How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Teufel]

1 hour ago, Rokko said:

Reports like this and the recent renewed Russian assaults make me think, that maybe going on the offensive this year was premature, although probably (unfortunately) politically necessary. It seems, the Russians are more than happy to continue grinding themselves down against the most heavily fortified positions in Donbas over and over again.

I believe the expression “hindsight is 20/20” refers to prefect vision for a reason. Was this scenario of the ongoing offensive possible outcomes in the overall plan? Of course it was! Was it significant risk of the plan? Probably, but just speculation. Did the risk of tough Russian resistance and slow grinding progress make the Ukrainians reconsider? Well, no!

The option of not moving forward would not necessarily entice the Russians to attack. On the contrary it just enable them to dig deeper and wider defenses. Getting the ball rolling was partly about disrupting the ongoing defensive preparations of Russia. Imagine waiting until late spring knowing what they built in 4-5 months. We’d be looking at bunkers and not trenches as defensive fortifications.

Reality for our assessment is obviously prior expectations. We learn from experience, see the outcomes, expect similar if things are conducted in similar fashion. Just look at the beginning of the offensive, it didn’t work as planned (better for the long term) to roll up all that armor against prepared defenses. We keep saying, lack of air superiority, sure would help. But Iraq and Afghanistan didn’t have the air defenses and capabilities Russia has. Nor is the USAF involved in this conflict with overwhelming numbers and resources.

I am not so sure the F-16 will make the difference we are expecting them to yield. We again start from assumptions based on prior experience in other circumstances.

The more I look back at high intensity fighting not involving the US directly, the more I start to think this shouldn’t been unexpected. We were initially expecting boxing match between pro-boxer against amateur. Turns out that Ivan Drago underestimated his opponent, and suddenly we have ourselves street brawl where all bets are off. We can’t expect the fight to resemble anything we seen as few of us ever witnessed street fighting. Most of us will think it resembles the movies, when it in reality its short, brutal and unpredictable.

Edited October 11, 2023 by Teufel

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Rokko said:

https://militaryland.net/news/the-situation-in-magura-brigade-is-far-from-perfect/

This article claims, the 47th Mech is basically a spent force and has to resort to sending specialists into assaults.

Reports like this and the recent renewed Russian assaults make me think, that maybe going on the offensive this year was premature, although probably (unfortunately) politically necessary. It seems, the Russians are more than happy to continue grinding themselves down against the most heavily fortified positions in Donbas over and over again. Had the Ukrainians stayed on the defensive and projected caution and weakness, rather than exuberant optimism and confidence, the Russians would have likely resumed their attacks much earlier. I believe there even was an allegation by Mashovets a couple of weeks before the "counter-offensive" kicked off that the Russian command was split on whether they should prepare for the coming blows or go on the offensive themselves (believing the counter-offensive talk to be basically a PsyOp).

I think it's quite possible that RU forces in Ukraine could have been attritted more efficiently that way, instead of grinding down multiple UKR brigades while carving out a tiny salient near Tokmak, thereby laying the ground work for 2024. Of course, hindsight is 20/20 and, as I said, it was probably necessary for political reasons, both domestic and international.

Too early.  That is a really tough one without being inside the UA staff and knowing the details.  Of course there was political pressure, we were talking about a UA offensive months before it happened.  But there were also military factors.  How long do you let the RA dig in?  How long to replace losses from their failed winter offensives?  What was the force generation trajectory for UA reinforcements?  How are sustainment and enablers holding up?

My guess is that 1) the UA knew the RA was pretty badly mauled, 2) was creating a Putin line of defence along their most likely axis of advance, and 3) they were in about as good a shape as they were going to get.  Alternatively, perhaps the UA knew the offensive would take much longer to yield results and wanted to get to those benchmarks before Winter.  

The UA tried a western style larger push at the beginning and they all got blunted pretty badly.  So they switched to Kherson style small bites, which also would have been programmed into any options analysis.

Finally, the rules of war are all up in the air.  I am a broken record on that point.  Take any metrics you may have about how war is supposed to work and throw them out the window.  We have never had a war operationally like this one since Iran-Iraq in the 80s.  We have not had one strategically since Korea.  We did learn that minefields, ATGMs and stand-off tac aviation still work for the RA, even if their arty has been degraded.  It appears that even basic tac ISR is working for the RA in holding a line.  The RA are leaning on what they are good at…lots of troops dug in.

