Heavy machine guns and suppressive fire

[YankeeDog]

Sounds good to me. I didn't like the way that it worked in CMBB. It was better than CMBO's MGs not stopping anything but viewed at in isolation the CMBB hack didn't work very well.

I think that the way to go would probably be to allow extra freedom and speed in switching targets when presented with numerous "attractive" targets. "Attractive" means out of cover. That would do something precisely about the situation tested earlier, where a platoon can overrun a HMG over open ground.

This can lead to expending the ammunition early but alas I think that is realistic and appropriate here. If the attacker is willing to sacrifice 25-35 men it would be realistic to run an unsupplied HMG out of ammo.

Yes; this seems like a good solution to me. I don't think its unrealistic for an HMG crew to push the ROF to a degree, and perhaps risk running out of ammo or overheating the gun, if they are presented with a "target rich" environment. Especially if said targets might overrun the gun position...

Devil is, as always, in the details. I understand that TacAI stuff like this is very tricky to balance and get right, and seemingly simple changes can be difficult to implement correctly.

[Redwolf]

Would probably be good if 10 or more people ran the test and posted their opinions. Of course you'll always have somebody say the opposite of the popular opinion absolutely regardless of circumstances

[JasonC]

I'd like to ask those running the tests what they think the tactical reality is (real world), not what result they are seeing in the game. Because I think there are some unrealistic expectations here on that score.

I've looked at the bloodiest outlier successes of the war, in terms of mass, exposed target, with little cover, hit for long periods of time by multiple well protected MGs, with 5000 rounds per gun available. And they don't kill everyone in front of them.

They can wound half the men in front of them, and the rest come apart in any useful tactical sense, but that is all.

An average full 50 round belt run through an HMG under such best conditions does not hit a single man opposite. It takes more like 5 or 10 belts. That reflects some fire being area suppression or sustained just to keep heads down, some overkilling of the most exposed men, and the like, to be sure. But if you count the MGs on one side of the field, and count the men hit on the other side of the field, and do the math, they are emphatically not hitting 100 men each. Occasionally they are hitting 15 or 25 each - but over half a day and their entire ammo load, not five minutes.

If platoons are succeeding in advancing into range, suppressing and killing MGs, then it may be a mismodeling of morale and cohesion, agreed. But they should not be getting shot down to a man attempting it. As an average performance at least, that is not what an emplaced MG can be expected to deliver.

The average MG42 position at Omaha got maybe 20 men and certainly did not exceed 25 - all day. As an example. At that sufficed to make it one of the bloodiest shambles of the war, inflicted by MG fire.

[CBR]

FWIW I think they might be killing too much when one looks at rounds fired. I just like to see more variable ROF depending on number of targets and an overall better suppression.

They seem rather impotent against the AI human wave attacks I have seen. Or maybe I just expect too much of them.

[StellarRat]

A platoon might be able to take out a HMG realistically - but not with a full click of open ground in front of it. That would require HMG malfunction or running out of ammo.

I disagree with you on this. First of all, even seeing a man sized target that is doing it's best to hide and wearing camo is not easy at 1 km. Second, these guys are going to sprinting and covering not saying "here I am shoot me please". Getting on dispersed targets that sprint and cover is like whack a mole. It's not that easy (as one of our previous posters with practical experience said.) Third, 30 men with semi-auto rifles, BARs and rifle grenades is a lot of firepower for one MG to deal with (assuming it wasn't in a fortified emplacement.) Under normal circumstances I would expect the platoon to win IF they had nothing else to deal with, but it would definitely slow their advance to a crawl. Using proper fire and maneuver tactics is time consuming.

[stikkypixie]

For sure !

Recovering moral goes way too fast at the moment...should be some minutes not seconds overall.

You can always turn down the motivation or morale of the troops.

[Peregrine]

Switching targets is not necessarily a good idea solution because it lifts the suppression constantly.

In CMBB played I played lot of MEs and by picking infantry heavy forces it wasn't overly difficult attacking a roughly equal sized force. The trick against HMGs was to manage the suppression of your troops by always presenting the TAC AI with a new and tastier target. I would spread my orders to try and always have someone running but not for very long. You would see the TAC AI switch targets constantly and ultimately shoot at everybody but never really hurt anybody. This was with regular troops. Yet to PBEM a human but I don't think this will work anymore under CMBN.

