How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[akd]

This would seem to confirm that the pontoon bridge built alongside the Antonovsky Bridge is damaged beyond use and is not being repaired:

 

[Beleg85]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

The bigger problem for Russia now is it said its withdrawing.  Imagine the propaganda problems Russia will have if it loses several thousand soldiers while "withdrawing".  Not good at all.

So yes. I think they will withdraw even though they haven't done so already.

I for one am interested to see how long it takes for their withdrawal to break down into chaos.  Because their river transportation capacity is not great.  Full barges with hundreds of men per barge?  Probably that's the plan.

They're going to leave a lot of stuff behind. that's for sure.

Steve

 

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So Russia just announced to the world it is pulling out, to the point that famously cautious mainstream news is reporting it.  They know that we can see Pvt Potato Head scratching his a$$ from space.  So what would be the possible use of lying at this point?  “Ah ha, we cleverly lured you into a trap on the wrong side of a river onto a city you were already advancing on”…?

Some sort of IO play on the population?  But to what end?  Russian has been deporting and oppressing all over the occupied territories but now it need some weird gambit to convince the local population of something?  

If ISR is still picking up RA on the scopes at this point it is just as likely a SNAFU on withdrawal than a clever ploy.  Unless someone can explain what the point of a setting up a fake withdrawal would be?

I would vote it is real withdrawal, but how one witdrew matters a lot for Putin. And when talking about fighting withdrawal, better analogy than Gallipolli/Dunkirk is perhaps Suvorov's Swiss retreat. That is actually model operation of that type known to many Russian high commanders. But this is different; they have big city to fight for now.

Now look at it from Kremlin perspective. They prepare for it probably since Surovikin took command, we only see open stage (probably not final- operation can take a long time and is probably multi-pronged). We don't know state of fortifications in the city itself, but we heard about Russian soldiers dressing as civilians, deporting people from "delicate" areas, puting tons of minefields, here and there constructing bunkers. Ofc. Putin does not care about lifes of anybody, not mobiks nor civilians. Evacuation action was announced weeks ago, so authorities have free hands regarding anyone who prefered to stay; they did on their "own" demand. Crucially, from Putin's perspective sacrifice of brave "Russian" citizens of Kherson and soldiers defending it is not that bad, if only they will put heroic resistance for several days. It is entirely within Russian possibilities, even mobiks, to put such a fight. Destruction of the city, especially by Ukrainian artillery is big bonus from PR viewpoint - we know they don't even need reality for it, look at Nuclear PP and Boris Johnson planning assaults; but it is nonetheless nicer to Simonyan-types to base on real events one can spin later. Hero-city, last banners flying over central bunker, stories of heroic wounded soldiers calling strikes on their own position...this is not only part of Putin's sick brain, but living and functioning societal imagination of Russian state. So It is not impossible he may be  inclined to turn the city into "doomed position". Perhaps medals are already being produced.

In other words, in current circumstances the bloodier, the better for Putin. He is still rationalizing it "West forced me to escalate, so it's on their own heads". Victims can be quite useful for creation of such a myth, and further reinforce support for war; risky move domestically, but better to be proactive than observe "fog eating snow" until it falls uncontrollably apart.

Oh, and if domestic nats will start crying a river too much, they can join Motorolla, Givi and Stremousov as "model Russian patriots".

Edited November 9, 2022 by Beleg85

[womble]

7 minutes ago, akd said:

This would seem to confirm that the pontoon bridge built alongside the Antonovsky Bridge is damaged beyond use and is not being repaired:

 

This reminds me that "way back when", the consensus was that even if UKR regained Kherson, they wouldn't be able to use the Antonovsky bridge to get to the left bank, because RUS would have demolished it comprehensively upon giving up the territory. They have full control of the bridge and perfectly competent demolitions guys in their armed forces; it "should" be wired to become a very long pile of rubble at the push of a button. Russia are blowing bridges in the "hinterlands" of the city and they obviously have resigned themselves to being unable to restore the Antonovskiy to their use: why have they not dropped the thing into the river yet?

[danfrodo]

15 minutes ago, womble said:

This reminds me that "way back when", the consensus was that even if UKR regained Kherson, they wouldn't be able to use the Antonovsky bridge to get to the left bank, because RUS would have demolished it comprehensively upon giving up the territory. They have full control of the bridge and perfectly competent demolitions guys in their armed forces; it "should" be wired to become a very long pile of rubble at the push of a button. Russia are blowing bridges in the "hinterlands" of the city and they obviously have resigned themselves to being unable to restore the Antonovskiy to their use: why have they not dropped the thing into the river yet?

I am guessing they don't need to drop it all the way.  It's not being used and they would want it standing when they recover the left bank.  But why would they cross a giant river when they have ~200km or more of frontage on the Melitopol-mariupol front?  Maybe they will send SOF across river to disrupt behind RU lines on occasion but that river is a crazy huge logistical obstacle.  Any force put across that is asking to be cut off.  

