Vanir Ausf B

An enemy minefield will always be un-marked until you find it (usually the hard way). 
Red sign with a skull and crossbones = Active non-marked minefield.
Off white sign (yellow in CMBS) with a skull and crossbones = A marked minefield. 
Green sign with a white X = Neutralized minefield (all mines detonated)
 
Just some additional information on the topic: 
 
Engineers can most reliably and safely locate unidentified minefields using the Slow command.  
Marking a minefield substantially reduces the chance of triggering a mine for infantry traversing the minefield.
Antitank minefields can be marked but there is no effect. Infantry can traverse them without risk and vehicles don't benefit from marking.
Friendly mines will destroy friendly troops and vehicles.  
Mines cannot be placed on bridges.  They can go in the river bottom under the bridge but have no effect on bridge traffic.
Minefields can be neutralized by heavy artillery (150mm+), if it scores a direct hit.
Minefields can be neutralized by a blast from a demo charge if there is a blastable obstacle (wire) in the action spot.
Anti-personnel mines have a cumulative effect on vehicle mobility. ie: Number of Action Spots a vehicle can generally cross in an AP Minefield before immobilization: Armor= 2 A/S, light Armor= 1 A/S, Transport= Destroyed.

Export models have different armor. AFAIK there are none of those in storage.

Yes, as I wrote before Crimea is separate case, as it occupies very important place both in Kremlin imperial ideology and actuall sentiments of Russians. Muscovite-controlled Donbas perhaps too, but rather for hardcore nationalist than Russians populace as a whole.
As to newly annexed lands it's very doubtful larger Russian population cares about Zaporizhia as much as Putin would like. Even puting awkwardness of internaitonal situation created by this theoretical anschluss aside, these things need time to settle in national psyche. Reality may be very different than administrative acts, which leads into typical Russian schizophrenia when comes to where Russia actually ends.
 
Kofman trying to summarize situation now; seems like pretty balanced view:
 

"QUICK THREAD on the Russian take of where UAVs and drones are today for both Russian and Ukrainian militaries - from a pro-Kremlin Telegram channel - main points below:
A year in, both us (Russians) and the adversary (Ukrainians) "moved to the next class." Commercial "flying binoculars" have become the de facto standard across the front lines, and the means of combating them/protection against them are already rapidly developing. The number of competent drone pilots is already in the thousands, and this is now the order of things. However, now both sides are on the threshold of the next "phase transition", and there is a kind of speed race going on now. For reconnaissance, VTOL drones have become the most promising factor, combining the advantages of a copter and an airplane: vertical takeoff and landing anywhere, with the ability to hover over an object, and can spend much more time in the air than quadcopters. The VTOL flight range is at the level of long-range artillery, and if we add the ability to select frequency ranges that adversary EW systems are not trained to work with... Now Ukrainians are buying hundreds of VTOLs...and we too are doing something (about it) Standard quadcopters, meanwhile, are being used more and more for dropping munitions. Accordingly, this ability is being improved, experiments with carrying capacity are underway, and the pilot skills are growing. But still: drone quantity plays a big role. The munitions drop is effective when there are lots of drones. Some may grumble that this is irrational - the drone is not cheap, the chances of losing it are high, and the payload is small - nevertheless, the massed accuracy it provides trumps all these disadvantages. Nevertheless, the strike drone of the very near future is still a disposable kamikaze drone (loitering munition), controlled by a sufficiently trained pilot in FPV mode (that is, through goggles). If we had such drones in service today we would not have to attack entire buildings with artillery in order to suppress one firing point. It would be enough to find this target with a scout drone and send (a kamikaze UAV) there that is capable of flying through the window. In the near future, this (kamikaze drone) will become the standard means of operation for assault units. And if an ordinary recon drone gives only the advantage of awareness, then such a kamikaze drone is already a revolution in tactics, comparable to the Maxim machine gun. In fact, this is a flying munition capable of flying in any arbitrarily way, flying even into the windows. In principle, this is a way out of the current "positional impasse"; the only question, as always, is the speed of development and mass application. https://twitter.com/SamBendett/status/1622270288003055616
 

