How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Vanir Ausf B]

32 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

The US and the West is at war with Russia. Would a blockade instigate a WMD attack? If not, there really is no downside. Those accepting Russian energy or other favors are becoming more and more complicit with Ukraine's hardships. Enough is enough already. 

Again, the no-fly zone argument. If the premise is that there is no downside to direct conflict all sorts of possibilities open up. Indeed one would then have to ask why not begin airstrikes on Russian forces immediately. That's where you'll end up eventually. Might as well cut to the chase.

But we had this discussion six months ago. No matter what you or I think of it's merits there is a zero point zero percent chance of it happening.

[akd]

Something else to look for at the front soon:

 

Edited January 3, 2023 by akd

[Beleg85]

Interesting thoughts a la these several twits, that I think did not appear here before- since Russians have problems fighting in concentration as a solid mass, Belarus direction can be a safe haven for them to conduct any kind of offensive operation in this war according to their existing doctrine, at least initially. That could partially explain why they amass so much forces there and make visible preparations for renewed offensive, despite very low probablility of success.

Since UA till now was rather cautious not to hit Belarussian civilians, operating within 20-30 kms of border zone would probably give Muscovites relative free hands in concentrating their columns. It is curious if such tactical consideration could translate into strategic one in the minds of Russian High Command.

 

[kevinkin]

The largest country on the world has little access to warm water. The Russian navy would provide nothing more than a fleet exercise for the US navy. My goodness, Russian can't supply troops just across the border in Ukraine let alone across hemispheres at sea. Defeating Russia for a long term peace is not going to be comfortable. Ask an Ukrainian. Go ask the family of a kid at the receiving end of a HIMARS if we are not at war with the Russian regime. The west has not declared war, but you have to agree we have conducted hostile acts outside the normal bounds of geopolitical struggle. "Sanctions already blockade by proxy" - so we are in a proxy war, I agree. "The US and West are not at war." I don't get it. War is war when your actions take lives during hostilities. Proxy or declared, who cares who pulls the trigger. In 2023 that's semantics. Again a blockade, or call it intense surveillance, is just a tool to be considered to enforce a peace and allow Ukraine some breathing room to recover. 

 

[OldSarge]

Canadian LAV ACSV Super Bison seen in Ukraine.

https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/canadian_lav_acsv_armored_personnel_carriers_was_spotted_in_ukraine-5303.html

[FancyCat]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

If I were on the staff I would recommend, isolate, siege and a campaign of precision strike to be honest.  Let the HIMARs do the work, but you are going to need a lot of them.  Bottle up the place and shoot fish in the barrel until they tap out.  If the UA wants to take real estate Donbas is the better option in the shorter term.

I believe you had just stated that Ukraine has the opportunity to once again divide Russian forces via defending Crimea and defending Donbas and doing a Kharkiv and Kherson offensive again (sorta)? If not, the point of whoever made it still stands, any Russian deployment to Crimea or Donbas leaves it unable to be reallocated easily in the event of UKR offensive on either front. That would probably require the same sort of posturing by Ukraine, making it so that whenever the offensive takes place, it must be seen as the secondary threat from a incoming offensive. 

Meaning, Ukraine may well opt (or appear to opt) to invade Crimea, also if Ukraine can manage to end the bridge again, even temporarily for a period of time, I could definitely see a concerted campaign to pile units to defend Crimea, then drop the bridge, and take advantage of Russia being unable to deploy units to launch a offensive in the Donbas, or vice versa, units in the Donbas can rely on a more viable and varied supply routes vs Crimea (with only the bridge), pile units into the Donbas, drop the bridge, invade Crimea. 

Either way, Ukraine will certainly keep Russia guessing. And the worldwide public by extension. 

[FancyCat]

Article from where the tweet refers to: https://nepszava.hu/3180687_oregsegi-nyugdijkorhatar-mszp-tallai

Google translate seemingly backs it up.

 

 

[FancyCat]

The officer who shoved them into that building filled with ammo and a vehicle depot gets off scot free then...

