Heavy machine guns and suppressive fire

[Wengart]

I did one test with the M1917 which ended miserably. I think the HMG team got 4 kills the the MG and 5 kills with rifles, and 2 of the 4 mg kills were made while the Grenadier Plt. was entering its trench.

I definitely think suppression needs a look at, or possibly morale recovery. I consistently had 5-8 man remnants of a platoon take orders and overrun elite experience HMG crews.

Anyway I'm setting up a Rifle Company attack over open ground on a single defending platoon+HMG in cover. Is there specific information I should be looking for?

[Vanir Ausf B]

Does the M1917 get any bonus for being water-cooled? If not it's just a heavier M1919.

[Wengart]

I also did some tests using green rifle platoons and a few with 2 HMGs instead of one. In general all that happened was a higher casualty rate and slight bogging of the attack (maybe a minute tops in most cases) the HMG teams were still overrun.

Just finished my first Rifle Company sans Weapons PLt. vs. pioneer plt. + HMG42 test.

US Army 77 OK 21 KIA 27 WIA

Germans 4 OK 26 KIA 10 WIA

The HMG, due to poor placement in a crater by myself, ended up getting only two kills, both from the German rifle squad situated to its front.

[Steiner14]

Wow! That is not the backbone of a defensive position, that's useless garbage.

[The_Capt]

Ok, ran a couple test of my own trying to get to the bottom of this. I am surprised to find myself totally agreeing with Jason. I think Jason has nailed it, everyone else is talking mechanics but it appears that people are the heart of the issue.

Rather than focus on the physical damage of the HMG, I shifted focus to the damage to the morale and motivation of the attacker to actually fight, which is a lot harder to put ones hands on and has a larger effect on the battlefield.

I ran three tests, same setup, both played in Hotseat.

1 x US Inf Coy, Regular, no heavy weapons, starting at roughly 900-1000 out across open ground. Remember that in CMBN, like CMBO, "open ground" is not a total parking lot, there is still some cover.

1 x Grenadier pl w 1 x MG42 HMG in trenches.

Standard military doctrine tells me that at approx 3:1 (125 US to 41 German) I should be able to take the objective. Based on my experience in RL I would not be comfortable with this situation in the least. This is an unsupported frontal on a prepared position so if I can pull it off it is going to be expensive.

First run thru I had both German and US at Normal motivation. I sent the US on a bald ass Quick charge onto the objective. I directed fire on the German side, trying to concentrate on sections of the oncoming attack line to break up the charge.

Result

US; 75 OK, 50 dead or wounded. That is a 40% loss for this engagement. I did take out the German platoon but this Company is pretty much spent. Whole thing took 7 minutes.

Germans; 10 Ok, 31 dead or wounded.

Now I get peoples points that this looks a little odd. Should a Company be able to charge across open ground onto dug-in troops? My intial reaction was that it could happen but was pretty unlikely to unfold this way. But note that the loss rate is about right, 40%. Particularly considering the MGs were firing from the front instead of from the side (enfilade or defilade...I can never get those two right) which means they can engage only a single squad at a time, two at best if they get an overlap.

BTW MGs all opened up at around the 800m mark and really got deadly at 600m. A little short in my opinion BUT the US squads were not returning effective fire until around 400m less the sharpshooters. So it appears CMBN has shrunked the battlefield wrt infantry ranges somewhat (ie to the effective ranges of the weapons vice maximum) but has done so equally so the MGs still have that effective range advantage.

So 2nd test, same setup but this time I dialed the US Coy motivation to Poor.

Result:

US; 70 Ok, 55 KIA or wounded. Here a 44% loss. BUT the outcome was totally different. The US Coy totally fell apart at about 300m from the objective and failed to take it. I cease fired at 7 minutes again.

Germans; 35 Ok, 6 KIA or wounded.

This outcome is what I would expect to see in RL. A high loss but in line with the previous attempt but the Coy fell apart and was combat ineffective before it could deal with the Germans.

3rd test.

For this test I still ran the US as Poor in motivation, however this time I applied tactics to the situation. I advanced the Coy carefully and in platoon bounds when in contact, static units providing covering fire. Once I got to within 300m I started using the squad Assault command.