"QUICK THREAD on the Russian take of where UAVs and drones are today for both Russian and Ukrainian militaries - from a pro-Kremlin Telegram channel - main points below:
A year in, both us (Russians) and the adversary (Ukrainians) "moved to the next class." Commercial "flying binoculars" have become the de facto standard across the front lines, and the means of combating them/protection against them are already rapidly developing. The number of competent drone pilots is already in the thousands, and this is now the order of things. However, now both sides are on the threshold of the next "phase transition", and there is a kind of speed race going on now. For reconnaissance, VTOL drones have become the most promising factor, combining the advantages of a copter and an airplane: vertical takeoff and landing anywhere, with the ability to hover over an object, and can spend much more time in the air than quadcopters. The VTOL flight range is at the level of long-range artillery, and if we add the ability to select frequency ranges that adversary EW systems are not trained to work with... Now Ukrainians are buying hundreds of VTOLs...and we too are doing something (about it) Standard quadcopters, meanwhile, are being used more and more for dropping munitions. Accordingly, this ability is being improved, experiments with carrying capacity are underway, and the pilot skills are growing. But still: drone quantity plays a big role. The munitions drop is effective when there are lots of drones. Some may grumble that this is irrational - the drone is not cheap, the chances of losing it are high, and the payload is small - nevertheless, the massed accuracy it provides trumps all these disadvantages. Nevertheless, the strike drone of the very near future is still a disposable kamikaze drone (loitering munition), controlled by a sufficiently trained pilot in FPV mode (that is, through goggles). If we had such drones in service today we would not have to attack entire buildings with artillery in order to suppress one firing point. It would be enough to find this target with a scout drone and send (a kamikaze UAV) there that is capable of flying through the window. In the near future, this (kamikaze drone) will become the standard means of operation for assault units. And if an ordinary recon drone gives only the advantage of awareness, then such a kamikaze drone is already a revolution in tactics, comparable to the Maxim machine gun. In fact, this is a flying munition capable of flying in any arbitrarily way, flying even into the windows. In principle, this is a way out of the current "positional impasse"; the only question, as always, is the speed of development and mass application. https://twitter.com/SamBendett/status/1622270288003055616
 

"QUICK THREAD on the Russian take of where UAVs and drones are today for both Russian and Ukrainian militaries - from a pro-Kremlin Telegram channel - main points below:
A year in, both us (Russians) and the adversary (Ukrainians) "moved to the next class." Commercial "flying binoculars" have become the de facto standard across the front lines, and the means of combating them/protection against them are already rapidly developing. The number of competent drone pilots is already in the thousands, and this is now the order of things. However, now both sides are on the threshold of the next "phase transition", and there is a kind of speed race going on now. For reconnaissance, VTOL drones have become the most promising factor, combining the advantages of a copter and an airplane: vertical takeoff and landing anywhere, with the ability to hover over an object, and can spend much more time in the air than quadcopters. The VTOL flight range is at the level of long-range artillery, and if we add the ability to select frequency ranges that adversary EW systems are not trained to work with... Now Ukrainians are buying hundreds of VTOLs...and we too are doing something (about it) Standard quadcopters, meanwhile, are being used more and more for dropping munitions. Accordingly, this ability is being improved, experiments with carrying capacity are underway, and the pilot skills are growing. But still: drone quantity plays a big role. The munitions drop is effective when there are lots of drones. Some may grumble that this is irrational - the drone is not cheap, the chances of losing it are high, and the payload is small - nevertheless, the massed accuracy it provides trumps all these disadvantages. Nevertheless, the strike drone of the very near future is still a disposable kamikaze drone (loitering munition), controlled by a sufficiently trained pilot in FPV mode (that is, through goggles). If we had such drones in service today we would not have to attack entire buildings with artillery in order to suppress one firing point. It would be enough to find this target with a scout drone and send (a kamikaze UAV) there that is capable of flying through the window. In the near future, this (kamikaze drone) will become the standard means of operation for assault units. And if an ordinary recon drone gives only the advantage of awareness, then such a kamikaze drone is already a revolution in tactics, comparable to the Maxim machine gun. In fact, this is a flying munition capable of flying in any arbitrarily way, flying even into the windows. In principle, this is a way out of the current "positional impasse"; the only question, as always, is the speed of development and mass application. https://twitter.com/SamBendett/status/1622270288003055616
 

What? A new Perun PowerPoint video drops and no one mentions it? I'll fix that.
 

