SeinfeldRules

I probably have more questions then observations at this point. I don't think anything fundamentally has changed from previous conflict, even dating back to WW 1. Artillery is still a crucial arm of any modern military and is your only all weather, truly responsive means of shaping the battlefield. Artillery is the King of Battle, even with today's technology. I can't say I've been truly shocked at anything I've seen so far.
All of my observations are based off OSINT videos - I imagine most of the US military's observations of the conflict are still close hold at higher levels due to the sensitivity of collecting in an active conflict.
Drones have proven to be incredibly useful but I don't see anything revolutionary or fundamentally doctrine-altering with them - aerial observers have been a thing since the Civil War, and artillery battalions during WW2 literally had their own observation planes sometimes - we can just get them closer then ever before without risking a human. You still see a lot of "long range" observation from drones in these strike videos however - so there is definitely a real threat of ADA/EW that is keeping drones at a distance. It's harder then ever before to hide your forces from observation, but I imagine there are a lot of smart people churning away at a practical military answer to the UAV problem, and I think it will have an easier solution then the tank will have dealing with top down attack, fire-and-forget ATGM systems.
Loitering munitions I'm still not 100% sold on - probably useful for high value targets (radar, ADA, command posts), but seem hard to utilize at a more tactical level.  Honestly, it seems like a complex solution to a problem that isn't terribly hard to solve with more conventional and flexible fires. The Switchblade 300 is seriously unimpressive to me, a glorified flying grenade. Great for taking out an ISIS leader in the middle of a crowd, not so impactful in a war where individual casualties are a given and virtually meaningless in a tactical or operational sense. I don't think the Switchblade 300 is going to single-handedly stop a town from being lost. Would LOVE to see an actual statistical analysis on the effectiveness of loitering munitions, that isn't all buzz words and "ooooh scary kamikaze drones!!"
Armored vehicles seem to be more vulnerable to artillery then commonly believed in the US/NATO. Lots of footage of (what seems to be) destroyed vehicles due to rocket and cannon fire.
Not seeing much utilization of mortars. Not sure if this is due to a lack of use, improper characterization of OSINT videos, or a function of UKR/RUS TOE lacking a significant amount of mortar tubes?
Russian and Ukrainian artillery forces seldom use effective cover and are often lined up in neat rows in the open, instead of utilizing dispersion and tree lines. I think this is mainly a function of the manual nature of most of their artillery, which requires howitzers to be somewhat closer and more orderly for a variety of technical reasons I won't get in to (unless you would like me to). This is in contract to the digital, self-locating, self-laying howitzers the US military has, which have a more robust ability to "roam". Of note, the M777s we gifted to Ukraine do not seem to have this self-locating capability, as the two videos I've seen of the howitzers operating in Ukraine showed them lacking these digital systems. These may be the Canadian howitzers though. Will be following that one closely.
Lack of digital systems aside, the above does stir some questions in my mind on the actual effectiveness and feasibility of true "counterfire" - meaning a howitzer shoots, then immediately has to move to avoid rapid and accurate fires from an opposing artillery unit. I don't think UKR and RUS artillery units are so pig headed or naive to not appreciate the usefulness of emplacing in a tree line - I wonder if the impetus to do so is even there. What I mean by that is: how often are artillery units shooting and then immediately taking fire? I don't see many videos of fires being directed on artillery units actively engaged in shooting, displacing, or even moving between firing points. In fact, in most videos of fire against an artillery battery, I don't see any people at all! Just the howitzers. And videos I've seen of artillery units firing don't seem to have a terrible sense of urgency on the need to displace immediately, which raises even more questions for me on why that would be the case. Again, would LOVE to do a deep dive into counterfire procedures during this conflict, and the effectiveness of firefinder radars and whether we truly need to "shoot and scoot" after every mission to stay alive. From my limited view of things, I'm just not seeing the same counterfire fight our doctrine envisions us fighting - but maybe that's just due to the nature of what videos are actually released versus what is happening... would love to know the actual ground truth there.

Trent Telenko's posts on Twitter really bother me because he seems to take singular events and extrapolate them into generalities that sound good on paper and which people lap up. It started with his tires post, and if he saw the quality of some of the equipment I had as a battery commander (yes, including their tires) he'd probably have an aneurysm. I've also seen my own share of 40 mile convoys of stopped American logistical vehicles, the difference being that US soldiers got to go home after their training with some lessons learned, and the Russians didn't. And as an artillery officer I don't even want to talk about his observations about VT fuzes.

I'm not entirely sure where he is going with this thread, but having actually worked in a Division level strike cell in Iraq, processing missions from SOF, ground space owners, and targets developed within our own cell, the so called "JAG officer poisoned chain of command" is a gross over simplification at best. Yes, times to strike were lengthy, but it was designed that way and NOT due to JAG considerations, and we were certainly capable of being faster, and routinely did so when the situation required. Trying to compare a COIN oriented environment to the modern LSCO fight is ignorant, and as a OC/T who see units training Brigade level fire support in large scale combat operations on a monthly basis, we are certainly faster then the "hour" he claims we are at. From what he describes, the GIS ARTA app is very similar to the US Army's AFATDS system - designed to process a large range of target requests and associate them with a shooter. It's good to see Ukraine adopting this style of software, but it's hardly unique, and the realities of maintaining the digital communication linkages required for full functionality of the system can be hard in a contested environment. The US military has a difficult enough time doing that in the field, and we have much better comms equipment then Starlink and a lot less incoming rounds.
Sure makes for a good sounding Twitter thread though.

