How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[kraze]

3 hours ago, chuckdyke said:

It is Nature vs Nurture. Some people just won't survive if you place them in a university with the commitment to graduate inside an X number of years. Give them five acres of land and they are home for generations to come. How big is Siberia and why do they want to expand towards Western Europe? 

Problem is russians are incapable of doing anything both in a "university" and "land" "biomes". It's not part of the culture or mentality.

Siberia is HUGE. Siberia is also really really rich in nature. Forests, rivers, it's all there. And yet for centuries russians did nothing to civilize it, citing it as being "unwelcome" - but, of course, deported millions of slaves from occupied countries there so they would do it instead (Gulag boss music). But slavery does not bear that kind of quality fruit.

And then you have cities like Las Vegas. Initially an empty desert, would've been a fitting set for post-apocalyptic wasteland movies - and yet now it's one of the biggest resorts in North America.

And that example puts things into perspective, eh?

Some people just want to create the best they can with what they have, some people don't, but want to have what others did for free.

Edited August 25, 2022 by kraze

[LongLeftFlank]

 

 

[Huba]

Putin signed a decree about increasing the size of armed forces by 100K+ personell starting next year. I'd think it's largely irrelevant, as increased number of conscripts doesn't change anything without mobilization:

Also, no intent to bash anybody, but the joke is hilarious:

 

Edited August 25, 2022 by Huba

[Kinophile]

14 minutes ago, Huba said:

 

Also, no intent to bash anybody, but the joke is hilarious:

 

Lmao. 

That's on par with the meme of Macron looking upset and sad, "When you can't surrender - because it's not your country". 

[LongLeftFlank]

20 minutes ago, kraze said:

 

... but thar wasn't quite as many as there wuz a while ago.

[Beleg85]

Interesting snippet of high tensions between PMC and regular Russian forces:

And article summarising many things we know (and don't know) about Dugina's death.

https://www.thebulwark.com/the-dugina-killing-aftermath/

Edited August 25, 2022 by Beleg85

[The_Capt]

14 hours ago, billbindc said:

Dannatt is very similar to a lot of folks who work on this issue. They can tell you quite articulately how badly Russia is doing and how brilliant the Ukraine campaign has been but simply cannot see how Ukraine wins. I have had this conversation numerous times with legit experts and many cherish as an article of faith that Russia has another gear it can drop into an win the war...or at least not lose it. There are decades of attitudes and expectations in that view and it's just impossible for some folks to get over it.  

Hmm, well I know nothing of the good retired Gen but I am sure he has his own calculus upon which to base his opinion.

Personally, given the data and information I can see, the Russian military system is sick.  The devolution in tactics, the loss of anything that resembles operational offensive - they never really came out of the "pause", and them now dancing to Ukraine's tunes around Kherson are all symptoms.  Right along with reports of low morale, poor support, flailing targeting and other indicators of system failures (e.g. baffling suicidal OPSEC violations) point to an eroding Russian military system.  Russian option spaces have shrunk to the point that it appears all they have left are WMDs, "holding on" and tactical nibbling - they appear to have exhausted all others, if they have another gear they should have dropped into it back in Jun.

Of course Russia can lose, any nation can lose a war...I think we have demonstrated this enough times.  I suppose the question is "how much is enough?"

All war is negotiation - and sacrifice.

So in these sorts of things definitions become incredibly important.  "Russia cannot lose" - what does that actually mean?  Because by any political or strategic goals metrics, it already has lost this war. 

From a selfish western perspective, stepping back, one could argue that 'we' have gained-

- Ukraine - there is no other end-state to this thing other than Ukraine in the UE and NATO - Putin and his cronies can quack and blather but that ship sailed after March.

- Finland and Sweden.

- NATO defence spending commitments for the next decade.

- A clear demonstration to the globe that we are willing to defend the current global order to any and all revisionist states (kinda) - we have re-established a certainty.

