How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[FancyCat]

Huh. You know, they do some pretty sweeping shots of the car. That 27 second clip is completely of the car. Dunno how long the segment is in total, but why spend 27 seconds on a car for any reason? Galeev so some salt but sweeping shot of the car is correct.

 

[FancyCat]

 

[Battlefront.com]

43 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

It is hard to say. It is obviously Zelenskiy's team after Russian "dress rehersal" in 2021 understand that war is close, and as consequense of this became Zaluzhnyi appointment instead Khomchak, which openly "pacificated" and "optimized" UKR army, openly told that UKR will never win in the war with Russia, entered money awarding for "truce executing" in JFO and had a conflict with Minister of defense Taran, which failed State Defence Ordering program in 2020-21. I more than belive that in 2020 Zelenskyi and Yermak could have some secret preliminary agreements with Russia how to finish the war (his strange visit to Oman has born many conspiracy), so in this time Ukraine was making several tactical concessions to Moscov, which summoned angry in society (like "Wagnergate"). But contray to expectations of Zelenskiy's office, Russia kept tough position and didn't want make any concessions from own side. So, I think exactly in 2021 during big Russin "maneuvers" Zelenskiy and Yermak understood, that any peace agreements with Russia will be impossible, so "hawks" were assigned, and active dipomacy work has begun for westren AT-systems receiveing and future support.  

There is other problem - there are more than rumors that direct access to Zelenskyi is possible only via President's Office (Yermak). So, Information, which president receives, initially interpreted by President Office. Former chief of SBU Bakanov, for example, using personal friendship with Zeklenskiy, could bypass Yermak and this caused hidden conflict between him and Yermak for influence on president. So, main reason of Bakanov dismissal is result of Yermak's victory, than real fails of service. Zelenskiy maybe understand the war is close, but he is not politic, and completely relies on own "grey cardinal". In 2019 he apperared as naive pacifist whith words "I already have finished the war in my mind" or "I never will give order to solve Donbas question in military way", "I have to look in Putin's eyes and I believe we can make a deal". I can't judge is Yermak is Russian influencer or not, but he is obviously was a source of scepticism of prsident about NATO, EU and US warnings. Some people in President's Office had a duties diring Yanukovich times and by their support (and of course by "yes" of Yermak) influent lawer Andrey Portnov, strong opponent of western course of Ukriane and bright enemy of Maidan returned to Ukraine. So, I think not so "pro-Russian", but "pro-System, anti-Maidan" wing of President's team was forning mistrust of Zelenskiy to western organizations, by mesages about "western interfering in Ukraine" (relating to corruption) and "external control over Ukraine". So, Zelenskyi to the last wanted to believe that he can avoid the war and all warnings is a games of the West, which wanted to use Ukriane in own geopolitical goals. But, I think this opinion at least partially has a right for life. There is no friends between states, there is only matching of interests.  

Thank you for your insights!  I've read higher level overviews that hint at the same basic realities, but you have put a lot of nice details into the mix.

What it boils down to is that before 2021 Zelensky was attempting to negotiate something with Russia, but Russia then (as now) doesn't want to negotiate.  They want everything handed to them while giving up nothing.  Zelensky and his main influencers did not want this, so they rejected Russian conditions for ending the war.

This is where I think things get interesting from a larger Russian strategic view.  We've already discussed (several times) all the reasons why Putin wanted to take more of Ukraine for Russia and he was growing impatient because it wasn't happening.  I think part of the answer of "why invade in 2022?" is answered by the failures in 2020-2021 to pressure Ukraine into peacefully giving Russia what it wanted.  Since Putin was fixated on gutting Ukraine one way or another, war was the only alternative.

Once the US started revealing that Ukraine's worst fears about the "maneuvers" were true, there must have been a period of "adjustment" to thinking about a war that many Ukrainians didn't think was winnable.  It must have been a very, very confusing, depressing, and angry time within the government and military.  I am glad I wasn't there

I have always assumed that many in Ukraine convinced themselves that the US intel was only partially correct.  Specifically, the part about Russia attacking was true, but trying to take Kyiv all the way to Odessa was disinformation put out by Russia to dilute Ukraine's defenses.  If this is what the Ukrainian government thought, I sympathize with them because that is what I thought until about February 22nd   A Russian offensive in Donbas made a lot of sense, while a country wide offensive was moronic.  Like me, Ukraine might have given Putin too much credit for being smart.

