Too Many Strykers

[Andreas]

200 M1A2 are better than 200 Strykers.

Discuss.

All the best

Andreas

[MikeyD]

"200 M1A2 are better than 200 Strykers."

- As long as you're not that infantry brigade having to sit on the hot engine decks for transport.

- As long as you've got a line of fuel bowsers following you.

- until someone gets an eye poked out... then its not fun anymore, is it!?

[Sergei]

Originally posted by MikeyD:

- As long as you're not that infantry brigade having to sit on the hot engine decks for transport.

Here's an idea: attach a big armoured cart to the rear of Abrams and put the supporting infantry in it. I'm sure one Abrams could tow a company of troopers

[Sgt Joch]

200 M1A2s are better than 200 Strykers, until they run out of gas 200 km into Syria, at which point they become 200 targets to be turned into 200 bonfires by 2000 Syrian ATGMs.

note:edited to keep my favorite modder happy, although I am not sure Syria has 2000 ATGMs

[ March 21, 2007, 02:50 PM: Message edited by: Sgt.Joch ]

[MikeyD]

"...by 200 Syrian ATGMs"

Don't forget to factor in the typical kill rate for ATGM launchers manned by poorly trained crews - The line should perhaps instead read "...by 900+ ATGMs"? I can't imagine lots of precious Kornets have been fired downrange during Syrian trainee target practice.

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[juan_gigante]

Adam - the key point that you're not getting is that with the absolute US air and artillery supremacy, EVERY US force is a heavy force. Two guys with a radio have the same combat power of an Abrams. The light Stryker elements are more capable than a heavy force at fixing and moving around and past enemy positions, and can move farther. At the operational level, air and arty do the vast majority of the killing.

[imported_Wildman]

Originally posted by juan_gigante:

Adam - the key point that you're not getting is that with the absolute US air and artillery supremacy, EVERY US force is a heavy force. Two guys with a radio have the same combat power of an Abrams. The light Stryker elements are more capable than a heavy force at fixing and moving around and past enemy positions, and can move farther. At the operational level, air and arty do the vast majority of the killing.

I wouldn't say, "killing" but battlefield effects are greater by air and arty at the operational level.

Air and arty funnel and attrit but do not defeat. (I say this as an Air Force weenie). You are however correct in stating that any force (light, medium, or heavy) is never so "deep" as to be out of reach of support.

I think the conventional roles of light, medium and heavy have changes. In WW2 the infantry was designed to penetrate the MDL and then the "heavy" armor would race through and move into deep or medium breakthru operations.

Now, I believe that heavy units are the one designated to open the hole in a conventional MDL. At that point is when a medium forces comes into its own. It now becomes the follow on exploitation unit. At that point light infantry can move through to widen the gap and provide flank security for the medium force with the heavy force now held in reserve.

I think everyone has a picture of a Stryker bridge hanging out 50km behind the lines on their own...when in reality they would be the tip of a larger force behind them.

[Battlefront.com]

Quick comment on Adam's post:

I don't see this as any kind of advantage, I'm not sure how having less armament on a vehicle is made up for by having more of them to lose, and losing less each time.

Then you don't understand why it was the Germans lost the war. They had better stuff, by and large, but less of it. Sure a Panther could take out 5 Shermans, but when 5 Shermans showed up and there was no Panther becuase it broke down or couldn't cross a bridge do to its weight, what good was that statistic? The Allies won largely on the principle of having more and faster rather than less and slower. You'd think you would know that by now.

As for the rest of the debate, it is clear we're not having one. The points have all been made and people will either listen to them or not. The fact is that the US military is building its combat power increasingly on non-Heavy forces. I suspect that the military knows what it is doing in this regard. The days of Heavy forces are not over, but until they are equipped to overcome the ATM/ATGM threat and somehow fit within ever shrinking budgets, they will continue to be less important on the battlefield of tomorrow than they were of the battlefield of yesterday. It would be healthy if armor fanatics understood this and moved on.

Steve

[imported_Wildman]

But tanks are cool!!!

[zwinship]

Originally posted by Wildman:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by juan_gigante:

[qb] Adam - the key point that you're not getting is that with the absolute US air and artillery supremacy, EVERY US force is a heavy force. Two guys with a radio have the same combat power of an Abrams. The light Stryker elements are more capable than a heavy force at fixing and moving around and past enemy positions, and can move farther. At the operational level, air and arty do the vast majority of the killing.

I wouldn't say, "killing" but battlefield effects are greater by air and arty at the operational level.

Air and arty funnel and attrit but do not defeat. (I say this as an Air Force weenie). You are however correct in stating that any force (light, medium, or heavy) is never so "deep" as to be out of reach of support.

</font>

[c3k]

Gents,

This is all great, all this force type A vs. force type B using tactics/operations/strategy type Z. I love this talk. But, c'mon. How much of this will be USEFUL in a new conflict?

Point 1: US vs. Iraq, 2003 - the initial breakthrough resulted in a total disintegration of conventional forces quite rapidly.