Trent Telenko's posts on Twitter really bother me because he seems to take singular events and extrapolate them into generalities that sound good on paper and which people lap up. It started with his tires post, and if he saw the quality of some of the equipment I had as a battery commander (yes, including their tires) he'd probably have an aneurysm. I've also seen my own share of 40 mile convoys of stopped American logistical vehicles, the difference being that US soldiers got to go home after their training with some lessons learned, and the Russians didn't. And as an artillery officer I don't even want to talk about his observations about VT fuzes.

I'm not entirely sure where he is going with this thread, but having actually worked in a Division level strike cell in Iraq, processing missions from SOF, ground space owners, and targets developed within our own cell, the so called "JAG officer poisoned chain of command" is a gross over simplification at best. Yes, times to strike were lengthy, but it was designed that way and NOT due to JAG considerations, and we were certainly capable of being faster, and routinely did so when the situation required. Trying to compare a COIN oriented environment to the modern LSCO fight is ignorant, and as a OC/T who see units training Brigade level fire support in large scale combat operations on a monthly basis, we are certainly faster then the "hour" he claims we are at. From what he describes, the GIS ARTA app is very similar to the US Army's AFATDS system - designed to process a large range of target requests and associate them with a shooter. It's good to see Ukraine adopting this style of software, but it's hardly unique, and the realities of maintaining the digital communication linkages required for full functionality of the system can be hard in a contested environment. The US military has a difficult enough time doing that in the field, and we have much better comms equipment then Starlink and a lot less incoming rounds.
Sure makes for a good sounding Twitter thread though.

I probably have more questions then observations at this point. I don't think anything fundamentally has changed from previous conflict, even dating back to WW 1. Artillery is still a crucial arm of any modern military and is your only all weather, truly responsive means of shaping the battlefield. Artillery is the King of Battle, even with today's technology. I can't say I've been truly shocked at anything I've seen so far.
All of my observations are based off OSINT videos - I imagine most of the US military's observations of the conflict are still close hold at higher levels due to the sensitivity of collecting in an active conflict.
Drones have proven to be incredibly useful but I don't see anything revolutionary or fundamentally doctrine-altering with them - aerial observers have been a thing since the Civil War, and artillery battalions during WW2 literally had their own observation planes sometimes - we can just get them closer then ever before without risking a human. You still see a lot of "long range" observation from drones in these strike videos however - so there is definitely a real threat of ADA/EW that is keeping drones at a distance. It's harder then ever before to hide your forces from observation, but I imagine there are a lot of smart people churning away at a practical military answer to the UAV problem, and I think it will have an easier solution then the tank will have dealing with top down attack, fire-and-forget ATGM systems.
Loitering munitions I'm still not 100% sold on - probably useful for high value targets (radar, ADA, command posts), but seem hard to utilize at a more tactical level.  Honestly, it seems like a complex solution to a problem that isn't terribly hard to solve with more conventional and flexible fires. The Switchblade 300 is seriously unimpressive to me, a glorified flying grenade. Great for taking out an ISIS leader in the middle of a crowd, not so impactful in a war where individual casualties are a given and virtually meaningless in a tactical or operational sense. I don't think the Switchblade 300 is going to single-handedly stop a town from being lost. Would LOVE to see an actual statistical analysis on the effectiveness of loitering munitions, that isn't all buzz words and "ooooh scary kamikaze drones!!"
Armored vehicles seem to be more vulnerable to artillery then commonly believed in the US/NATO. Lots of footage of (what seems to be) destroyed vehicles due to rocket and cannon fire.
Not seeing much utilization of mortars. Not sure if this is due to a lack of use, improper characterization of OSINT videos, or a function of UKR/RUS TOE lacking a significant amount of mortar tubes?
Russian and Ukrainian artillery forces seldom use effective cover and are often lined up in neat rows in the open, instead of utilizing dispersion and tree lines. I think this is mainly a function of the manual nature of most of their artillery, which requires howitzers to be somewhat closer and more orderly for a variety of technical reasons I won't get in to (unless you would like me to). This is in contract to the digital, self-locating, self-laying howitzers the US military has, which have a more robust ability to "roam". Of note, the M777s we gifted to Ukraine do not seem to have this self-locating capability, as the two videos I've seen of the howitzers operating in Ukraine showed them lacking these digital systems. These may be the Canadian howitzers though. Will be following that one closely.
Lack of digital systems aside, the above does stir some questions in my mind on the actual effectiveness and feasibility of true "counterfire" - meaning a howitzer shoots, then immediately has to move to avoid rapid and accurate fires from an opposing artillery unit. I don't think UKR and RUS artillery units are so pig headed or naive to not appreciate the usefulness of emplacing in a tree line - I wonder if the impetus to do so is even there. What I mean by that is: how often are artillery units shooting and then immediately taking fire? I don't see many videos of fires being directed on artillery units actively engaged in shooting, displacing, or even moving between firing points. In fact, in most videos of fire against an artillery battery, I don't see any people at all! Just the howitzers. And videos I've seen of artillery units firing don't seem to have a terrible sense of urgency on the need to displace immediately, which raises even more questions for me on why that would be the case. Again, would LOVE to do a deep dive into counterfire procedures during this conflict, and the effectiveness of firefinder radars and whether we truly need to "shoot and scoot" after every mission to stay alive. From my limited view of things, I'm just not seeing the same counterfire fight our doctrine envisions us fighting - but maybe that's just due to the nature of what videos are actually released versus what is happening... would love to know the actual ground truth there.