What is surprising is RA morale.  How on earth they are holding it together after last winter is beyond me - I guess that Russian steel is still out there.  They have also managed to keep an operational system floating after horrendous losses.  As we discussed, the bar is much lower on defence, but still…

So here we are, waiting for something to happen.  Or not, which is still something.  Can the RA still break?  Definitely. Can the UA fail and lose initiative?  Definitely.  Is you favourite pet platform going to make a difference, probably not, but we should probably keep pushing it anyway.

 

[Ultradave]

11 hours ago, THH149 said:

Anyway, I'm not an expert on US congress but if there's no Reps speaker, can the House pass laws to fund the US gov (and Ukr with it) without a Speaker? Is that why Biden is thinking of a one off $100bn gift to finance Ukr for 2+ more years to kind of firewall Ukr war finances?

Without a Speaker no business gets done. The Speaker Pro Tem's (the interim Speaker) one and only responsibility is to preside over the election of a new Speaker, after which they can get down to business. There's been some talk on voting to give him more responsibility in order to pass aid bills, but I can't really see that happening. Opening a can of worms unless it's very restrictively written.

The large aid package is unrelated to the Speaker election or lack of a Speaker. The one time large aid package is a proposal to avoid dickering about aid every 2 months with smaller appropriations bills, and just get enough aid to last until the election (next November). Biden can't do it himself. Both houses have to pass it, which they may do. There is still good support in both parties for aid to Ukraine, although recent news has showed lessening support among Republicans. But their majority is only 5 seats, so it would only take 6 Republicans and all the Democrats to pass a bill, or some similar combination. The big however to this might be getting it to the floor in the House to vote on, depending on who the next Speaker is. 

Hope that helps. My gut feeling is that sanity will prevail. Someone recently quoted the Churchill saying about Americans being counted on to do the right thing, once all the other possibilities are exhausted. Very perceptive, he was.

Dave

[Lethaface]

On 10/10/2023 at 12:19 PM, Butschi said:

That is too polemic for my taste. I mean, sure, we could do more. But compared to other conflicts we are already doing a lot! The numbers are readily available so you can do the math yourself for other countries. Germany's total commitment is around 38 bln € so far, that is twice what Afghanistan cost us in 10x less time. That includes the cost for harbouring refugees but excludes the indirect costs, especially the hit on German economy caused by sanctions etc., which is estimated to be over 100 bln €. If you call that dribbling...

Re: Western attention. That has nothing to do with TikTok and everything with the way we humans work. I am convinced that even the Ukrainians living here (and possibly even in the quieter parts of Ukraine) tend to be more concerned with their day-to-day lives than with the war. I myself admit that recently I was more concerned with my car breaking down than with soldiers dying far away. While on an intellectual level I am aware that the latter is the far greater tragedy, my car refusing to drive has a far greater direct impact on my life. Call me a cynic.

It is great that we are paying so much attention to the war in Ukraine here on this forum! But let's be a little honest to ourselves. Part of why we do that is because we are war(gaming) nerds and this war involves one of our favourite enemies and fancy toys. A war with similar number of casualties somewhere in Africa with people slaughtering each other the old-fashioned way (AKs and machetes?) wouldn't generate a thread with almost 3000 pages here.

Out of likes as usual (first world problem :D), but here is one.

Yemen anyone? Sudan also going on, etc. This war has large ramifications for most of us. Indirect results like inflation, energy pricing, etc; 

Anyway I'm not that bleak about support dwindling yet; so far it's more of a media / politics thing afaik. Of course from Ukraine perspective the support can never come (quickly) enough. 

[Rokko]

1 hour ago, Teufel said:

 

The option of not moving forward would not necessarily entice the Russians to attack. On the contrary it just enable them to dig deeper and wider defenses. Getting the ball rolling was partly about disrupting the ongoing defensive preparations of Russia. Imagine waiting until late spring knowing what they built in 4-5 months. We’d be looking at bunkers and not trenches as defensive fortifications.

If the Russians had any sense they wouldn't be attacking, at all. But common sense is evidently not the primary guiding factor in their decision making process, so I think it is pretty much a given that the same senseless meat assaults would have gone on earlier and at higher intensity than what we are seeing now. There is a major and fairly obvious downside to basing your strategic planning on the assumption of your enemy's stupidity, since at any point the might get the memo and just cease it. At least by attacking UKR can force attrition upon the Russians on their own terms, but much less efficiently.