IF there is a problem with the HMGs it is more to do with insufficient suppression.

Also the MG42 seems a much better weapon if you have some sort of defense (hedgerow, foxhole, trench) than running around deploying it in the open.

[Blackcat]

A thirty man US platoon of the summer of 1944 does indeed have a lot of firepower and if they can get in range I can see no objection to them taking down a single HMG. The question is should they be able to get in range in good order with very few casualties?

It has been suggested that a platoon using fire and movement tactics will be hard to hit and will slowly be able to advance and achieve the results I saw yesterday. I would offer two points on this.

Firstly, the attacking platoons were not using fire and movement tactics per se. They were running using the quick movement in bounds succesive bounds of about 100 metres. So for the crucial first 700 metres (i.e. before they get into the effective range of their own weapons) the attackers were upright and clearly visible whilst the defenders were in cover, not taking fire and in very good order.

Secondly, HMGs are primarily an area weapon. They are not designed to hit individuals but to put down a rain of fire that stands a good chance of hitting any person in the beaten zone or is betwen the beaten zone and the MG position.

When I started out running the tests yesterday I expected to see a single HMG cause some significant casualties, sufficent to cause a serious morale drop, against a platoon that was effecively trying to do a re-run of some of the later actions on the Somme. I then intended to move on and test using proper advance to contact tactics. However, in the first run through all six platoons took their objective easily without any serious morale drop an very few casualties (lowest 2, highest 4). I became curious and ran the same test many times - with the same results.

The point about how many casualties individual HMGs caused in a specific action does not take the discussion about HMGs in the game forward. In any real world fight, such as Omaha their were lots of other weapon systems in play which had a significant effect. In any scenario there will be other weapons involved too, but that doesn't alter what a HMG was and should be capable of as a weapon in its own right.

P.S. I just ran a test in which the infantry walked, walked, (using the move command) the 800 yards into effective rifle range. The casualties were higher but not disabling and each MG was pinned and then overcome by the attackers. I don't believe infantry should be able to walk bolt upright across 800 metres of open ground towards an unsupressed HMG, let alone do so and be in a state to fight when they got there, 1st July 1916 strongly indicates the reverse.

As an aside, I did notice several sections go through tiring to tired after walking less than 600 metres. Can that be right?

[Sgt Joch]

I'd like to ask those running the tests what they think the tactical reality is (real world), not what result they are seeing in the game. Because I think there are some unrealistic expectations here on that score.

Agreed. It is hard to test because infantry did not fight that way in Normandy.

First, Infantry would not charge through an open field against an unsuppressed MG nest. As soon as its presence was known, suppressive fire would be directed against it to pin/ kill it and/ or assault teams would try to outflank it to get close and kill it.

Second, the Germans would not leave a MG position alone in a fixed position. MG nests would be mutually supporting and camouflaged. The Germans would also frequently move the MGs around during battle between prepared positions so the US had a hard time spotting exactly where they were.

So yes, a lone fixed MG42 out in the open facing a platoon would eventually be knocked out if the platoon leader uses proper tactics.

What the tests show is the ability of the MG42 to hit moving targets out to 600 meters and in that regard, its capability looks about right as it is.

[Blackcat]

"So yes, a lone fixed MG42 out in the open facing a platoon would eventually be knocked out if the platoon leader uses proper tactics."

However, it would seem in the game one doesn't need to use proper tactics, you can walk up into rifle range and take the damn thing out. Surely all the reason the tactics were developed was that they HMG was sufficiently deadly that they were needed.

I am not sure that one can argue that in actual combat the HMG is OK becuase it will be supported by other systems and anyway no player will charge it because the wouldn't in real life.

Aside from in the game a regular HMG seems to open fire at 600 yards, why pick that number? In basic training and using a bipod MG we were trained to fire out to 1000 yards. A tripod mounted HMG should be effective at a lot further than 600.

P.S. If you still want my test map ping me a PM with your email and I'll send it to you.