"QUICK THREAD on the Russian take of where UAVs and drones are today for both Russian and Ukrainian militaries - from a pro-Kremlin Telegram channel - main points below:
A year in, both us (Russians) and the adversary (Ukrainians) "moved to the next class." Commercial "flying binoculars" have become the de facto standard across the front lines, and the means of combating them/protection against them are already rapidly developing. The number of competent drone pilots is already in the thousands, and this is now the order of things. However, now both sides are on the threshold of the next "phase transition", and there is a kind of speed race going on now. For reconnaissance, VTOL drones have become the most promising factor, combining the advantages of a copter and an airplane: vertical takeoff and landing anywhere, with the ability to hover over an object, and can spend much more time in the air than quadcopters. The VTOL flight range is at the level of long-range artillery, and if we add the ability to select frequency ranges that adversary EW systems are not trained to work with... Now Ukrainians are buying hundreds of VTOLs...and we too are doing something (about it) Standard quadcopters, meanwhile, are being used more and more for dropping munitions. Accordingly, this ability is being improved, experiments with carrying capacity are underway, and the pilot skills are growing. But still: drone quantity plays a big role. The munitions drop is effective when there are lots of drones. Some may grumble that this is irrational - the drone is not cheap, the chances of losing it are high, and the payload is small - nevertheless, the massed accuracy it provides trumps all these disadvantages. Nevertheless, the strike drone of the very near future is still a disposable kamikaze drone (loitering munition), controlled by a sufficiently trained pilot in FPV mode (that is, through goggles). If we had such drones in service today we would not have to attack entire buildings with artillery in order to suppress one firing point. It would be enough to find this target with a scout drone and send (a kamikaze UAV) there that is capable of flying through the window. In the near future, this (kamikaze drone) will become the standard means of operation for assault units. And if an ordinary recon drone gives only the advantage of awareness, then such a kamikaze drone is already a revolution in tactics, comparable to the Maxim machine gun. In fact, this is a flying munition capable of flying in any arbitrarily way, flying even into the windows. In principle, this is a way out of the current "positional impasse"; the only question, as always, is the speed of development and mass application. https://twitter.com/SamBendett/status/1622270288003055616
 

"QUICK THREAD on the Russian take of where UAVs and drones are today for both Russian and Ukrainian militaries - from a pro-Kremlin Telegram channel - main points below:
A year in, both us (Russians) and the adversary (Ukrainians) "moved to the next class." Commercial "flying binoculars" have become the de facto standard across the front lines, and the means of combating them/protection against them are already rapidly developing. The number of competent drone pilots is already in the thousands, and this is now the order of things. However, now both sides are on the threshold of the next "phase transition", and there is a kind of speed race going on now. For reconnaissance, VTOL drones have become the most promising factor, combining the advantages of a copter and an airplane: vertical takeoff and landing anywhere, with the ability to hover over an object, and can spend much more time in the air than quadcopters. The VTOL flight range is at the level of long-range artillery, and if we add the ability to select frequency ranges that adversary EW systems are not trained to work with... Now Ukrainians are buying hundreds of VTOLs...and we too are doing something (about it) Standard quadcopters, meanwhile, are being used more and more for dropping munitions. Accordingly, this ability is being improved, experiments with carrying capacity are underway, and the pilot skills are growing. But still: drone quantity plays a big role. The munitions drop is effective when there are lots of drones. Some may grumble that this is irrational - the drone is not cheap, the chances of losing it are high, and the payload is small - nevertheless, the massed accuracy it provides trumps all these disadvantages. Nevertheless, the strike drone of the very near future is still a disposable kamikaze drone (loitering munition), controlled by a sufficiently trained pilot in FPV mode (that is, through goggles). If we had such drones in service today we would not have to attack entire buildings with artillery in order to suppress one firing point. It would be enough to find this target with a scout drone and send (a kamikaze UAV) there that is capable of flying through the window. In the near future, this (kamikaze drone) will become the standard means of operation for assault units. And if an ordinary recon drone gives only the advantage of awareness, then such a kamikaze drone is already a revolution in tactics, comparable to the Maxim machine gun. In fact, this is a flying munition capable of flying in any arbitrarily way, flying even into the windows. In principle, this is a way out of the current "positional impasse"; the only question, as always, is the speed of development and mass application. https://twitter.com/SamBendett/status/1622270288003055616
 

What? A new Perun PowerPoint video drops and no one mentions it? I'll fix that.
 

https://t.me/tpkr1775/18465
A young journalist came to Bakhmut to take an interview. The video contains a cut of her reactions to shell explosions. Also noteworthy is the reaction to the explosions of local and military personnel next to it. At the end, the operator praises her courage and says that not all reporters risk going to Bakhmut

Found one.

Found one.