[sburke]

46 minutes ago, womble said:

they obviously have resigned themselves to being unable to restore the Antonovskiy to their use: why have they not dropped the thing into the river yet?

my  guess - it is still good for foot traffic or perceived to be.  If you drop it whatever forces are still on the other side are gonna panic.

Edited November 9, 2022 by sburke

[The_Capt]

39 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

 

I would vote it is real withdrawal, but how one witdrew matters a lot for Putin. And when talking about fighting withdrawal, better analogy than Gallipolli/Dunkirk is perhaps Suvorov's Swiss retreat. That is actually model operation of that type known to many Russian high commanders. But this is different; they have big city to fight for now.

Now look at it from Kremlin perspective. They prepare for it probably since Surovikin took command, we only see open stage (probably not final- operation can take a long time and is probably multi-pronged). We don't know state of fortifications in the city itself, but we heard about Russian soldiers dressing as civilians, deporting people from "delicate" areas, puting tons of minefields, here and there constructing bunkers. Ofc. Putin does not care about lifes of anybody, not mobiks nor civilians. Evacuation action was announced weeks ago, so authorities have free hands regarding anyone who prefered to stay; they did on their "own" demand. Crucially, from Putin's perspective sacrifice of brave "Russian" citizens of Kherson and soldiers defending it is not that bad, if only they will put heroic resistance for several days. It is entirely within Russian possibilities, even mobiks, to put such a fight. Destruction of the city, especially by Ukrainian artillery is big bonus from PR viewpoint - we know they don't even need reality for it, look at Nuclear PP and Boris Johnson planning assaults; but it is nonetheless nicer to Simonyan-types to base on real events one can spin later. Hero-city, last banners flying over central bunker, stories of heroic wounded soldiers calling strikes on their own position...this is not only part of Putin's sick brain, but living and functioning societal imagination of Russian state. So It is not impossible he may be  inclined to turn the city into "doomed position". Perhaps medals are already being produced.

In other words, in current circumstances the bloodier, the better for Putin. He is still rationalizing it "West forced me to escalate, so it's on their own heads". Victims can be quite useful for creation of such a myth, and further reinforce support for war; risky move domestically, but better to be proactive than observe "fog eating snow" until it falls uncontrollably apart.

Oh, and if domestic nats will start crying a river too much, they can join Motorolla, Givi and Stremousov as "model Russian patriots".

Interesting hypothesis.  However, I am not sure there is a forcing function on the UA in all this.  Why pound your own city to rubble when you can just isolate it?  A bunch of tunnel rats hiding in holes in Kherson do not have any real range outside the city.  Once the UA closes in they can isolate the city further from the other side of the river, so leave em in place.

Once they secure the North bank of the Dnipro the UA has options, a lot of options.  They can try to bounce the Dnipro in about 5 locations by my count or maybe they just secure it and pound RA positions from a distance and open up an offensive elsewhere, like down from Zaporizhya towards Melitopol.  From there they can push south toward the Crimea and/or west to cut off Kherson from the south.  All these positions are viable and support advantage in the continued erosion of the RA in that sector.  

Feeding good troops into a cauldron of Kherson really is playing by Russia’s rules and to their strengths and I don’t see the UA falling for it.

If the RA manages an orderly withdrawal it isn’t great but they are withdrawing for a reason, namely that their position is untenable.  Finally, this withdrawal is going to be one way.  Without a major - and I am talking biblical - strategic shift, the RA is pretty much on the defence and will not be on the north bank of the Dnipro again.  They will have left a lot of hardware and people behind for nearly zero gain and that is a good news story in any war.

[Haiduk]

21 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yet Ukraine's scrappy barely post Soviet ad-hoc force with crappy equipment, corrupt leadership, traitors all over the place, and a brand new government was winning the ground war.

As for me this is inccorrect to explain success of Russians only with UKR "crappy equipment" and say "UKR didn't have army" like this already say followerts of Poroshenko, defendding Minsk agreements. I'm sorry, we raised 350 000 of personnel. And our "scrappy equipment" was not much worse then that one, with which we broke Russians in Phase I in 2022. Javs, NLAWS, drones it's all good, but 24th FEB we have met with the same T-64BV and BMP - and most of theese BMP already was older BMP-1, not BMP-2 like in 2014. The same Soviet artillery engeged the enemy. 

If Russian modernized army mod.2022 turned out so "sucked", imagine what it was in REAL in 2014! All Russian and separs sucesses were caused not only traitors and corrupted leadership and military planning mistakes. First of all they were caused by the abscense of political will of Poroshenko to resist by military way. Poroshenko was like Denetor, who looked in Palantir, seen the "power of Mordor" and lost will to fight. Each time he was appealing to West "to influence on Russia", and repaeating "did you see Russian military budget? We can't fight with Russia".