Our opponent, on the other hand, has gained about what 60-80k sq kms of destroyed, largely empty countryside? [Aside: no there is not mountains of resources in the area they control, we covered that one already]  A crushing economic trajectory that will put them in the 3rd world if it goes on long enough.  A Europe that is literally re-wiring themselves away from Russia's one trump card.  A pretty much destroyed military - in both physical and more importantly psychological domains.  And a historic loss of global influence and credibility that will haunt them for the rest of the century.

Doesn't look too bad on paper...however, it leaves a nasty unresolved feeling doesn't it?  The single largest problem is that we in the west have never defined our war goals, our strategic and political endstates.  We went from "oh crap, ok so let's figure out how to support an insurgency", to "oh crap, ok so let's how to support a defence", to now, "oh, crap, let's figure out how to support an offence".  We have been stuck on, "let's make sure Ukraine doesn't lose" that we never figured out what it means to ensure that "we win...enough."  The west's victory is directly tied to Ukraine's outcomes in this war - all stop.  So what does that look like?

I have opinions but it is really up to our political leaders to lead and determine what "that" is, or is not.  The absence of this is apparent in a lot of the narratives such as Gen Dannatt's where we are very nervous about a run-away war in intensity or duration - especially duration because we have all had our fingers burned recently.

I think the impulse to re-establish certainty is overpowering, particularly within the large establishments of power such as government and militaries - they are the very definition of positive capability. Russia as a scary global power was a certainty, people built entire careers on it, trillions spent on defence for it.  The global order as we knew it, another enormous certainty, we built everything on it.  This entire war has been one enormous global uncertainty, and it is offensive to our sense of order - there are parts of the world where this sort of behaviour is expected, Europe was not one of them.

So victory is directly tied to "how much certainty is enough?"  And here is the thing, victory does not simply 'happen', which is very disconcerting trend I am seeing in the west - Ukraine+snazy weapons and support = "victory happens"...what it is not happening fast enough....happen faster!....hmm, maybe they should negotiate....

Victory is work, it is built, it is earned.  And we are back to sacrifice.  If we cannot define what we want, we cannot define what we are willing to spend to get it - which makes our negotiation position largely in the blind - more an act of faith and hope than a deliberate extension of collective human will to re-assert our certainty.  

I guess my question back to Gen Dannatt (with respect) and the mass of the mandarinate ( @LongLeftFlank that is a brilliant word btw) - "What is our certainty?" "What are we willing to lose?"  Until someone can answer that, then we really have no idea if this war is worth the continued effort from a western interests point of view.

Personally, I think that if we keep doing this for a decade, it will be time and money better spent than other adventures that were far less central to our certainty - but "how much?!", "how long?!"

https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures/2021/human-and-budgetary-costs-date-us-war-afghanistan-2001-2022

But what about the "recession" and my gas prices?!

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_crisis_of_2007–2008

My advice - we are in this thing until Russia is back in their box and we have a gang of thugs in power we can actually do business with - we will then risk manage that train wreck of a nation, we have dealt with worse.  We are in it until Ukraine is re-built into a shining example of what western national building really means.  We are in it until we can demonstrate what western collective resolve looks like for the rest of the world into the 21st century, and that while we may have to renegotiate what world order looks like, my grandkids will damn well have their hands on that pen.

But I am just some guy on the internet.  

 

 

Edited August 25, 2022 by The_Capt

[Harmon Rabb]

4 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Really good stuff

Sometimes when I read a post like this I wish I can give my whole daily ration of upvotes to it, unfortunately I can only give one.

[danfrodo]

5 hours ago, Holien said:

 

Ok so I am a bit pissed off with this and would ask you two to reconsider, I can kinda forgive MikeyD as I sort of get where he is coming from but Dan you have added nothing and just attacked a UK Public Servant who has given a good part of his life to protecting the UK and Europe and working with America. So shame on both of you....

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Dannatt

Before you start slagging off people that don't agree with your views please take a look at the whole and if you do have any evidence that he is a racist I would love to see it.

So YES he is old school and you have to view the context of these senior leaders they don't always do detail and were very used to a life at the top being fed information to make the key choices on what to do.

