How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[ArmouredTopHat]

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/sweden-allots-46-bln-sek-fresh-support-ukraine-2024-09-09/

Gripens announced as a 'possible' transfer for the future by Sweden. Not sure how they would interrupt F-16 deliveries as claimed by Sweden but at least its not a no I guess. 

[billbindc]

43 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Valid points.

But while I don't go to them there fancy DC dinner parties, I do know a proper barfight when I see one. And this one has guns on the tables. From experience, things can go irrational very quickly in these sorts of things.

Sure. Which is why the much maligned “restraint” of the Biden White House is going to look pretty good in the history books. 

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Tux said:

Come on, now.  Are we really saying that as long as loss rates are lower than the Germans suffered during their famously catastrophic series of collapses on the Eastern Front then it's all good?  I'm not aware that Goodwood is usually considered any kind of template for the proper employment of armour, either.  Generally, surely it has to be considered that the tanks fighting in Europe during 1943-45 were in constant, heavy use; regularly participating en masse in the kind of concentrated battles that have been notable for their absence from the war in Ukraine.  By contrast, the losses of armour in Ukraine have taken place despite (certainly Ukrainian) tanks playing a relatively low-profile role.  They've been positively wrapped in cotton wool by WW2 standards.

I would say the lengths the combatants are having to go to in order not to suffer even heavier losses of tanks are closer to what is being considered one of 'the key indicator[s] of their looming obsolescence'.

 

I don't think anyone has argued that tanks 'belong in the trash bin'.  Tanks are contributing to the war in Ukraine and, to the extent they already exist and are able to be employed they will continue to contribute.  No-one is arguing for their removal from today's battlefield.

 

Ok... I think the whole point is that your interlocutors are willing to think about this and are concluding that MBTs don't look like a good medium-long term investment when considering apparent alternatives.  If you're not thinking about those timescales and are anchoring your arguments to tanks' apparent utility today then are you just talking past one another?

Ok then let's actually have a talk about the future of armor then. We tried this before and it always devolved to pre-conclusions and single point advocation, not open eyes analysis.

We have not been able to have an actual discussion on the subject because for a few they already have the answer and will go to extreme lengths to try and "prove" it.

To use actual military force development principles a tank is nothing more than a vehicle that supports a military capability. The tank is not the capability in itself. As has been said, an exhausting number of times, the capability is mobile protected firepower. That capability supports the larger military effect of manoeuvre (see all the chatter on tempo and momentum). Which itself supports the broader operational doctrine of Manoeuvre Warfare within military strategies of Annihilation through Dislocation.

A tank is nothing more than an armored carrier for projected kinetic and chemical energy. The entire thing exist s around the gun. And the gun only exists to fire the ammunition. Ammunition that can be rapidly positioned around the battlefield, delivered with extremely high precision at the 3km range with high levels of protection...that is it.

So what? Well the tank is a tool looking for a job. A job it did very well in the past but signs are not good that it can continue to do so. If all we want to do is move strike rapidly around the battlefield with high precision, we have emerging systems and munitions that can do that better than the tank. Let's take a look:

- Drones:

Mobility: Drones are more mobile than a tank - they can fly and don't weigh 40-60 tons. But they lack the range. Keep putting gas in and do maintenance, and a tank can move for thousands of km. Drones are offsetting by being very light, so they can be carried those hundreds of kms  on a motorcycle, and still do the last 10-15kms of killing quite well. Much like a tank carries the gun for the same reason.

Lethality: Drones are not limited by LOS - that is a very big problem with the tank. If someone can produce a cheap guided tank munition that can fire NLOS and hit with high precision, we could be back in business. But then again we already have artillery guns that can do this. Drones cannot do sabot and they have limitations on weight for carrying HEAT rounds. But explosive yields are increasing while weight is getting lower. That and it takes very little weight for chemical energy on a tank to do serious damage. Unless the tank is covered in so much armor that its mobility suffers. So tanks rule the direct fire LOS, around 3kms range space. Problem is that while this space still matters in combat, it is mattering a lot less. Ranges are growing, a trend that has been happening for decades. Precision is growing due to cheap, light processing power. Going to get worse with AI. So, in effect, drones have taken those tank energies and spread them all over the battlefield to greater ranges, precision and effect than what the tank can deliver.