 

 

[NamEndedAllen]

10 hours ago, Holien said:

we have talked about how the war won't end until Ukraine says so but even if Russia is pushed back to their own borders they could continue to launch attacks on Ukraine. 

That is both true and probable. But once all Ukraine’s borders are its own again, without salients let alone Oblasts under the invaders’ control, Ukraine could become NATO membership eligible.

We’ve seen a range of possible outcomes from (improbable) total Ukraine defeat to some sort of fairy tale Russian change of heart, staying intact and playing nice with both Ukraine and the West under a new rational government - no matter how attractive and rational that may be in the abstract. But neither extreme seem anywhere near the real world - too many improbable steps must occur in lock step and with no failures of the necessary steps. In my brilliant, far seeing and worth less than what you are paying for it opinion, the best outcome we can realistically hope for is the means for NATO protection for Ukraine. This requires no magical “better” Russian dictator, no decision by Russia to withdraw and become peaceful, no magical change in Russian control of their internal media and propaganda. It only requires victory on the battlefield by Ukraine. And that requires not only continued military aid, but ramped up aid that permits inexorable step by step battlefield exhaustion, defeat, and retreat by Russia. 

Other realistic but negative outcomes are a debilitating stalemate with continued agony, death and destruction; or a slackening of Western resolve coupled to strengthened ties for Russia and other outlaw nations like Iran and North Korea to deliver more weapons and matériel - leading to renewed gains of Ukrainian territory. Which leads into a spiral of weakening Western political and public resolve. Ominously, in my (literally) priceless opinion, these outcomes increase in probability as time goes on without Ukrainian victory. Thus the importance of hastening Russian defeat on the battlefield.

[Huba]

Layest news regarding Makiivka body count:

 

[The_Capt]

40 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

I believe you had just stated that Ukraine has the opportunity to once again divide Russian forces via defending Crimea and defending Donbas and doing a Kharkiv and Kherson offensive again (sorta)? If not, the point of whoever made it still stands, any Russian deployment to Crimea or Donbas leaves it unable to be reallocated easily in the event of UKR offensive on either front. That would probably require the same sort of posturing by Ukraine, making it so that whenever the offensive takes place, it must be seen as the secondary threat from a incoming offensive. 

Meaning, Ukraine may well opt (or appear to opt) to invade Crimea, also if Ukraine can manage to end the bridge again, even temporarily for a period of time, I could definitely see a concerted campaign to pile units to defend Crimea, then drop the bridge, and take advantage of Russia being unable to deploy units to launch a offensive in the Donbas, or vice versa, units in the Donbas can rely on a more viable and varied supply routes vs Crimea (with only the bridge), pile units into the Donbas, drop the bridge, invade Crimea. 

Either way, Ukraine will certainly keep Russia guessing. And the worldwide public by extension. 

Ya that would work, a Crimean honey pot.  Pull the RA in and then drop the bridge and hammer connectors.  It is pretty much an upscaled strategy they used at Kherson.  The Russians are likely dumb enough to fall for it too.

Right now I would worry about that central corridor between south of Kherson and Donbas.  Set that up and cut it right up to the Sea of Azov.  We might actually see conventional manoeuvre there as it makes sense if the UA can set it up.  Problem would normally be holding it with threats on both sides but the RA is pretty much out of offensive options.  They will likely try some weak tea tactical shoves but a full scale operational offensive by the RA is not likely, or at least a successful one.

I would do this in three operations:

Cut the corridor - use pressure on both ends of the line to pull RA apart and then go up the middle.

Box up Donbas - squeeze them back into a box and keep squeezing

Crimea Last - Once you have done 1 & 2, all the while Crimea is sealed up and hammered.  The go in and try to retake.  

The real unknown is whether the UA has that sort of capacity.  If someone had asked me in Sep I would have said no, but after Kharkiv and Kherson it is clear the UA has a lot of operational game.