I probably have more questions then observations at this point. I don't think anything fundamentally has changed from previous conflict, even dating back to WW 1. Artillery is still a crucial arm of any modern military and is your only all weather, truly responsive means of shaping the battlefield. Artillery is the King of Battle, even with today's technology. I can't say I've been truly shocked at anything I've seen so far.
All of my observations are based off OSINT videos - I imagine most of the US military's observations of the conflict are still close hold at higher levels due to the sensitivity of collecting in an active conflict.
Drones have proven to be incredibly useful but I don't see anything revolutionary or fundamentally doctrine-altering with them - aerial observers have been a thing since the Civil War, and artillery battalions during WW2 literally had their own observation planes sometimes - we can just get them closer then ever before without risking a human. You still see a lot of "long range" observation from drones in these strike videos however - so there is definitely a real threat of ADA/EW that is keeping drones at a distance. It's harder then ever before to hide your forces from observation, but I imagine there are a lot of smart people churning away at a practical military answer to the UAV problem, and I think it will have an easier solution then the tank will have dealing with top down attack, fire-and-forget ATGM systems.
Loitering munitions I'm still not 100% sold on - probably useful for high value targets (radar, ADA, command posts), but seem hard to utilize at a more tactical level.  Honestly, it seems like a complex solution to a problem that isn't terribly hard to solve with more conventional and flexible fires. The Switchblade 300 is seriously unimpressive to me, a glorified flying grenade. Great for taking out an ISIS leader in the middle of a crowd, not so impactful in a war where individual casualties are a given and virtually meaningless in a tactical or operational sense. I don't think the Switchblade 300 is going to single-handedly stop a town from being lost. Would LOVE to see an actual statistical analysis on the effectiveness of loitering munitions, that isn't all buzz words and "ooooh scary kamikaze drones!!"
Armored vehicles seem to be more vulnerable to artillery then commonly believed in the US/NATO. Lots of footage of (what seems to be) destroyed vehicles due to rocket and cannon fire.
Not seeing much utilization of mortars. Not sure if this is due to a lack of use, improper characterization of OSINT videos, or a function of UKR/RUS TOE lacking a significant amount of mortar tubes?
Russian and Ukrainian artillery forces seldom use effective cover and are often lined up in neat rows in the open, instead of utilizing dispersion and tree lines. I think this is mainly a function of the manual nature of most of their artillery, which requires howitzers to be somewhat closer and more orderly for a variety of technical reasons I won't get in to (unless you would like me to). This is in contract to the digital, self-locating, self-laying howitzers the US military has, which have a more robust ability to "roam". Of note, the M777s we gifted to Ukraine do not seem to have this self-locating capability, as the two videos I've seen of the howitzers operating in Ukraine showed them lacking these digital systems. These may be the Canadian howitzers though. Will be following that one closely.
Lack of digital systems aside, the above does stir some questions in my mind on the actual effectiveness and feasibility of true "counterfire" - meaning a howitzer shoots, then immediately has to move to avoid rapid and accurate fires from an opposing artillery unit. I don't think UKR and RUS artillery units are so pig headed or naive to not appreciate the usefulness of emplacing in a tree line - I wonder if the impetus to do so is even there. What I mean by that is: how often are artillery units shooting and then immediately taking fire? I don't see many videos of fires being directed on artillery units actively engaged in shooting, displacing, or even moving between firing points. In fact, in most videos of fire against an artillery battery, I don't see any people at all! Just the howitzers. And videos I've seen of artillery units firing don't seem to have a terrible sense of urgency on the need to displace immediately, which raises even more questions for me on why that would be the case. Again, would LOVE to do a deep dive into counterfire procedures during this conflict, and the effectiveness of firefinder radars and whether we truly need to "shoot and scoot" after every mission to stay alive. From my limited view of things, I'm just not seeing the same counterfire fight our doctrine envisions us fighting - but maybe that's just due to the nature of what videos are actually released versus what is happening... would love to know the actual ground truth there.

