How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

23 minutes ago, hcrof said:

Agreed on all point except the mobile operations part - while mobility has been vital to pull this off, I'm not sure what has been achieved so far counts as mobile operations - 15km (ish) in 2 days is still effectively walking pace. 

I would love to see why the Ukrainians didn't go further but I suspect caution played a big part.

Agree with your agreement.  A small incursion using things that move on wheels or tracks isn't different from the recent past and is still a shadow of what it was in 2022 and 2023.

The major reason Ukraine is able to move is because the usual means of preventing them seem to be absent or mishandled.

This is more similar to Prigy's run on Moscow, with a little more shooting.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Regarding relative manpower, I don't really trust either Russian or Ukrainian sources on their assessments of forces for either side.  It's too loaded a topic and often people don't know what they don't know when it comes to the big picture.

My impression is that Ukraine has some reserves, but not much.  I think their frontline forces are stretched pretty thing.

On the Russian side, I think their lines are also thin and areas have been probably dangerously stripped of forces.  Like the Kursk sector   We've seen this pattern with Russia many times in the past.  Which is they build up a force of significant size over a few months, they burn it out in one operation, then continue burning through new forces faster than they can be replaced.

I doubt VERY MUCH that Russia made significant border defenses.  Unlike what Ukraine had to slog through last summer, this is "a piece of piss" by comparison.

Steve

[kimbosbread]

56 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Assuming Ukraine in fact has control of this gas junction at Suzdha, what can they do with it? I mean obviously they could blow it up, but can they do anything else? Shift gas to Ukraine and a away from whaterver portion of Russia this thing serves? 

Could they turn it off? That would force the upstream pumps to divert or stop pumping, which in turn force them to cap some wells, maybe eventually!?

[Kraft]

14 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Agree with your agreement.  A small incursion using things that move on wheels or tracks isn't different from the recent past and is still a shadow of what it was in 2022 and 2023.

The major reason Ukraine is able to move is because the usual means of preventing them seem to be absent or mishandled.

This is more similar to Prigy's run on Moscow, with a little more shooting.

Steve

15 km for the main force that requires a constant AD and EW umbrella, the raiding sections are reported by russians 22km from the NPP and 37ish km from the border.

Korenevo has a railway hub with a direct line into Sumy, that can be used for further operations, if the ruAF is kept away.

Tanks have been reported in multiple sections as well by the rus forces and the Brigades are equippted with them.

Most importantly, there is close to no ruAF so they either have no eyes, get shot down (as claimed) or both, which tells me there is some serious equiptment in the mix that is not seen anywhere else in this density on the front

 

Edited August 8 by Kraft

[kimbosbread]

22 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

From the limited footage we have seen, the AFU seem to be using a mix of MRAPs and IFVs to move around, I doubt they are making their troops walk everywhere.

The is the kind of classic Bush War raiding force we discussed hundreds of pages ago as an option given Ukraine’s logistical constraints. Of course, it requires ISR UAVs to be neutralized and minefields to dissappear…

[sburke]

well the raid certainly seems to have shaken Putin's tree.   @The_Capt keeps referring to conflict and messaging.  Seems the messaging on the Russian side has gone sideways.  If I was a Russian commander I'd avoid windows and stairs.

Putin Convenes Urgent Security Talks, as Ukrainian Troops Breach Russian Border (msn.com)

 

 

[billbindc]

24 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Agree with your agreement.  A small incursion using things that move on wheels or tracks isn't different from the recent past and is still a shadow of what it was in 2022 and 2023.

The major reason Ukraine is able to move is because the usual means of preventing them seem to be absent or mishandled.

This is more similar to Prigy's run on Moscow, with a little more shooting.

Steve

The best word is chevauchée. A raid to compel, discomfit.

[Grigb]

42 minutes ago, hcrof said:

Agreed on all point except the mobile operations part - while mobility has been vital to pull this off, I'm not sure what has been achieved so far counts as mobile operations - 15km (ish) in 2 days is still effectively walking pace. 

I would love to see why the Ukrainians didn't go further but I suspect caution played a big part.

Around 15 km in 2 days is conservative estimate. I looked at RU local traffic and marked additional places where it strangely disappears. 

So, according to optimistic estimate they advanced around 25-30 km.