If Minsk-1 can be considered as needed respite (but anyway, this was political success of Russia - they hadn't a goal to conquere Ukraine - only to force our politics to stay in Russian orbit), that Minsk-2 turned out political disaster, which didn't match to result of Debaltsevo battle. UKR group of troops (even not all army, but about 6000 men!), avoided encirclement, but Poroshenko agreed the document, which really was similar to political capitulation, because the document clearly provided a formula "first - local elections, then - withdrawal the troops" and a result of Minsk-2 acomplishing should be establishing of "special status oblasts", with own force structures, own cultural and economy policy, own right of direct relations with Russia and veto on any pro-Western steps of Ukraine - all this with fixing in Constitutin. Ukriane power over thees territories in result would be remained like nominal. And Poroshenko like and Putin, Merkel and Olland signed Declaration in support of Minsk-2. So, he agreed on this BS and set huge mine under Ukriane, giving to Russia formal lever of political pressure.  

Edited November 9, 2022 by Haiduk

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Why pound your own city to rubble when you can just isolate it?  A bunch of tunnel rats hiding in holes in Kherson do not have any real range outside the city.  Once the UA closes in they can isolate the city further from the other side of the river, so leave em in place.

Even better for Putin. City with several hundred thousand civilians inside, cut from supplies and holding on iron will of supreme dictator against cruel Nazi enemies...Leningrad vibes anynone?  Note- place of birth of Vova; he heard these stories probably before he even learn to read.

Now you are right about Ukrainian military goals, but I tried to imagine this situation from Putin's side. I still don't think he treats Ukrainian militray entirely seriously on itsef, and is not accustomed to military planning anyway.

On the other side, whole plan of withdrawal suggest he came to his senses regarding strategic standing and at least partially autonomy for his high command. So again we may be left with this bizarre, typically Russian blend of perfectly sound military understanding and choice of action ("action for effect") but framed (and undermined) by odd perception of reality by Kremlin elites, living their own imagined version of events.

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

If the RA manages an orderly withdrawal it isn’t great but they are withdrawing for a reason, namely that their position is untenable.  Finally, this withdrawal is going to be one way.  Without a major - and I am talking biblical - strategic shift, the RA is pretty much on the defence and will not be on the north bank of the Dnipro again.  They will have left a lot of hardware and people behind for nearly zero gain and that is a good news story in any war.

True. But if whole operation will take weeks, it will be relative success ("Gallipolli" scenario) with defence of the city itself as final accord only. Putin doesn't need even weeks for it, just several days of staunch resistance for PR purposes to sell it as success. City population is great bargaining chip for moscals anyway. I wouldn't even exclude they will try hard by unofficial channels to stuck a secret deal with Kyiv, "city for soldiers"- otherwise, they can simply starve population.

The main point here for Kremlin is to hold the frame of events, even if loosing it is loosing our way. Preferebly prolonged (overexcited western public will start to blame UA for slow advance),with many surprises around. Otherwise Putin may not be such alpha male as people around take him for.

PS> When you used word biblical I just imagined Russian troops trying to blow up the dam...let's better stay away from Old Testament reference.

Edited November 9, 2022 by Beleg85

[chrisl]

1 hour ago, danfrodo said:

I am guessing they don't need to drop it all the way.  It's not being used and they would want it standing when they recover the left bank.  But why would they cross a giant river when they have ~200km or more of frontage on the Melitopol-mariupol front?  Maybe they will send SOF across river to disrupt behind RU lines on occasion but that river is a crazy huge logistical obstacle.  Any force put across that is asking to be cut off.  

Since it’s not useful for anything heavy it’s only useful as a foot escape route for Russians.  Ukraine seems to have enough control of the sky that they can conduct river crossings at will.  Even more so after they move back into Kherson.

[Zeleban]

 

[kraze]

52 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

As for me this is inccorrect to explain success of Russians only with UKR "crappy equipment" and say "UKR didn't have army" like this already say followerts of Poroshenko, defendding Minsk agreements. I'm sorry, we raised 350 000 of personnel. And our "scrappy equipment" was not much worse then that one, with which we broke Russians in Phase I in 2022. Javs, NLAWS, drones it's all good, but 24th FEB we have met with the same T-64BV and BMP - and most of theese BMP already was older BMP-1, not BMP-2 like in 2014. The same Soviet artillery engeged the enemy. 

If Russian modernized army mod.2022 turned out so "sucked", imagine what it was in REAL in 2014! All Russian and separs sucesses were caused not only traitors and corrupted leadership and military planning mistakes. First of all they were caused by the abscense of political will of Poroshenko to resist by military way. Poroshenko was like Denetor, who looked in Palantir, seen the "power of Mordor" and lost will to fight. Each time he was appealing to West "to influence on Russia", and repaeating "did you see Russian military budget? We can't fight with Russia".