He could well be wrong about the outcome of the war as he does not have the detail he once had access to. He is of course has life experience to draw upon which we don't have the same as him. Unless you served at the top of your armed forces?

What we want is a quick end to this war and from following here I am hopeful that will happen but it has not happened yet and for me the next phase is key to see if Ukraine can pull off a major victory and force Russia out of say Kherson.

This would be a good indication that they can turn the tables on Russia and win the war quickly.

Of course Kherson could all be a diversion and they have another target, that would be good too but so far we have not seen it and I wait in hope and keep looking at the Tea Leafs for signs...

 

Point taken, Holien.   Thanks for correcting me on this.  I neglectfully assumed things about him that I did not actually know.

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, Grigb said:

Next is translation of Mashkovets post (24-AUF) without map regarding RU forces situation at Donbass

 

This is an interesting summary, thanks.  I think those of us who have been following events on the Donbas front have intuitively, if not in detail, figured this out.  But Mashkovets provides a little more detail and some good commentary.  It also ties in very, very nicely with the report of a conflict between PMC and Russian forces (Spetsnaz specifically).  I'll summarize all of this in a more analytical way without the entertainment (Luganda.... heh!).

Russia's primary stated objective of this entire Special Military Operation is the full liberation of Luhansk and Donetsk, however an unstated objective overriding all other objectives is to not lose the war.  This might seem obvious, however I feel it should be stated directly because it explains why they are putting their primary stated objective at risk.  I'd even go so far as to say that they are putting the war at risk in a different way.

We know, for a fact, that Russia has stripped most of its combat capable fighting units out of the fight in the central Donbas area even though the objective of taking all of Donetsk is far from complete.  This includes several points on the map that RU Nats have been obsessing over (Siversk and Bakhmut).  We also know that the forces that remain in place (including Russian Armed Forces in Izyum) are making near zero progress along the entire central front and no new progress towards the south (Donetsk City).  Seemingly putting the nail in the coffin of Russian expectations is Shoigu's announcement a few days ago that they are reducing the tempo of operations there to "spare civilian casualties".

The inevitable conclusion here is that Russia has officially written off taking the Donbas for the foreseeable future.  The problem for the regime is that it must at least pretend to still be on the offensive otherwise people might ask uncomfortable questions.  Specifically, how can we be winning the war if we are unable to take our objectives?  We know the answer very well, so do the RU Nats.  Which is why the RU Nats have been under increasing pressure to curb their criticism (my personal opinion is the Dugina attack, 3 days before Shoigu's announcement, was part of the pressure campaign) in order to minimize the general population's awareness that Russia lacks the ability to deliver on its stated objectives.

Surely Russia could reinforce the Donbas front and make eventual progress, even at great cost.  The question for us to consider is why they are deliberately choosing not to.  To me it's obvious that the Kremlin believes it can't keep up a real Donbas offensive and also defend the long front between Donetsk City and Kherson.  The Kremlin, therefore, had to make a choice between costly PR advances in the Donbas against the possibility of an obvious and humiliating reversal in the south.  Because *any* reversal in the south would be problematic, but a significant one (such as the loss of Kherson) would probably set off a chain reaction of events that lead to total military collapse and increased regime instability, the Kremlin has made the only smart choice... reinforce the south and use non-Russian forces to keep up the appearance of taking the Donbas.

The primary challenge of this strategy is that Russia is now nearly totally reliant upon DLPR and PMC forces to continue operations in the Donbas.  Unlike the military, these forces are not fully controlled by the Kremlin.  Worse, the persons fighting in these units are some of the most difficult to control because they are a mix of fanatics, criminals, mercenaries, and abductees.  They have their own motivations to fight and probably very little of it is "to advance the greatness of Russia".  The more they understand that they're being abandoned by Russia, yet expected to die for it, the less likely they will continue to fight.  We have already seen clear evidence of this throughout the war, but it does seem to be getting progressively worse.  Which is not surprising since Russia just changed the arrangement with them (e.g. you are no longer fighting with us, you are fighting for us).