This is all good background for the recent internal political moves by Zelensky.  Thank you!

Steve

[FancyCat]

Is it just me or are Russian false flags quite bloodless now? Has Putin lost his touch? Don't get me wrong, lots of dead Ukrainian lives, I hope that cowboy hat wearing soldier dies very quickly, but not even one dead Russian soldier in the PoW camp attack? Consider that vs the apartment bombings that brought Putin to power. 300 dead. Recall the false flags done up to the invasion, no one died at all either.

Consider also the explanations offered for the PoW bombing, Zelensky asked that the Mariupol defenders lay down their arms and made a country wide speech justifying the decision, that does not sound like a man who wants the Azov killed to keep quiet their war crimes.

Ukraine was very happily trading Russian PoWs for Azov members in earlier prisoner exchanges just emphasize how ridiculous it is. (And happily saying so publicly just underscores how domestically it wanted them saved, and any foreign Azov concerns are not important)

Why not say it was mistaken targeting? Much more believable.

As the Theiner Twitter thread notes, wasting HIMAR on a target well within range of conventional artillery, no serious intelligence agency is going to ignore that, plus everything else like how it's not even akin to the explosions of HIMARS, it's just very shoddy work blaming Ukraine. UA intelligence stated this was done to cause domestic issues in Ukraine, is anyone in Ukraine convinced this was ordered by Zelensky to get rid of troublesome Azov?

Is any EU or Western intelligence agency going to tell their political master, that Russia may not be wholly at fault?

Edited July 30, 2022 by FancyCat

[Battlefront.com]

I haven't checked in on Tom Cooper's postings for a while. 

https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-q-a-24-july-2022-fbaa25166f0e

For some reason today I decided to check in.  Unfortunately, I was quickly reminded why I stopped reading his posts.  In his most recent post, from 6 days ago, he did a Q&A and quickly stumbled badly.  Second question was:

Quote

Q: Is the destruction of the Antonovsky Road Bridge outside Kherson (photo above) ‘the end’ of the VSRF’s occupation of that Oblast; a situation that’s going to force Russians into withdrawal from that part of Ukraine?

He starts out strong by reminding people that (at the time) the Antonovsky vehicular bridge was only slightly damaged and that the rail bridge (at the time) hadn't been attacked.  He then restated his strongly held (and correct) position that Russia is heavily dependent upon rail supply.  Therefore, since the rail bridge was working fine that meant Russian forces weren't cut off from supply.  All good and sound stuff.  But then he concludes with this:

Quote

….especially considering the following: mind that achieving this — the destruction of so many ammo depots, headquarters, and damaging few bridges in the Kherson area — required so much effort by the diminutive Ukrainian M142 + NATO-supplied-artillery force, that meanwhile the Russians were left free to repair the crucially important railway bridge in southern Kupyansk, knocked out nearly a month ago. I.e. Ukrainians have not had enough HIMARS’ and long-range 155mm howitzers to at least ‘hinder’, not to talk about ‘prevent’ the Russians from repairing such an important facility. and to knock out bridges in the Kherson area — all at once, simultaneously. Result: since few days, the Russians are able to fully resupply their forces in the Donbass.

I think the kids would call this a "fail"   His conclusion is the worst sort of analysis... "because X hasn't happened yet, X won't happen and therefore I can avoid answering the original question".

Boiled down, he is saying that Ukraine is stretched too thin and and is capable of making a conclusive result in Kherson because it can't do it in Donbas.  This is not good analytical thinking because conditions can change.  Ukraine could forego hitting things elsewhere and instead focus on Kherson.  Ukraine is getting more of these weapons and ammo, so maybe it will soon be able to focus on Kherson and someplace else.  Could be that the rail bridge was temporarily left standing on purpose to sucker Russia into putting a bunch of stuff into Kherson before cutting them off.  All kinds of possibilities, none of which Cooper seems to have considered worthy of exploring.

At the very least he should have acknowledged that conditions could hypothetically change in a way that would make the original question relevant.  Even better if he went on to describe what the hypothetical cases were and what chances they could become reality.  That's what analysts exist to do IMHO.