Disruption of defensive preparation would have had merit, I think, if the offensive had managed to achieve notable gains. But as it stands now the main line basically holds and there are just to little bumps in a vast defensive network, which the Russians will probably easily be able to "buff out" over the fall/winter again. They did attrit the Russian forces holding this line, but not as efficiently as staying on the defensive would have achieved, is what I am arguing. Killing Russians is easier while they are on suicidal assaults than when you have to root them out from minefields and trenches.

What personally worries me and what maybe explains why I perhaps obsess a bit about the, let's say efficiency of attrition, so much, are the long term prospects of continued supply of arms. Even if the Western countries maintain their political will to supply UKR, most of the stuff that is required is extremely finite and has abysmal yearly production rates. Denmark can only send their entire fleet of motorized artillery so often (once, to be precise), Leopard 2 tanks are produced at a rate of I think a couple of dozen each year and Western countries seem more focused on back-filling their own arsenals for the near future. The only thing to be optimistic about seems to be the production of 155mm shells, which does appear to be slowly ramping up, but I have yet to see evidence for increased production of all the other stuff. Last time I checked, I think Oryx listed 1/3 of all M777s ever delivered as destroyed or damaged, mostly by Lancets, and I don't think I've seen announcements of further pieces since last summer, to give another example.

To summarize, UKR mostly lacks the capabilities to produce their own armaments and the current rate of attrition appears to be too high to sustain given what the West is physically able to replace without digging deeper into its own arsenals, against which there appears to be a very strong political aversion. Therefore, the attritional battle UKR intends to fight would have to be as optimized/efficient as possible to work out.

[Rokko]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

My guess is that 1) the UA knew the RA was pretty badly mauled[...]

 

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

The UA tried a western style larger push at the beginning and they all got blunted pretty badly.  So they switched to Kherson style small bites, which also would have been programmed into any options analysis.

I think, this is a fairly safe assumption, otherwise these early failed breach/breakthrough attempts would not have been made. It was also probably the right choice to make these attempts, given the extremely high upside potential in case the RU forces had in fact been as brittle as everyone seemed to expect, which probably was quite a reasonable assumption given their showing during the previous winter and, in fact, the entire war up to that point for that matter.

I am just doubtful about the sense of proceeding with the slow grinding "Kherson style" approach.

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

What is surprising is RA morale.  How on earth they are holding it together after last winter is beyond me - I guess that Russian steel is still out there.  They have also managed to keep an operational system floating after horrendous losses.  As we discussed, the bar is much lower on defence, but still…

I mean, I get that you are mostly not referring to personnel losses here, but the entire support structure, which is obviously many times smaller than what the Soviet Union had in WW2. But in terms of manpower losses, the Russian casualty figures for the entire war are roughly equivalent to a good (as in "not too bloddy") month during 1941/1942.

[Teufel]

36 minutes ago, Rokko said:

If the Russians had any sense they wouldn't be attacking, at all. But common sense is evidently not the primary guiding factor in their decision making process, so I think it is pretty much a given that the same senseless meat assaults would have gone on earlier and at higher intensity than what we are seeing now. There is a major and fairly obvious downside to basing your strategic planning on the assumption of your enemy's stupidity, since at any point the might get the memo and just cease it. At least by attacking UKR can force attrition upon the Russians on their own terms, but much less efficiently.

Disruption of defensive preparation would have had merit, I think, if the offensive had managed to achieve notable gains. But as it stands now the main line basically holds and there are just to little bumps in a vast defensive network, which the Russians will probably easily be able to "buff out" over the fall/winter again. They did attrit the Russian forces holding this line, but not as efficiently as staying on the defensive would have achieved, is what I am arguing. Killing Russians is easier while they are on suicidal assaults than when you have to root them out from minefields and trenches.

What personally worries me and what maybe explains why I perhaps obsess a bit about the, let's say efficiency of attrition, so much, are the long term prospects of continued supply of arms. Even if the Western countries maintain their political will to supply UKR, most of the stuff that is required is extremely finite and has abysmal yearly production rates. Denmark can only send their entire fleet of motorized artillery so often (once, to be precise), Leopard 2 tanks are produced at a rate of I think a couple of dozen each year and Western countries seem more focused on back-filling their own arsenals for the near future. The only thing to be optimistic about seems to be the production of 155mm shells, which does appear to be slowly ramping up, but I have yet to see evidence for increased production of all the other stuff. Last time I checked, I think Oryx listed 1/3 of all M777s ever delivered as destroyed or damaged, mostly by Lancets, and I don't think I've seen announcements of further pieces since last summer, to give another example.