Survivability. Tanks are armored beasts designed to resist frag, small arms, AT and even other tanks (aspect specific). Drones are flimsy little things, prone to EW and AD pushback...but. Drones have offset survivability by disaggregating. A single drone is not going to survive for long, a dozen, two dozen? Further, the drones we are seeing; the ones that basically kept Ukraine in the game last winter, are all commercial off-the-shelf models. They proved that with enough of them one can stop mechanized manoeuvre cold. Their survivability equation is dispersion, very low target profile and capacity - the exact opposite of the tank.

So what? We have in drones off-set survivability, synthetic mass and lethality-thru-precision. Unless one is a drooling tank fanboi, the real question that needs to be asked is "ok, but how much can we trust all this?" Well here we have to look at the entire system. Like the tank, drones are a tool. Other systems in the toolbox are evolving as well. Artillery, ATGMs and infantry. The introduction of ubiquitous, persistent integrated ISR - all being enabled more and more by AI has changed the game for many of these systems. We have an emerging combat arm for Denial/Defensive primacy (add mines and wait one hour). This is looking as lethal as infantry+ MGs+ fast firing artillery+ communications wire was in WW1.

So this new system, along with our new friends in AD (also highly impacted by C4ISR), are creating enormous denial pressure. The costs of doing anything forward are extremely high compared to the costs of that denial. The difference between this and full defensive primacy is force ratios. We do not know if sufficient force ratios for offence could overcome the denial we are seeing. Why? Because neither side is willing to try it. Why? Because it looks like any conventional mass gets picked up and lit up far to easily. So both sides are playing penny-packeting, incremental attrition warfare. 

Finally, because I am so tired of the weak @ss arguments coming from some corners, how about I make the argument for what will need to happen in order to put tanks back in the game? It is not the drones, it is the C4ISR. Make an opponent deaf, dumb and blind - the laws of warfare get contained into local spaces. An ATGM or drone operator without a feed to broader ISR, or the ability to communicate what it is seeing, is in a small box a few kms a side. If a side can establish C4ISR superiority, while denying it to an opponent, they can negate the denial pressures and reestablish conditions for conventional manoeuvre. I have been writing this since early on:

Mass beats isolation, precision beats mass, massed precision beats everything.  If you want traditional conventional mass to work...create isolation and deny precision.

Ok, now to the problem. Easy to say, hard to do...maybe impossible. Cyber has not turned out to be the dark angel we though it would be. EW only goes so far. There are really no capabilities that can counter an opponents C4ISR beyond strike. And the problem here is that ISR is 1) everywhere (thank you internet of freakin things) and 2) has insane ranges. The UA looks like they solved for ISR at Kursk, but it may have just been because the RA did have any there. C4ISR denial and superiority in a modern context are a real problem. Hell, we had our hands full with terrorist, let alone Russia.

So you see the problem is much larger than freakin tanks. In order to sustain advantage we have much larger problems than a lone steel box that costs a lot, and is a major logistical burden for what we can get out of it in this environment. The fate of tanks is a symptom, not a cause of the shifts we are seeing in this war.

Now, will these extend to the next one? That is a very good question.

Edited September 9 by The_Capt

[sburke]

10 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I mean, you could argue the same logic with any ground unit in NATO at that point.

I would counter though by pointing out that NATO does deploy multinational units to areas at risk. UK Armoured units being present in Estonia for instance. There is no reason to assume that Dutch brigades might be placed somewhere where fighting might break out, at which point those tanks suddenly become quite useful. Having better equipped brigades means NATO gets more appropriately armed brigades to put into action where they are needed. 

I believe I said exactly that.

Quote

Honestly I am having a hard time envisioning any ground troops being able to be deployed 1500 km away in time to contribute anything.  I don't see that as simply an issue for the Netherlands either.  I think Poland has got the right idea in foward basing US units.  That is a trip wire Russia cannot avoid.

 Now lets assume that NATO gets its act together and starts forward basing of units on a rotational basis to the Baltics and Poland.  This isn't the Cold War where we could expect the entire force of the GSFG to surge across the border in a massive armoured assault hitting the German border in a surprise assault a la Tom Clancy Red Storm Rising.  The US was sounding the alarm months in advance that Russia was going to invade Ukraine.  The RA right now is fielding Cold War era tanks and conscripts into the grist mill as it has completely run out of ideas as to how to fight this war any other way.