I probably have more questions then observations at this point. I don't think anything fundamentally has changed from previous conflict, even dating back to WW 1. Artillery is still a crucial arm of any modern military and is your only all weather, truly responsive means of shaping the battlefield. Artillery is the King of Battle, even with today's technology. I can't say I've been truly shocked at anything I've seen so far.
All of my observations are based off OSINT videos - I imagine most of the US military's observations of the conflict are still close hold at higher levels due to the sensitivity of collecting in an active conflict.
Drones have proven to be incredibly useful but I don't see anything revolutionary or fundamentally doctrine-altering with them - aerial observers have been a thing since the Civil War, and artillery battalions during WW2 literally had their own observation planes sometimes - we can just get them closer then ever before without risking a human. You still see a lot of "long range" observation from drones in these strike videos however - so there is definitely a real threat of ADA/EW that is keeping drones at a distance. It's harder then ever before to hide your forces from observation, but I imagine there are a lot of smart people churning away at a practical military answer to the UAV problem, and I think it will have an easier solution then the tank will have dealing with top down attack, fire-and-forget ATGM systems.
Loitering munitions I'm still not 100% sold on - probably useful for high value targets (radar, ADA, command posts), but seem hard to utilize at a more tactical level.  Honestly, it seems like a complex solution to a problem that isn't terribly hard to solve with more conventional and flexible fires. The Switchblade 300 is seriously unimpressive to me, a glorified flying grenade. Great for taking out an ISIS leader in the middle of a crowd, not so impactful in a war where individual casualties are a given and virtually meaningless in a tactical or operational sense. I don't think the Switchblade 300 is going to single-handedly stop a town from being lost. Would LOVE to see an actual statistical analysis on the effectiveness of loitering munitions, that isn't all buzz words and "ooooh scary kamikaze drones!!"
Armored vehicles seem to be more vulnerable to artillery then commonly believed in the US/NATO. Lots of footage of (what seems to be) destroyed vehicles due to rocket and cannon fire.
Not seeing much utilization of mortars. Not sure if this is due to a lack of use, improper characterization of OSINT videos, or a function of UKR/RUS TOE lacking a significant amount of mortar tubes?
Russian and Ukrainian artillery forces seldom use effective cover and are often lined up in neat rows in the open, instead of utilizing dispersion and tree lines. I think this is mainly a function of the manual nature of most of their artillery, which requires howitzers to be somewhat closer and more orderly for a variety of technical reasons I won't get in to (unless you would like me to). This is in contract to the digital, self-locating, self-laying howitzers the US military has, which have a more robust ability to "roam". Of note, the M777s we gifted to Ukraine do not seem to have this self-locating capability, as the two videos I've seen of the howitzers operating in Ukraine showed them lacking these digital systems. These may be the Canadian howitzers though. Will be following that one closely.
Lack of digital systems aside, the above does stir some questions in my mind on the actual effectiveness and feasibility of true "counterfire" - meaning a howitzer shoots, then immediately has to move to avoid rapid and accurate fires from an opposing artillery unit. I don't think UKR and RUS artillery units are so pig headed or naive to not appreciate the usefulness of emplacing in a tree line - I wonder if the impetus to do so is even there. What I mean by that is: how often are artillery units shooting and then immediately taking fire? I don't see many videos of fires being directed on artillery units actively engaged in shooting, displacing, or even moving between firing points. In fact, in most videos of fire against an artillery battery, I don't see any people at all! Just the howitzers. And videos I've seen of artillery units firing don't seem to have a terrible sense of urgency on the need to displace immediately, which raises even more questions for me on why that would be the case. Again, would LOVE to do a deep dive into counterfire procedures during this conflict, and the effectiveness of firefinder radars and whether we truly need to "shoot and scoot" after every mission to stay alive. From my limited view of things, I'm just not seeing the same counterfire fight our doctrine envisions us fighting - but maybe that's just due to the nature of what videos are actually released versus what is happening... would love to know the actual ground truth there.

I probably have more questions then observations at this point. I don't think anything fundamentally has changed from previous conflict, even dating back to WW 1. Artillery is still a crucial arm of any modern military and is your only all weather, truly responsive means of shaping the battlefield. Artillery is the King of Battle, even with today's technology. I can't say I've been truly shocked at anything I've seen so far.
All of my observations are based off OSINT videos - I imagine most of the US military's observations of the conflict are still close hold at higher levels due to the sensitivity of collecting in an active conflict.
Drones have proven to be incredibly useful but I don't see anything revolutionary or fundamentally doctrine-altering with them - aerial observers have been a thing since the Civil War, and artillery battalions during WW2 literally had their own observation planes sometimes - we can just get them closer then ever before without risking a human. You still see a lot of "long range" observation from drones in these strike videos however - so there is definitely a real threat of ADA/EW that is keeping drones at a distance. It's harder then ever before to hide your forces from observation, but I imagine there are a lot of smart people churning away at a practical military answer to the UAV problem, and I think it will have an easier solution then the tank will have dealing with top down attack, fire-and-forget ATGM systems.
Loitering munitions I'm still not 100% sold on - probably useful for high value targets (radar, ADA, command posts), but seem hard to utilize at a more tactical level.  Honestly, it seems like a complex solution to a problem that isn't terribly hard to solve with more conventional and flexible fires. The Switchblade 300 is seriously unimpressive to me, a glorified flying grenade. Great for taking out an ISIS leader in the middle of a crowd, not so impactful in a war where individual casualties are a given and virtually meaningless in a tactical or operational sense. I don't think the Switchblade 300 is going to single-handedly stop a town from being lost. Would LOVE to see an actual statistical analysis on the effectiveness of loitering munitions, that isn't all buzz words and "ooooh scary kamikaze drones!!"
Armored vehicles seem to be more vulnerable to artillery then commonly believed in the US/NATO. Lots of footage of (what seems to be) destroyed vehicles due to rocket and cannon fire.
Not seeing much utilization of mortars. Not sure if this is due to a lack of use, improper characterization of OSINT videos, or a function of UKR/RUS TOE lacking a significant amount of mortar tubes?
Russian and Ukrainian artillery forces seldom use effective cover and are often lined up in neat rows in the open, instead of utilizing dispersion and tree lines. I think this is mainly a function of the manual nature of most of their artillery, which requires howitzers to be somewhat closer and more orderly for a variety of technical reasons I won't get in to (unless you would like me to). This is in contract to the digital, self-locating, self-laying howitzers the US military has, which have a more robust ability to "roam". Of note, the M777s we gifted to Ukraine do not seem to have this self-locating capability, as the two videos I've seen of the howitzers operating in Ukraine showed them lacking these digital systems. These may be the Canadian howitzers though. Will be following that one closely.
Lack of digital systems aside, the above does stir some questions in my mind on the actual effectiveness and feasibility of true "counterfire" - meaning a howitzer shoots, then immediately has to move to avoid rapid and accurate fires from an opposing artillery unit. I don't think UKR and RUS artillery units are so pig headed or naive to not appreciate the usefulness of emplacing in a tree line - I wonder if the impetus to do so is even there. What I mean by that is: how often are artillery units shooting and then immediately taking fire? I don't see many videos of fires being directed on artillery units actively engaged in shooting, displacing, or even moving between firing points. In fact, in most videos of fire against an artillery battery, I don't see any people at all! Just the howitzers. And videos I've seen of artillery units firing don't seem to have a terrible sense of urgency on the need to displace immediately, which raises even more questions for me on why that would be the case. Again, would LOVE to do a deep dive into counterfire procedures during this conflict, and the effectiveness of firefinder radars and whether we truly need to "shoot and scoot" after every mission to stay alive. From my limited view of things, I'm just not seeing the same counterfire fight our doctrine envisions us fighting - but maybe that's just due to the nature of what videos are actually released versus what is happening... would love to know the actual ground truth there.

