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How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?


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13 hours ago, Elmar Bijlsma said:

Okay, I am seriously beginning to wonder how many YPRs we Dutch had left to give. I had it in my mind that we sent over some 40 of them. But they keep showing up just about everywhere. Either we had more of the things that I thought or they are multiplying like Tribbles.

Good to see the Ukrainians get good use out of the old beasties. I sometimes wince when I see what risks they are taking with them, but they seem to be doing alright, all things considered. The Ukrainians should get on the phone with the Turks and Egyptians and see if they can get some more.The ones with cannons, if they can manage it.

You forget that we are a trading nation.

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14 hours ago, dan/california said:

This should be preemptively included in the intro to the next game, to reduce the endless complaints about " My wunderwaffen hit a tree, &^%%^*(&, this can't be right."

The thing I read people complaining about is AP slugs getting blocked by tree brances, not HE, as obviously explosive shells (and these drones) have sensitive fuses.

I think they would even detonate when hitting a straw man.

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7 hours ago, Livdoc44 said:

 

Interestingly, the clips that @Haiduk posted yesterday afternoon of destroyed YRPs are apparently from this attack. 

 

No, these were different attacks. Failed one was on Zaporizhzhia front, other one - more likely in Avdiivka area. Destroyed YPR had other symbols on the hull. White cross which added later yellow circle (probably "southern front" marking). YPRs on the video with attack, which passed close to the operator have two wide vertical white stripes and clear writing "110 ombr" - means "110th mechanized brigade". Also it has own name "казино" ("casino")

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12 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

Something I haven't seen before. UR-77 used for indirect fire rather than it's usual mine-clearing role.

I suppose you meant indirect fire at terrain, not for building demolishing during urban clashes. Because latter Russians used as far as Chechnya wars. They used this in Syria, during Donetsk airport assaults and in full-scale war during assaults of Mariupol. Popasna and other towns. 

But usage of UR-77/UR-83 (portable launcher) to supress field positions also known since ATO times. As I can recall in 2018 (?) LPR troops used UR-83 charge to clear mines and destroy our position near R-66 road. They heavy shell-shocked most of harrison by explosion and most of them coldn't resist, so all four soldiers were killed by grenades and by rifle fire   

Edited by Haiduk
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14 hours ago, Elmar Bijlsma said:

Okay, I am seriously beginning to wonder how many YPRs we Dutch had left to give. I had it in my mind that we sent over some 40 of them.

According to Orix list 100+ And 19 visullay confirmed losses (without last ones near Robotyne)

Edited by Haiduk
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1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

No, these were different attacks. Failed one was on Zaporizhzhia front, other one - more likely in Avdiivka area. Destroyed YPR had other symbols on the hull. White cross which added later yellow circle (probably "southern front" marking). YPRs on the video with attack, which passed close to the operator have two wide vertical white stripes and clear writing "110 ombr" - means "110th mechanized brigade". Also it has own name "казино" ("casino")

Ah, I see what you mean! I've gotta pay better attention to the details ha ha. Thanks for the clarification and sorry for the confusion.

And thanks for all your contributions!

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57 minutes ago, Livdoc44 said:

Ah, I see what you mean! I've gotta pay better attention to the details ha ha. Thanks for the clarification and sorry for the confusion.

And thanks for all your contributions!

Well, it is inherently confusing so no harm done ;)

For me the confusing part is that we had two sightings of the YPRs at different parts of the front at nearly the same time.  Yet if the number of 40 was accurate that would be quite difficult to imagine.  Ukraine has divided its battalions up over long distances before, but I got the sense that this is no longer common practice.  Haiduk, can you comment on current practices?

With 100 YPR in hand they had enough to outfit roughly 3 battalions.  I'm pretty sure at Kherson it was the 47th Mech that had them, but they lost quite a few.   Now we have evidence of the 110th Mech.  I wonder if there is a third unit with them or if they kept some in reserve for replacements.  Having some for replacements would certainly be smart.

Steve

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And a timely OpEd from Washington Post about the dangers of confirmation bias.  The piece is called "Beware the Certainty Trap"

 

  By Christine Emba
Opinion columnist and editor

Think of a belief that you hold dear. 

Are you sure about that? Really sure?

Well, have you considered … being less so?