[The_Capt]

4 minutes ago, NamEndedAllen said:

That is both true and probable. But once all Ukraine’s borders are its own again, without salients let alone Oblasts under the invaders’ control, Ukraine could become NATO membership eligible.

We’ve seen a range of possible outcomes from (improbable) total Ukraine defeat to some sort of fairy tale Russian change of heart, staying intact and playing nice with both Ukraine and the West under a new rational government - no matter how attractive and rational that may be in the abstract. But neither extreme seem anywhere near the real world - too many improbable steps must occur in lock step and with no failures of the necessary steps. In my brilliant, far seeing and worth less than what you are paying for it opinion, the best outcome we can realistically hope for is the means for NATO protection for Ukraine. This requires no magical “better” Russian dictator, no decision by Russia to withdraw and become peaceful, no magical change in Russian control of their internal media and propaganda. It only requires victory on the battlefield by Ukraine. And that requires not only continued military aid, but ramped up aid that permits inexorable step by step battlefield exhaustion, defeat, and retreat by Russia. 

Other realistic but negative outcomes are a debilitating stalemate with continued agony, death and destruction; or a slackening of Western resolve coupled to strengthened ties for Russia and other outlaw nations like Iran and North Korea to deliver more weapons and matériel - leading to renewed gains of Ukrainian territory. Which leads into a spiral of weakening Western political and public resolve. Ominously, in my (literally) priceless opinion, these outcomes increase in probability as time goes on without Ukrainian victory. Thus the importance of hastening Russian defeat on the battlefield.

Wow, a lot of absolutes there.  I would offer it is nowhere near that cut and dry.  Victory is a pretty squishy concept and hard tying it to lines on a map is a good way to get people killed for nothing.

Pre-2014 borders are not a pre-requisite for NATO membership, it is a political body that makes up the rules as it goes.  We could simply redraw the borders and allow Ukraine to enter.  What we do need is for the shooting to stop because no one wants an article 5 on signing day.

As to Russian withdraw, well a political collapse back home would definitely work, has before.  Or they could get pushed back to Feb 24 lines, when I suspect the pressure to end this thing will increase.  I mean seriously the risks of retaking some of these areas is not small.

In the end “decision of force of arms” sounds good and plays well in movies but the reality is that at some point people are going to get tired of dying and some sort of negotiable end state will be put forward.  In that package the real dealing can start on reparations, warcrimes and possible renormalization with Russia.  Or Russia can choose the way of pain and drive off a cliff, at which point we will feel good for about 12 seconds and then have a whole other set of world ending problems. 

[Beleg85]

13 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Cut the corridor - use pressure on both ends of the line to pull RA apart and then go up the middle.

Box up Donbas - squeeze them back into a box and keep squeezing

Crimea Last - Once you have done 1 & 2, all the while Crimea is sealed up and hammered.  The go in and try to retake.  

The real unknown is whether the UA has that sort of capacity.  If someone had asked me in Sep I would have said no, but after Kharkiv and Kherson it is clear the UA has a lot of operational game.

Hard to believe AFU has anything of this sort of capability. Zaluzhny himself directly stated it is not the case unless magical sack with hundreds of vehicles and artillery would open in the West. For now even capturing Kreminna, theoretically sorrounded from 3-sides, becomes problematic (just today UA could again lost foothold at Chervonopopivka).

[dan/california]

 

 

18 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Hard to believe AFU has anything of this sort of capability. Zaluzhny himself directly stated it is not the case unless magical sack with hundreds of vehicles and artillery would open in the West. For now even capturing Kreminna, theoretically sorrounded from 3-sides, becomes problematic (just today UA could again lost foothold at Chervonopopivka).

I would just reiterate that we don't know anything until the ground freezes and stays frozen. The AFU is not going to commit to a serious offensive in the mud. We are starting to edge into an outside chance that the ground just WON'T freeze this winter. That opens an interesting discussion about which side benefits more from that eventuality. I would simply point out that A, Ukraine gets more people back from NATO training every week. For the Russians, there is zero evidence sitting around Belarus last winter did their effectiveness any good. I don't think semi-regular mass casualty HIMARS attacks will make that any better this time around.