To end this little rant of mine... at the time of Cooper's post it was pretty clear that Ukraine had the capability to effectively knock out all the Kherson bridges if it wanted to.  He didn't didn't see it that way, despite it being pretty obvious.  I've run into this sort of inexplicable blindness before with him, which is why I pretty much stopped reading his posts.  Now I'm convinced I should close his tab in my browser.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

44 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Is it just me or are Russian false flags quite bloodless now? Has Putin lost his touch? Don't get me wrong, lots of dead Ukrainian lives, I hope that cowboy hat wearing soldier dies very quickly, but not even one dead Russian soldier in the PoW camp attack? Consider that vs the apartment bombings that brought Putin to power. 300 dead. Recall the false flags done up to the invasion, no one died at all either.

Consider also the explanations offered for the PoW bombing, Zelensky asked that the Mariupol defenders lay down their arms and made a country wide speech justifying the decision, that does not sound like a man who wants the Azov killed to keep quiet their war crimes.

Ukraine was very happily trading Russian PoWs for Azov members in earlier prisoner exchanges just emphasize how ridiculous it is. (And happily saying so publicly just underscores how domestically it wanted them saved, and any foreign Azov concerns are not important)

Why not say it was mistaken targeting? Much more believable.

As the Theiner Twitter thread notes, wasting HIMAR on a target well within range of conventional artillery, no serious intelligence agency is going to ignore that, plus everything else like how it's not even akin to the explosions of HIMARS, it's just very shoddy work blaming Ukraine. UA intelligence stated this was done to cause domestic issues in Ukraine, is anyone in Ukraine convinced this was ordered by Zelensky to get rid of troublesome Azov?

Is any EU or Western intelligence agency going to tell their political master, that Russia may not be wholly at fault?

Russia's false flag operations have always been shoddy in execution, but the real ones do have a well thought out cover story ahead of time.  That is why I do not believe MH-17 was a false flag operation... Russia had a half dozen stories, none of which could possibly be true.  That's the difference between a cover story and a cover up.

There's been several bloody false flag attacks since the war started.  Russia has shelled some of its own villages and definitely shelled Donetsk.  Body count was low, but it wasn't zero.

Steve

[Grigb]

So, today's map of Donbass area up to 10 PM. Unfortunately, it became very convoluted (and I still could not cram some additional info). Looks like I will have to separate it into two maps. Also, I apologize for mistakes/some rough translation - do not feel well lately, probably got sick.

Bold red border - new info. Dotted arrow - failed attack/withdrawal.

Regarding Kherson there is very few new detailed info from both sides. RU Nats as usual are claiming big UKR losses but mostly keep silent regarding bridgehead. 

[Beleg85]

36 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

To end this little rant of mine... at the time of Cooper's post it was pretty clear that Ukraine had the capability to effectively knock out all the Kherson bridges if it wanted to.  Tom didn't pretty apparently didn't see it that way, despite it being pretty obvious.  I've run into this sort of inexplicable blindness before with him, which is why I pretty much stopped reading his posts.  Now I'm convinced I should close his tab in my browser.

He is pretty good when comes to Airforce stuff. But has a tendency to draw very strange and wide-ranging conclusions from rather scant evidence. And manner of "sarcastic, anti-establishment sage" is repulsive in long run.

 

https://defence-ua.com/news/skilki_t_64_zalishilos_v_stroju_zsu_i_jake_majbutnje_maje_tsej_tank_video-8370.html

An interview with one Ukrianian tank expert. If I understand correctly, according to him, Ukrainian fleet of just T-64BV is still around 600 pieces distributed between two tank brigades and smaller battalions of several older mechanzied brigades. They try to find exact place for new tanks from NATO countries of T-72 and T-91 types.

It seems Ukrainian still has pretty sizeable armoured corps 5 month into the war. Not bad.

2 hours ago, danfrodo said:

But how can it really defend that area?  I think they can't do it by conventional means, so I suppose the first thing RU will do is to starve the civilians, knowing how Putin operates.  Bascially they've got many thousands of civilians as hostages.  That's my worry, and also why I think UKR was trying to entice RU to leave.  Maybe mass murder is Putin's plan. 