Predictions...

I think we'll see less fighting in the Donbas between Russian backed forces and Ukrainians, more fighting between Russian backed forces and Russia.  This in turn will cause Russia to either divert units back to the Donbas, have to cancel it's PR offensive entirely, or try to keep things going and risk a large scale mutiny.  It seems they are already diverting resources in the form of Rosgvardiya and at least one Russian MP battalion.  Either the situation has already gotten so bad that a mutiny is a realistic possibility even with the reduced PR offensive or they believe the presence of "punishment" units will allow them to keep the PR offensive going without a mutiny.  Whatever is the case is, things in the Donbas appear to be nearing collapse.

Things might get a lot more interesting very soon.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

47 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Hmm, well I know nothing of the good retired Gen but I am sure he has his own calculus upon which to base his opinion.

Personally, given the data and information I can see, the Russian military system is sick.  The devolution in tactics, the loss of anything that resembles operational offensive - they never really came out of the "pause", and them now dancing to Ukraine's tunes around Kherson are all symptoms.  Right along with reports of low morale, poor support, flailing targeting and other indicators of system failures (e.g. baffling suicidal OPSEC violations) point to an eroding Russian military system.  Russian option spaces have shrunk to the point that it appears all they have left are WMDs, "holding on" and tactical nibbling - they appear to have exhausted all others, if they have another gear they should have dropped into it back in Jun.

ISW reported yesterday that there are indications that all three field commands now report directly to Putin.  If that's the "other gear" Russia has to drop into, well... good luck to 'em

The people that insist Russia has something else it can do should be put on TV, with cameras rolling, and explain which gears the Soviet Union (a vastly more powerful version of Russia) had, but didn't use, in their Afghanistan War.  That would be entertaining enough, but then pressing them to explain why the Soviets didn't use them would be exceptionally fun to watch.  I'd even sit down with some popcorn to watch that!

47 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So in these sorts of things definitions become incredibly important.  "Russia cannot lose" - what does that actually mean?  Because by any political or strategic goals metrics, it already has lost this war. 

Yup, before the first shot was even fired.

This is where I still gnash my teeth... Russia's maximalist approach to Ukraine was bound to fail because the underlying requirement was the Ukrainian people surrendering to slavery.  The details of that failure aren't relevant for drawing this conclusion. 

Here's an analogy... an old and worn out ship hits an iceberg and tears open a section of its hull.  I predict, here and now, that the ship will sink if there's nobody to come to its rescue.  I don't need to know what the ship is, where it is, what sort of damage control it has, how good the crew is, what sort of weather there is, how good the captain might be, etc.. my prediction is the ship will sink. 

In a way this is how I concluded Russia would lose a full scale war with Ukraine.  Except it was apparent to me that the ship was a bad design with poor damage control and maintenance, crewed by an incompetent crew and captained by someone whose actions would be sure to result in disaster.

47 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Doesn't look too bad on paper...however, it leaves a nasty unresolved feeling doesn't it?  The single largest problem is that we in the west have never defined our war goals, our strategic and political endstates.  We went from "oh crap, ok so let's figure out how to support an insurgency", to "oh crap, ok so let's how to support a defence", to now, "oh, crap, let's figure out how to support an offence".  We have been stuck on, "let's make sure Ukraine doesn't lose" that we never figured out what it means to ensure that "we win...enough."  The west's victory is directly tied to Ukraine's outcomes in this war - all stop.  So what does that look like?

I do see some signs that there's the start of the beginning of figuring out what to do after the war is successfully concluded.  The talk is now of defeating Russia so that it might be obligated to change into something less nasty.  This is vague and woefully inadequate, but it is at least something to build off of that didn't exist when the war started.

47 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I guess my question back to Gen Dannatt (with respect) and the mass of the mandarinate ( @LongLeftFlank that is a brilliant word btw) - "What is our certainty?" "What are we willing to lose?"  Until someone can answer that, then we really have no idea if this war is worth the continued effort from a western interests point of view.