To summarize, UKR mostly lacks the capabilities to produce their own armaments and the current rate of attrition appears to be too high to sustain given what the West is physically able to replace without digging deeper into its own arsenals, against which there appears to be a very strong political aversion. Therefore, the attritional battle UKR intends to fight would have to be as optimized/efficient as possible to work out.

Valid points several of them! There are several aspects to what you are saying that holds merit from hindsight. Trust we wouldn’t have this discussion, now I assume rather than ask, had Ukraine met your expectations of actual progress. In terms of land, Russians killed, I don’t know, by some relevant measure. Referencing The_Capt, this is far from over and God knows what’s next. We can all speculate and that holds some bragging rights later, in hindsight if any one of us had some sort of correct assumption. And even in that case it be like stock picking, mostly good timing, bit of luck and only advertise if successfully sold.

Without going into details, with that I mean you will have to take my word for it (I don’t fancy doing time in federal prison because I wanted to prove a point). Production, methods, materials, and exact capacities, plans and time lines for expansions of such, etc. when it comes to military equipment is classified information. Private companies doing the manufacturing yes, but arms deals are country to country business. Why we have “export controls” of information and steel. Thus, we can debate but you can’t see the facts, you have to trust me when I say that American controlled capabilities are in no measurable way dwarfing the Russian capabilities. Just American, in the US and abroad, are bigger and have high double digit growth in some capabilities.

You nor anyone else should be losing your sleep over manufacturing, supply chains, know-how, machinery, components, etc. in potentially prolonger war. If it comes to that, Russians have zero chance and now I am suggesting parity to start with. Russians are scraping together pieces from long term storage that could seen action in Korea or Vietnam if they are lucky. Let’s not even get into differences of technology levels of new materiel.

You are right about enticing Russians and killing them in the open. But they are conducting these suicide attacks for lost ground, not to expand into new. They started building these fortifications in tactically and strategically favorable places. That’s why they insist on coming back to retake these. If they don’t the Ukrainians can suddenly see and hit any given chimney in the valley’s below. Had the Ukrainians not punched the Russians in the teeth and literally been fighting uphill we wouldn't have seen these in our eyes senseless Russians assaults.

[kimbosbread]

1 hour ago, Rokko said:

What personally worries me and what maybe explains why I perhaps obsess a bit about the, let's say efficiency of attrition, so much, are the long term prospects of continued supply of arms. Even if the Western countries maintain their political will to supply UKR, most of the stuff that is required is extremely finite and has abysmal yearly production rates.

Fortunately, some of stuff that is really effective is not only cheap but has high production rates: Artillery shells and small drones. I personally am optimistic that Ukraine’s long range drone program will really kick up during the winter. I wouldn’t want to be a Russian power plant near Moscow or St. Petersburg, that’s for sure.

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, THH149 said:

I got you, ISW (prob from Telegram), Ukr Prada and wikipedia based on Ukr sources, thanks.

Extreme oversimplifications won't help you understand this war as it is not easily boiled down.  ISW uses every available OSINT source out there, and clearly documents them with footnotes.  Telegram is widely used by 1st and 2nd hand Russian and Ukrainian sources so it is common to see references to various accounts.  They also use official Russian and Ukrainian sources, accredited media, and even think tanks when applicable.  The great thing about ISW is that they frame all of these sources coherently with analysis that is consistent from report to report.  If one side said X yesterday and Y today, they call it out.  If side A or side B has a history of distortion they will make sure we know about it (when it's important, obviously).  Best of all, they do this each and every day with the same approach.  It's the best source of its kind.

Wikipedia is the usual Wikipedia thing.  With losses the articles are similar to WW2 in that they cite ranges that are usually based on both attacker and defender's sources.

7 hours ago, THH149 said:

The ISW map seems to have a slow refesh rate, with some very slow reconcilation of competing claims, going with the maximalist claims from both sides. eg I've seen several OSINT sources say the RF hasn't taken Orikhovo NW of Bahkmut (and never did apart from some random russian telegramers, several weeks ago) but there it is, still an RF claim. Though if someone had a source for an ongoing RF claim for capture, then I'd love to read it.

Yes, ISW deliberately does not keep their maps up-to-date on a daily basis.  I personally never use their maps because it's pointless for me as I am following the war daily.