If Minsk-1 can be considered as needed respite (but anyway, this was political success of Russia - they hadn't a goal to conquere Ukraine - only to force our politics to stay in Russian orbit), that Minsk-2 turned out political disaster, which didn't match to result of Debaltsevo battle. UKR group of troops (even not all army, but about 6000 men!), avoided encirclement, but Poroshenko agreed the document, which really was similar to political capitulation, because the document clearly provided a formula "first - local elections, then - withdrawal the troops" and a result of Minsk-2 acomplishing should be establishing of "special status oblasts", with own force structures, own cultural and economy policy, own right of direct relations with Russia and veto on any pro-Western steps of Ukraine - all this with fixing in Constitutin. Ukriane power over thees territories in result would be remained like nominal. And Poroshenko like and Putin, Merkel and Olland signed Declaration in support of Minsk-2. So, he agreed on this BS and set huge mine under Ukriane, giving to Russia formal lever of political pressure.  

Except nope. In 2014 we didn't have an army. After russians went in with full ground force they all but eliminated what remained of it, at a price - and same remnants of our forces had to drive all across the frontline and shoot here and there forcing russians to believe there are much more army left than there really was. If they kept pushing - they would've occupied a lot more territories, but they themselves were uncertain. And Minsk-1 won us some time. Of course russians quickly realized that they were fooled and so they renewed the offensive while we still didn't have an army and so Minsk-2 had to be signed to buy some more time, while also being worded in such way that Ukraine would've never did anything to follow it, starting with the very first paragraph that required hostilities to stop at XX:XX on XX/XX/XX. Since russians didn't stop - Minsk-2 was null and void and they got sanctions.

Heck pretending like Minsk-2 didn't buy us an army is hypocritical because up to 2016 I had to buy secondhand uniforms and SOCKS for my friends in the army - because army reform was only in its infancy and volunteer battalions got to be fully integrated only by late 2015. BMP1s? Pffft. Soldiers had to solder metal plates on common civilian trucks to have some kind of an APC because 80% of our APC fleet was in absolute disrepair and parts had to be smuggled in through contrabandists. The law that allowed worse parts of our society to drive "polish" and "lithuanian" cars for a while got voted to allow EU ambulances to be brought in avoiding customs - because AFU had no medical vehicles apart from old soviet trash known as "tabletka".

There were no drones, no Kropyva, nothing. Heck Aerorozvidka was a paramilitary unit started by my, sadly deceased, friend, who wasn't even in military, just a businessman, and the unit wasn't even accepted by the General Stuff until 2017 as part of the army. Old, zero-combat-experience soviet generals couldn't understand what the hell is a drone and there were no battle generals to replace them with (and 8 years later there were)

Now, 8 years of army reforms and modernization later after Minsk-2, of course it's easy to dump garbage on it and play revisionists - but the situation in 2015 was extremely dire and it was the best outcome Ukraine could've ever had. It bought us time. You could've had any Bandera, Sagaydachny and Petlura running the country and it wouldn't have changed a thing - political will or not.

And thanks to the time bought everyone on this forum can be like "Ukrainian ISR is wow, Hrim2 is wow, Neptune is wow, NCOs are wow".

Edited November 9, 2022 by kraze

[danfrodo]

Let us not forget that there are many thousands of civilians in Kherson that will be starving w/o electricity or clean water.  This could change UKR choices on how hard to push if RU does leave units in the city.

And RU is going to do scorched earth for sure either way.

Edit:  apologies to Beleg, I didn't notice he already made this point above.

Edited November 9, 2022 by danfrodo
addition

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

Even better for Putin. City with several hundred thousand civilians inside, cut from supplies and holding on iron will of supreme dictator against cruel Nazi enemies...Leningrad vibes anynone?  Note- place of birth of Vova; he heard these stories probably before he even learn to read.

Now you are right about Ukrainian military goals, but I tried to imagine this situation from Putin's side. I still don't think he treats Ukrainian militray entirely seriously on itsef, and is not accustomed to military planning anyway.

On the other side, whole plan of withdrawal suggest he came to his senses regarding strategic standing and at least partially autonomy for his high command. So again we may be left with this bizarre, typically Russian blend of perfectly sound military understanding and choice of action ("action for effect") but framed (and undermined) by odd perception of reality by Kremlin elites, living their own imagined version of events.

True. But if whole operation will take weeks, it will be relative success ("Gallipolli" scenario) with defence of the city itself as final accord only. Putin doesn't need even weeks for it, just several days of staunch resistance for PR purposes to sell it as success. City population is great bargaining chip for moscals anyway. I wouldn't even exclude they will try hard by unofficial channels to stuck a secret deal with Kyiv, "city for soldiers"- otherwise, they can simply starve population.

The main point here for Kremlin is to hold the frame of events, even if loosing it is loosing our way. Preferebly prolonged (overexcited western public will start to blame UA for slow advance),with many surprises around. Otherwise Putin may not be such alpha male as people around take him for.

