our unit during that operation, a thing that the Croatian government denies to this very day.  Despite us photographing the Croatian dead after the battle and collecting their ID, etc.    We had god damn evidence and to this day, the Croatian government position is that they never attacked us.
Part of our job, beside trying to keep the warring factions apart, was to document evidence of ethnic cleansing and I was in charge (I was an officer) of a evidence collection team.  So, literally thousands of photos, videos.  Transcripts of interviews with witnesses and victims.  Six months exposed to that living hell, day after f*n day....
So I had the evidence, because sometimes our official recording devices ran out film or tape and we used our personal recording devices to finish up at a site.
After I got out the military, I found myself sometimes on various military forms about games, such as this one.  Arma forums, military wargame forums... that sort of thing.  And as it happened, I ran into forum members from Croatia and Bosnia Serbs and we would get into it.
Universally, every Croatian or Bosnian Serb forum poster denied what happened there.  And I was called a liar on many occasions for telling them them the truth of that war as I was there and they weren't.  And I have evidence to back up my claims.  No one believed me and if I offered visual proof, they didn't want to see it or they disclaimed it as fake.
I remember a particular Bosnian Serb who was not in the war but we got deep into the weeds discussing what happened during that war.  Deny, deny, deny.  It never happened.  Until videos that the Bosnian Serbs took of them killing civilians and dumping them in mass graves what was recorded by the very soldiers who committed the atrocities surfaced and made it onto their local media and they couldn't deny it any longer.  Those videos were part of the process besides sanctions that resulted in some notable Bosnia Serb / Serbian leaders being turned over to the ICC for prosecution for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.  After the revelation came out, this individual on that forum who I had spent hours engaging with about the culpability of Serbs in the atrocities simply ignored me from that point onwards.  I will never know why.... was it that he discovered that I was right all a long and he was wrong and he was ashamed (as he would have been) or he simply wanted to hang onto his delusion of what narrative he wanted to believe was true and he knew that I would keep chipping away.   
Denial is a powerful thing.   I don't understand why it has such power but it does.  People can dismiss an outright objective reality because to accept the truth is to undermine what they think reality is or should be.   I don't get it and is beyond madding to see the denials in the face of objective reality happen over and over.
Sigh.   I don't know why the hell I rambled on with this.  Maybe it was a story I need to tell to remain sane in light of the same brutality I witnessed back in Bosnia happening in Ukraine now.  Or maybe I still am the greater fool for believing my experiences in Bosnia can be an object lesson to others about holding onto a narrative that is personally comfortable but runs counter to all the real evidence to the contrary.   DMS, I am looking at you....
The truth will come out after all this is over.  At least, I hope it does.  The truth of this war needs to be told and codified so generations that follow can know what really happend.
Now at the end of this and reviewing it, I feel that I should have deleted this or apologize for it.  
I am hitting post. It is my truth.  Let people accept it and learn something from it or ignore it.  I needed to say this for a long time.   
 
 

Points to note - consistent with what the likes of me, @LukeFFand other veterans have been saying for a while on the long list of buddy aid threads, the extraction attempt was epic, no weapons or ammunition were harvested and nobody tried to give buddy aid from the prone position. 

His Majesty's Ship Dreadnought was launched in 1906 and commissioned into the Royal Navy later that year.

His Majesty's Ship Dreadnought was launched in 1906 and commissioned into the Royal Navy later that year.

It is a matter of taste, perception and implementation.  The Hull Down command in CMx1 was apparently quite good, I don't remember the intricasies myself but it seemed to work pretty much as designed; however, CMx2 is a lot more detailed in its modelling which makes things like hunt and hull down more tricky to implement in a way that satisfied players.  Some very experienced and highly skilled players such as @Bil Hardenberger eschew the Hull Down command in favour of using a series of other commands to get their unit/vehicle to a point that they have identified is Hull Down in relation to the direction the unit/vehicle will face or hull down in relation to where the enemy might be pointing a day ruining weapon system.  I am not a good player and rarely play the game other than testing scenarios so my comments in relation to whether Hunt-Slow-Pause combinations work better than Hull Down should be taken in that context.  My preference is to use a combination system rather than Hull Down but. I have seen Hull Down do the job on many occasions.
The sum of the parts is that it is not a case of coming up with a 'Don't Get Shot' (or whatever it is going to be called) command to replace Hull Down it is more one of deciding how much you are bothered by your troops getting zapped and working out whether Hull Down or another sequence of the available commands is the best solution to assuage your concerns.

More boom, boom, boom from Ukrainian gunners.  Target is Russian troops in Sulyhivka.  The image below is Google Earth roughly oriented to the starting angle of camera:

Footage:
Google Earth placemark:
Sulyhivka.kmz
General Orientation Overview:

Strapped for time so not much analysis I'm afraid - at least one tank and between at least half a dozen and dozen AFVs, some of which being MTLB variants.