Spain will send from 4 to 6 Leopard 2A4 at first (but I don't expect a lot more).

It will take about two months to refurbish them. About 10 tank crews and maintenance personnel will be trained in the Spanish CNAD (National Training Center) in Zaragoza for two months and a half. It has dynamic simulators for the Leopard, to reproduce the movements of the armored vehicle in full gear, and four tower simulators from the Spanish firm Indra that allow the simultaneous training of a complete section of tanks. In addition, it has several Leopard 2A4, such as those that will be supplied to Ukraine, with which it is planned to carry out real exercises in the neighboring maneuver field, of more than 300 square kilometers.

https://elpais.com/espana/2023-02-01/espana-planea-un-primer-envio-a-ucrania-de-entre-cuatro-y-seis-tanques-leopard-rehabilitados.html

BTW, that's interesting: 
[...]Last Thursday, a first meeting of the coalition of countries willing to supply Leopard tanks to Kyiv was held, by videoconference, convened by the new German Defense Minister, Boris Pistorius, in which his counterparts from Canada, Portugal, Spain, Netherlands and Finland. Surprisingly, Poland was not present at the meeting, the country that pushed the most to supply the Leopards to kyiv and that threatened to deliver a company (14 tanks) even without the permission of Berlin, a country that has the license and must authorize any re-export.[...]

(Page 1987. Last mention of the actual battlefield situation in this thread: page 1980).
UA may simply be in a defensive pause cuz regearing or cuz training or cuz mud or wev and then unleash their next stunning surprise. But an alternate thesis is that their best formations are getting badly hammered right now and cycling through. Even if Ivan is faring much worse.
Fine, yielding the ruins of Bakhmut is irrelevant to the strategic situation. But regardless of where the lines are drawn, thousands of Ukrainians are getting shot up. Meanwhile, the Russians still show no signs of running short of meat or firepower. Not June peak shell volumes, but hardly shell famine either.  No stream of surrenders of desperate, freezing mobiks.  In short, no real signs of Collapse, but disturbing glimpses of strain on the Ukraine side in spite of the veil of secrecy.
 
 
 
(this thread is worth a read. Defmon stays on top of the frontline situation)
....And last time I checked in mid Jan, Kreminna and Svatove were allegedly becoming untenable for Ivan. Not now, it seems. The UA has fallen back nearly to Torske.

https://ukrainevolunteer297689472.wordpress.com/2023/01/27/i-have-now-been-in-three-wars/
The old snakeater's outfit looks like it's pulling from the woodlands as well.
****
Initiative has passed back to Moscow, it looks like to me. Both sides are fighting Russia's war right now. While on the static fronts (land bridge), Ivan just keeps on digging and mining, (I'd guess) planning  some kind of Zitadelle rematch to absorb  a straight punch by the Western heavies.
****
Here's Jack Watling in the Spectator (not gonna post the clickbaity German bashing headline, far too much of that here already). Here's the useful bit, the rest is the usual wailing about Western foot dragging:
Russia is currently at the nadir of its capabilities, fielding poorly trained troops with older and more varied equipment, and with shortages of munitions.
At the same time Russia has enough forces on the ground to mean that Ukraine can only make progress with a deliberate offensive.
Russia can also mobilise and train more personnel [than Ukraine].
Russia’s defence industry is also increasing production, so that if Ukraine does not retain the initiative, it will become progressively harder to liberate territory.  

I'm pretty sceptical about the PBEM++ feature tbh, as I've had several bad experiences of the game not continuing. 
I'm looking forward to successful tournaments and ppl in the game request saying theyre willing to use PBEM++ before I make a similar offer.
But, new CM content is always welcome! (Oddly, i find CMBN more difficult than CMBS, 'cos I can't see **** before I'm dead from point blank fire!)

Russian defense analyst Ruslan Pukhov on western tanks.
Delivery of Abrams tanks could seriously aggravate the situation at the front for Russian forces because even export variants of the M1A2 SEP V2 is significantly better than existing Russian tanks in serial production. This doesn't include T-90M, which aren't in serial production. He says Russian tanks are using old Soviet-era ammunition, which is sufficient against T-64, T-72, and T-80 tanks at short ranges, but NATO tanks could engage them at longer distances, putting them at a disadvantage. He also says that Russia lacks a 3rd generation ATGM like the Javelin, and that Russian forces don't have enough Kornets. Instead, older Konkurs and Fagot ATGMs are the bulk of Russia's ATGMs. He says that 30-50 tanks is unlikely to affect the situation, but 200-300 could be a significant operational factor. He says much will depend on Russian producers of anti-tank systems. https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1618380131214688261
 

Great video with good comments , analyses from `3rd separate assault brigade` about one operation in Bakhmut.
 

