How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Centurian52]

7 hours ago, hcrof said:

Related: a lot of talk here like the whole operation is going to be easy and the Russians have learned nothing/are terminally incompetent.

Last year I cautioned on a few occasions that the Russians might learn from their mistakes (afterall, the Soviets started WW2 as an absolute tactical mess, but they definitely got a lot better by the end). And yes, they seem to have learned some lessons. But I think Russia faces several obstacles to learning.

First, war is a two player game. It isn't enough to learn from your past mistakes. You need to learn faster than the other side. And the Ukrainians have proven that they are much faster learners than the Russians. The competence gap has gotten wider, not narrower, despite evidence that the Russians have managed to learn some lessons.

Second, the Russian military seems to have a lot of deeply ingrained problems which actively resist efforts to get the organization as a whole to learn, even if its individual members learn. This video touches on one of those issues, combat compliance.

With a combat compliance problem as bad as Russia's even a very talented tactician may not be able to employ his formations in a tactically proficient way. A lot of tactics which would be more effective simply cease to be options. And this is just one example out of many issues in the Russian army (the difficulty in transferring lessons between multiple parallel organizations that don't like each other is another). These are the sorts of problems that need to be solved before actual tactics can even begin to improve.

7 hours ago, hcrof said:

2. The Russian defensive trenches, mines and anti tank ditches are a formidable obstacle

This is absolutely true. The outer crust of Russia's prepared defenses will be the hard part. They also don't have to worry as much about combat compliance, training, maneuver, and other issues while all they are asking their men to do is hold a trench. But that outer crust will not hold forever. Sooner or later Russian forces will have to maneuver, or fall back under pressure, and I have serious doubts about their ability to do that.

[sburke]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

- If Russia had the ability to conduct deep operational battle (e.g. static bridges, rail etc) via AirPower, then why has it waited until now to use it?

They sort of did in their concerted attempt tp destroy Ukraine's energy infrastructure - all stuff in fixed locations a lot easier to take out than a bridge... but.. err... FAIL

[kimbosbread]

1 hour ago, womble said:

It has seemed to me, from the accounts promulgated here, that most times UKR stray from under their established AD perimeter, they do suffer from RUS CAS.

Yeah despite Russia’s loss of jets and helos and pilots this has been a consistent theme.

40 minutes ago, dan/california said:

A hundred ATACMS directed at the Crimean airfields would mean a LOT less concern about the Russian Air Force. Not doing that is on us. 

Or poverty Shaheeds. I think we can assume that any major mechanized movement will be preceded by a long range drone/missile strikes and/or sabotage on Crimean airfields. Don’t need to wipe out everything, but damage a few jets, kill some pilots, blow up fuel or weapon storage…

[Battlefront.com]

Some thoughts...

Some people (not pointing fingers at anybody here) who criticize groups like ours as pro-Ukrainian "group think" and "echo chamber" seem to forget that much of the pushback against the direction of our discussion is coming from the "group think" and "echo chambers" who doubt Ukraine's capabilities and/or put too much stock in Russia's.  It is nice to see Kofman finally breaking out of his funk that he was in before and just after the war started, because for a long time he was the poster child for this sort of thing.  Cooper also has a track record of jumping at shadows and/or diving too deep into a technical discussion without proper context.

The simple fact is that we here have a proven track record of being "right" and the naysayers being "wrong".  In fact, if anything we have underestimated Ukraine's capabilities and given Russians way too much credit in terms of their ability AND willingness to fight a modern war.  This has produced some surprises, including that Russia is still able to fight at all.

As was pointed to above, I am certainly not predicting Ukraine is going to nail Russia's coffin lid shut this year, no matter how how many nails the Russians give Ukraine to help them do the job.  It is certainly possible that a systemic collapse could happen, but I for one am not counting on it happening.  I think of it as a "would be nice if it happens" situation (er, until the after effects start to add up - see previous discussions about the downsides of Russian collapse), but I'd put it at maybe 25% chance of happening.

My expectation is we will see one big fight that is a mix of Kherson/Kharkiv elements and at least one that is closer to Kharkiv in character, though not necessarily in territorial liberation.

In both cases I expect Ukraine will have a tough fight on its hands, but Russia's resources are not as dense or as capable as they were in Kherson.  Even in the north where there's a lot better terrain and troop density from Russia's side.  Ukraine was able to breach tougher defenses in Kherson, albeit slowly and with fairly significant losses.  I think Ukraine will have an easier time of it this go around, relatively speaking, because Ukraine has shown its ability to learn while Russia has struggled to make improvements that really matter.