PS> When you used word biblical I just imagined Russian troops trying to blow up the dam...let's better stay away from Old Testament reference.

I am not too worried about the humanitarian disaster being projected onto Ukraine - well, I mean from a strictly military objectives perspective. Given the events of this war it is going to be an extreme reach for  Russia to sell a humanitarian disaster in Kherson as “the UA’s fault” because they are not attacking hard enough.  I can imagine line ups of NGO aid waiting to get into the city - make it Russia’s problem.  That is harsh but there is no real way out if the RA digs in as heavy urban combat will be so much worse.  Threatening to starve the civilian population or the same civilians being blasted in a street fight is all crappy but here we are.  The UA should not burn itself out on Kherson or it will risk its ability to continue offensive ops and plays into freezing the conflict or at least really dragging it out.

I think your point on Russian “losing our way” is spot on and links back to the whole identity thing.  They are looking for Stalingrad and the best military strategy is to simply picket and bypass.  How that will float at the political level is another story.

Didnt Russia already blow up the dam upstream?  I am not sure what the additional damage blowing another one will do, which dam are we talking about? 

Edited November 9, 2022 by The_Capt

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, Zeleban said:

 

Hopefully we'll be seeing lots of this.  RU is losing vehicles at an astonishing rate. 

[Beleg85]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Given the events of this war it is going to be an extreme reach for  Russia to sell a humanitarian disaster in Kherson as “the UA’s fault” because they are not attacking hard enough.  I can imagine line ups of NGO aid waiting to get into the city - make it Russia’s problem.

I still remember Mariupol and Russians stopping thousands of refugees, shelling humanitarian corridors etc. Did it had any adverse effect domestically? Nope, even streghtened Russian will. Engaging in (limited) bloodbath actually reinforce sense of participation in polity like Russian one, and subsequently can help his war effort. Unlike with the grain deal, where Putin was forced to include real core interests of externel actors, taking Kherson' population hostage will not trigger immediate response but rather another letters of condemnation. He can, and already lives with that.

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

The UA should not burn itself out on Kherson or it will risk its ability to continue offensive ops and plays into freezing the conflict or at least really dragging it out.

I think you point on Russian “losing our way” is spot on and links back to the whole identity thing.  They are looking for Stalingrad and the best military strategy is to simply picket and bypass.  How that will float at the political level is another story.

Didnt Russia already blow up the dam upstream?  I am not sure what the additional damage blowing another one will do, which dam are we talking about? 

Yup, Stalingrad also comes to mind. From Kremlin side perception and emotions may overrule military needs and frame set of victory conditions on its own. To put it in banal Dungeons and Dragons terms- remember Putin upbringing, he is Thief/Ilussionist, not Warrior or Paladin. So if he will be able to protract whole withdrawal for enough time and cause feel of disconcern/boredoom/lost chances on Western and Ukrainian side, he will come out as winner of whole situation. Or at least not a looser. Enough food for his propaganda to spin it somehow.

I hope Ukrianians will not fall for this and remain focused on cautious/minimalist gains. Militarly Russian "Galipolli" scenario is not desired by Ukraine, but on other foot may be preferable to other outcomes because of humanitarian and political reasons. Really devilish bargain.

I have bad feeilng that it will not play out for Ukraine the way we would like to; it will be RU strategic defeat, but not as decisive, effortless or fast as initially thought. In the end, we will see, perhaps I am wrong and Russians simply leave whole area within days with hundreds and thousands of abandoned amrour. The moment when river become target for Ukrainian barrel artilley will probably be crucial, and decisive if we will see Gallipolli, Dunkirk, Falaise or Stalingrad scenario.

About the dam I mean Kakhovka. Of course potentially damaged by "Ukraonazi terrorist". There is also Nuclear Plant near by, hundreds of thousands of potential hostages, and so on. Putin has still plenty of cards in his sleeve, a piece of cake if somebody is not afraid to play them. And empathy is weakness in Tsar's world.

Edited November 10, 2022 by Beleg85

[sross112]

5 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

48 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

The UA should not burn itself out on Kherson or it will risk its ability to continue offensive ops and plays into freezing the conflict or at least really dragging it out.

I think you point on Russian “losing our way” is spot on and links back to the whole identity thing.  They are looking for Stalingrad and the best military strategy is to simply picket and bypass.  How that will float at the political level is another story.

Didnt Russia already blow up the dam upstream?  I am not sure what the additional damage blowing another one will do, which dam are we talking about? 

Expand  

Yup, Stalingrad also comes to mind. From Kremlin side perception and emotions may overrule military needs and frame set of victory conditions on its own. To put it in banal Dungeons and Dragons terms- remember Putin upbringing, he is Thief/Ilussionist, not Warrior or Paladin. So if he will be able to protract whole withdrawal for enough time and cause enough disconcern/boredoom/gloom on Western and Ukrainian side, he will feel as winner. Or at least not a looser.