For a comparison with RU Legskrig here is a simple map

[Letter from Prague]

Man, the power plant is right there. I assume Ukrainians are forbidden from taking HIMARS with them (*), but they could, uh, safely remove a turbine or two and that would make Russian energy situation much more difficult and would probably be beyond Russia's ability to fix anytime soon, given the sanctions.

(*) I am now imagining a flork meme saying "we didn't fire it into Russia."

[Probus]

Did a Ukrainian dual missile launcher (not sure which type) get hit by a Russian cluster munition or was it the other way around?  I seem to remember a video of it getting hit and the missiles firing off. 

[Grigb]

22 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Regarding relative manpower, I don't really trust either Russian or Ukrainian sources on their assessments of forces for either side.  It's too loaded a topic and often people don't know what they don't know when it comes to the big picture.

My impression is that Ukraine has some reserves, but not much.  I think their frontline forces are stretched pretty thing.

This is where we strongly disagree. Let's looks at Pro-West RU Nats (yes, there are such guys. They linked to UKR RDK unit). July 1 post

Quote

The AFU has 173,000 people involved in combat operations in all directions, another 85,000 are on the Southern Front (Zaporizhia, Kherson regions), but there is no intense fighting or major activity there. Troops guarding the borders with Belarus (approximately 32-34 thousand people), troops around Transnistria (up to 18 thousand people), formations assembled in the Western regions of Ukraine (up to 50 thousand people), as well as reserves in other parts of the country are not involved in the battles. The total number of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (according to sources) is up to 520 thousand people.

If these estimates of the number of troops made on the basis of information from sources on both sides are correct, it turns out that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have put more than 75% of all available forces into combat, and the Armed Forces of Ukraine [just] 33%. At the same time, the AFU retains reserves. New ones are also arriving (recently, units that have been trained in EU countries have arrived in Ukraine, this is more than 10 thousand people). And the Russian occupation forces have a bad situation with reserves, to put it mildly. There are practically none. As shown by the Ukrainian strikes near Terny, in the Serebryansk forestry and in the Chasov Yar area, instead of reserves, Russian generals simply withdraw troops from other directions, which only worsens their situation.

Russian propaganda is trying to convince that the occupying forces have the initiative and are close to complete victory. In fact, the AFU forced the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to continue the offensive even where it is unprofitable for them, forcing them [RU] to pull out almost all reserves and retain [UKR] forces for a real capture of the initiative.

I believe UKR situation is not as bad as it might look like.

[Carolus]

8 minutes ago, Probus said:

Did a Ukrainian dual missile launcher (not sure which type) get hit by a Russian cluster munition or was it the other way around?  I seem to remember a video of it getting hit and the missiles firing off. 

I saw what was claimed to be two Ukrainian Buk / Hawk hybridz be hit with clusters by RU nat channel, but I lack the expertise to verify.

[ArmouredTopHat]

Probably a little exaggerated but they do seem to be a lot of prisoners being taken at the moment. 

[TheVulture]

7 minutes ago, Grigb said:

This is where we strongly disagree. Let's looks at Pro-West RU Nats (yes, there are such guys. They linked to UKR RDK unit). July 1 post

I believe UKR situation is not as bad as it might look like.

By that estimation, it would sound like what the Soviets did at Stalingrad: feed just enough defenders in to the city to keep the battle there going while building up the reserves to counter elsewhere. Tough for the poor sods who get fed into the grinder part of the battle though. 

 Obviously I'm in no position to know whether this is remotely the case here, but it seems to be what that one source is suggesting.

[riptides]

Surprise, surprise.

Maneuver warfare not so dead after all.

 

 

[Beleg85]

32 minutes ago, billbindc said:

The best word is chevauchée. A raid to compel, discomfit.

I am not sure this is valid comparision- original chevauchees were aimed at maximal destruction of civilians and plunder; it was also before unified front was a thing in warfare. Now this looks like (at least temporal) actual land-grab with good follow-up, methodical offensive and logistics.

Some accounts here (with good sources in AFU, not only Osint) write that first rotation of some forward Ukrainian troops already finished. Advance parties are far ahead and there are problems with logistics of heavier mechanized troops. Also Ukrainian aviation reportedly is doing courses over battlefield, with helicopters bringing ammo and taking wounded. That last part is interesting.