Last week in Opinions, Ilana Redstone, a University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign sociology professor, introduced us to the concept of the Certainty Trap: the tendency to treat our values, principles or beliefs as inviolable.

In her words, “it is what gives us the satisfying sense of righteousness we need to judge harshly, condemn and dismiss people with whom we disagree.”

Certainty in some areas is natural, and helpful. Night follows day, gravity exists and the 15-seed Princeton basketball team really did defeat 2-seed Arizona in March Madness on Thursday. 

“However, when it comes to heated political debates, the Certainty Trap holds us back and puts up walls. Paradoxically, those issues where we feel most threatened by disagreement are the ones where we most need to be able to talk with one another.”

An oversupply of certainty blinds us to the fact that the things we care most about tend to be the most ethically and morally complicated. And if we want constructive dialogue and mutual engagement on the issues that matter — or even to persuade others to come to our point of view — being too certain just holds us back. 

Luckily, there’s a way out of this bind. “Ultimately, we don’t have to abandon our principles or our values — we just have to be willing to hold them up to the light and examine them. One way to think about avoiding the Certainty Trap is that it’s less about answering questions than it is about generating them.”

Questions for us? Let us know.

And enjoy the rest of your weekend!

P.S. Listen to this TikTok before you read the final link below.

-----

As it relates to various debates here, I am absolutely fine to have everything I know about this war proven wrong by someone making clear, logical, and well supported arguments.  As certain as I am about the soundness of my understanding of this war, I welcome being corrected if I am off the mark.  I have no interest in spending time and energy being wrong.  For me, personally, this is a basic philosophy I carry with me every day about everything.

Ironically, those people who constantly play Devil's Advocate without sound arguments to back them up help REINFORCE confirmation bias instead of challenging it.  If you make a hypothesis and the only people challenging the premise can't make a solid argument as to why it's wrong, well it gets you thinking that the reason for that is that there isn't a solid counter argument to be made.

Furthermore, confirmation bias is not limited to one side.  The Devil's Advocate who makes the same unsubstantiated arguments over and over again may incorrectly come to believe that "the other person doesn't want to listen" when the reality is the other person is listening carefully, but the challenges are not of sufficient quality or substance to reasonably expect change.  In this case the Devil's Advocate is the one who has the confirmation bias problem because continually making the same poorly crafted counter arguments can lead to the conclusion "the other person isn't listening" when, in fact, it is the Devil's Advocate that isn't.

And there is your deep thought for a Sunday ;)

Steve

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https://www.newstream.cz/leaders/jiri-hynek-evropa-nema-naboje-ani-na-tricet-dni-ukrajine-uz-tezko-vic-pomuzeme

Quote

There are only three producers of nitrocellulose in Europe. Which is the basic raw material for you to craft ammo. One manufacturer is in France, and it is currently out of business because of a crash there. One is in the Czech Republic, Synthesia in Pardubice, and one is in Serbia. There is no other significant producer of nitrocellulose in Europe.

(Google Translation from Czech)

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https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/trinitrotoluene-market

Quote

The largest producers of TNT are based in the Asia-Pacific region. Some of the leading companies in the production of TNT are China Gezhouba (Group) Corporation, Orica Limited, MAXAMCORP HOLDING, Dyno Nobel, and Enaex.

https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/trinitrotoluene-tnt-market-latest-research-report-2023-2029-2023-02-16

Quote

What are the top key players in the Trinitrotoluene (TNT) Market?

● Orica
● IPL (Dyno Nobel)
● MAXAM
● AEL
● ENAEX
● Sasol
● Yunnan Civil Explosive
● Solar Explosives
● Gezhouba Explosive
● EPC Groupe
● Anhui Jiangnan
● Poly Permanent Union Holding Group
● Nanling Civil Explosive
● BME Mining
● NOF Corporation
● IDEAL
● Sichuan Yahua
● AUSTIN
● Kailong Chemical
● Leiming Kehua

and more…

Several of the top ones are Australian, so that's hopeful.

Edited by cesmonkey
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8 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

Reminds me of the early days of the pandemic.  When testing kits were developed there was a massive shortage of cotton swabs of the type needed for this application.  There were only two factories in the world producing them; one in Italy and one in the US.  The refractory agents needed for the sampling were produced by one factory in China (IIRC there were some very small players elsewhere).  So yeah, quickly ramping up production of something is often times not about money.