I think the answer is highly dependent on the specifics of the outcome of the war.  There's a huge difference between Putin retaining control and a new gang of thugs taking his place, for example.  A Russian military that avoids collapse by withdrawing is different than one that collapses in the field.  Russia agreeing to Ukraine's conditions for a ceasefire is different than the war continuing to some other conclusion.

That said, there are a fairly limited number of solutions to these various cases.  If I were someone in charge of figuring this stuff out I would spend all my time identifying a couple of solutions, flesh them out, and then when the war ends take whatever the end state is and plug it into one of the prepared solutions.  Worst case the situation is so unexpected that an interim solution has to be improvised to guide events towards one of the preplanned ones.

47 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

My advice - we are in this thing until Russia is back in their box and we have a gang of thugs in power we can actually do business with - we will then risk manage that train wreck of a nation, we have dealt with worse.  We are in it until Ukraine is re-built into a shining example of what western national building really means.  We are in it until we can demonstrate what western collective resolve looks like for the rest of the world into the 21st century, and that while we may have to renegotiate what world order looks like, my grandkids will damn well have their hands on that pen.

This is, I think, the most likely way it will go.  Provided power in the Kremlin doesn't shift as a result of defeat.  In that case the "management" of Russia will be distinctly different in nature.

Steve

[keas66]

I mean though where does this legendary prowess of the Russians even spring from I wonder . The fact that  opponents keep underestimating the difficulty of invading Russia and  over reach - and the Russians chase them back out ?

When was the last time Russia actually successfully invaded another country on its own  - and on its own initiative ( starting the hostilities ? )

[poesel]

3 hours ago, Huba said:

 

According to our minister of defense, this is not a tank.

[Grigb]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

Interesting snippet of high tensions between PMC and regular Russian forces:

What worries me is that I have not seen any mention of it yet in RU Nats post. It does not mean it did not happen but it might mean the event is not as big as the source say. On the other hand due to the latest maps, I have a bit of backlog.  Will try to sort it out today.  

 

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

And article summarising many things we know (and don't know) about Dugina's death.

https://www.thebulwark.com/the-dugina-killing-aftermath/

Interesting snippet - the translation of Dugin post is slightly wrong in one detail but this detail is critical for understanding. The quote from article [bold here is mine]:

Quote

The special operation is now more important than the state in its subjective dimension. With the beginning of the special operation, the regime of history itself has irreversibly changed: a new ontological vector has appeared, which cannot be dissolved by arbitrariness or decree. The mighty forces of history came into play, the tectonic plates shifted.

Dugin did not say: ...the state. He actually used RU word that have double meaning Power and Government. And given context the true meaning is: The special military operation is now more important than the [current] government - in its subjective dimension. Actually, in whole post word state must be replaced with [current] government or better Kremlin. 

The whole post is about the Kremlin and that the Kremlin is not important now because regardless of what the Kremlin wants the Nationalists are coming anyway and the Kremlin cannot stop them.

Bold post. Very bold post. 

And now for something completely different - looking at photos from Dugin lecture I noticed an interesting guy:

 

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

And article summarising many things we know (and don't know) about Dugina's death.

https://www.thebulwark.com/the-dugina-killing-aftermath/

That was an excellent read!  Thanks.  Based on this reporter's analysis it seems there's still no clear indications of who did it or why, but it seems she's reasonably confident with the sources to conclude:

• Not an FSB operation to whip up anti-Azov and/or Ukrainian sentiment
• Darya Dugina was the likely target, but still some reason to be cautious about that assessment
• The “National Republican Army” isn't real and unclear why it entered the picture (could be a publicity stunt)
• The accused assassin appears to be a real Ukrainian citizen that was likely picked by the FSB to pin the blame on
• Killing Dugina was likely part of power struggles within the Kremlin elite, likely as some sort of "message"

I've been thinking about Natalia Vovk, the accused assassin.  It does seem that she is real and was near the scene, which we must remember was a Russian nationalist convention.  Either she had incredibly bad luck to be in the enemy state's capitol at the gathering of Ukraine's worst enemies just as a car bomb went off killing one of their intellectual leadership, or she was deliberately there on some sort of mission.