Yes, this is unfortunatelly a possibility. There were some movies and threads with locals from Kherson  being very concerned about logistical situation. Putin would not shy away from taking them as virtual hostages and even mass murder if needed- it can be shown in propaganda as effects of "Ukrianian cruel way of war". I don't think his regime cares about external propaganda anymore, only domestic one; and they will swell almost everything or don't care. It may also potentially serve as additional "punishment" element for helping partisans.

Edited July 30, 2022 by Beleg85

[MikeyD]

Its interesting how South Korea is walking a fine line on Ukraine. Wanting to claim 'neutrality' (due to its proximity to Russia) but willing to sell to nations helping Ukraine. Canada gives Ukraine 500,000 artillery rounds, Korea provides Canada with an equivalent in replacement stocks. Poland helps Ukraine, S. Korea agrees to a big Polish arms deal. There's always one degree of separation.

[Beleg85]

Talking about possible false flags. Donetsk was already shelled by thermite, now this. Are those mines even used by UAF?:

 

Edited July 30, 2022 by Beleg85

[The_Capt]

36 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I haven't checked in on Tom Cooper's postings for a while. 

https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-q-a-24-july-2022-fbaa25166f0e

For some reason today I decided to check in.  Unfortunately, I was quickly reminded why I stopped reading his posts.  In his most recent post, from 6 days ago, he did a Q&A and quickly stumbled badly.  Second question was:

He starts out strong by reminding people that (at the time) the Antonovsky vehicular bridge was only slightly damaged and that the rail bridge (at the time) hadn't been attacked.  He then restated his strongly held (and correct) position that Russia is heavily dependent upon rail supply.  Therefore, since the rail bridge was working fine that meant Russian forces weren't cut off from supply.  All good and sound stuff.  But then he concludes with this:

I think the kids would call this a "fail"   His conclusion is the worst sort of analysis... "because X hasn't happened yet, X won't happen and therefore I can avoid answering the original question".

Boiled down, he is saying that Ukraine is stretched too thin and and is capable of making a conclusive result in Kherson because it can't do it in Donbas.  This is not good analytical thinking because conditions can change.  Ukraine could forego hitting things elsewhere and instead focus on Kherson.  Ukraine is getting more of these weapons and ammo, so maybe it will soon be able to focus on Kherson and someplace else.  Could be that the rail bridge was temporarily left standing on purpose to sucker Russia into putting a bunch of stuff into Kherson before cutting them off.  All kinds of possibilities, none of which Cooper seems to have considered worthy of exploring.

At the very least he should have acknowledged that conditions could hypothetically change in a way that would make the original question relevant.  Even better if he went on to describe what the hypothetical cases were and what chances they could become reality.  That's what analysts exist to do IMHO.

To end this little rant of mine... at the time of Cooper's post it was pretty clear that Ukraine had the capability to effectively knock out all the Kherson bridges if it wanted to.  Tom didn't pretty apparently didn't see it that way, despite it being pretty obvious.  I've run into this sort of inexplicable blindness before with him, which is why I pretty much stopped reading his posts.  Now I'm convinced I should close his tab in my browser.

Steve

I find this sort of analysis (Cooper’s) confusing.  Ukraine has opened up another phase of this war - deep strike manoeuvre essentially, which is disrupting and dislocation Russian offensive operations to the point I am not sure they will be able to resume (how long has this pause been going on now?).  They have been shaping the battlefield around Kherson very effectively, only the dimmest analyst cannot see they are setting the Russians up for “bad”.  All of this is supposed to be when the UA was on its back foot after the glorious Russian victories at Severodonetsk.

I have not followed this Cooper guy but have read others who have built assessments but refuse to get off them once they are proven wrong.  So there were only three bridges across the Dneiper and the UA have nailed two of them so precisely that it would put an engineer to shame, let alone an air strike.  “Oh but look the Russian’s repaired a bridge at Kharkiv”…so f#cking what!?  Last we heard the Russians were scrambling towards Kherson and stalling in the Donbas, while desertions/refuseniks/ and general signs of morale failure continue.  Unless this guy can show that the action at Kharkiv is opening up a new operational offensive, it is like that kid we all grew up with that would go “well sure a trip to Disneyland is nice but…”.