Result

US 89 Ok, 36 KIA or wounded, a loss of roughly 29%, which is almost textbook results for this sort of attack. The Coy did manage to take its objective but only after 16 minutes and only after getting into effective range and pounding the Germans down. One platoon was totally Broken and I wouldn't put them back into the fight without a trip back to England first.

Germans; 10 Ok, 31 KIA or wounded.

Looking at all three test I have to say the last two results are exactly what one should expect in this given tactical situation. The US coy is spent at nearly 30-40% lost doing it stupid didn't work, applying real world tactics worked.

If the Germans had added force multipliers (ie wire, minefield and/or mortars) it would have pushed the force ratio closer to 2:1 or even 1:1 and the US would not have stood a chance.

So the bottom line. If you want real world results, dial your troops motivation to Poor. I think this may appeal to Hardcore gamers but for casual gamers I would warn you that it will slow the game down drastically and start to feel a lot like work and possible "un-fun".

Could Motivation be tweaked, sure but right now every player has the option and at current settings I think BFC has them setup for the widest audience.

[YankeeDog]

So the bottom line. If you want real world results, dial your troops motivation to Poor. I think this may appeal to Hardcore gamers but for casual gamers I would warn you that it will slow the game down drastically and start to feel a lot like work and possible "un-fun".

Could Motivation be tweaked, sure but right now every player has the option and at current settings I think BFC has them setup for the widest audience.

Great tests, Capt; thanks.

Personally, for those of us that prefer a more realistic treatment of infantry morale and suppression, I would like to see some sort of better option than going into the editor and turning all of the troops' motivation down a notch for every scenario I play.

If BFC is really concerned about turning off "casual gamers" (and FWIW, I'm not convinced this is something they should be too concerned about wrt this issue), perhaps "more realistic morale and suppression" modeling could be an option that comes in at the Elite and/or Iron level of play?

Worth noting that this wouldn't necessarily make scenarios harder, across the board, since it would effect both sides equally. It would probably usually favor the attacker, though not always, since it would presumably also make it somewhat easier to suppress & break defensive positions with ranged fire.

Fundamentally, it would weight things more towards the "Fire" side of "Fire and Maneuver." But this doesn't bother me in the slightest.

[Blackcat]

We seem to have slipped deftly from are HMGs modelled about right to are attacks generally producing about results that "feel" right. I am sure Steve said only recently that feelings were not good enough and only hard facts would do. I also remember him giving us, pre-release, posts about how CMx2 was about accurately modelling weapons systems that then behave as they would in the real world as opposed to modelling for effect. I am struggling here as there seems to be a contradiction between then and now.

However, as I have spent far too much time on this issue, I am going to bow out. I am sure it will surface again, it did in CMBO, but I think I'd sooner spend my time playing the game rather than trying to play what small part I can to help improve it.

[Sgt Joch]

yes, good test, The Capt.

I dont think switching every unit from "good" to "poor" motivation is being presented as a global answer, just that there are many, many variables that go into the outcome of any battle and the tools are there now to model it in CMBN.

JasonC gave examples of successful frontal assaults through open fields in RL against MG nests. Those troops were highly motivated and driven by determined commanders, and paid the price for it.

On the other hand, Doubler in his article seems to suggest that poor motivation was a common problem among US troops:

Bad terrain and the Germans' tactical proficiency were not the only conditions hampering operations. American commanders observed many defects in the training and effectiveness of their troops. As experience in other theaters had shown, lack of aggressiveness was a major problem in most infantry units. Infantrymen failed to maneuver in order to place more effective direct fire on the enemy. Instead, units maneuvered to locate the Germans and then called for heavy weapons and indirect fire to neutralize the defenders. Even after the artillery had pounded enemy positions, many infantry units were slow in seizing their objectives. General Bradley acknowledged that a major problem in First Army was the infantry's slowness in following their close supporting artillery barrages.10

Interrogation of German prisoners during the hedgerow battles revealed that even the Germans detected a lack of aggressive drive among the American infantry units. Prisoners stated that the American infantry moved too cautiously and consequently failed to take weakly held positions. They were surprised that artillery barrages were not followed up by determined infantry assaults. An experienced corporal in the German 275th Infantry Division summed up German attitudes: "Americans use infantry cautiously. If they used it the way Russians do, they would be in Paris now."11