Edited January 4, 2023 by dan/california

[The_Capt]

10 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Hard to believe AFU has anything of this sort of capability. Zaluzhny himself directly stated it is not the case unless magical sack with hundreds of vehicles and artillery would open in the West. For now even capturing Kreminna, theoretically sorrounded from 3-sides, becomes problematic (just today UA could again lost foothold at Chervonopopivka).

Well I was in agreement right up to the point that the UA pulled off two separate operational level offensives over 500 kms apart, while still holding onto ground in the Donbas last Fall.  That demonstrated a level of operational capacity and depth I am not sure anyone was ready to believe.  I am half convinced Zaluzhny was playing things up to convince the Russians of what they already want to hear, while the UA in reality has more than a few rabbits left in the hat.  I am not saying we should pause on support but the UA is coming off two major victories while the RA is in palliative care. This combined with some rewriting the rules of warfare has me pretty much gobsmacked.

We will see.

[NamEndedAllen]

35 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Wow, a lot of absolutes there.  I would offer it is nowhere near that cut and dry.  Victory is a pretty squishy concept and hard tying it to lines on a map is a good way to get people killed for nothing.

Pre-2014 borders are not a pre-requisite for NATO membership, it is a political body that makes up the rules as it goes.  We could simply redraw the borders and allow Ukraine to enter.  What we do need is for the shooting to stop because no one wants an article 5 on signing day.

As to Russian withdraw, well a political collapse back home would definitely work, has before.  Or they could get pushed back to Feb 24 lines, when I suspect the pressure to end this thing will increase.  I mean seriously the risks of retaking some of these areas is not small.

In the end “decision of force of arms” sounds good and plays well in movies but the reality is that at some point people are going to get tired of dying and some sort of negotiable end state will be put forward.  In that package the real dealing can start on reparations, warcrimes and possible renormalization with Russia.  Or Russia can choose the way of pain and drive off a cliff, at which point we will feel good for about 12 seconds and then have a whole other set of world ending problems. 

Yah, I’ve been seeing a lot of absolutes tossed about. So am looking for the more likely in-between states for outcomes. Absolutes about Russia will take Kyiv in three days, then the Russian army will collapse *last* year in May, then in June, then in August. Then the Russian government will collapse. Then either or both will collapse in Autumn. That Russia *must* lose. That Russia *already* has lost. So I remain skeptical of any of our peanut gallery predictions of what *must* happen. Skeptical, not dismissive. Because these are opinions about what we think *should* happen. Often very well argued (as by Steve and the Capt).

Negotiation always seems like a nice way to end a big war. But basically, nobody seriously negotiates until the pain is extraordinary. Or there isn’t any negotiation: WWII Germany. Unconditional surrender. WWII Japan: Unconditional surrender. Russia in Afghanistan. Messier? But eventually run away. Pretty similar to the USA Afghan Adventure except after tossing tremendous mountains of taxpayer dollars into the fire.

I understand your suggestions of what *could* happen, as you just outlined. I just don’t buy that they are most likely. They keep ignoring Ukraine, almost as if it is a puppet on Western strings, as Putin intimates. But it is not. Example: “We could simply redraw the borders and allow Ukraine to enter.” Sure! But NATO has not done this and I suspect Ukraine has had quite enough of other nations wanting to change its borders, thank you very much.  Similarly, sure, NATO *could* change its rules as you’ve said a few months ago iirc. But it has not, and has not hinted at such a thing. In my opinion, the likelihood that NATO as a political body will ever vote to admit Ukraine as a member while the war is raging is akin to me becoming the Philadelphia Eagles next quarterback. 
I feel almost the same about predictions that Russia will collapse. And that it will pay a penny of reparations. Maybe so. But that is far from a strategy, let alone a given.
 