We have been talking a lot about metrics and one I keep coming back to is “options”.  The introduction of more deep strike capability in the UA has clearly expanded their options while compressing the RA’s and by any standard that is not a good thing for Russia.  We should double down on this and send more deep strike…cause it is working.

[billbindc]

6 hours ago, Haiduk said:

You should take into account that Kryvonos is not only military, but also political figure in Ukraine, and he has tensions with Zelenskiy's team, so he can be politically biased in own assesmnts. I believe, that in Zelenskiy's office really can be enough maybe not direct Russian agents, but influencers, but the words of Kryvonos about "no reactions on warnings" this is not true. For some reason he didn't say that most troops since 8th of Feb already moved to appointed areas as if for "maneuvers". And of course evacuation of our aviation obviously weren't separate decisions of aviation brigade commanders.

From other military carefuly told in own interviews, we can tell not about "oversliping the war", but about mistake in assesments of probable Russian strike. Our politics as if considred Russians will attack only on Donbas and probably on NE - Kharkiv-Sumy and couldn't maintain invasion from many directions. Why politics so stubbornly though that Russians will attack only on Donbas, it's a real question. Because military really warned that Kyiv and Crimea directions will be active with high probability too. Kryvonos also warned about Hostomel, like a weak point of Kyiv for two weeks before invasion. Though, on 24th Feb some screen forces anyway were deployed north of Kyiv and they delayed Russian offensive, so this is wrong to say "lidership did nothing and ignored all".

Add to this that there many good reasons for Zelensky to downplay the likelihood of invasion, not least the Ukrainian economy and the fairly large contingent in the West at that point prepared to believe that Russia was being provoked.

[billbindc]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

The irony is that self driving AI is probably safer than the average Human driver.  Doesn't fall asleep, can't get intoxicated, isn't distracted by texting, etc.  Yet it's being forcefully pushed back against because it isn't "perfect".  Our species has a really, really tough time with risk assessment and risk management strategies

 Getting into my professional lane here...and actually, "self driving" AI isn't really safer. There's a big bias in the numbers where if the driver intervenes to try and stop an AI created accident, they often report the accident as driver initiated. Tesla is egregiously guilty of this. While that may seem off topic, it gets at how profoundly difficult these sorts of problems are. As an engineer once described it to me...it's not so hard to get to 85% effectiveness but every percentage toward real self driving on un-geofenced roads after that becomes exponentially harder and without near perfection, it's simply not going to fly socially or economically.

I strongly suspect any attempt to "quantify war" would face a similarly steep gradient with the similar issue that failure has huge real world consequences.

Edited July 30, 2022 by billbindc

[akd]

43 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Talking about possible false flags. Donetsk was already shelled by thermite, now this. Are those mines even used by UAF?:

 

Somewhat doubt this as a false flag since it would mostly just impair their own communication until the roads are cleared.  Interesting solution to speeding that up in the absence of proper EOD:

 

[Haiduk]

@Battlefront.com 

"DONBASIZATION" of battle for Donbas

(based mostly on selections from Konstantin Mashovets review and slightly on my vision)

Now we are entering in new phase of war. Russian offensive on Donbas with goals of capturing Sloviansk and Kramatorsk almost failed. This happened because of strong resistance of UKR troops on Izium axis and on Siversk direction, which foiled Russian plans to conduct combimed strike by Izium and Lyman groups (latter should cross the Siverskyi Donets after seizing of Siversk and Raihorodok). 

They, of course will continiue this operation but even they will achieve some goals and push off UKR troops from Donbas, this will not lead to that political outcome, which expect in Kremlin. By analogy with "vietnamization" of war in 70th in Vietnam, now we can see "donbasiztion" of battle for Donbas. Russia is shifting own military goals and now moving own troops on other direction, leaving LDPR froces now as main component of Donbas offensive. Of course, Russian troops will be also present, but their support now mostly will be in artillery, aviation and air defense. Their regular ground troops now will play more role of assistants, than leading force.

Russian offensive, main efforts of which directed on Avdiivka and Bakhmut, shows, that mainly the enemy now use LDPR troops and PMCs.