I hope Ukrianians will not fall for this and remain focused on cautious/minimalist gains. Militarly Russian "Galipolli" scenario is not desired by Ukraine, but on other foot may be preferable to other outcomes because of humanitarian and political reasons. Really devilish bargain.

About the dam I mean Kakhovka. Of course potentially damaged by "Ukraonazi terrorist". There is also Nuclear Plant near by, hundreds of thousands of potential hostages, and so on. Putin has still plenty of cards in his sleeve, a piece of cake if somebody is not afraid to play them. Empathy is weakness in Tsar's world.

I agree that they are probably thinking of a Stalingrad or Mariupol for a rallying cry for their military and civilians, but the big differing factor that they are again miscalculating is the micro-social aspect (see, weez lernd nu werds). The will of the people is not with them and personally I'd much rather be attacking a city where the people were on my side than trying to defend one where all the civilians would rather see you dead. This harkens back to the ISR supremacy and trying to fight when everyone in the city is telling the UA where you are, what you have and how many of you are there. I can't imagine that the UA would try to shock and awe Kherson or storm it with mounds of bodies like a Russian attack. If they do move on it, it will be fog eating snow urban style. The Russians on the other hand, I agree with Kraze here, will smash the city with everything they can throw at it no matter what. 

A better plan would be to clear everything else on that side of the river down to the bridge on the outskirts of Kherson before doing anything about the city. Good chance that whatever forces the RA tries to defend Kherson with will melt away or surrender once that last lifeline is gone. Letting them sweat and think about their situation as the rest of the bank is cleared gives them lots of opportunities to go elsewhere. This is where the micro-social of the military members comes in too. In addition, like others have said, it is doubtful that the RA will garrison Kherson with their best troops knowing they will be lost, my money is chmobiks. If they were defending Moscow they might fight for all they were worth to the end no matter what, but Kherson isn't Russian and they know it. 

If the RA leaves anything to defend Kherson, especially if they intend to pound it to dust like some of us believe, that actually plays well for the UA. If the UA clears all but Kherson on that side of the river, moves their long range guns up and pounds anything of value on the far side of the river (AA, arty and logistics attempts) that is way more costly for the RA than the chmobiks defending the city. 

It will be interesting to see how their withdrawal works out. The right way would be for their best units to cover with rear guard actions and try to get as much across as possible. Since they will probably try to save their best units, once they are across I expect to see the "withdrawal" speed up exponentially as the lower tier units start deciding to try to survive either in small groups or whole units. 

[billbindc]

It should be clear that Russia can only end this war on favorable terms if it either can militarily compel Ukraine to favorable terms or if it has something Ukraine needs badly enough in exchange for same. Under neither one of these scenarios is a retreat from Kherson remotely a positive thing for the Kremlin. It puts them farther away from either of the conditions above, it stimulates Ukrainian morale, it hurts Russian morale and it shows Ukraine's backers that their aid is working. I'm sure the Kremlin will spin it and the usual suspects will swallow that spin...but the likes of Glenn Greenwald don't win your wars for you. 

[dan/california]

6 minutes ago, billbindc said:

It should be clear that Russia can only end this war on favorable terms if it either can militarily compel Ukraine to favorable terms or if it has something Ukraine needs badly enough in exchange for same. Under neither one of these scenarios is a retreat from Kherson remotely a positive thing for the Kremlin. It puts them farther away from either of the conditions above, it stimulates Ukrainian morale, it hurts Russian morale and it shows Ukraine's backers that their aid is working. I'm sure the Kremlin will spin it and the usual suspects will swallow that spin...but the likes of Glenn Greenwald don't win your wars for you. 

Out of likes, so What he said! ^^^^^^^^^

[BlackMoria]

2 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

I still remember Mariupol and Russians stopping thousands of refugees, shelling humanitarian corridors etc. Did it had any adverse effect domestically? Nope, even streghtened Russian will. Engaging in (limited) bloodbath actually reinforce sense of participation in polity like Russian one, and subsequently can help his war effort. Unlike with the grain deal, where Putin was forced to include real core interests of externel actors, taking Kherson' population hostage will not trigger immediate response but rather another letters of condemnation. He can, and already lives with that.

Yup, Stalingrad also comes to mind. From Kremlin side perception and emotions may overrule military needs and frame set of victory conditions on its own. To put it in banal Dungeons and Dragons terms- remember Putin upbringing, he is Thief/Ilussionist, not Warrior or Paladin. So if he will be able to protract whole withdrawal for enough time and cause feel of disconcern/boredoom/lost chances on Western and Ukrainian side, he will come out as winner of whole situation. Or at least not a looser. Enough food for his propaganda to spin it somehow.

I hope Ukrianians will not fall for this and remain focused on cautious/minimalist gains. Militarly Russian "Galipolli" scenario is not desired by Ukraine, but on other foot may be preferable to other outcomes because of humanitarian and political reasons. Really devilish bargain.