[YankeeDog]

Aside from in the game a regular HMG seems to open fire at 600 yards, why pick that number? In basic training and using a bipod MG we were trained to fire out to 1000 yards. A tripod mounted HMG should be effective at a lot further than 600.

Bear in mind that ~600 meters is the distance at which the MG crew will open up of its own accord, absent other orders. The player can always override this with a Cover Arc or a specific Target order.

Seems like a reasonable "default" setting to me. Just because an MG *can* fire at targets 1000m away with at least some effect, doesn't mean they necessarily should take to initiative to do so on their own.

[~Viajero]

Quick one for those doing HMG tests: were the HMG left to the TacAI to decide targets or where you forcing area fire where appropriate during the infantry advance. Do you think it would make a difference?

[c3k]

Blackcat, I would like a copy of your test scenario. Email it to my profile email if you would. Or, failing that, post it online with a link.

Thanks,

Ken

[Redwolf]

I'd like to ask those running the tests what they think the tactical reality is (real world), not what result they are seeing in the game. Because I think there are some unrealistic expectations here on that score.

I've looked at the bloodiest outlier successes of the war, in terms of mass, exposed target, with little cover, hit for long periods of time by multiple well protected MGs, with 5000 rounds per gun available. And they don't kill everyone in front of them.

They can wound half the men in front of them, and the rest come apart in any useful tactical sense, but that is all.

An average full 50 round belt run through an HMG under such best conditions does not hit a single man opposite. It takes more like 5 or 10 belts. That reflects some fire being area suppression or sustained just to keep heads down, some overkilling of the most exposed men, and the like, to be sure. But if you count the MGs on one side of the field, and count the men hit on the other side of the field, and do the math, they are emphatically not hitting 100 men each. Occasionally they are hitting 15 or 25 each - but over half a day and their entire ammo load, not five minutes.

If platoons are succeeding in advancing into range, suppressing and killing MGs, then it may be a mismodeling of morale and cohesion, agreed. But they should not be getting shot down to a man attempting it. As an average performance at least, that is not what an emplaced MG can be expected to deliver.

The average MG42 position at Omaha got maybe 20 men and certainly did not exceed 25 - all day. As an example. At that sufficed to make it one of the bloodiest shambles of the war, inflicted by MG fire.

I don't want to kill everyone in the platoon. I want the platoon not to be able to reach the HMG over open ground, in the specific situation that there is so much open ground that the rifle squads all run across the ground and do not or can not bring on suppressive fire.

I disagree with you on this. First of all, even seeing a man sized target that is doing it's best to hide and wearing camo is not easy at 1 km. Second, these guys are going to sprinting and covering not saying "here I am shoot me please". Getting on dispersed targets that sprint and cover is like whack a mole.

Yeah but we were talking about a full kilometer or so.

And the HMG has a crew with extra rifles.

It's not that easy (as one of our previous posters with practical experience said.) Third, 30 men with semi-auto rifles, BARs and rifle grenades is a lot of firepower for one MG to deal with (assuming it wasn't in a fortified emplacement.) Under normal circumstances I would expect the platoon to win IF they had nothing else to deal with, but it would definitely slow their advance to a crawl. Using proper fire and maneuver tactics is time consuming.

You should be able to take out the HMG with a platoon using real tactics.

But what I think we are talking about here is doing so by simply running all 4 elements towards the HMG across a kilometer of open ground. That should not work. Maybe with a Russian human wave command.

I mean this is what suicidal human waves are about. You shouldn't be able to order an American platoon to do it, or rather, it shouldn't work.

Switching targets is not necessarily a good idea solution because it lifts the suppression constantly.

The area assumed to be the suppressive area needs to be half-smart, certain more smart than just "50m around current bullet impact point".

Certainly an open field in front of a HMG that is willing to expend a lot of ammo and isn't currently jammed should have a suppressive area that is pretty much the extent of the field. Not total suppression everywhere but surely a squad in the left section that has just been grazed will not feel secure a second after the HMG switched to a different target in the same open field. The suppression should last longer than in different situations. The threat is not gone.

[...]

IF there is a problem with the HMGs it is more to do with insufficient suppression.