Now, exploring my GRU theory a bit more...

This was a planned assassination.  Anybody would know the time and place of both Dugins that day WELL IN ADVANCE.  If someone decided to target them a while ago, the assassination plot could have been put in motion well ahead of time.

So, what does every good assassination plot by a nefarious organization require?  A patsy.  The GRU likely has lots of good ones already on the payroll to choose from.  Some of them quite unaware of who they are working for, being specifically selected because they are naive or otherwise easy to manipulate.  Having "unwitting agents" on payroll is standard practice for spy agencies as far as I know.

Plausibly the GRU had Vovk on payroll thinking she was working for the GUR or SBU and not Russia.  The GRU sent her to the conference ostensibly to "keep an eye on our enemy" and might have even suggested she take her daughter to help with her cover.  GRU agents did the bombing and after they told her to get out of the country right away and that going back the way she came was unsafe.  They then provided her some license plates and and directed her to the Estonian crossing.  They either tipped off the FSB or figured the FSB was at least competent enough to pick up the trail the GRU so clearly left for them to find.

Yes, it's all speculative... but it ties everything we know together without any one element being implausible.  In fact, when you step back and look at what I just wrote... it's actually a very simple plot.

Steve

P.S. I find the timing of Dugina's murder, with the increasing criticism by Dugin (and RU Nats in general), the military reality in Ukraine, and Shoigu's announcement all quite interesting.  If there was ever a time when the military would want to shut up the RU Nats, it would be right before having Shoigu effectively announce Russia has lost the ground war in the Donbas.

[Battlefront.com]

21 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Bold post. Very bold post. 

Yeah, it was bold enough even before your corrected translation!

While the timing of this is too close to the assassination to likely be the cause of it (I see more long term planning than 1 day), I am sure that Russian authorities (GRU in my theory) knew something like this was coming.  Hell, even we here knew it was coming as we've been discussing it for a couple of weeks now.  Of course I don't mean the specific post, I mean the RU Nats crossing a line red enough that there would be a strong response.

Steve

[Huba]

28 minutes ago, Grigb said:

And now for something completely different - looking at photos from Dugin lecture I noticed an interesting guy:

 

Please elaborate 

[Sojourner]

10 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yes, it's all speculative... but it ties everything we know together without any one element being implausible.  In fact, when you step back and look at what I just wrote... it's actually a very simple plot.

For all we really know, it could have been a jilted lover. Extreme yes, but a damn good way to deflect suspicion.

Occam's razor anyone?

[cesmonkey]

I hadn't seen this posted yet.

This is the Vampire anti-drone system the US announced yesterday they would be delivering to Ukraine:
https://www.l3harris.com/all-capabilities/vampire

And I found this part of the DoD press briefing from yesterday interesting where he discusses why Western aircraft and ATACMS are not currently being sent:

https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3138872/undersecretary-of-defense-for-policy-dr-colin-kahl-holds-a-press-briefing-on-se/

 

Quote

So, you know, as it relates to future aircrafts, fourth generation aircraft, for example, even if we were to provide those now, they wouldn't arrive for years, so we've been focused on as it relates to their fighter aircraft on what they need for the to support the current efforts to hold in the east and perhaps going on a counter offensive. 

As it relates to the future of aircraft, let me tell you where we are in the process. So, Secretary Austin has tasked the office of Secretary of Defense to work with the Joint Staff and European Command, essentially on a future-forces picture of kind of the Ukrainian force for the mid- to long-term. 

Obviously, this is done in close consultation with the Ukrainians It is, after all, their military, and we're really trying to be very deliberate and disciplined about what type of Ukrainian force matters in the next 12, 24, 36 months. Under any range of scenarios. It could be a scenario in which the war continues, it could be a scenario in which the violence ebbs because there's an agreement or because it just dies down a bit. But even in that instance, the Ukrainians are going to need to defend their territory and deter future aggression. 