Once Ukraine gets through the initial belt of defenses, that's where I am uncertain about outcome.  A big breach with a lot of unspent Ukrainian potential likely means a Kharkiv like outcome.  Ukraine has shown it is able to move faster and with better coordination than Russia can organize defenses.  However, if the tears into Russia's lines are too narrow or too costly, then far more modest advances are to be expected.

There is also a different set of expectations depending on where Ukraine strikes.  The northern Donbas line holds less potential for gains than the south does.

And Russian air power does not have a real chance of influencing any of this in a significant way.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

A quick note about Russia's past successes in using its air power...

Whether it be in the northern Donbas or during the Kherson fighting, the defining feature was attacking relatively static and easily spotted Ukrainian positions.  Bridges, concentrations of armor, perhaps a key building in use for hours or days, etc.  Even when successful, these attacks were not decisive in any way.  Neither was Russian artillery, and I'd bet it was far more effective than air power.

As history as our guide, the best case for Russian air power is that it slows things down a bit and causes Ukraine to suffer more casualties than it otherwise would.  But I do not think there is any indication that it will do more than that.

One of the reasons to come to this conclusion is the lack of evidence that Russia can hit anything that is on the move.  Even tactically behind the front.  This is the sort of interdiction that air power is supposed to be good at and yet Russia's airforce doesn't seem up to the challenge (we've discussed in detail why that is, so no surprise to us).  As long as Ukraine can largely move without being hit, Russia is at a major disadvantage.  Especially once Ukraine achieves a breakthrough somewhere.  Because unlike Russia's track record of generally lethargic advances (there are a couple of exceptions), Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to exploit openings rapidly and in force.

Steve

[Huba]

No airforce markings on these, must be civilian I guess...

 

[Probus]

Does Ukraine have to cut Crimea off with a drive to the Black Sea in order for their offensive to be considered a success or is there more that the UA needs to accomplish?

[panzermartin]

37 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

A quick note about Russia's past successes in using its air power...

Whether it be in the northern Donbas or during the Kherson fighting, the defining feature was attacking relatively static and easily spotted Ukrainian positions.  Bridges, concentrations of armor, perhaps a key building in use for hours or days, etc.  Even when successful, these attacks were not decisive in any way.  Neither was Russian artillery, and I'd bet it was far more effective than air power.

As history as our guide, the best case for Russian air power is that it slows things down a bit and causes Ukraine to suffer more casualties than it otherwise would.  But I do not think there is any indication that it will do more than that.

One of the reasons to come to this conclusion is the lack of evidence that Russia can hit anything that is on the move.  Even tactically behind the front.  This is the sort of interdiction that air power is supposed to be good at and yet Russia's airforce doesn't seem up to the challenge (we've discussed in detail why that is, so no surprise to us).  As long as Ukraine can largely move without being hit, Russia is at a major disadvantage.  Especially once Ukraine achieves a breakthrough somewhere.  Because unlike Russia's track record of generally lethargic advances (there are a couple of exceptions), Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to exploit openings rapidly and in force.

Steve

Unfortunately for the russians, this seems to be mostly true. The lack of real CAS ability in coordination with the troops below. Otherwise counterattacks like those in the summer wouldnt be a walk in the park if RU could effectively employ its numerous aircrafts effectively in ground role. Maybe we'll see something different now or maybe not.

There is one exception perhaps, I have seen some videos from attack helicopters using their Vikhr missiles from a distance on moving UKR vehicles. if I were the russian commander I would invest a lot in this to counter defense lines penetrations, with the hope that advance elements of the attacker are usually ahead of any AA coverage. 

Edited April 28, 2023 by panzermartin

[panzermartin]

And now I just realized that WW2 Sturmoviks were probably more succesful than the modern russian Jets in hunting APCs and MBTs.

Anyway, we dont have much info on this yet, it would be interesting after the war to collect data on what the russian air force actually managed to hit in the frontlines.

[Centurian52]

2 minutes ago, Probus said:

Does Ukraine have to cut Crimea off with a drive to the Black Sea in order for their offensive to be considered a success or is there more that the UA needs to accomplish?