'Fake' armor 😉
__________
But federal policy forbids the export of Abrams with classified armor packages used by the U.S. military, which includes depleted uranium, according to a fourth person with knowledge of the policy. The U.S. strips the vehicles of this secret armor “recipe” before selling them to other countries. There are other armor packages the U.S. can provide for foreign military sales customers. The Pentagon is planning to provide Ukraine the A2 version in this “exportable” form, according to one defense official and two other people with knowledge of the deliberations.
__________
https://www.politico.com/news/2023/01/26/us-sends-ukraine-advanced-abrams-tanks-00079648

Oh well, I guess I'm not one of the cool kids.
Find all the trucks. Find them all.

 
Oh, and here's something for the tank crowd:
 
 

New message from Mashovts. A little about the situation near Kremennaya, as well as information about the hitherto little-known PMC Redut (it was previously reported that this company belongs to Defense Minister Shoigu)
1️⃣ The enemy command in the Lyman direction began to actively strengthen its grouping of troops by units and units of airborne troops. Obviously, striving to achieve a fundamental change in the situation in their favor, in particular:
🔺on the northern and northwestern outskirts of Kremennaya, 2 battalions of the 104th Airborne Assault Regiment of the 76th Airborne Assault Division are deployed, digging in and preparing occupied positions for defense
🔺subdivisions of two more regiments of this division (the 234th and 237th airborne assault regiments) are concentrated in the area of the village Kuzmines are being re-equipped, are being replenished, are getting ready to go into battle
🔺 battalion of the 331st Airborne Regiment of the 98th Airborne Division, deployed in the area of Dybrova, takes part in the attacks
🔺separately, the 31st separate amphibious assault brigade is concentrated in the reserve, almost in its entirety in the Luhansk region.
In the same direction, the enemy continues its fruitless attempts to advance in the direction of Liman, with the aim of pushing the Armed Forces beyond the Black Zerebec River
Thus, during the previous days, the enemy made at least two attempts to advance in this direction:
🔺with the forces of two motorized rifle platoons from the 55th separate motorized rifle brigade, with the support of artillery, but without armored vehicles, he attacked the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the direction of Chervonpopovka - Yampolevka
🔺and also with the forces of two platoons from the 331st regiment of the 98th airborne division, he tried to attack with the support of 2-3 tanks and 2 armored personnel carriers in the direction of Dybrova - Torskoye, Dybrova - Yampolevka.
Both requests ended in vain for the enemy.
2️⃣ Information on the combat and quantitative composition of tanks (T-72, T-80, T-90 type tanks) in the zone of defense of units and formations of the 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army of the Central Military District as of January 25, 2023
A total of 127, including:
🔺At positions — 73 (T-72 – 26, T-80 – 46, T-90 – 0)
🔺In the area of concentration - 18 (T-72 - 0, T-80 - 13, T-90 - 5)
🔺SPAM – 36 (T-72 – 10, T-80 – 25, T – 90 – 1)
Thus, it becomes clear that the situation with tanks in a typical Russian general army (and the 2nd Guards CAA is not currently among the most active in terms of the participation of its units and formations in combat operations, but rather is a "reserve" storage unit) looks like It's sad enough - almost 45% of this type of equipment is in a state of being knocked down, out of order for technical reasons...
That is, in two motorized rifle brigades of the army (15th and 21st), in two tank and one motorized rifle regiments of the 4th TD (attached from the 1st Guards TA), in 2 tank regiments of the 90th TD (6th and 80th TR), as well as in the 1234th MRR of the territorial troops, a total of only 90-91 more or less combat-ready tanks... that's only 3 tank battalions...for the entire combined army... Let's put it bluntly - not densely.
Moreover, in most cases, all of them are spread across regiments and brigades... 5-7 tanks are in positions and 4-6 tanks are in concentration areas...
 

Ah, well zero-for-zero then but I am all about anonymity.  Leave them wondering and let the myths grow.  I heard The Capt was a naval officer who lost an eye in a bar fight in Manila, and now runs guns and rum under the cover of a travelling manatee show.  His insights on military affairs come entirely from MASH reruns and RoW tournaments.