How much of a force therefore needs to be put into a NATO deterrent element.  Let's say the Netherlands supplies one brigade (a huge reach I would think but just for grins and giggles).  So that brigade gets what - a tank company?  And Netherlands currently has what... a tank company?

Now again don't get me wrong.  As I had already noted I don't think this is just an issue for the Dutch army.  I would argue the same for the US.  According to Wiki the US has 5000 tanks with another 3600 in reserve.  Where exactly are we ever gonna need 8600 tanks?  Hell why don't we just give the Dutch 50 M1s and call it a day?  While we are at it offer to the UA to cycle out the tanks they feel aren't capable anymore and help them standardize to a single platform with a single logistics and ammo need.  I honestly don't expect them to perform much differently in that environment, but from a logistical standpoint it could help and then we could focus on Patriots and other more useful products to defend against Russia.

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

- Legacy of Soviet doctrine: this more often from people who actually have no idea what that was or how it evolved over time. It is also built on arrogance and some sort of thinking that “we won the Cold War so Soviet doctrine must be inferior.” That is simply not true. People can go explore on their own but anyone with a passing knowledge of Soviet doctrine knows that “mass” and “manoeuvre” were at the centre. Unlike the west the Soviets stressed operational manoeuvre vice tactical.

Aside from your other astute observations about the thin excuses, I wanted to say a bit about this one.

The Soviet Union in WW2 set a standard for operational maneuver that no WW2 Western Ally or post-war NATO force ever even contemplated.  This doctrine remains at the heart of the Russian concept of maneuver as seen in this war.  What exactly is it?

Saturate a section of front with massed force, achieve breakthroughs wherever possible, then flood large quantities of mechanized forces into that breach as possible as quickly as possible.  This might sound like Western maneuver theory, but there are distinct differences:

1.  The Soviet/Russian doctrine does not prioritize force preservation in any of this.  If 9 of 10 attacks fail with 80% losses and 1 in 10 achieves a breakthrough, then it's deemed a success even if the gains are relatively modest.

2.  Once a breakthrough is achieved follow up forces are flooded in with minimal higher level direction.  There might be an operational level framework for directing the forces, sure enough, but they aren't necessarily coordinated or mutually reliant.  To put it crudely, each tactical unit is given the order "drive in that direction as fast as you can and kill anything you meet".  As with the first phase, force preservation is not a priority.

3.  The safety and well being of the breakthrough forces are not a primary concern.  A specific force running out of resources to fight is acceptable provided momentum is maintained elsewhere. Therefore, the shortcomings of Soviet/Russian logistics are baked into the planning.  Or as we say in software development, "it's a feature, not a bug".

 

The point here is that if armored mass was still the key to maneuver warfare, even with the increased lethality from precision weapons, then Russia would have had better results on the ground.  The combination of their mass with a doctrine designed to overcome force wide deficiencies should have been enough to achieve dramatic advances even if only at the tactical or operational level.  But it hasn't.  There's reasons for that and those reasons aren't amongst the Russia Sucks™ variety.

Steve

 

[Holien]

A short interlude from the tank debate

https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m0020xmq

Quote

After the fall of the Soviet Union, America stood alone as the world’s only global superpower, but what responsibilities came with that power? Rare archive and in-depth testimony from decision-makers gives an insight into the workings of the inner sanctums of the White House to better understand not the 'what', but the 'why'.

Just been watching this series and a tough watch at times.

Really interesting coverage and thought provoking on how and when America has got involved.

I know some on here were involved in certain areas as well.

There is a slight edge (perhaps bias / agenda) to the series but it really brings home there is no right answer and America will be damned no matter which choice it makes.

Working through the Kosovo episode at moment. Interesting the relationship with Russia is highlighted.

A VPN is required for our foreign friends or see when they will be broadcast in your area.

https://www.imdb.com/title/tt33076876/reviews/

Now back to Tanks are dead or not...

 

 

Edited September 9 by Holien

[ArmouredTopHat]

Im not sure I trust the state that sends its walking wounded out to fight with being able to conduct mechanised warfare properly. 

[Battlefront.com]

1 minute ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Im not sure I trust the state that sends its walking wounded out to fight with being able to conduct mechanised warfare properly. 