I have bad feeilng that it will not play out for Ukraine the way we would like to; it will be RU strategic defeat, but not as decisive, effortless or fast as initially thought. In the end, we will see, perhaps I am wrong and Russians simply leave whole area within days with hundreds and thousands of abandoned amrour. The moment when river become target for Ukrainian barrel artilley will probably be crucial, and decisive if we will see Gallipolli, Dunkirk, Falaise or Stalingrad scenario.

About the dam I mean Kakhovka. Of course potentially damaged by "Ukraonazi terrorist". There is also Nuclear Plant near by, hundreds of thousands of potential hostages, and so on. Putin has still plenty of cards in his sleeve, a piece of cake if somebody is not afraid to play them. And empathy is weakness in Tsar's world.

+1 for the D&D reference!!  Been playing D&D in its various incarnations since 1974.  

 

[FancyCat]

Recall that a big problem with Russian morale is a feeling among the masses that high command is sending them to their deaths and doing so for fruitless reasons. In that sense, it is important to signal to the Russian soldiers that retreat is occurring, it is planned and orderly, and is being undertaken to actually not send you to your deaths for no reason.

Makes sense to announce it to illustrate control of the situation both to civilians and the home front and to the soldiers in Ukraine or nearly about to be sent.

[kevinkin]

"But Yevgeny, the retreat was planned and orderly. Like we practiced in the good old days"

"Yes Vladimir, and tonight the firring squad might be planned, but don't count on it being orderly or having any practice." 

[dan/california]

17 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Recall that a big problem with Russian morale is a feeling among the masses that high command is sending them to their deaths and doing so for fruitless reasons. In that sense, it is important to signal to the Russian soldiers that retreat is occurring, it is planned and orderly, and is being undertaken to actually not send you to your deaths for no reason.

Makes sense to announce it to illustrate control of the situation both to civilians and the home front and to the soldiers in Ukraine or nearly about to be sent.

A dam of Russian bodies at the mouth of the Dnipro would make an outstanding countermessage...

[dan/california]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I am not too worried about the humanitarian disaster being projected onto Ukraine - well, I mean from a strictly military objectives perspective. Given the events of this war it is going to be an extreme reach for  Russia to sell a humanitarian disaster in Kherson as “the UA’s fault” because they are not attacking hard enough.  I can imagine line ups of NGO aid waiting to get into the city - make it Russia’s problem.  That is harsh but there is no real way out if the RA digs in as heavy urban combat will be so much worse.  Threatening to starve the civilian population or the same civilians being blasted in a street fight is all crappy but here we are.  The UA should not burn itself out on Kherson or it will risk its ability to continue offensive ops and plays into freezing the conflict or at least really dragging it out.

I think your point on Russian “losing our way” is spot on and links back to the whole identity thing.  They are looking for Stalingrad and the best military strategy is to simply picket and bypass.  How that will float at the political level is another story.

Didnt Russia already blow up the dam upstream?  I am not sure what the additional damage blowing another one will do, which dam are we talking about? 

That have blown dams on the Inhulets, and the Oskil. The haven't blown the dam on the Dnipro at Nova Kakhovka yet. The river and the dam in question are both ten times or more the size. The wrinkle is that south/Russian controlled side is lower, and blowing it will turn a big piece of it into impassible marsh. So they can't do it until they have everybody off the North/ soon to be Ukrainian side they think they can save.

Edited November 10, 2022 by dan/california

[Seminole]

14 hours ago, The_Capt said:

The Minsk II agreement gave Russia exactly what it wanted, a legal foundation for full annexation without a peep from the western powers - they even got OSCE monitors in ffs!  

I think they wouldn’t consider full annexation the best option because it leaves a more western leaning Ukraine.  
Forcing a federation on them with two vetos to keep NATO out seems more favorable, and leaves door open to swing of the overall country with D+L populations inside it.  
2022+ I read the Russian view as NATO now inevitable in Ukraine and clock ticking on forcing any kind of more favorable outcome closing.  2022+ Russian aim as annexation of Donetsk and Luhansk (and likely seize coast through Odessa to make remaining Ukrainian state land locked) and occupying Kiev to install a puppet government and get an Austrian style neutrality from the new government.  
 

If CMBB taught me anything, it’s the hyper lethality of modern weapons makes attacking hard, insanely so if you are trying to hurry.  

Edited November 10, 2022 by Seminole
Finish thought and spell

[Battlefront.com]

14 hours ago, The_Capt said:

That was the overall political objective, in fact this war points to even broader ones; however, Russia has demonstrated a strategy of incrementalism warfare as opposed to full on land grabs - examples of this are throughout the Baltics and it’s Near Abroad, it is what makes this war so odd.  My point was that the overall objectives of the 2014 action were not clear, and while I am sure Russia would have been very happy with the entire Donbas region, the actual objectives of the operation in context of the overriding requirement to minimize western reaction are still in doubt and likely in Putin’s head.  