American infantrymen were not convinced of the potency and effectiveness of their own rifle and machine-gun fires. Their failure to maintain the proper distribution and volume of smallarms fire during assaults was a major problem. infantry training stressed covering the entire objective with small-arms fire during an attack to suppress enemy defensive fires. In Normandy, many riflemen failed to keep up a steady rate of fire during the attack. Instead, they tended not to fire at suspected enemy positions but to wait for a definite target before opening fire. Consequently, many concealed German positions were not fired on during the attack.12

Infantrymen crouching behind bushes atop a hedgerow

Inexperience in combat also hampered infantry units. In battle for the first time, infantrymen had to rely on their training and leaders to get them through the initial trauma of combat. Many had to learn how to survive through their own experiences and from the misfortunes of others. Green troops of all ranks had a tendency not to move under fire, preferring the protection of the closest cover or simply hugging the open ground. German snipers were a particular source of fear."13The experience of a platoon leader in the 9th Division illustrates how untried troops can react under fire:

For normal infantrymen, becoming "battle wise" was a terrible, if not fatal, experience

http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/doubler/doubler.asp#21

[JasonC]

Blackcat - several people have reported test on this thread, and provided links to webpages containing their results. If you follow them you can see the number of men hit for the various quality levels of shooters in the various tests. Add up the results, excluding the "elite" shooters who perform twice as well as the others. Divide by the number of tests. Report back here the numerical average of men hit in the tests. (Hint, it's about 10 as I said). That's where the numbers I report as typical are coming from. "Typical" means average over many, not what you personally saw in one test.

[JasonC]

Capt - thanks, very useful. It gets at whether the relationship between loss and suppression in the game is about right, rather than the typical FP of MGs specifically, but I think that is the main issue in any case.

I'm not sure I agree entirely with your conclusions however. I'd expect formations taking those kind of losses to come apart, which you do report for the greens without proper tactics (44% and fail). But I'd also expect that even use of proper tactics would typically come apart, if they lack cover and take 30% losses. Proper tactics and some cover, yes that is the right general result, though probably for veteran troops.

Not a large disagreement, however. Just a tweaking of the suppression to loss relationship. As related the game behavior may be 2 notches too robust at the normal settings. I say that because actual green troops frequently came apart at losses around or even under 20%; regulars should stall out around 25, and it would take vets to sustain 30% losses and continue the mission to a total defender kill by firepower.

The firepower remaining to a regular formation that has already taken 30% losses in a short period would be very low in reality, especially without cover. As many man again, or more, would be ineffective from incohesion effects (aiding the wounded, abandoned the field, personally "broken", etc). And the roughly 40% of the initial strength left would normally be prone and putting their heads up only occasionally, thus generating less in outgoing fire than unsuppressed men. The total firepower remaining to the formation might be only 10-15% of what it was theoretically capable of at the start line. Even with decent initial odds, that would often fail to suffice to outshoot defenders in cover, when those remaining attackers didn't have any (though some of the defenders would be suppressed too etc).

Fire dominance rather than movement is what normally takes ground, agreed. But attacker cover normally helps achieve that. Enough infantry gets to safe-ish spots close enough to the defenders to hit them with small arms fire; that then accumulates hits and suppression on the defenders, allows more infantry to get to such spots, and snowballs into taking the position. That normally requires that the men that got that close achieve some sort of protection for themselves, that allows them to deliver their own reply fire effectively and continually. If the movement into effective rifle range physically wounds or kills a third of the attackers, I sincerely doubt 3 to 1 initial odds would suffice to outshoot defenders in cover with the operating remainder, in the absence of over for that operating remainder.

Another way of putting it is the result Capt called about right, proper tactics plus 30% loss succeeding, strikes me as about right for veterans with (limited, but some) cover (e.g. shellholes or at least brush and irregularities in the relief, within rifle range of the defenders), not regulars without.

I go into it with such detail not because I think we are far apart but because I think we are close, and I want to home in on the correct level of average morale adjustment. I'd estimate it at "two notches" of the quality and motivation ratings.