So, we're trying to be very deliberate about what systems we think makes the most sense for Ukraine to have in that context, and also matters very much—can they sustain it? Can they afford it? Because, of course, you know, billions of dollars of international assistance is not, you know, may not be something 10 years from now, or 20 years from now. So, these also have to be systems that Ukraine itself can sustain. But I can tell you that fighter aircraft remain on the table, just no final decisions have been made about that. 

Yeah, as it relates to ATACMS. So, I think as most of you are tracking, you know, we've been we've provided 16 HIMARS systems, which are precision rocket, multiple launch rocket systems, a number of other Allies have provided similar systems the Brits and Germans in particular have provided M-270 systems. The HIMARS is a truck, it launches the rockets off the back, the M-270s, launches the same rockets, but essentially off the chassis of a Bradley fighting vehicle type of armored vehicle. 

We have provided them guided multiple launch rocket systems, or GMLRS, that have a range of, you know, around 70 or 80 kilometers, we have provided them with hundreds and hundreds of these precision guided systems, and the Ukrainians have been using them to extraordinary effect on the battlefield. 

It's our assessment that the most relevant Munitions for the current fight are the GMLRS. And so, we have prioritized getting the Ukrainians, the GMLRS they need, not only to hold in the east, but may generate some momentum elsewhere in the country. 

It's our assessment that they don't currently require ATACMS to service targets that are directly relevant to the current fight. You know, we'll obviously continue to have conversations with the Ukrainians about their needs, but it's our judgment at the moment that we should be focusing on GMLRS, not ATACMS. 

 

[Vergeltungswaffe]

Infantry? Tanks? Naaaaah...

Short Circuit had the prophetic vision with Johnny Five

[Kinophile]

@Battlefront.com

the stated original RUS "primary" objective of the whole war is still stated as,  functionally, forced regime change.  Initially they said that required the capture of Kiev, but now, as we all understand it,  Shoigu essentially said they're stuck with what they have ref the Donbass,  and any further meaningful advancement will need different conditions (unsaid, but a rebuilt army, weakened UKR). 

But the maximal objective, suppression of Ukraine as an independent state,  was still reiterated. 

To have fun with your Titanic analogy further, its not just that the ship hit an iceberg, its that the captain sought out and deliberately and at full speed rammed into the only iceberg in the entire herd, on the one specific path, that could sink the ship - and expected the iceberg to shatter. 

Now,  as the lower decks flood and the ship starts to tilt they're shouting that the iceberg is still doomed and their new plan is to use the ship's rotation as it sinks to angle the mighty propellers and chomp the berg to bits. 

Taadaaa.  Victo-blubblubblub blub blub. 

 

Blub. 

Blooop. 

 

Edited August 25, 2022 by Kinophile

[Grigb]

Fresh Girkin post 

Quote

Yesterday, massive missile strikes were carried out on a number of targets deep in enemy territory. Some of them were obviously successful (I don't know about the majority).
A limited operation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation continues in the Mykolaiv direction along the southern bank of the Ingul Canal.
There is a relative lull in the Donetsk direction, but Donetsk itself, as well as Makeyevka, Gorlovka and a number of other settlements, were subjected to fierce shelling by enemy artillery.
In general - "on the Western Front - no changes."

Discussion:

• Girkin seems uninterested in military situations. Comparing with old military posts current ones are short and much less informative. All the while he writes useless for us political posts about SMO in general.
• Agent Murz is also became quiet. He found somewhere French grenade and that's it.
• Interestingly, another DPR fighter and self-made RU propagandist Tatarsky [pen name] recently disappeared from front line and appeared today at another end of RU in Vladivostok city. The guy loves victory PR stunts at front line (He was first from propagandists who appeared at Pisky Cowshed). But not now...