Trent Telenko's posts on Twitter really bother me because he seems to take singular events and extrapolate them into generalities that sound good on paper and which people lap up. It started with his tires post, and if he saw the quality of some of the equipment I had as a battery commander (yes, including their tires) he'd probably have an aneurysm. I've also seen my own share of 40 mile convoys of stopped American logistical vehicles, the difference being that US soldiers got to go home after their training with some lessons learned, and the Russians didn't. And as an artillery officer I don't even want to talk about his observations about VT fuzes.

I'm not entirely sure where he is going with this thread, but having actually worked in a Division level strike cell in Iraq, processing missions from SOF, ground space owners, and targets developed within our own cell, the so called "JAG officer poisoned chain of command" is a gross over simplification at best. Yes, times to strike were lengthy, but it was designed that way and NOT due to JAG considerations, and we were certainly capable of being faster, and routinely did so when the situation required. Trying to compare a COIN oriented environment to the modern LSCO fight is ignorant, and as a OC/T who see units training Brigade level fire support in large scale combat operations on a monthly basis, we are certainly faster then the "hour" he claims we are at. From what he describes, the GIS ARTA app is very similar to the US Army's AFATDS system - designed to process a large range of target requests and associate them with a shooter. It's good to see Ukraine adopting this style of software, but it's hardly unique, and the realities of maintaining the digital communication linkages required for full functionality of the system can be hard in a contested environment. The US military has a difficult enough time doing that in the field, and we have much better comms equipment then Starlink and a lot less incoming rounds.
Sure makes for a good sounding Twitter thread though.

Trent Telenko's posts on Twitter really bother me because he seems to take singular events and extrapolate them into generalities that sound good on paper and which people lap up. It started with his tires post, and if he saw the quality of some of the equipment I had as a battery commander (yes, including their tires) he'd probably have an aneurysm. I've also seen my own share of 40 mile convoys of stopped American logistical vehicles, the difference being that US soldiers got to go home after their training with some lessons learned, and the Russians didn't. And as an artillery officer I don't even want to talk about his observations about VT fuzes.

I'm not entirely sure where he is going with this thread, but having actually worked in a Division level strike cell in Iraq, processing missions from SOF, ground space owners, and targets developed within our own cell, the so called "JAG officer poisoned chain of command" is a gross over simplification at best. Yes, times to strike were lengthy, but it was designed that way and NOT due to JAG considerations, and we were certainly capable of being faster, and routinely did so when the situation required. Trying to compare a COIN oriented environment to the modern LSCO fight is ignorant, and as a OC/T who see units training Brigade level fire support in large scale combat operations on a monthly basis, we are certainly faster then the "hour" he claims we are at. From what he describes, the GIS ARTA app is very similar to the US Army's AFATDS system - designed to process a large range of target requests and associate them with a shooter. It's good to see Ukraine adopting this style of software, but it's hardly unique, and the realities of maintaining the digital communication linkages required for full functionality of the system can be hard in a contested environment. The US military has a difficult enough time doing that in the field, and we have much better comms equipment then Starlink and a lot less incoming rounds.
Sure makes for a good sounding Twitter thread though.