The objectives for 2014 were mostly clear, with the primary goal being extremely clear.  It's the same one as with this war -> the full destruction of the Ukrainian state as a viable country. 

The "Novorossiya" plan, put into motion shortly after Yanukovych was ousted, intended to separate all territory between Odessa to Kharkiv to Mariupol ruled by Russia proxies.  Just like it tried to do in this war, just without the silly Novorossiya nonsense.

When this plan didn't work (despite bloodshed and false flag actions in Odessa and Kharkiv), and only had marginal success in the Donbas, Russia switched to armed actions to take over what became DPR and LPR.  This is when Russia let loose Girkin and pals.  Russia had peace keepers already standing by to move in, but Russia backed down on that one.

Remember, the Black Sea backstory was already written and Black Sea 95% done at the time of this invasion.  Putin did almost exactly what our backstory predicted right up until the peace keepers (in our story he inserted them).  The "playbook" was the same as Georgia, so it's not like the two of us who wrote the majority of it (the other guy wound up being an OSCE advisor and is still in Kyiv) were clairvoyant.  It was just obvious it was going to happen at some point.  We just didn't know when.

14 hours ago, The_Capt said:

There is no evidence that points to the RA running out of gas in early ‘15 (in fact quite the opposite) forcing the Russian political level to the table - that is pure fiction as far as I can tell, particularly the depth of the Russian military gas tank demonstrated in this war.

You're still not understanding what I've been saying   Of course Russia had massive resources left to invest if it had wanted to.  But that's putting you in the "Russia is a big scary bear and can't be defeated" camp, which is exactly how 2022 was missed.  Instead, you should be looking at how Russian forces performed at the tactical level.  That's what I was doing as the battles were being fought.

Russia's initial forces, which was the hybrid Russian and Ukrainian proxy effort, increasingly including line Russian units as the summer wore on.  This force was just about to be completely defeated militarily, despite all of the myriad of problems Ukraine had at the time (I agree with Kraze's assessment for this period, not Haiduk's). 

The military defeat of Russia's hybrid forces is a matter of record.  It's fact.

Russia absolutely wanted to keep things low key because of other considerations, but having Ukraine regain all of Donbas was obviously not acceptable to Russia.  So it took a calculated risk and did an "informal" conventional invasion, though with minimal air support.  Initially it crushed Ukraine in the south, however it is abundantly clear Russia wanted a lot more, but could not with the forces it had already invested.  So it froze the conflict to build better Proxy forces and have them take more territory.  This also ran into limitations and so once again had to invest direct Russian BTGs and other resources.  This culminated in Debaltseve. 

I have no doubt Russia could have done a lot more, perhaps taking over as much terrain as it did at the height of this war.  Mass would have been enough to do it at that particular time because Ukraine wasn't ready for it.

14 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Finally looking at Minsk II in detail: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_agreements

The thing got agreement on “elections of self-government” (para 4),for the Ukraine to still pay for land it just lost (p8 ) and to reform its very constitution to open the door to “decentralization” (para 11) …where I come from when a nation is agreeing to re-write its constitution at the insistence of another, after armed conflict, is a solid loss.

The Minsk II agreement gave Russia exactly what it wanted, a legal foundation for full annexation without a peep from the western powers - they even got OSCE monitors in ffs!

Ukraine agreed to a lot of things, but so did Russia.  Russia ignored their responsibilities so did Ukraine.  Ukraine never executed the local control and therefore Russia got stuck.  For 8 years it has been pissing and moaning about this.  In fact, Ukraine's refusal to proceed with its political obligations under Minsk II was a major stated reason for this war now.

To be clear, in no way, shape or form do I think Ukraine "won" the 2014/2015 war, however they obviously did not "lose".  Ukraine remained a viable state and became increasingly independent from Russian influence, completely contrary to Russia's historical wishes and specifically the intent of the 2014 invasion.  Ukraine rebuilt it's military specifically to defeat Russia and that is looking to be exactly where this is headed.  Russia not only has to deal with a hostile NATO/EU aligned country on its border, it also is headed towards becoming a failed state.  Where I come from I call that a solid loss,. but not for Ukraine

That said, I have absolutely no idea what any of this has to do with the underlying reasons I thought Russia would lose against Ukraine.  What I observed, as the war unfolded, were hints that Russia's traditional military weaknesses persisted and would not fare well against a NATOish nation determined to stand its ground.  I doubt I'm the only one that saw this.  In fact, I think Ukraine saw this quite clearly and that guided 8 years of military policy.  Western analysts, however, apparently missed it more than they spotted it.

Crimea and Donbas 2014/2015 were battles in the middle of a very long hybrid war against Ukraine.  Russia "won" the battle for Crimea and came up with a "draw" for Donbas.  We are now, hopefully, in the final stage of the last phase of this decades long war.  Russia will not come out with a "win" in the end.

Steve