Steve

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14 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

One of comments in UA Twitter under this news: "With this mess in EU NATO I suppose it wasn't empty bravade from Russian side about week to La Manche"

Edited by Haiduk
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9 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

One of comments in UA Twitetr under this news: "With this mess in EU NATO I suppose it wasn't empty bravade from Russian side about week to La Manche"

One part of Europe spent the last few decades demilitarising as much as they felt they could (we can argue about whether they went too far) while another part of Europe spent its time focusing on things like ‘getting to the Channel in a week”.  Which of those two approaches would your commenter say had been most productive, on balance?

Even having got itself into this “mess” the EU is playing a key role in Russia’s defeat and Ukraine’s salvation and it will likely play a key role in everyone’s (likely)  recovery after the war as well. 
 

Hopefully the explosives shortage can be puzzled through sooner rather than later. 

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10 hours ago, Kinophile said:

I'm a gonna take this slim opening and completely abuse it...

Directed to @The_Capt -

You mentioned a while back back about Information as Mass. I found this very interesting. I guess this feeds into "Precision" but I got the subsense you were thinking on something else - something broader in military effects on the Line but deeper in source depth, perhaps? Stretching from the furthest Trench to the nearest Starbucks.... Is this a good read?

I was struck by how something as foggy and vague as Information could have Mass, both from a figurative and literal sense. TBH I'm not even sure if Information is the best descriptor, but I also don't know what's rolling around inside the pinball machine of your mind. But I sense myself it could be a very good angle on the nature of this war.

Could you elaborate?

Information as the New Mass.  This was in context of how Ukraine appears to be violating the rules when it comes to conventional military mass.  They are consistently a much smaller force (mass wise) on both offence and defence, yet they are succeeding.  How?

I was thinking that if one treated information as mass, Ukraine’s ratios start to make a lot more sense.  And here I mean as both a resource and effect - much like conventional mass.  First there is the amount of data being collected.  The UA is linked into a collection system backstopped by the US/west.  We could literally compare the terabytes of data each side of this are able to collect and my bet is Ukraine is orders of magnitude higher than Russia.  

Next is the ability to turn that data into usable information in prosecutions of the war.  Again Ukraine is being backstopped by a powerful information enterprise - “big data”, capable of taking a whole bunch of data and rendering it actionable. Again, this competitive space is very likely in favour of Ukraine in ability to creat more-better information and use it.

And then we get into knowledge and learning space as information is used to build better understanding and underlying theories of causation and effect.  The RA can learn, but is has been noted repeatedly that they are not able to learn as fast as the UA.  The answer to this is pretty simple through a lens of Information Mass - Ukraine has a far higher information mass ratio than RA to draw from and translate into learning.

Last point is Information-to-Effect.  The weaponization of information.  Here we can see the mass advantage almost everyday as Ukraine is waging an information war for the history books.  It has been noted we are in a social media war, a crowd sourced war and the information mass equation very much matters in this space.  Propaganda is likely the most obvious example of Information Mass.  The interesting thing is that information can self generate if it resonates - something conventional mass does as well but it takes a lot longer (eg I take resources with tanks, those resources let me build more tanks).  Information becomes rumour which spreads and multiplies like a virus, self generating mass at far higher rates than physical.

My hypothesis is that at the beginning of this thing everyone was tossing up diagrams of force comparisons of conventional mass - how many tanks,  AFV, guns and airplanes, and Ukraine was “totally screwed”.  But nowhere did I see (and nor was I clever enough myself) a diagram of each sides effective information mass.  How much bandwidth could either side employ?  How many bytes could they collect and effectively process?  How connected and resilient were their networks?  For me, I knew something was very wrong for Russia when we could see UAS feeds all over social media a week into this war.  It basically meant that Russia was unable to establish information superiority, which is just as critical as air or sea domains in modern warfare.

If one adds information to mass equations then the RA did not have a 12:1 advantage at Kyiv. They did not have a 1:1 at Kherson.  And they do not have a 3:1 at Bakhmut.  Information kills, a lesson the Russians keeps learning in hard ways.  In fact Precision and the massing of precise effects is entirely reliant on information advantage - at least for now.  The word itself comes from “to cut” (https://www.etymonline.com/word/precision) which we all know needs measurement before the action to be effective.