Point 2: Israel vs. Hezbollah - Hezbollah NEVER offered conventional forces in battle. The Israeli goals were stuffed.

Point 3: How would YOU fight the U.S. having seen the two lessons?

The best way to destroy an unconventional force would be to absolutely devastate the area. Destroy every building and man-made object. You know, the "no stone on top of another stone", "salt the earth" approach. Of course, that's not popular with the target population, and given enough video footage of killed/maimed children it tends to lose popularity at home as well. However, that is the advantage of heavy firepower.

Now, take geo-political realities, rational goals, and modern media, and put that together with a wily, determined opponent, and you get something like what Hezbollah demonstrated.

How does a HEAVY force work now?

Thanks,

Ken

[JasonC]

The Israeli pols considered 22 wounded in their tanks unacceptable heavy causalties. I.e. they are unserious delusional nitwitted wimps who want to lose. That is about the only lesson from the Lebanon war. There is an old one from 73, coordinate armor with arty to beat ATGMs, but everybody already knows that. There is another old one from Kosovo, air and arty alone just let the enemy go deep, but everyone already knows that, too. What does heavy do today? It drives through wherever you want to go, coordinated with indirect fires, and kills anything in its path that fires back, until you reach the physical locations of enemy C3I or national command, eliminating those too. State power cannot exist in the face of it, whenever anyone is actually willing to use it. When you aren't, what business do you have reaching for conventional force in the first place?

[c3k]

JasonC,

Thanks for proving my point. The Israeli national goals were crippled when 22 casualties (I don't think they were just wounded, BTW) were inflicted on them. That, and internationally broadcast pictures of blood soaked Lebanese grandmothers mourning over maimed children.

No more wars will be fought in a media blackout (Hutus and Tutsis notwithstanding).

The set-piece battle is a fun mental exercise. But that is all. Any government facing combat against the U.S. should follow a simple formula: sacrifice the unreliable majority of your forces just to keep the U.S. honest and force the U.S. to follow traditional military roles. Take the reliable minority of your forces, put them in civilian clothes, spread them throughout your built up areas, flood them with modern LATW's, and let them attrit the U.S.

Heck, after 4 years, you could end up with ~3,000 KIA, 25,000 WIA (to include ~500 amputees whose TV/video/web presence far outweighs ANY other media coverage). Let's not even mention U.S. highway deaths are ~50,000 per year. Yet, losing 750 KIA a year is beyond the ability of a country with 300,000,000 total population to sustain. Why? Because manipulation of perception counts. No more wars will be fought in a vacuum.

The U.S. will need to have a "kick down the door" force. After the U.S. has established a presence, then what? Seriously.

Regards,

Ken

[JasonC]

It isn't beyond anybody's ability to sustain, and perception has precious little to do with it. The average housewife in Duluth is just sick of these bleeding people on her tele during the dinner hour, and if she has to sign off on any sort of horrible consequence to not think about them, she will. Meanwhile, there are all the telegenic corpses you like in the Congo, but nobody cares a lick. Political power within major western countries is involved in the first, that is why. All of which only shows it is a war of choice and nobody can be bothered to be serious about any of it.

[Wisbech_lad]

Colonial police forces are very different beasts from "knock the door down" forces.

Think the average housewife in Duluth is somewhat more sensible than she is given credit for. Just because one has the ability to sustain an idiotic war of choice, doesn't mean one should...

[JasonC]

The idea that it has anything to do with force structure or even doctrine is laughable. No, being in cuter vehicles or without vehicles of any kind will not make the blood any more photogenic. The force structure does not exist that sufficient lack of seriousness can't screw up. If enough people want to lose, then you still only lose if you are fool enough to listen to them. Polling your enemies for approval is not going to work in Strykers or just BDUs any more than in M-1 Abrams.

[civdiv]

I started this all by starting the topic. I simply didn't think that the Stryker vehicle should be over represented given the nature of the conflict modeled in the game. There have been many to include Battlefront itself that disagree. But the proof is in the pudding, so to speak. BF will model the units and then it is up to us to prove their utility or lack there-of. Yes, modelling of supporting arms will have a lot to do with the success of the Stryker concept, but to a certain extent, modelling the capabilities of the Stryker units and their dismounts properly will go a long way to determining whether the concept is valid. I look forward to playing w/ the concept.

civdiv

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[Battlefront.com]

I just read about the movement of TF Arrow during the late Spring of 2004. An ad-hoc group was sent from Mosul down to An Najaf when things were really getting out of hand with al Sadr. The Strykers performed as a sort of reinforced recon element consisting of about 2 companies worth of Strykers. They were in charge of finding a convoy route that was safe and capable of handling the heavy HET loaded with Bradleys. Yup, the Bradleys were going on the backs of trucks because speed was an issue and I'm guessing they didn't want the Bradleys rolling into An Najaf in need of maintainence from the punishing road march.