See previous post.  The Soviets did quite well with this in WW2, including murder squads of NKVD to make sure the wounded stayed in the fight instead of being evacuated.

Steve

 

[sburke]

Russian Repairs Insufficient as Crimean Bridge Parts Begin to Collapse (msn.com)

 

looks like this isn't accurate and just old pics... bummer

Edited September 10 by sburke

[ArmouredTopHat]

21 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

See previous post.  The Soviets did quite well with this in WW2, including murder squads of NKVD to make sure the wounded stayed in the fight instead of being evacuated.

Steve

 

Is this not a colossal waste given that the modern Russian state is a far cry from the soviets that could actually afford to do this?

[Bearstronaut]

24 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Im not sure I trust the state that sends its walking wounded out to fight with being able to conduct mechanised warfare properly. 

I continue to be amazed at what the average Russian soldier is willing to tolerate from his superiors. The US military is by no means perfect but this kind of treatment from officers would result in a severe increase in fraggings. 

[Battlefront.com]

34 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

Is this not a colossal waste given that the modern Russian state is a far cry from the soviets that could actually afford to do this?

Yup!  And yet here we are... 2.5 years later and it still hasn't broken Russia's back.  Much to many people's amazement, including my own.

Since the days of CMBB (2002) I have harped on the functional beauty of the Soviet concept of maneuver warfare.  I'd argue that it is just as well internally balanced as the Western doctrine, perhaps being even more robust in the face of adversity.  At least back then.  Now?  I think it would get the stuffing knocked out of it by a NATO force.  The reason gets back to precision vs. mass equation having changed significantly over the past 20ish years.

This is why Russia has basically abandoned the Battalion Tactical Group concept.  They dipped their toes into the Western way of doing maneuver warfare without the supporting capabilities that make it successful.  What they have reverted to are task assembled tactical units (company sized or smaller) which are intended to perform very small, very limited, tasks with little expectation that they will survive as functional units.  This is the antithesis of maneuver warfare, theirs and NATO's.  Evidence suggests they were forced into this adaptation, not because it is optimal but because it is necessary.

Interestingly enough, Ukraine has been forced into the same sort of small tactical unit actions vs. traditional operational maneuvers.  The difference is that the quality of Ukrainian forces (including equipment) produces better results from the smaller units.  It still limits the possibilities of operational success against an organized and/or decently resourced defense, but it at least works pretty well against a disorganized and/or under resourced one.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

50 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

 

Expect another Russian blogger to get the Girkin treatment, or perhaps even the prigo treatment shortly

"Putin soiled himself." 

Well that does seem to be the prevailing fashion among world leaders these days....

Edited September 9 by LongLeftFlank

[sburke]

11 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

"Putin soiled himself." 

Well that does seem to be the prevailing fashion among world leaders these days....

I'd laugh but I can see a regular monthly delivery of depends from Amazon in my future.....  sigh.  

[LongLeftFlank]

8 hours ago, Kraft said:

I interrupt the 10 page tank discussion thread with Germany bashing. Scholz is reportedly doubling down on the "3rd times the charm" Minsk3 approach. 

 

Axis of weasels rulez ok.

 

[ArmouredTopHat]

31 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yup!  And yet here we are... 2.5 years later and it still hasn't broken Russia's back.  Much to many people's amazement, including my own.

Since the days of CMBB (2002) I have harped on the functional beauty of the Soviet concept of maneuver warfare.  I'd argue that it is just as well internally balanced as the Western doctrine, perhaps being even more robust in the face of adversity.  At least back then.  Now?  I think it would get the stuffing knocked out of it by a NATO force.  The reason gets back to precision vs. mass equation having changed significantly over the past 20ish years.

This is why Russia has basically abandoned the Battalion Tactical Group concept.  They dipped their toes into the Western way of doing maneuver warfare without the supporting capabilities that make it successful.  What they have reverted to are task assembled tactical units (company sized or smaller) which are intended to perform very small, very limited, tasks with little expectation that they will survive as functional units.  This is the antithesis of maneuver warfare, theirs and NATO's.  Evidence suggests they were forced into this adaptation, not because it is optimal but because it is necessary.