My *opinion*, which is all it is, is that Ukraine will decide whether and when it is tired of its casualties, whether it wishes to give up Crimea or the Donbas. Likewise for Russia. So far, all the progress or lack of it is what has happened on the battlefield. I may well be wrong, but I think for Ukraine’s POV clear, unmistakable battlefield defeat of Russia is what precedes any sort of negotiations to wrap the hostilities up. I suspect Ukrainians sense it is now or *never* to liberate Crimea and the Donbas. 

Edited January 4, 2023 by NamEndedAllen

[Beleg85]

28 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Well I was in agreement right up to the point that the UA pulled off two separate operational level offensives over 500 kms apart, while still holding onto ground in the Donbas last Fall.  That demonstrated a level of operational capacity and depth I am not sure anyone was ready to believe.  I am half convinced Zaluzhny was playing things up to convince the Russians of what they already want to hear, while the UA in reality has more than a few rabbits left in the hat.  I am not saying we should pause on support but the UA is coming off two major victories while the RA is in palliative care. This combined with some rewriting the rules of warfare has me pretty much gobsmacked.

We will see.

Sure, but they made this strategy working because Russian blanket was waaaay too short. In effect at Kharkiv they had 5:1 to maybe even 10:1 initall advantage (I met different sources as to number of troops involved- we will probbaly only know when serious historians will describe this war). So it was brilliant strategic victory without doubt, but not that surprising as won over weaker enemy. With up to 200k Russian mobiks in current training (again- Ukrainian estimates) that some of them already undertake for several months, Russians will probably have enough troops to form more or less coherent front + local reserves. I am sceptical of possibility of another similar blitz even in better weather conditions. Ofc. unless Russian military (and wider state apparatus) would start to rot internally to the extent it would be uncontrollable.

So yes, still too many variables. This damn thing called Russia always ticks to its own strange logic, making it so unpredictable on all levels- political, military and culturally.

PS. As to Zaluzhny interview, criticism of him by other members of UA apparatus/part of public opinion could point to it being actually geuine. Of course it could also be master PsyOps plan-within-a plan as well, but hard to believe knowing how divided is Ukrainian political landscape. Last time I saw quite interesting counting of AFU brigades at Bakhmut, with something like 10+ units identified there. Doesn't seem like boys have much time to R&R and form new strike corps to use somewhere else.

Edited January 4, 2023 by Beleg85

[dan/california]

Allow me to add that it is currently one degree warmer in Luhansk than it is in my suburb of Seattle, and that definitively is not freezing anything...

 

[NamEndedAllen]

To be clear, I am looking for a range of outcomes, not one prediction that must happen. Not absolutes. I assume that the extreme on either end of most or least preferred outcomes tend to be the least likely ( kind of like life!). So I seek examples of outcomes along the spectrum of possibilities, always keeping in mind the difference between what I prefer and the squishy probabilities of what could happen. So I prefer a Ukrainian victory, but recognize that it could take various shapes. Only one is as the Capt prefers, and only another one is as I prefer. There are quite a few. Lengthy stalemate is a possibility, also a grinding back and forth prolonged war. All these are possible, besides total defeat of Ukraine and total collapse of Russia and a new government there that pays reparations and embraces peace with Ukraine. 

Edited January 4, 2023 by NamEndedAllen

[The_Capt]

41 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Sure, but they made this strategy working because Russian blanket was waaaay too short. In effect at Kharkiv they had 5:1 to maybe even 10:1 initall advantage (I met different sources as to number of troops involved- we will probbaly only know when serious historians will describe this war). So it was brilliant strategic victory without doubt, but not that surprising as won over weaker enemy. With up to 200k Russian mobiks in current training (again- Ukrainian estimates) that some of them already undertake for several months, Russians will probably have enough troops to form more or less coherent front + local reserves. I am sceptical of possibility of another similar blitz even in better weather conditions. Ofc. unless Russian military (and wider state apparatus) would start to rot internally to the extent it would be uncontrollable.