FWIW...

[JasonC]

Steve - agreed, it is certainly not trivial to get this suppression stuff right. But very valuable for realism and fidelity to historical tactics, combined arms relationships, etc when it is.

[PanzerMiller]

I also remember him (Steve) giving us, pre-release, posts about how CMx2 was about accurately modelling weapons systems that then behave as they would in the real world as opposed to modelling for effect.

I've been thinking about that same thread as I work my way through this discussion. I think the whole "engineered vs. designed for effect" debate is critical material for this forum, although I realize it ultimately boils down to philosophical differences that are unliley to be resolved here.

However, as I have spent far too much time on this issue, I am going to bow out.

C'mon, Blackcat -- don't go home now! We all learn so much on this forum from the ideas, throughts and analyses we present -- including yours.

Get back in there, soldier!! -- Your morale is waning!!! (ironic, isn't it??!!)

[undead reindeer cavalry]

i would buy the argument that HMG accuracy & effectiveness is right, if the tests had historical circumstances (terrain, type of movement of the advancing units, negative battlefield effects on the HMG etc). the tests put the HMG in the ideal circumstances where it ought to really excel. such circumstances were highly atypical historically, if for nothing else then for natural selection that quickly took its toll. as is, the tests are target practice and so far none of the crews have passed the basic gunnery course.

i am not suggesting HMGs should be super lethal in a historical battlefield environment. i am suggesting that HMGs (especially something like a MG42 with good tripod & scope in a prepared position) should be super lethal WHEN the terrain is flat & open, the HMG is not suppressed AND the highly concentrated targets stay upright for tens of seconds while moving towards the HMG.

the advancing infantry should hit the ground or die. if they need to move, they should make quick short (1-3 seconds) leaps here and there, or crawl if terrain permits, so that the HMG doesn't have a good target. as long as the infantry is taking cover the HMG is just suppressing, slowing the advancing infantry down to *gasp* crawl.

this is the initial setup of the basic rock-paper-scissors combined arms tactics of the open fields. prep fires, prep defensive positions, armor, ATGs, fix & flank, mines & wires, combat engineers, mortars on the pinned infantry, recon, etc etc etc come after this initial basic condition is recognized. if the basic condition is not met there is no need for the rest that follows.

EDIT: i naturally agree about all that's said about suppression.

[Steiner14]

I'm amazed that "experts" here calculate with a 3:1 ratio for a successful attack - over open ground without any support weapons and no cover!

:D

Incredible.

Following this argumentation, a 1:1 ratio for attacks in a favourable map would have been enough.

How were attacks in reality conducted? The weakest spot is exploited, the terrain with most cover is used, where the enemy has the worst LOF and all support weapons that are available are brought into action. Then the 3:1 ratio could be expected to work.

The examples brought up here should be simply suicidal, if the HMG of the defender doesn't jam or isn't supressed.

But following this discussion, it seems to be enough to go to ground for the defender to lose interest in the attacker. But how is a HMG crew acting? Lying flat in open ground is only of help for the first few seconds, until the HMG has stopped the advance, brought the attacker down to the ground and afterwards begins to strafe and aim at the cowering soldiers while the other infantry starts the clay pigeon shooting...

An attack over open ground has not been a voluntary option, only the last option if everything elese failed. And even then, it needed to be supported by other weapons.

Why that? The Soviets hardly reached a 3:1 casualty rate in their most successful battles. Why, if rushing over open ground without support weapons already works with that ratio?!

And there is no need to speculate at all:

Just take a look at the human wave-attacks of the Soviets and how successful they were. There you find all the facts to study the impact of open ground and how effective HMGs are to stop attacks over open ground!

[MengJiao]

Why that? The Soviets hardly reached a 3:1 casualty rate in their most successful battles. Why, if rushing over open ground without support weapons already works with that ratio?!

And there is no need to speculate at all:

Just take a look at the human wave-attacks of the Soviets and how successful they were. There you find all the facts to study the impact of open ground and how effective HMGs are to stop attacks over open ground!