Anyway, there was an interesting part of the mission where the Strykers had to find a bridge over the Tigris because the one they had intended on using was blown up by insurgents just before the Strykers rolled in (well ahead of everybody else). There was an ambush that resulted in minor damage to one Stryker, but otherwise was cleared by follow up forces as the Strykers pushed forward. When they found the bridge weakened by the explosion they had to drive up and down the bank of the river to locate an alternative bridge. They found one, but it wasn't strong enough to take the Bradleys and their transporters. So they had to unload all the Bradleys and the trucks drove over then the Bradleys, which then got back onto the trucks and continued on. A Polish platoon was left in charge of the bridge to keep the route open.

When they got to An Najaf things were tense, to say the least. The commander wanted to get into the city with as little fuss as possible. An earlier experience with Humvees went very badly and the Bradleys were rulled out because they made too much noise, which would undermine attempts to get in without drawig too much attention. Therefore, the Strykers were chosen for the mission because they were far more capable than the Humvees and yet quiet enough that the mission would not be jeopardized by announcing their movement. In the words of one of the Majors invovled in the assault:

Colonel Pittard (the TF CO) figured out that 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry (Stryker), was more mobile than 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry (Bradley), and more survivable than 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry (Humvee), so we got the mission to go into the center of An Najaf to secure the mosque where al Sadr was hiding

Anyhoo, an interesting story. It clearly demonstrates some of the operational advantages of the Stryker as discussed in this thread, as well as some of the disadvantages of the heavier and more mechanically involved Bradley. Again, this is not a slam on the Bradley, rather an opportunity to see a new form of combined arms capability for the US Army.

Steve

[Apocalypse 31]

5/20 Huah. 3rd Brigade!

[John Kettler]

JasonC,

I think you're not factoring in how small Israel's population is relative to the U.S., thus the seemingly disproportionate Israeli sensitivity to casualties. Twenty IDF fatalities would be the rough equivalent of 200 U.S. KIA, and that, I assure you, would get major domestic attention here. Also, I feel fairly safe in asserting that, all other things being equal, Israel is much tighter knit, in terms of interrelationships and such, than the much more heterogenous U.S., magnifying the effects of any losses sustained.

Here's the tale of the tape, courtesy of the CIA's World Fact Book

Israel

https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/is.html#Military

U.S.

https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html#Military

Regards,

John Kettler

[ April 01, 2007, 11:55 PM: Message edited by: John Kettler ]

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[Battlefront.com]

LT Mike,

Just before leaving on their trip south one of 5/20's Stryker ATGMs hit a truck with 12 insurgents in it. They made the mistake of opening up on the Strykers with RPGs. That was the last mistake they made.

John,

There is another factor too. Israel's forces come from a combo of required national service and career service personnel. One of the reasons to move to an all volunteer force is to remove the "my little Johnny or Jenny didn't have a choice!"

Adam,

Sorta. This was an Operational move in an environment that was very much considered hostile, though obviously far lower intensity compared to a year earlier or what CM:SF simulates (no enemy armor, for example). So while it does demonstrate some aspects of what I was talking about, isn't an apples to apples comparison.

The big difference is the limiting factors places on the Strykers of TF Arrow. 5/20 had to leave 2 of its 3 Rifle Companies behind to keep Mosul quiet. This meant it had to stick pretty close to its attached truck transported Bradley infantry and lighter truck bound infantry. If 5/20 ran into a big fight on its own it would likely be in trouble since it was starting out with a serious lack of dismounts compared to what it is supposed to have (note Stryker Rifle Companies have more infantry than either the other types). In the scenario we're picturing the Stryker Battalions would be kept largely intact, and therefore have plenty of dismounts to tackle a large enemy force (Brigade or smaller).

On the other hand, in our setting the Bradleys wouldn't be truck transported. So we see more joint ops between the Medium and Heavy units instead of Medium and Light (as was the case in TF Arrow). In fact, we are not including US Infantry BCTs (light infantry) in CM:SF. Our storyline has them being elsewhere and therefore not relevant to CM:SF's intial release any more than the Marines or European forces are.

The assault into An Najaf is a bit more like what we're talking about, though the stealth factor wouldn't be as important in a CM:SF setting. Again, instead of working alone or with Light we would expect an assault like that to be done in conjunction with Heavy in a full up conventional conflict.

But yes... the basic gist of this example is what I've been talking about. Strykers can do some things that heavy armor can't. That doesn't make them super heroes or anything (well, except for LT Mike ), but it does show that they have an important role to play on a conventional battlefield. They are, in all senses of the word, the bridge between the advantages and disadvantages of both Light an Heavy forces. That has to be a good thing no matter what shortcomings the Stryker vehicle itself has over possible alternatives. Combined arms gets its strength through a diverse set of capabilities which can be rebalanced easily depending on circumstances. No force, Light, Medium, or Heavy alone has the sort of potential they have when combined.

Steve

[ April 02, 2007, 12:53 AM: Message edited by: Battlefront.com ]