Edited August 8 by Beleg85

[billbindc]

4 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

I am not sure this is valid comparision- original chevauchees were aimed at maximal destruction of civilians and plunder; it was also before unified front was a thing in warfare. Now this looks like (at least temporal) actual land-grab with good follow-up, methodical offensive and logistics.

Some accounts here (with good sources in AFU, not only Osint) write that first rotation of some forward Ukrainian troops already finished. Advance parties are far ahead and there are problems with logistics of heavier mechanized troops. Also Ukrainian aviation reportedly is doing courses over battlefield, with helicopters bringing ammo and taking wounded. That last part is interesting.

I will be beyond surprised and impressed if Ukraine can actually hold onto the majority of what they are currently seizing. It would suggest a manpower maskirovka of quite large proportions with war ending capacity. Would be very happy to be wrong.

[Beleg85]

2 minutes ago, billbindc said:

I will be beyond surprised and impressed if Ukraine can actually hold onto the majority of what they are currently seizing. It would suggest a manpower maskirovka of quite large proportions with war ending capacity. Would be very happy to be wrong.

Yes, it is indeed very risky and soldiers in other fronts are cursing Syrsky...but who knows? Several weeks of keeping larger swath of Russian soil would be very damaging for Putin's mojo.

[FancyCat]

According to this random twitter poster, there is a rail line that runs into Ukraine thru Korenevo and Snagost to eventually Sumy and Kiyv. Also timely UKR railways tweet.

Quote

For now I think the thing to keep your eye on is not the reports of the AFU being much further into Kursk Oblast but instead the two small rail villages of Snagost and Korenevo

Rail map for reference

Quote

Ukrainian railways enters the de-occupied territories after the Ukrainian army.

We could, of course, take over the Sudja, Koreneve and Psel railway stations in Kurshchyna, but our priority is to return and rebuild Ukrainian railway stations and depots.

 

[Sgt Joch]

Well if you look at the ISW map of what has been seized so far, you are really talking about a negligible area.

Other issue, assuming this is the start of an offensive, where are they going? Driving NE towards Kursk takes you away from the main front lines. An offensive would make sense if they would drive E/SE 300 km+ and try to cut off the Russian forces attacking Kharkov, but do they have the troops and supplies for something that ambitious?

Edited August 8 by Sgt Joch

[ArmouredTopHat]

Mechanised units really do seem to be roaming free for the most part. 

[Grigb]

12 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

According to this random twitter poster, there is a rail line that runs into Ukraine thru Korenevo and Snagost to eventually Sumy and Kiyv. Also timely UKR railways tweet.

 

Well, according to RU claims UKR are pushing in to three directions:

• From Liubimovka to Korenevo
• From Snagost toward Glushkove district (to the west of Snagost)
• From Malaya Loknya to Kromskie Byki toward Lgov

BTW, seems first UKR photo from Liubimovka

 

[Grigb]

4 minutes ago, Sgt Joch said:

Well if you look at the ISW map of what has been seized so far, you are really talking about a negligible area.

Other issue, assuming this is the start of an offensive, where are they going? Driving NE towards Kursk takes you away from the main front lines. An offensive would make sense if they would drive E/SE 300 km+ and try to cut off the Russian forces attacking Kharkov, but do they have the troops and supplies for something that ambitious?

ISW map is old. it is of August 7, 3 PM. 

[Sgt Joch]

Just now, Grigb said:

ISW map is old. it is of August 7, 3 PM. 

Maybe, but my assessment does not change, launching a major offensive from that point does not make a lot of sense.

[FancyCat]

5 minutes ago, Sgt Joch said:

Well if you look at the ISW map of what has been seized so far, you are really talking about a negligible area. (not sure if map will show).

Other issue, assuming this is the start of an offensive, where are they going? Driving NE towards Kursk takes you away from the main front lines. An offensive would make sense if they would drive E/SE 150-200 km and try to cut off the Russian forces attacking Kharkov, but do they have the troops and supplies for something that ambitious?

A reminder, Ukraine is starved of electricity production, and faces huge shortages for winter. While of course it could destroy/stop production at Kursk NPP remotely, the only way to not look bad in the eyes of the West is to naturally occupy it and woops some stuff gets shut off. Just as Russia has done in Ukraine.

....what's the infrastructure for suddenly directing that production to Ukraine?