Interestingly enough, Ukraine has been forced into the same sort of small tactical unit actions vs. traditional operational maneuvers.  The difference is that the quality of Ukrainian forces (including equipment) produces better results from the smaller units.  It still limits the possibilities of operational success against an organized and/or decently resourced defense, but it at least works pretty well against a disorganized and/or under resourced one.

Steve

This is actually a really quite interesting point that I cant help but entirely agree with. I can only add that in my view they were forced into adapting for such small scale unit actions because their military is entirely incapable of doing anything more advanced, which was made clear with the failure of the BTG system and the actions of 2022. Still means a lot of inertia from the size of the military force compared to the AFU, not to mention some capability advantages, and it has to be admitted the Russians have proven resilient in maintaining such a system...though collapse could come quite suddenly given just how wasteful it is. 

You would still think them taking a few years to regroup, retrain and properly organise larger and more coordinated units would have yielded better results rather than the constant, incessant attacks by small units that get decimated for the occasional scrap of ground. I suppose they are under the belief that just a bit more pressure on the Ukrainians will have them collapse. Very reminiscent of the 'just one last push' mindset that's turning into a greater and greater sunken cost fallacy. 

Edited September 9 by ArmouredTopHat

[Artkin]

They've returned to the forward detachment concept minus the whole planned breakthrough thing. 

[Offshoot]

3 hours ago, sburke said:

Russian Repairs Insufficient as Crimean Bridge Parts Begin to Collapse (msn.com)

These pictures have been doing the rounds on twitter but at least one poster retracted their post saying the pictures are old.

 

[sburke]

53 minutes ago, Offshoot said:

These pictures have been doing the rounds on twitter but at least one poster retracted their post saying the pictures are old.

 

ah bummer.  I was hoping to see a vid in the near future of parts falling off the bridge.

[Fenris]

Latest 54th Brigade K-2 drone unit video.  CO narrates what's happening.  Subtitles are good.  Like their previous videos and from what he says, it seems like it's a daily routine.  RU do a bit of arty prep, send over a couple of AFVs with with infantry, UKR drones hit them and then mop up the survivors as they try to retreat.  Rinse, repeat.  Pretty grim.  Thankfully they've blurred out the gory details.

https://youtu.be/scu4Viwqe5E

[Kraft]

This much praised escalation management:

Nato escorting russian kamikaze drones for 100km through Romanian airspace after being informed of their presence by Ukrainian officials.

The drones then went on to explode in Odessa. 

-----

I just want to remind everyone of what putin did when ~300 of his wagner PMCs were slaughtered by American troops in syria 2018.

Absolutely nothing.

Allowing russian missiles and drones to freely transit through NATO airspace is not 'wise caution' it is cowardice ie election risk management and putin is well aware half of 'war weary' Europe* would yield other people's land on posturing alone. God forbid a war breaks out.

7 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Well that does seem to be the prevailing fashion among world leaders these days

 

*Excluding the countries that would share a border with russia. Curious coincidence

As long as he is the only one willing to sacrifice half a million pawns for someone elses land and not Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, ..US etc, Latvia and co better build up that fortress wall because there will be no country X's conscripts dying to retake any of it. 

Just a: "whatever it takes"

Edited September 10 by Kraft

[sburke]

Ukrainian Forces Infiltrate Russian Rail System to Track Military Supply Routes (msn.com)

[Joe982]

30 minutes ago, sburke said:

Ukrainian Forces Infiltrate Russian Rail System to Track Military Supply Routes (msn.com)

If we are aware of it then the Russians will be aware of it too. And find a way around the issue.

[paxromana]

4 minutes ago, Joe982 said:

If we are aware of it then the Russians will be aware of it too. And find a way around the issue.

And send it all by truck ... 

... oooh, wait ...

[FancyCat]

3 hours ago, Kraft said:

This much praised escalation management:

Nato escorting russian kamikaze drones for 100km through Romanian airspace after being informed of their presence by Ukrainian officials.

The drones then went on to explode in Odessa. 

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/romania-searching-possible-drone-fragments-after-russian-attack-ukraine-2024-09-08/

o.O

a bit silly but maybe the optics will be better if this passes and Romania does shoot them down next time. 

Quote

Romanian lawmakers plan to consider legislation at their current session on enabling Romania to shoot down drones invading the country's airspace in peacetime.