The trouble with defining success is that in the real world success is a spectrum, not a toggle. The question isn't "will it be a success?", but "how successful will it be?". Ukraine is certain to retake some territory and inflict some casualties, just as it is certain to take some casualties. But it all comes down to how much of each. If they just manage to retake a handful of towns and inflict a few thousand casualties, but lose tens of thousand of soldiers in the process, then it will be a dismal failure (like the Russian winter offensive). If they manage to drive the Russians out of Ukraine entirely, effectively destroy the entire Russian army, and only lose a handful of men, then it will be a crushing victory. And there are a million variations in between those two extremes, each more successful than some possible outcomes, and less successful than other possible outcomes.

For my part I'm hoping to at least see a chunk of territory retaken on par with the Kherson or Kharkiv offensives, with enough strength left in the Ukrainian army to follow it up with at least one more offensive before the year is out. If it can accomplish something of strategic value, like cutting the Crimean land bridge, then that's even better. An even better outcome would be to not only take everything up to the neck of Crimea, but to retake Crimea as well all in one go. And in my wildest dreams I even imagine this thing collapsing the whole Russian frontline.

Of course the media is going to report the outcome as a position on a toggle, not a position on a spectrum (success or failure, not a degree of success). Whether it will be reported as a success will be determined by whether the results exceeded or fell short of public expectations. So it would seem that the best way to get PR victories in a war is to keep public expectations as low as possible. Kharkiv was playing this game on easy mode, since it came completely out of the blue, with no public expectations at all. Does anyone have any feel for what the public expectations are for this offensive? Are people expecting it to drive the Russians completely out of Ukraine or to just move the needle a bit?

[akd]

Part 3 of battle for “Cyclops” position. Shows how difficult and dangerous this work is even with drone support:

 

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, womble said:

For sure. Or maybe the UKR Hrim program already has that sorted. Or maybe the success of RUS CAS I remember being reported was an outlier. Needs to be more than a hope, though, or the poor tankers and infantry might end up regretting it.

We have seen five Hrims, ever, maybe. The Ukrainians need at least high double digits Hrims, ATACMS or similar to make the airfields in Crimea unlivable, and hit the rail system all the way back to the Kerch bridge. They have been telling us that since last July. 

[Kinophile]

2 hours ago, Probus said:

Does Ukraine have to cut Crimea off with a drive to the Black Sea in order for their offensive to be considered a success or is there more that the UA needs to accomplish?

We should definitely start defining Ukrainian  "success". 

Steve has outlined significant territorial recapture as a good threshold (let's say at minimum equal to either/both Kherson & Kharkiv quantities). 

I'd separate those two though,  as Kherson was a fixed point objective while Kharkiv was a more "pure"  territory capture. 

But those are "only"  operational successes,  when little was expected of those actions from a strategic or geopolitical sense. They were a very good proof of the pudding,  that Ukraine could attack and win but as we all know, expectations weren't high. 

However,  this year's offensive is an entirely different beast. Now,  there is very much an overt tone of Show Us You're Not Wasting Our Time. Expectations are high,  hopes are unreasonable and politicians are ticklish to growing backlash/Russian pressure of various types. 

Theres the adage of People understand what they already know.  So if we suggest that for a key geopolitical win,  that the general Western Commons can easily grasp,  then the ZSU  could try 3 objectives:

1. Kharkiv+ Type: Retake a lot of territory (even more than in '22). 

2. Kherson Type: Retake another major city

3. Kiev Type: Cause massive and operational level collapse of Russian forces, forcing flight to Russian borders, a blindingly clear defeat that gives Ukraine the initiative into 2024.

#1 can be achieved without 2 or 3. Potentially fast but inherently extends GLOCs

#2 requires #1 and ideally #3. Hard,  but potentially slow and attrional. 

#3 would provide #1 & #2 but is hardest of them all. 

 

Edited April 28, 2023 by Kinophile

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, panzermartin said:

And now I just realized that WW2 Sturmoviks were probably more succesful than the modern russian Jets in hunting APCs and MBTs.

I was thinking the same thing, but more specifically about USAF fighter bombers in France.  However, there were two things going for the USAF in that situation.  First, it was a target rich environment.  Lots and lots and lots of vehicles to blow up meant that a single sortie had a decent chance of finding a target.  Second, the Allies flooded the German rear with a high density of aircraft on a consistent basis.  Even more chance of finding a target to hit.

Yet, with all of that in the Allies' favor, recent historical assessments do not attribute much destruction or even disruption to air power (with some exceptions).  It was a constant harassment which no doubt had some impact, but more in the realm of annoyance at the operational level.