So yes, still too many variables. This damn thing called Russia always ticks to its own strange logic, making it so unpredictable on all levels- political, military and culturally.

PS. As to Zaluzhny interview, criticism of him by other members of UA apparatus/part of public opinion could point to it being actually geuine. Of course it could also be master PsyOps plan-within-a plan as well, but hard to believe knowing how divided is Ukrainian political landscape. Last time I saw quite interesting counting of AFU brigades at Bakhmut, with something like 10+ units identified there. Doesn't seem like boys have much time to R&R and form new strike corps to use somewhere else.

200k sounds like a big number but we are still talking over 700kms of front.  That comes to about 258 men per km, which factoring for rotations and combat support is likely about a company per km.  This will shore up the line but it is not going to make it airtight.  Russian ISR is nowhere near the UAs so they have to spread out to cover more ground while the UA stay back in some sectors while seeing Russian moves before they even start.

My honest bet is that the RA folds in 2023 - is has done this three times now and the big one is a’comin.  Adding more troops is actually making things worse by stressing an already pretty beaten up logistics and C2 system.  Now how hard and fast that fold happens is really unknown but if we see continued levels of support to the UA, or better yet increases, and the continuing trend of corrosion on the RA - and let’s all say it together - all along the entire length of its operational system, the RA is doomed to failure. I suspect the milbloggers in the Russian sphere already know this.  

The real question is “what happens when the RA faces operational collapse?”  Does it cascade into a full strategic collapse?  Does it trigger a political collapse?  Or worse a complete social implosion?  The Russians had chances to get off this train from the start but stubbornly refused them.  There were off-ramps, Ukraine was even suing for peace back in March, remember “neutral nation”?  But the Russians just kept digging that hole.  Life is hard, it is harder when one is dumb.  What the west needs to remember, and take very personally, is that Russia took us all on this ride, not just Ukraine.

[billbindc]

3 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

200k sounds like a big number but we are still talking over 700kms of front.  That comes to about 258 men per km, which factoring for rotations and combat support is likely about a company per km.  This will shore up the line but it is not going to make it airtight.  Russian ISR is nowhere near the UAs so they have to spread out to cover more ground while the UA stay back in some sectors while seeing Russian moves before they even start.

My honest bet is that the RA folds in 2023 - is has done this three times now and the big one is a’comin.  Adding more troops is actually making things worse by stressing an already pretty beaten up logistics and C2 system.  Now how hard and fast that fold happens is really unknown but if we see continued levels of support to the UA, or better yet increases, and the continuing trend of corrosion on the RA - and let’s all say it together - all along the entire length of its operational system, the RA is doomed to failure. I suspect the milbloggers in the Russian sphere already know this.  

The real question is “what happens when the RA faces operational collapse?”  Does it cascade into a full strategic collapse?  Does it trigger a political collapse?  Or worse a complete social implosion?  The Russians had chances to get off this train from the start but stubbornly refused them.  There were off-ramps, Ukraine was even suing for peace back in March, remember “neutral nation”?  But the Russians just kept digging that hole.  Life is hard, it is harder when one is dumb.  What the west needs to remember, and take very personally, is that Russia took us all on this ride, not just Ukraine.

 

It's clear that the Russian system already lacks the resilience and the depth to do the most basic things such that it is almost working against itself at this point. Too few few officers and NCOs? Well, then you cannot properly disperse your troops if you don't want them wandering off and they are susceptible to catastrophic HIMARS strikes. A completely fubared replacement system? Well, then you are stuck throwing untrained or incorrectly matched troops towards whatever crisis is currently most dire. Etc, rinse and repeat.

I wouldn't dare say when this war will end but it's quite clear that some form of collapse has been happening for 6 months already. 

Also, it's quite notable that Xi chose Qin Gang as his foreign minister. China's not coming to save Putin and that will add to the political stresses bubbling below the surface.