There are several OSINT maps that are pretty good.  The person/people keeping them up-to-date only make updates when some bit of information confirms the line has shifted for real (not 2 guys with a camera taking selfies).  Here's one of the best ones I've found:

https://militaryland.net/maps/deployment-map/

This is another one, but something seems to be screwed up with the website right now:

https://www.scribblemaps.com/maps/view/The-War-in-Ukraine/091194

7 hours ago, THH149 said:

OSINT sources are such conjecture, assumption, wishful thinking and outright propaganda, not even secondary sources in an academic sense. Remember when historians of rome talk about the reliability of sources? here it is true to life.

Not all OSINT sources are created equally, for sure, but there are plenty out there that have been portraying the fighting correctly and consistently.  There are also those who have been doing the opposite.  Rybar, a Russian source, is directly tied into first hand sources, however it is also Russian so it lies/distorts constantly.  Usually not wildly counter factual, but enough to make it unreliable on its own.  Which is why it's so important to use a variety of sources to determine what is likely going on and what isn't.

An example of this is wherever you got the notion that the Ukrainian 110th was destroyed.  As someone that's been following OSINT sources since the beginning of the war, I can tell you that simple statement of yours triggered all of my alarm bells   It's a bold claim that runs counter to other OSINT reporting as well as accumulated knowledge (e.g. Russia has NEVER "destroyed" a Ukrainian unit since the war started).

Steve

[cesmonkey]

Hey Ukrainians, how tasty are the products from this company?

 

[Teufel]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

What is surprising is RA morale.  How on earth they are holding it together after last winter is beyond me - I guess that Russian steel is still out there.  They have also managed to keep an operational system floating after horrendous losses.  As we discussed, the bar is much lower on defence, but still…

 

This is a very interesting point! And again, I can’t offer too much details about specific things but let’s keep it on general terms. Keeping the equipment running goes according to the same principle for both sides. Damaged and recovered equipment which in Western military operations would never see action again goes back into action in Ukraine. Damaged and structurally compromised equipment is better than no equipment. That tank or IFV that saved the crew first time around may not or certainly will not save the crew next time but it’s going back in.

If the armor on the left hand side is compromised after hit with RPG it’s not disqualified from action in Ukraine. Run a mine and destroy the mine protection, it’s either replaced or disqualified in NATO conflict. In Ukraine, it’s welded up with industrial grade steel and resembling bucket from Home Depot on the damaged side, it’s going back in! Real quote “left side is compromised? Does that mean if we get hit on the right hand side we will survive? Maybe? Ok, if maybe it’s going back in!”

Out of necessity, like fighting without body armor, as long as your AK-platform fires you got a chance!

Same for Russians. I wish we could have these “health bars” we see in video games projecting on top of equipment. I’d be hard pressed to find, primarily Russian, equipment that has more than 50-70% vitality left. If it was piece of junk before, imagine what it is after no or little maintenance or worse being hit by western equipment?

But it still rolls and it maybe fires. The increase in “suicide tanks” last month or so is for this exact reason. Turret probably damaged beyond functional repair but tracks work. Load it with shells, mines, anything that explodes and send it with brick on gas pedal towards Ukrainians. Better value than pulling something they can’t repair anyway back home in Russia. This goes back into previous post, long term the Russians are screwed. Only if West assumes that now invisible health bar glows healthy green than critically wounded red are the Russians going to stand a chance and we will come to regret it.

On the morale side, can only speculate but knowing little bit of the inner workings of Eastern Europe military. Combination of indoctrinations (read brainwashing), hard drugs, in group and third party punishments, and primarily at this point - apathy. Man that looses fear in combat fights without anything to lose, including his life. Fear suggests you have something to live for, if nothing else for sole purpose of survival. Being under these conditions, probably injured many of them, left with only punishment if you speak up, and far from any chance of getting out of this hell. They become hollow shells of their own humanity, like walking dead. You would never treat soldiers or put them through circumstances Russians do in the West. It’s unheard of and thus we have hard time comprehending it.

Edit: “third party punishments” as in your family members back home threatened to be or actually harmed by your own actions at the front. Surrender and you will survive but rest assured your family will not.

Edited October 11, 2023 by Teufel

[akd]

T-72B3 obr.2023 “Copium”

 

[Lethaface]

5 minutes ago, akd said:

T-72B3 obr.2023 “Copium”

 

New NATO designation? 
Although I'd guess against drone dropped ordnance they can be effective.