Well, if you line up enough stereotypes you can make anything sound plausible. For example, if you take the destruction of Army Group center as the most successful soviet offensive, the German defenders lost 600,000 and the attackers lost 200,000 or 1:3 in the opposite direction. So by your logic attacking at 1:3 should work fine. There you find all the facts to study the impact of open ground and how effective HMGs are to stop attacks over open ground!

[The_Capt]

I'm amazed that "experts" here calculate with a 3:1 ratio for a successful attack - over open ground without any support weapons and no cover!

:D

Incredible.

Following this argumentation, a 1:1 ratio for attacks in a favourable map would have been enough.

How were attacks in reality conducted? The weakest spot is exploited, the terrain with most cover is used, where the enemy has the worst LOF and all support weapons that are available are brought into action. Then the 3:1 ratio could be expected to work.

The examples brought up here should be simply suicidal, if the HMG of the defender doesn't jam or isn't supressed.

But following this discussion, it seems to be enough to go to ground for the defender to lose interest in the attacker. But how is a HMG crew acting? Lying flat in open ground is only of help for the first few seconds, until the HMG has stopped the advance, brought the attacker down to the ground and afterwards begins to strafe and aim at the cowering soldiers while the other infantry starts the clay pigeon shooting...

An attack over open ground has not been a voluntary option, only the last option if everything elese failed. And even then, it needed to be supported by other weapons.

Why that? The Soviets hardly reached a 3:1 casualty rate in their most successful battles. Why, if rushing over open ground without support weapons already works with that ratio?!

And there is no need to speculate at all:

Just take a look at the human wave-attacks of the Soviets and how successful they were. There you find all the facts to study the impact of open ground and how effective HMGs are to stop attacks over open ground!

Easy there Tex, I said 3:1 is textbook minimum. In this scenario I had serious doubts due in large part to the same reasons you are going on about. Also force ratios tend to be somewhat abstract as they are related directly back to firepower which is often more than the simple sum of its parts.

This map is not "optimal"btw. It gives both side equal chance to react ie well in advance. Better for the defender would be a reverse slope position roughly 300m out, hold tight until they advance another 100m and open up. Troop caught in the open have two very unfun choices, fight it out a closer range with the other team going full bore early or run away, up hill...but I am sure you already knew that.

In reality you want 6:1 if you can get it.

Also "open ground" in CM (and this has been said a couple hundred times) is not a bald-ass parking lot. It has cover.

Ignoring our loud friend here and answering Jason,

I think I would agree with your assessment but maybe meet you half-way with a one notch tweak on motivation and then leave the rest for the player to tweak. If it gets hard wired into the game too far over, I think the game begins to drift out of "casual hobby" into "professional simulator"

[Steiner14]

Well, if you line up enough stereotypes you can make anything sound plausible. For example, if you take the destruction of Army Group center as the most successful soviet offensive, the German defenders lost 600,000 and the attackers lost 200,000 or 1:3 in the opposite direction. So by your logic attacking at 1:3 should work fine. There you find all the facts to study the impact of open ground and how effective HMGs are to stop attacks over open ground!

To be correct, Bagration was an operation, not a battle. And it were 400.000 losses on the German side, not 600.000.

But let's transfer the numbers into CMBN:

800.000 soldiers on German side vs. 2.300.000 Soviet side = 2,875 times attacker vs. defender for infantry.

less than 500 tanks : 4000 = 8 times more tanks for the attacker than for the defender.

Artillery and airforce around at least 10-20 times stronger. Let's say only factor 10.

Now set up a scenario with that relations in CMBN and tell me if you can achieve a ratio of losses of defender vs attacker of only 2:1...

QUED.