 

 

[NamEndedAllen]

It will be interesting to watch how much Russian military has learned, and to what effect this year: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/03/world/europe/putin-russia-ukraine-war.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare
With Heightened Anxiety, Putin Prepares Russians for Long Fight Ahead“American officials have said they see the Kremlin finally beginning to learn from its mistakes on the battlefield. Russia is improving its defenses and pushing more soldiers to the front lines, and has put a single general in charge of the war who was able to organize a retreat from the Ukrainian city of Kherson with minimal casualties in November.

Russian commanders are also publicly reining in their ambitions. Gen. Valery V. Gerasimov, the head of the Russian general staff, said on Dec. 22 that Russia’s current focus was limited to trying to capture the rest of the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine”

Edited January 4, 2023 by NamEndedAllen

[Beleg85]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

The real question is “what happens when the RA faces operational collapse?”  Does it cascade into a full strategic collapse?  Does it trigger a political collapse?  Or worse a complete social implosion?  The Russians had chances to get off this train from the start but stubbornly refused them.  There were off-ramps, Ukraine was even suing for peace back in March, remember “neutral nation”?  But the Russians just kept digging that hole.  Life is hard, it is harder when one is dumb.  What the west needs to remember, and take very personally, is that Russia took us all on this ride, not just Ukraine.

Good questions. My take is that Russian state (and broadly- political psyche) and its military is like a golem without normal neurological cords- you can punch it again and again, crash singluar parts  until you completelly tatter your fists to the blood- and it will still stay largely motionless where it was, not resembling any human figure anymore but still a block of something. Crushed, but also not entirely defeated. Problematic for anyone, because it is directed by strange internal logic. So what is pessimistic scenario?

It is obvious for anyone that Russians can now only count for a draw or at the most preservation of their conquest. Very likely they will loose it too. But question is- at what price? And what effects will it have on larger Ukrainian future? If Russians will resist enough (undoubtedly- at the price of thousands of their cannon fodder; but they ofc. don't care) and be able to endure let's say 2-3 failed UA offensives without collapse- will Ukrainian leaders  know when to throw the gauntlet?

UA already have entire generation devastated by war. There are several predictions of generally well regarded experts here describing Russian mobilization efforts that 2023 may be even bloodier than 2022- Russians are undoubtedly gearing their industry, political program and entire state toward real, long conflict. One particulary interesting voice (demograph by trade) predicted that if number of citizens of productive age crossess ca. 200k killed/crippled, Ukrainian demographic may spin into irreversible trend for several generations, unless those who survive the war would start to make children like rabbits afterwards (which generally does not happen in XXI cent. European societies). Note that UA already before 2022 had very dire situation in this respect.

Add massive devastation, unknown number of refugees, post-war economy, rising ethnonationalism (which some of even top leaders  apparently stopped to be shy of now) and looming political instability- and we have less than heartwarming scenario before us.

I don't say it will happen ofc, or even that this is most plausible version of the future, but I think we should remember it is still a possibility. Just, you know, not to gaze too much into our own overoptimistic echo-chamber, like was partly the case with Kherson's fall predictions. Certainly in Washington they intensively try to figure out how plasuible it may be.

Edited January 4, 2023 by Beleg85

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, NamEndedAllen said:

Yah, I’ve been seeing a lot of absolutes tossed about. So am looking for the more likely in-between states for outcomes. Absolutes about Russia will take Kyiv in three days, then the Russian army will collapse *last* year in May, then in June, then in August. Then the Russian government will collapse. Then either or both will collapse in Autumn. That Russia *must* lose. That Russia *already* has lost. So I remain skeptical of any of our peanut gallery predictions of what *must* happen. Skeptical, not dismissive. Because these are opinions about what we think *should* happen. Often very well argued (as by Steve and the Capt).

Negotiation always seems like a nice way to end a big war. But basically, nobody seriously negotiates until the pain is extraordinary. Or there isn’t any negotiation: WWII Germany. Unconditional surrender. WWII Japan: Unconditional surrender. Russia in Afghanistan. Messier? But eventually run away. Pretty similar to the USA Afghan Adventure except after tossing tremendous mountains of taxpayer dollars into the fire.