Enemy continue attacks on next directions: 

Maryinka - recently assaults didn't bring the enemy nothing except heavy losses. Maryinka is ruined, but stands. And in last weeks UKR troops even pushed off DPR forces almost to limts of Olexandrivka village. For three days of intensive airdtrikes, artillery shellings and assaults DPR/Russian troops could retake about 400 m  of land (there was a video from their side). Also enemy activated own shellings and attack norther from Maryinka operating from Staromykhaylivka to UKR controlled Krasnohorivka town. 

Avdiivka - unlike in previous times, when the enemy initially assaulted the town directly through industrial zone (so called "promka") from Yasynuvata direction and in second time tried to break through northern from the town, in that time they are trying to outflank Avdiivka from the north, attacking from Novoselivka Druha area through N-20 road to Krasnohorivka village (not to be confused with Krasnohorivka town from above), and from the south, attacking from Spartak-Vesele line on Opytne, Vodiane and Pisky - since Donetsk airport battle in 2014-2015 UKR positions didn't move a meter back there. Despite of heavy bombardments and artillery devastation, for three days DPRs have too minor sucess, causing lamentationds of Khodakovskiy, which were posted by Grigb. Some our sources wrote, UKR forces in first day have limited number of artillery and ammunition to it, so Russian/DPR advantage was total (they even claimed they destroyed almost all UKR arty and ammo dumps). But from next day situation became better, UKR arty has struck several targets in Donetsk and prevented DPR troops from further advance.

On this two directions involved next forces: 

DPR: 1st "Slavianskaya" MRB, 100th Republican Guard brigade (mix of VDV anf National Guard), 9th naval infantry MRR, 11th MRR "Vostok", 15th international brigade "Pyatnashka" (indeed about reinforced battalion strength, formed mostly from Russian/CIS volunteers, many from occupied Abkhazia), artillery brigade "Kolchuga" (former "Kalmius"), 1st separate tank battalion "Somali" (before 2022 it was motor-rifle assault battalion), 4th separate tank battlion "Avgust" (this one from LPR forces), 1919th special forces battalion "named after of Alexandr Nevskiy", 1539th battalion "Arkhangel Mikhail" (latter two are not conscripts, but reservists and volunteers) and other units, including conscripts and some special police and MGB units.

Russia: 3 BTGs from 114th and 143rd MRR of 127th MRD (Far East) of 5th CAA, Eastern Military District

Bakhmut - here we can see two enemy groups wich assaulting our positions from east and south in Semyhirya direction. Southern enemy group operates from Dolomitne - Novoluhanske area and consists of elements of 3rd MRB "Berkut" and 2nd separate tank battlion "Dizel" + 4-5 BTGs of Russian 40th naval infantry brigade (Pacific Fleet) and 336th naval infantry brigade (Baltic Fleet) + 2 PMC BTGs. Eastern group operates from Vidrodzhennia - Myronivskyi section to Vershyna - Semyhirya in composition of 2 PMC BTGs + some Russian ground forces, probably also from 127th MRD. For weeks of heavy fights Russians could push off UKR troops from power plant and partilally capture Vershyna village. 

All what northern - Soledar and Siversk directions already other grouping, actions of which are out of this article. I just can say on that directions we can see almost the same tendetions - LPR+PVC gradually substituting Russian troops. 

So, where all Russian forces are departing? To the south. There will be huge Russian offensive and decisieve battle of this war. About this tomorrow

Because of the fronline of this actions is more than 100 km I can't post full map, just only most intensive part - Maryinka - Avdiivka (40 km)

Edited July 30, 2022 by Haiduk

[The_Capt]

17 minutes ago, billbindc said:

 Getting into my professional lane here...and actually, "self driving" AI isn't really safer. There's a big bias in the numbers where if the driver intervenes to try and stop an AI created accident, they often report the accident as driver initiated. Tesla is egregiously guilty of this. While that may seem off topic, it gets at how profoundly difficult these sorts of problems are. As an engineer once described it to me...it's not so hard to get to 85% effectiveness but every percentage toward real self driving on un-geofenced roads after that becomes exponentially harder and without near perfection, it's simply not going to fly socially or economically.

I strongly suspect any attempt to "quantify war" would face a similarly steep gradient with the similar issue that failure has huge real world consequences.