[YankeeDog]

Ignoring our loud friend here and answering Jason,

I think I would agree with your assessment but maybe meet you half-way with a one notch tweak on motivation and then leave the rest for the player to tweak. If it gets hard wired into the game too far over, I think the game begins to drift out of "casual hobby" into "professional simulator"

Which, again, is why I wonder whether it's worth considering another Skill Level differentiation here. The manual already says that, at "Basic Training" level, "Troops suffer slightly fewer casualties and are less likely to panic [than at higher skill levels]." So there's already precedent for this. Perhaps things should ratchet up again at the Elite or Iron level, for those who like things more towards the "professional simulator" end of the spectrum.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

This map is not "optimal"btw. It gives both side equal chance to react ie well in advance. Better for the defender would be a reverse slope position roughly 300m out, hold tight until they advance another 100m and open up.

reverse slope is a defence against superior firepower. no such thing present on these test maps.

it was somewhat common to wait till 100 meters before opening up, because that's the kill zone for small arms fire. if the target appears at 300 meters there's not much point left to start pinning them down anymore, because they are able to lay effective fire once they regroup (and react to the situation, as you wrote). so you want to break them and rout them, not pin them.

HMGs overlooking a huge open flat field are an entirely different thing and you want to open fire before the advancing infantry can spot you. then once they have taken cover and are wondering what is hapenning, it's the time for you to drop the mortar package on them. and that breaks the advance, or at least puts half the men out of the battle.

[Sgt Joch]

If you want to compare CMBN with 1941 Eastern Front "Human Wave" scenarios, there are a few adjustments to be made:

1. the typical Soviet attack force would have been a mixture of "Green"/"Conscripts", with a lot of "poor" motivated troops;

2. the German HMGs would have typically been integrated into a defensive plan, with other HMG/LMGs providing crisscross covering fire; obstacles, wire and mines to funnel the attackers into a kill zone and mortars/artillery to finish them off.

I doubt that attack would be very effective in CMBN.

[MengJiao]

To be correct, Bagration was an operation, not a battle. And it were 400.000 losses on the German side, not 600.000.

But let's transfer the numbers into CMBN:

800.000 soldiers on German side vs. 2.300.000 Soviet side = 2,875 times attacker vs. defender for infantry.

less than 500 tanks : 4000 = 8 times more tanks for the attacker than for the defender.

Artillery and airforce around at least 10-20 times stronger. Let's say only factor 10.

Now set up a scenario with that relations in CMBN and tell me if you can achieve a ratio of losses of defender vs attacker of only 2:1...

QUED.

But in the actual operation the infantry superiority was less than 3:1 and the attackers inflicted at least 2times their loss on the defenders. Clearly the MG42 did not prove significantly magical in that set of battles.

[dan/california]

Bagration writ large is completely outside the scope of this discussion. The Russians had enough manpower and armor to probe the entire German front and then hammer like mad on whatever spot looked weakest. Their artillery advantage was just silly.

And for that matter Stalin's motivational techniqes were a bit different as well. You had to be a brave man to be a coward in the Russian army.

[Fūrinkazan]

i would not go into technical or historical considerations.

Every one can show exemples that show exact contrary results and there are too much variable things like experience of troops, weather etc ..

I made a company of infantry run in front of 3 MG 34 and 1 MG 42. The run was a little more than 600 m and the HMG's were in bunker.

Troops regular on both side maps 250 m large.

It took 3 minutes for the infantry to reach the bunker. After 3 mn of fight :

16 dead and 10 wounded for the U.S. company. 2 squads were panicked, 1 pinned (HQ) and one shaken.

One mg bunker destroyed.

Most of the suppression was at less than 200 m of the bunkers.

I think it was easy to get at good range of the mg to destroy them. And i gave no orders, just watched the action. some of my squads may have go behind bunkers if i had continued the battle after 3 minutes.

All the bunker had their suppression bar at the maximum.

So do you think that in that particular situation, this is possible.

Is it possible to run like that without pause on flat ground and with good visibility and reach the mg position ?:confused:

[Redwolf]

Would be interesting to take one of the test scenarios and re-run it in CMBO on one hand and CMBB or CMAK on the other hand.

As dirty as that might sound, I think we are very close to CMBO at this time.

That isn't all bad, I didn't like the CMBB hack. Sure it was overall better than CMBO but it was a hack that didn't work all that well either.

[Fūrinkazan]

For historical exemples :

I saw on a documentary an old french veteran ou survived at 4 years of war.

He was in the company of the french poet Charles Péguy in august 1914.

They had to advance in then open and they did a first 100 m run. after that, according to him, half of the company was down due to MG fire. At the second run the company was defenitively stopped after only 200 M and the commander, Charles Péguy was killed.