Trent Telenko's posts on Twitter really bother me because he seems to take singular events and extrapolate them into generalities that sound good on paper and which people lap up. It started with his tires post, and if he saw the quality of some of the equipment I had as a battery commander (yes, including their tires) he'd probably have an aneurysm. I've also seen my own share of 40 mile convoys of stopped American logistical vehicles, the difference being that US soldiers got to go home after their training with some lessons learned, and the Russians didn't. And as an artillery officer I don't even want to talk about his observations about VT fuzes.

I'm not entirely sure where he is going with this thread, but having actually worked in a Division level strike cell in Iraq, processing missions from SOF, ground space owners, and targets developed within our own cell, the so called "JAG officer poisoned chain of command" is a gross over simplification at best. Yes, times to strike were lengthy, but it was designed that way and NOT due to JAG considerations, and we were certainly capable of being faster, and routinely did so when the situation required. Trying to compare a COIN oriented environment to the modern LSCO fight is ignorant, and as a OC/T who see units training Brigade level fire support in large scale combat operations on a monthly basis, we are certainly faster then the "hour" he claims we are at. From what he describes, the GIS ARTA app is very similar to the US Army's AFATDS system - designed to process a large range of target requests and associate them with a shooter. It's good to see Ukraine adopting this style of software, but it's hardly unique, and the realities of maintaining the digital communication linkages required for full functionality of the system can be hard in a contested environment. The US military has a difficult enough time doing that in the field, and we have much better comms equipment then Starlink and a lot less incoming rounds.
Sure makes for a good sounding Twitter thread though.

Trent Telenko's posts on Twitter really bother me because he seems to take singular events and extrapolate them into generalities that sound good on paper and which people lap up. It started with his tires post, and if he saw the quality of some of the equipment I had as a battery commander (yes, including their tires) he'd probably have an aneurysm. I've also seen my own share of 40 mile convoys of stopped American logistical vehicles, the difference being that US soldiers got to go home after their training with some lessons learned, and the Russians didn't. And as an artillery officer I don't even want to talk about his observations about VT fuzes.

I'm not entirely sure where he is going with this thread, but having actually worked in a Division level strike cell in Iraq, processing missions from SOF, ground space owners, and targets developed within our own cell, the so called "JAG officer poisoned chain of command" is a gross over simplification at best. Yes, times to strike were lengthy, but it was designed that way and NOT due to JAG considerations, and we were certainly capable of being faster, and routinely did so when the situation required. Trying to compare a COIN oriented environment to the modern LSCO fight is ignorant, and as a OC/T who see units training Brigade level fire support in large scale combat operations on a monthly basis, we are certainly faster then the "hour" he claims we are at. From what he describes, the GIS ARTA app is very similar to the US Army's AFATDS system - designed to process a large range of target requests and associate them with a shooter. It's good to see Ukraine adopting this style of software, but it's hardly unique, and the realities of maintaining the digital communication linkages required for full functionality of the system can be hard in a contested environment. The US military has a difficult enough time doing that in the field, and we have much better comms equipment then Starlink and a lot less incoming rounds.
Sure makes for a good sounding Twitter thread though.

Trent Telenko's posts on Twitter really bother me because he seems to take singular events and extrapolate them into generalities that sound good on paper and which people lap up. It started with his tires post, and if he saw the quality of some of the equipment I had as a battery commander (yes, including their tires) he'd probably have an aneurysm. I've also seen my own share of 40 mile convoys of stopped American logistical vehicles, the difference being that US soldiers got to go home after their training with some lessons learned, and the Russians didn't. And as an artillery officer I don't even want to talk about his observations about VT fuzes.

I'm not entirely sure where he is going with this thread, but having actually worked in a Division level strike cell in Iraq, processing missions from SOF, ground space owners, and targets developed within our own cell, the so called "JAG officer poisoned chain of command" is a gross over simplification at best. Yes, times to strike were lengthy, but it was designed that way and NOT due to JAG considerations, and we were certainly capable of being faster, and routinely did so when the situation required. Trying to compare a COIN oriented environment to the modern LSCO fight is ignorant, and as a OC/T who see units training Brigade level fire support in large scale combat operations on a monthly basis, we are certainly faster then the "hour" he claims we are at. From what he describes, the GIS ARTA app is very similar to the US Army's AFATDS system - designed to process a large range of target requests and associate them with a shooter. It's good to see Ukraine adopting this style of software, but it's hardly unique, and the realities of maintaining the digital communication linkages required for full functionality of the system can be hard in a contested environment. The US military has a difficult enough time doing that in the field, and we have much better comms equipment then Starlink and a lot less incoming rounds.
Sure makes for a good sounding Twitter thread though.

Trent Telenko's posts on Twitter really bother me because he seems to take singular events and extrapolate them into generalities that sound good on paper and which people lap up. It started with his tires post, and if he saw the quality of some of the equipment I had as a battery commander (yes, including their tires) he'd probably have an aneurysm. I've also seen my own share of 40 mile convoys of stopped American logistical vehicles, the difference being that US soldiers got to go home after their training with some lessons learned, and the Russians didn't. And as an artillery officer I don't even want to talk about his observations about VT fuzes.