Also, there is a difference between hitting a unit "on the move" and a vehicle moving.  The former is about knowing where an enemy unit is and attacking it while it is still there.  Precision is not necessary for this, but it certainly does help.  Hitting a vehicle while moving, on the other hand, is a more specific situation and that's where precision becomes critically important.

What I don't think we've seen much evidence of, maybe none, is Russia being able to attack Ukrainian units while on the move.  Its ISR, communications, and command structure are are not up to the task.  Sure, here and there they might do something successfully, but for air power to have a solid impact it has to be both consistent and pervasive.  Nothing so far has indicated Russia has that going for it.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, akd said:

Part 3 of battle for “Cyclops” position. Shows how difficult and dangerous this work is even with drone support:

 

Looks like the information sharing between drone and those in the trench wasn't ideal.  You can see at one point where the wounded Russian withdrew from that the guys clearly didn't know he was gone and they dumped a bunch of grenades and small arms into where he had been.

It seems the Ukrainians were aware that there was a firing position from within the bunker somewhere on the side, but that they didn't know exactly where.  They were directing fire and grenades consistently in the wrong spot, including the Ukrainian soldier getting killed when firing a rifle grenade (though he was hit by one of the Russians in the trench).

Steve

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

We should definitely start defining Ukrainian  "success". 

Steve has outlined significant territorial recapture as a good threshold (let's say at minimum equal to either/both Kherson & Kharkiv quantities). 

I'd separate those two though,  as Kherson was a fixed point objective while Kharkiv was a more "pure"  territory capture. 

But those are "only"  operational successes,  when little was expected of those actions from a strategic or geopolitical sense. They were a very good proof of the pudding,  that Ukraine could attack and win but as we all know, expectations weren't high. 

However,  this year's offensive is an entirely different beast. Now,  there is very much an overt tone of Show Us You're Not Wasting Our Time. Expectations are high,  hopes are unreasonable and politicians are ticklish to growing backlash/Russian pressure of various types. 

Theres the adage of People understand what they already know.  So if we suggest that for a key geopolitical win,  that the general Western Commons can easily grasp,  then the ZSU  could try 3 objectives:

1. Kharkiv+ Type: Retake a lot of territory (even more than in '22). 

2. Kherson Type: Retake another major city

3. Kiev Type: Cause massive and operational level collapse of Russian forces, forcing flight to Russian borders, a blindingly clear defeat that gives Ukraine the initiative into 2024.

#1 can be achieved without 2 or 3. Potentially fast but inherently extends GLOCs

#2 requires #1 and ideally #3. Hard,  but potentially slow and attrional. 

#3 would provide #1 & #2 but is hardest of them all. 

 

Break the land bridge, and put the Kerch Bridge in HIMARS range. That is an unequivocal success, they can post video of using the bridge for target practice for weeks to get the point across.

[sburke]

15 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Break the land bridge, and put the Kerch Bridge in HIMARS range. That is an unequivocal success, they can post video of using the bridge for target practice for weeks to get the point across.

liberating a sizable chunk of occupied land and a long procession of prisoners being escorted to the rear could be enough.  @The_Capt has spoken a lot about options space so thinking strictly in terms of ground taken etc is only part of the picture.  A UA offensive that embarrasses Russia's military even further could have repercussions on the political front.

[Haiduk]

This morning at 5:20 we had missile strike attempt on Kyiv, but 11 missiles were intercepted on approaches. Terrible tragedy in Uman' town, Cherkasy oblast. The town was hit with two missiles, one hit some store facility, other hit directly at 9-storey residential building. One section of it collapsed completely. In present time 23 bodies are recovered from ruines (among them 4 children), 18 injured, 17 resqued

Also one missile destroyed private house in Dnipro city, young woman and her little doughter were killed. 

Edited April 28, 2023 by Haiduk

[sburke]

5 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

This morning at 5:20 we had missile strike attempt on Kyiv, but 11 missiles were intercepted on approaches. Terrible tragedy in Uman' town, Cherkasy oblast. The town was hit with two missiles, one hit some store facility, other hit directly at 9-storey residential building. One section of it collapsed completely. In present time 23 bodies are recovered from ruines (among them 4 children), 18 injured, 17 resqued

Also one missile destroyed private house in Dnipro city, young woman and her little doughter were killed. 

When the hell are we going to get around to declaring Russia a state sponsor of terror.  JFC

[Seminole]

4 hours ago, akd said:

Part 3 of battle for “Cyclops” position. Shows how difficult and dangerous this work is even with drone support:

 

Do we have any of these left in surplus?