I think there is a bit of a failure to communicate real life context here.  If a nation could 85% quantify war deterministically they would likely be able to rule the planet.  With our current methods, even with technology, I doubt we could do better than 25% on predictive accuracy, and Inam being generous.  This is a competitive space to say the least, where a few percentage points would be enormous.  So while people are debating 100%, the reality is that 50% could make someone a superpower basically overnight.

I am not even talking about deterministic or predictive.  I am talking “indicative” - ie we know what we are seeing when we see it.  We employ metrics and units in warfare all the time, translating then into real information advantage as operations are occurring it also a competition space, we are seeing it right now in Ukraine.  Anyway, it was a wonderful journey and I think I have landed on an answer, but we don’t need to unpack it, I will save it for work.

[Huba]

13 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

So, where all Russian forces are departing? To the south. There will be huge Russian offensive and decisieve battle of this war. About this tomorrow

Looking forward to your future post then! I really thought they ran out of steam and wouldn't try anything like that, but it is the Russians after all... 

[panzermartin]

3 hours ago, dan/california said:

Any clue what that works out too in actual manpower? The definition of a battlegroup has gotten sort of flexible lately. Also any indication of the number of guns and AFVs? I am just trying to get an approximate idea of how much tonnage has to cross the Dnipro every day to keep those forces functional. I realize that this may not be available from public sources.

 

3 hours ago, Haiduk said:

I posted about Kherson about week ago. In short - main forces there 7th air assault division (mountain) - at least 5-6 BTGs, then 205th MRB almost in full composition, BTG of 34th MRB (mountain), 11th air-assault brigade (at least 2 BTGs), 126th coastal defense MRB (also 2 BTGs), 127th recon brigade, about 1-1.5 BTGs ot 42nd MRD, moved from Zaporizhzhia, elements of 98th VDV division, moved from Donbas, at least four battalions of LDPR conscripts. Other lesser units, artllery, AD. In last days Russia moved many troops to Kherson and I will write about this. Up to 12-15 BTGs total, not counting LDPR conscripts

 

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

It's a bit dated (July 5), but Schlottman puts the BTG count stood at about 10.  Armor includes T-90s and BMP-3s, Marines, Airborne, and Spetsnaz units.  This was prior to the flood of reinforcements into the area, so there's likely quite a bit more there.

The dilemma for Russia is that if it withdrew its armor heavy artillery, it would effectively end any hope of keeping the western bank positions.  Why?  Because thus far Ukraine has shown itself more than capable of taking back terrain from Russian infantry units.  Especially in this case where Ukraine's forces are backed by armor and heavy artillery.

What this means is, realistically, Russia had to choose between defending Kherson with everything it had or retreating to the eastern side.  Anything other than full defense or full retreat would not have worked.

Steve

Thanks for the insight good points. I must have missed these updates. 

That's a rather impressive force to allow to be cut off. It will be a huge blow for the Russians if this surrenders or gets destroyed. I wonder have they thought of the chances the bridges to go out of action or the initial plan didn't predict they will get stuck in Kherson until now. The volume of units is still a challenge Imo for UA to defeat, even with problematic supply though . Eithers side defeat/victory will be pivotal for the course of the war for sure. 

@Battlefront.comit seems it's all or nothing I come to agree. We don't have indications that they are thinking or are able of withdrawing any of these forces. Also  studying the terrain seems that the eastern bank doesn't offer that much suitable spots for artillery base , not enough roads and a lot of wetlands.

A good chunk of media and people have lost interest in what's going on right now but this is going to be one of the most interesting events in European history since WW2. 

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

4 hours ago, danfrodo said:

But how can it really defend that area?  I think they can't do it by conventional means, so I suppose the first thing RU will do is to starve the civilians, knowing how Putin operates.  Bascially they've got many thousands of civilians as hostages.  That's my worry, and also why I think UKR was trying to entice RU to leave.  Maybe mass murder is Putin's plan. 

Yes, this is unfortunatelly a possibility. There were some movies and threads with locals from Kherson  being very concerned about logistical situation. Putin would not shy away from taking them as virtual hostages and even mass murder if needed- it can be shown in propaganda as effects of "Ukrianian cruel way of war". I don't think his regime cares about external propaganda anymore, only domestic one; and they will swell almost everything or don't care. It may also potentially serve as additional "punishment" element for helping partisans.