I guess my point is that one would likely do better to count IT servers, networks and AI support in the future as opposed to tanks and guns.

 

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47 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Information as the New Mass.  This was in context of how Ukraine appears to be violating the rules when it comes to conventional military mass.  They are consistently a much smaller force (mass wise) on both offence and defence, yet they are succeeding.  How?

Isnt this already sufficiently explained by troop quality?

47 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

 

I dont think youre wrong in looking at a militaries ability to generate, interprete and act upon information. Fully linked battle management systems are probably the cleareat case showing it matter.

But if your 10 guys can simply outshoot their 20 you just have more raw combat power.

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3 minutes ago, holoween said:

Isnt this already sufficiently explained by troop quality?

From a simulation standpoint, I'd say no.  Informational Mass is its own thing just like logistics capabilities, will to fight (different than morale), international political support, homefront strength, etc.  All of these things matter and yet the bean counter military experts seemed to have neglected them because they aren't as easy to evaluate as tanks and ships.

A term I don't hear too much lately is the concept of "force multiplier".  This is military speak for something that enhances the ability to kill something, but in and of itself doesn't.  ISR, night vision, body armor, radios, that sort of stuff has been referred to like that in the past.  The_Capt is arguing that ISR has advanced to the point where it is on par or superior to traditional aspects of warfare.  I agree.

A quick test... when playing CM would you rather know where everything of the enemy's is and be able to use that information to selectively and accurately target whatever you want *OR* would you rather have more or better tanks *OR* more or better artillery *OR* more or better infantry?  I know what my answer is ;)

3 minutes ago, holoween said:

I dont think youre wrong in looking at a militaries ability to generate, interprete and act upon information. Fully linked battle management systems are probably the cleareat case showing it matter.

But if your 10 guys can simply outshoot their 20 you just have more raw combat power.

Not exactly.  Raw combat power should still be thought of as a basic component such as how many shooters you have.  The reason is enhancements, such as ISR, are inherently fragile and can be removed or reduced without affecting the fundamental "raw" power of a unit. 

At least this is the way I look at things from a simulation standpoint.  ISR is its own thing in my view.

Steve

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Just now, holoween said:

Isnt this already sufficiently explained by troop quality?

I dont think youre wrong in looking at a militaries ability to generate, interprete and act upon information. Fully linked battle management systems are probably the cleareat case showing it matter.

But if your 10 guys can simply outshoot their 20 you just have more raw combat power.

Not at all.  We are talking information architecture to support all that mass, not simply the quality of troops involved.

At Severodonetsk, we saw the RA far "outshoot" the UA but it still took more loses. 

image.png.84ba82f65c12ea41fe9580a229d1852d.png

This famous graphic - not sure as to accuracy but it matches the moon scaping the RA did last summer.  Some took this as bad news and that the UA was being far overgunned, but if you look at the effects that much lower UA tonnage was able to deliver we begin to see the realities of information and precision.

Raw combat power matters much less than refined combat power.  A large part of refined combat power is information and in many ways it has a mass of its own as both a resource and effect.  The UA has never "shot more" is has "shot better" and to do that you need to be able to collect, process and employ information at much higher rates - compare a modern MBT information infrastructure to a WW2 tank and you can see what mean.  In fact one could argue that with enough information advantage one could defeat a modern MBT with a WW2 tank - knowing exactly what the MBT could see, where its weak points are, ability to hit it exactly on that spot etc.

Edited by The_Capt
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On 3/18/2023 at 12:31 AM, Markus86 said:

Or if you focus too much in one direction. Apparantly a russian is sneaking into the trench, while ukrainian soldiers focus on what is in front of them. 

 

Some details and the end of story.

This happened on 10th March. As claimed Russian TG, 48 y.o. private Aleksandr Maltsev, 488th motor-rifle regiment of 144th motor-rifle division, bursted into the trench, eliminated five UKR soldiers and captured two other (it's claimed the video is cutted and two other kills not shown). 

On 13th of March Maltsev was killed himself in the similar trench engagement - in this time UKR soldier was more lucky. 

 

Edited by Haiduk
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