I'm not entirely sure where he is going with this thread, but having actually worked in a Division level strike cell in Iraq, processing missions from SOF, ground space owners, and targets developed within our own cell, the so called "JAG officer poisoned chain of command" is a gross over simplification at best. Yes, times to strike were lengthy, but it was designed that way and NOT due to JAG considerations, and we were certainly capable of being faster, and routinely did so when the situation required. Trying to compare a COIN oriented environment to the modern LSCO fight is ignorant, and as a OC/T who see units training Brigade level fire support in large scale combat operations on a monthly basis, we are certainly faster then the "hour" he claims we are at. From what he describes, the GIS ARTA app is very similar to the US Army's AFATDS system - designed to process a large range of target requests and associate them with a shooter. It's good to see Ukraine adopting this style of software, but it's hardly unique, and the realities of maintaining the digital communication linkages required for full functionality of the system can be hard in a contested environment. The US military has a difficult enough time doing that in the field, and we have much better comms equipment then Starlink and a lot less incoming rounds.
Sure makes for a good sounding Twitter thread though.

Trent Telenko's posts on Twitter really bother me because he seems to take singular events and extrapolate them into generalities that sound good on paper and which people lap up. It started with his tires post, and if he saw the quality of some of the equipment I had as a battery commander (yes, including their tires) he'd probably have an aneurysm. I've also seen my own share of 40 mile convoys of stopped American logistical vehicles, the difference being that US soldiers got to go home after their training with some lessons learned, and the Russians didn't. And as an artillery officer I don't even want to talk about his observations about VT fuzes.

I'm not entirely sure where he is going with this thread, but having actually worked in a Division level strike cell in Iraq, processing missions from SOF, ground space owners, and targets developed within our own cell, the so called "JAG officer poisoned chain of command" is a gross over simplification at best. Yes, times to strike were lengthy, but it was designed that way and NOT due to JAG considerations, and we were certainly capable of being faster, and routinely did so when the situation required. Trying to compare a COIN oriented environment to the modern LSCO fight is ignorant, and as a OC/T who see units training Brigade level fire support in large scale combat operations on a monthly basis, we are certainly faster then the "hour" he claims we are at. From what he describes, the GIS ARTA app is very similar to the US Army's AFATDS system - designed to process a large range of target requests and associate them with a shooter. It's good to see Ukraine adopting this style of software, but it's hardly unique, and the realities of maintaining the digital communication linkages required for full functionality of the system can be hard in a contested environment. The US military has a difficult enough time doing that in the field, and we have much better comms equipment then Starlink and a lot less incoming rounds.
Sure makes for a good sounding Twitter thread though.

Proper use of the game's elevation tools will make or break the look of a map. It probably the number one thing that can ruin a map for me (right alongside large blocks of the same tree model in one place).
I'm a big fan of the adjust tool - set the delta to one and alternate between clicking and shift-clicking to add elevation differences between your contour lines. Adds realistic undulations that can help break up LOS and prevents the stair-step effect you can sometimes get with continuous contour lines.
Also, if you set the adjust tool to 0, you can "lock" the height of a tile... if you want to create a stream bed in the side of a hill, lock the height on both sides of the area where you want the stream bed to be, then go back and shift click with the adjust tool (but this time set at 1) to lower the terrain of the stream... if you do it right, you can create a realistic steam that follows the slope of the hill. Works on roads too!  You can create a sunken effect (like a dirt track) or elevated effect (such as a graded paved road), which you'll find on almost every road in the real world.
 

Proper use of the game's elevation tools will make or break the look of a map. It probably the number one thing that can ruin a map for me (right alongside large blocks of the same tree model in one place).
I'm a big fan of the adjust tool - set the delta to one and alternate between clicking and shift-clicking to add elevation differences between your contour lines. Adds realistic undulations that can help break up LOS and prevents the stair-step effect you can sometimes get with continuous contour lines.
Also, if you set the adjust tool to 0, you can "lock" the height of a tile... if you want to create a stream bed in the side of a hill, lock the height on both sides of the area where you want the stream bed to be, then go back and shift click with the adjust tool (but this time set at 1) to lower the terrain of the stream... if you do it right, you can create a realistic steam that follows the slope of the hill. Works on roads too!  You can create a sunken effect (like a dirt track) or elevated effect (such as a graded paved road), which you'll find on almost every road in the real world.
 

Hi all,
 
I've been working on a whole bunch of scenarios for CMRT, and finally got around to finishing a couple. I'll use this thread to post whatever I manage to finish. I have 4 for today (though one has already been posted before, just tweaked it a little), and hopefully I can put the finishing touches on 1 or 2 for tomorrow. Most of these have had barely any playtesting, beyond what I could do by myself. That's where I need feedback from you guys. These are not 100% tested. Please let me know what I can change to make it better!
 
I like small, company sized engagements. All of these have 2 companies or less. These may be suitable for H2H, do not have anyone to test them with though. All my maps are "hand made" originals. They look best with my terrain mod IMO!
 