[akd]

FPV attack with very precise air burst:

 

[Ultradave]

15 hours ago, THH149 said:

Just heard that the Ukr 110th Mech was destroyed around Avdiivka.

Usually someone would also post a link to where this information came from, especially considering how large the claim is.  "Just heard" is kind of nebulous. 

Dave

[dan/california]

By far the most interesting bit about the quality of newly produced 152 ammunition. He states there is a 2.5 kilo weight difference between new production shells in the sane batch. That sends the Russians already bad  CEP right off a cliff.

 

41 minutes ago, akd said:

FPV attack with very precise air burst:

 

This is the first really clear evidence of an FPV drone with a purpose built warhead , and I'm guessing some level AI targeting. I think the lag in the video feed would make that level of accuracy possible. If the Ukrainians have these in quantity it would be significant improvement. 

Edited October 11, 2023 by dan/california

[Battlefront.com]

58 minutes ago, akd said:

FPV attack with very precise air burst:

 

Interesting.  I don't think I've seen an airburst FPV before, but there's obviously nothing terribly difficult (on the scale of things) to make this possible.  However, it seems the explosive is a standard type, not shaped, as the effect is evenly dispersed.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, THH149 said:

So Ukr are saying Russia has 289k eliminated but NYT quotes officials saying 120k eliminated. And the US numbers would be based on what the Ukr tells them to say, so likely deliberately distorted to some degree. You be the judge.

Actually, the US estimates are their own.  Ukraine doesn't publish the information publicly or provide that information privately even to allies, at least according to US officials.

6 hours ago, THH149 said:

 where does the NYT get the idea that Russians outnumber the Ukr by 3:1 when Ukr seem to be mobilising a 1m or so army. Does the Russ have 3m? Really?

A standard mistake journalists have made since the beginning of the war.  They take the total force size for each side instead of specifically what each has committed to Ukraine.  It is possible that Russia's forces are about 3x larger than Ukraine's in total, but that includes all branches and all locations as well as the annual conscription that isn't usable in Ukraine.  Ukraine has hardly any air or naval forces so its force is disproportionally ground based and they have nearly no other commitments (they do have to guard the border with Belarus a little).

For much of the last year the estimates are that Ukraine and Russia have similar sized forces actually fighting in Ukraine.

Steve

[The_Capt]

10 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Actually, the US estimates are their own.  Ukraine doesn't publish the information publicly or provide that information privately even to allies, at least according to US officials.

A standard mistake journalists have made since the beginning of the war.  They take the total force size for each side instead of specifically what each has committed to Ukraine.  It is possible that Russia's forces are about 3x larger than Ukraine's in total, but that includes all branches and all locations as well as the annual conscription that isn't usable in Ukraine.  Ukraine has hardly any air or naval forces so its force is disproportionally ground based and they have nearly no other commitments (they do have to guard the border with Belarus a little).

For much of the last year the estimates are that Ukraine and Russia have similar sized forces actually fighting in Ukraine.

Steve

Ugh, this whole discussion line is starting to sound like info-nihilism, "we can't possible get any truth."  Which is almost always followed up by "so I will insert my own."

 

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, Rokko said:

Of course, hindsight is 20/20 and, as I said, it was probably necessary for political reasons, both domestic and international.

The problem with hindsight is with how far back you look.  At the beginning of the summer counter offensive the hindsight was "we should have attacked sooner before they dug in so much".  This would  have required a completely different approach to Bakhmut and that would have lost Ukraine the opportunity to attrit Russian forces in the numbers that they did.  It might also have meant Wagner and Prig would still be prancing around on the battlefield.

For a variety of reasons, including military, Ukraine needed to go on the offense this year.  The south offered the biggest chance of large scale gains.  It still does, despite the slow progress.  And the thought of giving Russia more chances to reinforce their front and then choose where to do their suicidal Charge Of The Mobik Brigade routine would probably mean Ukraine would not be able to settle this war militarily.  And since that is the only viable way for Ukraine to end the war on favorable terms... the counter offensive was the right call.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Ugh, this whole discussion line is starting to sound like info-nihilism, "we can't possible get any truth."  Which is almost always followed up by "so I will insert my own."

 

Yup, frustrating for sure.  We all remember the epic "Russia has 10,000 tanks!" nonsense that was so often repeated at the start of this war.