I think that Putin would pitch this internationally as UKR creating a humanitarian crisis.  It's no less ridiculous than the other nonsense he's spouted, like defeats as goodwill gestures. So I predict they will steal all the food from every house & apartment and grocery store, then ask for cease fires & such to bring in food, then steal that food while sneaking ammo across the river.  How can RU hope to prevail w/o some sorts of non-conventional methods?  Then they will try to hold whatever is within artillery support range of the left bank, along w using air support.

Of course, UKR can, as others have stated, say 'NO'. 

[Battlefront.com]

Update on Norwegian NASAMS air defense systems.  The US is purchasing them with the line of credit extended to Ukraine.  Here's the bit I found interesting:

Quote

As a reminder, Ukraine will receive two batteries of NASAMS air defense systems. It is about batteries, and not two systems, as previously reported by the media. It is not yet possible to name the exact number of anti-aircraft missile systems that Ukraine will receive.

https://censor.net/en/news/3357518/pentagon_buys_nasams_air_defense_system_for_ukraine

Yeah, last I think I heard about this it was 2 SYSTEMS, not 2 BATTERIES.  Now it looks like it's going to be more than that.

Steve

[dan/california]

The following is an utterly ruthless suggestion I do not endorse.

If the Russians get fifty thousand troops in the flood zone of the Nova Khahova dam. What happens if the Ukrainians blow the bleeping thing and leave all of them trapped in a sea of mud? I realize that this would have huge implications for both Ukrainian civilians and the world food situation. But would it win the war in a day? A couple of thousand Russian tanks and AFVs  trapped in mud to the turrets just waiting to be collected for scrap. Troops trying to walk out through hip deep mud with no supplies? What little I can find on the Hydrology implies the flooding would be infinitely worse in Russian held ares than Ukrainian ones. 

[Huba]

3 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Update on Norwegian NASAMS air defense systems.  The US is purchasing them with the line of credit extended to Ukraine.  Here's the bit I found interesting:

https://censor.net/en/news/3357518/pentagon_buys_nasams_air_defense_system_for_ukraine

Yeah, last I think I heard about this it was 2 SYSTEMS, not 2 BATTERIES.  Now it looks like it's going to be more than that.

Steve

I'm really waiting for some information about the chosen configuration. Specifically, if it will be a mobile 4x4 based system, or the stationary truck/ trailer based one...

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, billbindc said:

Getting into my professional lane here...and actually, "self driving" AI isn't really safer.

Not yet, for sure.  But under ideal circumstances (good condition Federal highways with decent weather) my impression is they are already pretty damned good.  Where they fall down, rather badly, is in complex dense areas.  There's just too much stuff to process too quickly.  For some reason even moderately competent drivers are able to handle it, not so much AI.

Which gets back to my point about a universal predictive model for warfare.  I think we can get excellent modeling for limited, carefully controlled battlefield environments.  I'd say Combat Mission fits that quite well. 

I agree with The_Capt though.  If we can get a predictive tool that can get even over the 50% mark, that would be quite valuable.  I think that's possible.  Predictive modeling for controlled battlefield environments can definitely be much better than that.  Again, I say CM is excellent at this. As long as CM is asked a question it is capable of answering, it could maybe get a customer into the 85% territory.  My professional bias aside, I really do believe this to be true.

Steve

[dan/california]

1 minute ago, Huba said:

I'm really waiting for some information about the chosen configuration. Specifically, if it will be a mobile 4x4 based system, or the stationary truck/ trailer based one...

If anybody involved has any sense it will be for as much of both as they can get, and as fast as they can get them. Does anybody know if the missiles themselves have to be modified from the air launched versions? If not They could be pulled Existing NATO stocks, This is another factory that needs to be copied four times over, and run 24/7. It is looking like Taiwan will need an infinity of them, too.

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, Huba said:

I'm really waiting for some information about the chosen configuration. Specifically, if it will be a mobile 4x4 based system, or the stationary truck/ trailer based one...

If they are talking about multiple batteries delivered quickly, my guess is trailer based.  And that would work pretty well for rear areas that need protecting.  Russia's ability to hit a stationary target of this size is about zero, so they're safe.  Within range of Russian artillery is a different story.

Steve