Interlock OP v1.0
https://www.dropbox.com/s/bs581b72xj6n96s/AD%20Interlock%20OP.zip?dl=0
 

 
You are in command of a German Grenadier platoon in Estonia. Soviet forces have secured an interlocking tower overlooking our forward positions and are calling artillery on our forces. You have been tasked with securing the tower by force and securing whatever intel you can. Axis vs AI only
 
 
Pastureland v1.0
https://www.dropbox.com/s/pq48lgx5c1tokfe/AD%20Pasture%20Land.zip?dl=0
 

 
The Germans are falling back in confusion. Our tank corps and mehanized infantry have pushed far foward, leaving us, the dismounted infantry, behind to mop up the remnants and widen the corridors. Your company was doing exactly that when you came out of a small copse of trees and immediately started taking machinegun fire. A large, open pastureland sits between you and the incoming fire. On the far side, a group of buildings on the outskirts of a village. You determine that is where the enemy fire is coming from, and you immediately decide to attack. Allied vs AI only.
 
 
Gorbatzewich Roadblock v1.0
https://www.dropbox.com/s/zsmkvq4hfcr09ms/AD%20Gorbatzewich%20Roadblock.zip?dl=0
 

 
You are in command of a Soviet Cavalry Squadron southwest of Babruysk. After several long days of fighting, we have finally managed to capture the vital city and open the road to Minsk. Remnants of German forces still remain around the city, occupying blocking positions and doing their best to prevent our forces from rushing into Minsk. One of these blocking forces is located in the village to your immediate front. Allied vs AI only
 
 
Amongst the Ruins v1.0
https://www.dropbox.com/s/wo11fj4zcq3h2au/AD%20Amongst%20the%20Ruins.zip?dl=0
 

 
You are in command of a German Pioneer Company somewhere within a large city inside Belarus. We have been fighting with the Soviets for control of this vital city for several days now. Your company has been tasked with taking back a bombed out industrial area. Axis vs AI only
 
 
 

A new scenario!
East of Aachen v1.0
http://bit.ly/2imjAVC

You are a German infantry commander, caught in the ever tightening noose that encircles Aachen. Your Volksgrenadier Regiment is responsible for the eastern portion of the defense, and has been slowly pushed back towards the edge of the city. American gains are steady, but we counterattack wherever we can to give the defenders of the city more time to prepare. Just this afternoon, American infantry and artillery pounded our battalion's position, pushing out our sister company from their foxholes and taking the ground for themselves. Your company, the regimental reserve, was quickly assembled and sent towards the position, in an effort to throw the Americans out before they can consolidate the ground and dig in.

Hi everyone, I have a mission that needs to be tested. This is the first map/scenario I ever created. It's gone through some revisions between then and now and hopefully I've come up with something decent. Allies vs Axis only. You have 2 platoons of infantry with attachments and need to find and destroy Axis units on a 320x320 map. Requires GL. Have run through it a couple times but need some fresh looks to let me know how it plays. Please let me know what you think!

https://www.dropbox.com/s/z70081b9igh4wrk/AD%20Small%20Patrol%20Action.zip

Hi everyone, have a new scenario that needs testing. German grenadiers take out an OP in a interlock tower. Platoon(+) sized, 560x480, 30 minutes, Axis vs AI only. Play tested it a couple times, hopefully it's not too hard or too easy. Please let me know how it is or if there are any improvement you might have!

https://www.dropbox.com/s/bs581b72xj6n96s/AD%20Interlock%20OP.zip?dl=0

And some random shots with the mod.

Cold (December-February)



Spring (Italy 1944 March-May)

Hello all,
 
Here is my much requested mod for CMBN's terrain. Again, almost all tiles are either from CMBN or CMFI, but I processed each to give a more even color scheme and retain color vibrancy while avoiding the fluorescent look of the original game.

I have done my very best to ensure that no work from other content creators has sneaked into my mod, but as this mod is really years old, I can not be 100% sure. If you find your work in this mod, please let me know and I'll either give you credit for your work or remove it from my mod entirely. This mod is also not nearly as comprehensive as my other mods, and a lot of original tiles remain untouched. I focused on the main tiles - grasses, dirts, forest tiles - as they make up the majority of maps and have the greatest effect on the overall look.
 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/ldmxvwmzosk4rrl/AD%20CMBN%20Terrain.zip?dl=0
 

 

 

 

Hello everyone. Here is a new terrain mod you can all try out for CMBS. It is essentially the same terrain mod I made for CMRT, with some minor differences in doodads and without some older terrain tiles not suitable for the modern time period. I recommend Kieme's foliage mod to be used along with this mod. If you tried out my CMRT mod, then you know what you are getting. If you haven't, check out this thread here: http://community.battlefront.com/topic/114363-new-terrain-mod-for-cmrt/ for screens of the terrain in CMRT.
 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/zgg7tdoumr534bz/AD%20CMBS%20Terrain.zip?dl=0
 
And here are two pictures showing off what the new terrain looks like in CMBS itself.
 

 

Hello All,
I have created a new terrain mod for CMFB, similar to my previous terrain mods for CM games. I've taken the various tiles provided by Battlefront and recolored them to provide a more unified color scheme, focusing on a realistic look with subtle variations between the various tiles. One of the biggest changes you will find is that October and November are far more "green" then the base game. All the pictures I could find online of Germany in the fall show a significant amount of greenery still present, even into November. December is a much more traditional look, with a very brown, dead look. Snow terrain has been touched very little by me, I focused mainly on the trees and basic snow tiles.
Here is the link, as always please provide feedback and any errors you find!
http://bit.ly/2g4bYIs
October - November



 
December - January  (No Snow)



 
Winter