I understand your suggestions of what *could* happen, as you just outlined. I just don’t buy that they are most likely. They keep ignoring Ukraine, almost as if it is a puppet on Western strings, as Putin intimates. But it is not. Example: “We could simply redraw the borders and allow Ukraine to enter.” Sure! But NATO has not done this and I suspect Ukraine has had quite enough of other nations wanting to change its borders, thank you very much.  Similarly, sure, NATO *could* change its rules as you’ve said a few months ago iirc. But it has not, and has not hinted at such a thing. In my opinion, the likelihood that NATO as a political body will ever vote to admit Ukraine as a member while the war is raging is akin to me becoming the Philadelphia Eagles next quarterback. 
I feel almost the same about predictions that Russia will collapse. And that it will pay a penny of reparations. Maybe so. But that is far from a strategy, let alone a given.
 

My *opinion*, which is all it is, is that Ukraine will decide whether and when it is tired of its casualties, whether it wishes to give up Crimea or the Donbas. Likewise for Russia. So far, all the progress or lack of it is what has happened on the battlefield. I may well be wrong, but I think for Ukraine’s POV clear, unmistakable battlefield defeat of Russia is what precedes any sort of negotiations to wrap the hostilities up. I suspect Ukrainians sense it is now or *never* to liberate Crimea and the Donbas. 

So I read through this a few times now and for the life of of cannot get the point you are driving at here.  So this war is solely between Ukraine and Russia?  The West gets no voice in it at all?  How about the people that actually live in Donbas and Crimea?  Negotiation is a “nice to have”? - the vast majority of war end without unconditional surrender.  It hasn’t happened yet so we should ignore all that and go with what exactly?

There are many roads to victory or defeat in this war, as well as negotiating an end-state, just because you cannot see them or “believe” does not mean they do not exist.  I mean, ok we have your opinion and I have pointed out some potential weaknesses in your position that you may want to widen your analytical framework somewhat.  You can do with that what you will.

This thread is not a betting pool or some sort of platform selling something.  It was, and is an attempt to understand this war better, as it happens, and cut through a lot of misinformation out there.  You have people on this thread who do this sort of work for a living with decades of experience in this area - from professional military, to historians to gamers.  We are trying to figure it out.  We have avoided detailed predictions, and frankly when we have made them we have been a lot more accurate than the mainstream - Fall offensive anyone?  

Your position appears to be “ya, ya with all that but here is what I think!”  Ok, well now we know what you think.  Let’s keep working on it. 

[The_Capt]

26 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

I don't say it will happen ofc, or even that this is most plausible version of the future, but I think we should remember it is still a possibility. Just, you know, not to gaze too much into our own overoptimistic echo-chamber, like was partly the case with Kherson's fall predictions. Certainly in Washington they intensively try to figure out how plasuible it may be.

Fair points and I would not say totally out of the realm of possibility.  I am not so sure Russia is as much a monolithic nation of stone as you describe - human societies do not work that way, even 1940s Japan had a breaking point.  I am not sure what Kherson predictions you are talking about to be honest.  We saw the fall coming and it came.  It was more orderly than I think many hoped for but Russia withdrew after taking a pounding. 

It is another fair point on being overly optimistic.  That said the RA has the hallmarks of a failing system across the board.  It has lost strategic and operational initiative and continues to demonstrate it is well behind the learning curve in this war.  No military organization can keep this up indefinitely and pouring more poorly trained troops into it is not a solution.  

The RA is broken in ways it cannot fix in this war, maybe the next one.  All that is adding up to a situation where it does not look good for the Russian military at all.  The only way this war fundamentally changes at this point is if the West pulls it support.  At that point the UA will lose ISR advantage and quickly run out of western supplied capabilities.  The the RA could freeze this thing as the playing field becomes more level.

Now as to the West losing the peace after this war, that is a whole other discussion and one that does concern me greatly.