[Haiduk]

Uman'...

[danfrodo]

24 minutes ago, sburke said:

When the hell are we going to get around to declaring Russia a state sponsor of terror.  JFC

No they are not a 'state sponsor' they are a TERRORIST STATE.  My blood is boiling seeing this.  I will stop because all I can do is type strings of violence-tinged expletives......

[Yet]

3 hours ago, Kinophile said:

We should definitely start defining Ukrainian  "success". 

Steve has outlined significant territorial recapture as a good threshold (let's say at minimum equal to either/both Kherson & Kharkiv quantities). 

I'd separate those two though,  as Kherson was a fixed point objective while Kharkiv was a more "pure"  territory capture. 

But those are "only"  operational successes,  when little was expected of those actions from a strategic or geopolitical sense. They were a very good proof of the pudding,  that Ukraine could attack and win but as we all know, expectations weren't high. 

However,  this year's offensive is an entirely different beast. Now,  there is very much an overt tone of Show Us You're Not Wasting Our Time. Expectations are high,  hopes are unreasonable and politicians are ticklish to growing backlash/Russian pressure of various types. 

Theres the adage of People understand what they already know.  So if we suggest that for a key geopolitical win,  that the general Western Commons can easily grasp,  then the ZSU  could try 3 objectives:

1. Kharkiv+ Type: Retake a lot of territory (even more than in '22). 

2. Kherson Type: Retake another major city

3. Kiev Type: Cause massive and operational level collapse of Russian forces, forcing flight to Russian borders, a blindingly clear defeat that gives Ukraine the initiative into 2024.

#1 can be achieved without 2 or 3. Potentially fast but inherently extends GLOCs

#2 requires #1 and ideally #3. Hard,  but potentially slow and attrional. 

#3 would provide #1 & #2 but is hardest of them all. 

 

question is: when its the success big enough that the Western media will spin it as a success, that makes the Western politicians and voters feel that the aid to Ukraine has been well-spend and thus can be maintained without increasing opposition.

possibly any on these can do: 

- march to the Azov Sea

- take 2 major cities

- take 10.000 km2

- down the kerch bridge and get Mariupol in 20km range.

- any not on this list which is hugely humiliation for RU in the eyes of the average newsconsumer (like serious internal RU state troubles due to high failures and a need for mobilization, RU need to use nukes or other clear massive RU fails which are of a few categories worse than we have seen yet)

 

any of these will most probably do it. anything less might also do it, depending on the circumstances/situation etc. ofc the 10.000km is quite arbitrairy- meaning a nicely visible big chunk of the map coloured blue helps a lot if none of the other points above are met.

 

 

 

 

Edited April 28, 2023 by Yet
addition

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, sburke said:

liberating a sizable chunk of occupied land and a long procession of prisoners being escorted to the rear could be enough.  @The_Capt has spoken a lot about options space so thinking strictly in terms of ground taken etc is only part of the picture.  A UA offensive that embarrasses Russia's military even further could have repercussions on the political front.

All true, but a daily HIMARs attack on Kerch bridge until it just fell down would be utterly impossible for Putin to spin.

 

Edited April 28, 2023 by dan/california

[Seminole]

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

I'd separate those two though,  as Kherson was a fixed point objective while Kharkiv was a more "pure"  territory capture. 

But those are "only"  operational successes,  when little was expected of those actions from a strategic or geopolitical sense. They were a very good proof of the pudding,  that Ukraine could attack and win but as we all know, expectations weren't high. 

I think the Kherson victory was both strategic and geopolitical.  Harder to incorporate Kherson Oblast into your conquest referendum when you don't even hold the capital.  And there is strategic significance in liberating the western bank, and effectively shutting the door on the threat to Odessa and the whole of the sea coast.

Cutting the land bridge is the most obvious, available, and 'marketable', win for the Ukrainians.  It also has strategic ramifications in hurting Russian LOCs.  

The Ukrainians can hopefully show that since last April Russia has steadily lost more than she has gained, and can only expect to lose yet more.

I think one of the biggest considerations for the Ukrainians has to be preservation of the new 'steel fist'.  You want an offensive that can show tangible results, but not get you bogged down, or ground down.  Dash to the coast fits that bill better than a dash to Sevastopol, or Kerch.

I'm not Wehrmacht fanboi, but I still marvel at the scope of the campaigns they waged when we see how easy it is to get bogged down and we dial our expectations accordingly.