That's what I'm saying. But I don't want the CMBB crawl of death either.

I guess you now did it, now I want to run some tests.

[Sgt Joch]

I have to run some more tests as well, but I think the issue is more with suppression/morale and maybe spotting.

If you look at just the performance of the MG42, it does not appear off.

The ROF is based on actual German practice, short controlled bursts.

The accuracy, from my tests also appears ok. I had the squads running directly towards the MG, so you can take aiming out of the equation.

The MGs start hitting at around 500-600 meters. Remember that past around 300 meters, the rounds are arcing up and coming down, so the gunner has to have the exact range and lead to hit. Out past 300 meters, every 2-3 bursts would hit someone.

Inside 300 meters, the trajectory is pretty flat, so you can ignore the range. in the 100-300 meters range, pretty much every burst hits 1,2, sometimes 3 soldiers. No one made it within 100 meters.

This is with a "regular" crew. The accuracy would be increased by using higher quality crews and/or TRPs.

Where there would appear to be an issue is with suppression/morale recovery. Namely, how many times can you order a platoon to charge a machine gun head on before they finally break? The rate at which morale is recovered may have to be increased.

ps - Blackcat, sent you a pm.

[JasonC]

Redwolf - I understand, but to me that is precisely the issue of morale that I flagged as the proper issue here, in my opinion. As I said, I think the physical destructiveness is about right, but the morale effects of that level of destructiveness are too low. There should not be more men hit, but they should pin sooner and especially stay pinned longer.

On comments about the Somme, it does not materially differ from the average effectiveness of MGs seen at Omaha. It is a much larger battle, of course, along a much longer frontage with more attackers exposed and more MGs firing at them. But the average consequences are strikingly similar.

Next a point about the actual defensive schemes used on both occasions. The damage was not inflicted simply by MGs firing at the men directly in front of them, easily approached by the attackers and subject to reply fire. Instead most of the MGs were sighted at high angles to the frontage, making it quite difficult to engage them from their immediate front. Even if a group of attackers knocked out all MGs directly in their path, they were still blocked by flanking fire coming in from beyond the range of the infantry's personal weapons.

In both cases, the way forward to close with the shooters was also blocked by obstacles and difficult terrain. But in both cases, the attackers did make it into the defense in the places where they found cut wire, or in holes in the fire net created by knocked out defenders, or masked by low visibility. (In the case of the Somme, the issue then became defending reserves, which reached the trench positions the attackers did in at least equal numbers and greater cohesion than the surviving attackers to that point. In the case of Omaha where there weren't any such reserves, the defense was penetrated as a result).

I also note that in both cases the men walked. They were heavily laden, too heavily for easy use of "quick", and they were also stunned by what was happening to them. Only small portions physically ran at what the game depicts as "quick". In the case of the Somme, they were also packed closer than tactically sound side to side, in long lines, not spread enough front to back. A similar effect occurred early in each wave at Omaha as the men exited the boats, too bunched up. Men in correct tactical open order (5 yards between each man), and moving at a jog by bounds with periods spent prone, would be much less vulnerable than the average target presented on either occasion.

Facing a single MG frontally with an unobstructed route into rifle range to fire back, is in fact a much easier proposition than the men faced on either of those two occasions. Which, it must be remembered, were outliers of high effectiveness on the part of the defending MGs.

What I think probably is undermodeled in the game as it stands is the duration of suppression from losses taken, and the spread of morale decreases to other units of the same platoon when some are hit hard enough.

[Blackcat]

"The MGs start hitting at around 500-600 meters. Remember that past around 300 meters, the rounds are arcing up and coming down, so the gunner has to have the exact range and lead to hit. Out past 300 meters, every 2-3 bursts would hit someone. "

I think here we are getting towards the nub. I think Sgt Joch is being conservative in his 300 metre flat tragetory limit, but let that pass, for now. HMGs were and are designed to fire at targets at long range. They don't need exact range data, did the Gemans have it on the Somme? The bullets come down in a elipitcal pattern (the beaten zone) anyone in that zone has a fairly serious chance to be hit. Those that aren't hit are, perhaps, not likely to want to go on and those yet to enter might well prefer to stay where they are, thank you. The zone thus produces a supressive effect.