[Beleg85]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

Dugin did not say: ...the state. He actually used RU word that have double meaning Power and Government. And given context the true meaning is: The special military operation is now more important than the [current] government - in its subjective dimension. Actually, in whole post word state must be replaced with [current] government or better Kremlin. 

The whole post is about the Kremlin and that the Kremlin is not important now because regardless of what the Kremlin wants the Nationalists are coming anyway and the Kremlin cannot stop them.

Bold post. Very bold post. 

Interesting detail. Still, planning the assassination take weeks, and as far as I know, after searching for some latest Dugin texts, he wasn't that much criticizing Kremlin. Especially compared with all girkinoids around. Plus, like most russian nats, they usually directly critique advisors, not Putin himself. Anyway, the most mysterious thing for me in whole issue is not even who made the killings, but why him/his daughter.

Do you @Grigb think that somebody could hit at Malofieiev this way, like some of his personal enemies? Seems odd and excessively brutal act even for Russian conditions, but we still cannot exclude infighting between trusted Kremlin oligarchs. That would fit Putin- "let buldoggs fight under the carpet, till it is me who throw them bones".

56 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This was a planned assassination.  Anybody would know the time and place of both Dugins that day WELL IN ADVANCE.  If someone decided to target them a while ago, the assassination plot could have been put in motion well ahead of time.

So, what does every good assassination plot by a nefarious organization require?  A patsy.  The GRU likely has lots of good ones already on the payroll to choose from.  Some of them quite unaware of who they are working for, being specifically selected because they are naive or otherwise easy to manipulate.  Having "unwitting agents" on payroll is standard practice for spy agencies as far as I know.

Plausibly the GRU had Vovk on payroll thinking she was working for the GUR or SBU and not Russia.  The GRU sent her to the conference ostensibly to "keep an eye on our enemy" and might have even suggested she take her daughter to help with her cover.  GRU agents did the bombing and after they told her to get out of the country right away and that going back the way she came was unsafe.  They then provided her some license plates and and directed her to the Estonian crossing.  They either tipped off the FSB or figured the FSB was at least competent enough to pick up the trail the GRU so clearly left for them to find.

Yes, it's all speculative... but it ties everything we know together without any one element being implausible.  In fact, when you step back and look at what I just wrote... it's actually a very simple plot.

Steve

P.S. I find the timing of Dugina's murder, with the increasing criticism by Dugin (and RU Nats in general), the military reality in Ukraine, and Shoigu's announcement all quite interesting.  If there was ever a time when the military would want to shut up the RU Nats, it would be right before having Shoigu effectively announce Russia has lost the ground war in the Donbas.

Yup, this scenario is quite possible. But she could even know what she was doing; Ukrainian extreme right was thoroughly penetrated by russian intelligence before 2014 and well past it, finding some UA citizen who was past participant in local right-wing initiatives (like Azov movement before restructurization) and Great-Rus follower at the same time would be a piece of cake for them. So regular GRU asset could as well be used by the "top" and then "burnt" by FSB as revenge, for example. This would be quite optimistic scenario from our perspective; if both services are turning against each other in violent way, it may ba a signal something is seriously brewing up.

I am curious what western services are now doing with her.

Perhaps after all, W. Suvorov wasn't such a fairy-teller as people believe him to be; his books about GRU are full of similar actions.

Edited August 25, 2022 by Beleg85

[Grigb]

38 minutes ago, Huba said:

Please elaborate 

Unlike almost everybody else the operator is covered and nervously looks at the camera that takes photos of everybody including him. He is a minder. And because he is an operator with the best spot, he is not a simple rogue minder. He is a well-connected in RU Nats circles [it is RU Nats event] minder.

[Harmon Rabb]

2 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Unlike almost everybody else the operator is covered and nervously looks at the camera that takes photos of everybody including him. He is a minder. And because he is an operator with the best spot, he is not a simple rogue minder. He is a well-connected in RU Nats circles [it is RU Nats event] minder.

He kind of looked like Girkin but I'll be honest with the angle and the attempt to cover his face I'm really not sure.

Don't leave us hanging, please tell us who he is if you know.