I think it is rather pointless to talk about strategic losses for either side as it really doesn't matter.  What matters is what each force still has to commit and how well things go when it does.  On that count, I'd say Ukraine has the upper hand now and for the near future.  Russia's forces are degrading in quality, Ukraine's are at least staying stable.  Russia's ability to conduct offensive actions is just about zero, Ukraine's is getting better.  This is important because Russia's stated goals require offensive action.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

2 hours ago, Teufel said:

Without going into details, with that I mean you will have to take my word for it (I don’t fancy doing time in federal prison because I wanted to prove a point).... Thus, we can debate but you can’t see the facts, you have to trust me when I say that American controlled capabilities are in no measurable way dwarfing the Russian capabilities. Just American, in the US and abroad, are bigger and have high double digit growth in some capabilities.

You nor anyone else should be losing your sleep over manufacturing, supply chains, know-how, machinery, components, etc. in potentially prolonger war. If it comes to that, Russians have zero chance and now I am suggesting parity to start with.

1 hour ago, Teufel said:

This is a very interesting point! And again, I can’t offer too much details about specific things but let’s keep it on general terms... 

 

OK mate, so while I greatly enjoy your commentary, and (like Martin Q. Blank and his cat) also respect your privacy, by your own account you are a (former/current) volunteer medic (in Ukraine?), seemingly of Eastern European origin.

But (duly accounting for 'lost in translation'), you're asking us to 'take your word for it' (cuz you can't share your sources or you'd go to Federal prison or sumfink?) regarding some high level assertions relating to US/Western vs. Russian production capacity.

Sure, we rando gamer geeks can all express our own opinions here (within reason), and even occasionally float BS we heard in a bar  (Spetsnaz on the tundra, anyone?).

...But it's probably best not to pretend to an authority, still less classified insider 'Red Pill' knowledge you don't actually have.

Unless you really *do*, of course. But then you'd have to kill us (In my particular case it's easy, poison my San Mig). 

[The_Capt]

1 minute ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yup, frustrating for sure.  I think it is rather pointless to talk about strategic losses for either side as it really doesn't matter.  What matters is what each force still has to commit and how well things go when it does.  On that count, I'd say Ukraine has the upper hand now and for the near future.  Russia's forces are degrading in quality, Ukraine's are at least staying stable.  Russia's ability to conduct offensive actions is just about zero, Ukraine's is getting better.  This is important because Russia's stated goals require offensive action.

Steve

Right?!  Neither nation is near a human capacity threshold in this war, so the hands flapping is premature.  This is now a force generation and sustainment fight...and I like Ukraine's odds.

[The_Capt]

5 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

OK mate, so while I greatly enjoy your commentary, and (like Martin Q. Blank and his cat) also respect your privacy, by your own account you are a (former/current) volunteer medic (in Ukraine?), seemingly of Eastern European origin.

But (duly accounting for 'lost in translation'), you're asking us to 'take your word for it' (cuz you can't share your sources or you'd go to Federal prison or sumfink?) regarding some high level assertions relating to US/Western vs. Russian production capacity.

Sure, we rando gamer geeks can all express our own opinions here (within reason), and even occasionally float BS we heard in a bar  (Spetsnaz on the tundra, anyone?).

...But it's probably best not to pretend to an authority, still less classified insider 'Red Pill' knowledge you don't actually have.

Unless you really *do*, of course. But then you'd have to kill us (In my particular case it's easy, poison my San Mig). 

After that last US leak on Reddit I would like to say that professionals know better, but there we go.

If you know "stuff" one does not go around saying "I know stuff but can't tell you"...you just don't say anything.  Simply saying you have access in a unsecure open forum is risky.

Could be window dressing, or maybe the young fella just doesn't know better.

[Battlefront.com]

10 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Right?!  Neither nation is near a human capacity threshold in this war, so the hands flapping is premature.  This is now a force generation and sustainment fight...and I like Ukraine's odds.

As we discussed earlier, Ukraine's ABILITY to conduct successful offensive operations and cause Russia casualties deep in the rear *is* dependent upon the West.  But Russia already has a long demonstrated INABILITY to conduct successful offensive operations or cause Ukraine casualties deep in the rear.  It seems to be improving the latter, but taking ground is still not anywhere on the near horizon.

This gets us back to defining "winning".  If I'm in a bar fight all on my own against 3 guys that are bigger than me, if somehow manage to get it down to just one and he's as spent on throwing punches as I am, I'd call that a win even if my face looks like hamburger.

Steve