Now returning to the 300 metres idea. Here we come to grazing fire, if you are between the HMG and the Beaten zone you stand a good chance to be struck by a bullet not aimed at you. If the game models HMG fire at ranges greater than 300 metres as rising above the height of a normal human it definitely does have a serious flaw.

Dang! The wife has come home and wants me to do things. Sorry, chaps, I'll be back later.

[Sgt Joch]

HMGs were and are designed to fire at targets at long range.

Agreed and I have not had a chance to test it out, but I am wondering if it is a spotting issue. At what range do the HMGs spot and identify the enemy infantry? They should start firing as soon as the infantry icon pops up.

[Sgt Joch]

I think here we are getting towards the nub. I think Sgt Joch is being conservative in his 300 metre flat tragetory limit, but let that pass,

(...)

If the game models HMG fire at ranges greater than 300 metres as rising above the height of a normal human it definitely does have a serious flaw.

I was guesstimating to illustrate a point. 300 meters is the range at which 5.56mm NATO ammo starts to really drop off, I realize that 7.92mm German ammo may travel farther in a straight line. The game models ballistics as they really were.

edit - actually I was not that far off, according to this, 7.92mm ammo starts to noticeably drop off past 400 meters (look at the ballistics table in the middle of the page):

http://omegacrossroads.com/GunCabinet/8X57/8mmMauser.htm

[Michael Emrys]

I am firmly in the camp of those who think that the problem lies in the morale effects of MG fire. It may be significant that the descriptions of bocage fighting state that the primary effect of MGs was to pin the men who had crossed the hedgerow into the contested field. They were then vulnerable to mortar fire which had been pre-registered on the field. It was the two in combination that did the killing.

The solution was to get the men across the field and into the German lines as quickly as possible and this was accomplished by suppressive fire from tanks, once a way to get them through the hedgerows was perfected, and smoke on the MG positions.

Michael

[Blackcat]

Just sneaking two minutes on the computer before Herself notices I am not "doing things". My thanks to those who are contributng to this debate and/or have asked for a copy of my Test Map . I'll be back with proper responses as soon as I can satisfy Herself that I have done sufficient "things" (given the size of the pile in the ironing basket it maybe some hours).

[~Viajero]

Just sneaking two minutes on the computer before Herself notices I am not "doing things". My thanks to those who are contributng to this debate and/or have asked for a copy of my Test Map . I'll be back with proper responses as soon as I can satisfy Herself that I have done sufficient "things" (given the size of the pile in the ironing basket it maybe some hours).

I believe Herselves supression is completely undermodeled.

[Michael Emrys]

I'll be back with proper responses as soon as I can satisfy Herself that I have done sufficient "things" (given the size of the pile in the ironing basket it maybe some hours).

She makes you do the ironing???!!!! Good lord!

:eek:

Michael

[Thomm]

She makes you do the ironing???!!!! Good lord!

Ironing + a good DVD is good synergy.

Best regards,

Thomm

[Zonks54]

I carried the MAG58 in our section during my military time, 1000rpm, 7.62NATO, we used it as a direct fire weapon or a suppressive weapon, we get a contact, I lay down a blanket of suppressing fire towards the enemy, the rifle team go forward and throw grenades, thats just one tactic, it's pretty hard to stop them when you have 7.62mm flying over your head sounding like the crack of a whip.

You only need to spend some time at the range down at the target butt to know what its like to have rounds going over your head, the suppressing fires effectiveness comes down to the skill of the gunner, and the nerve of the troops on the receiving end.

As far as the comments go on rate of fire, 5-8 rounds bursts with a bipod, anything over that and the kick throws the aim off and further fire becomes ineffective, tripods the kick is much less, therefore you can increase the rate of fire, you can read the military textbooks all you want, it all goes out the window in combat, I've seen machineguns barrels glowing red, I've never seen anyone counting the required 200 rounds to change a barrel, when you have enemy charging at you, your not going to stop to make a barrel change.

We were always told the the machinegun is 80% of the sections firepower, it's a meat grinder.